


ЕКОНОМСКИ, СВОЈИНСКОПРАВНИ И ДЕМОГРАФСКИ АСПЕКТИ
КОСОВСКОМЕТОХИЈСКОГ ПИТАЊА





SERBIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS
SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCES

Book?
Presidency
Book ??

SASA Committee for Serbian Question



СРПСКА АКАДЕМИЈА НАУКА И УМЕТНОСТИ
НАУЧНИ СКУПОВИ

Књига СХСIV
ПРЕДСЕДНИШТВО
Књига 15

АКАДЕМИЈСКИ ОДБОР ЗА СРПСКО ПИТАЊЕ

ECONOMIC, OWNERSHIP AND DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF THE KOSOVO-METONIA ISSUE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE
HELD ON FEBRUARY 25, 2022

Editor
Academician
ČASLAV OČIĆ

BELGRADE
2022

ЕКОНОМСКИ, СВОЈИНСКОПРАВНИ И ДЕМОГРАФСКИ АСПЕКТИ КОСОВСКОМЕТОХИЈСКОГ ПИТАЊА

ЗБОРНИК РАДОВА С НАУЧНОГ СКУПА
ОДРЖАНОГ 25. ФЕБРУАРА 2022. ГОДИНЕ

Уредник
академик
ЧАСЛАВ ОЦИЋ

БЕОГРАД
2022

ЕКОНОМСКИ, СВОЈИНСКОПРАВНИ И ДЕМОГРАФСКИ АСПЕКТИ
КОСОВСКОМЕТОХИЈСКОГ ПИТАЊА

С в е с к а п р в а

Зборник радова с научног скупа

ЕКОНОМСКИ, СВОЈИНСКОПРАВНИ И ДЕМОГРАФСКИ АСПЕКТИ
КОСОВСКОМЕТОХИЈСКОГ ПИТАЊА

одржаног 25. фебруара 2025. године у свечаној сали Српске академије
наука и уметности

С в е с к а д р у г а

РАЗВОЈ КОСОВА И МЕТОХИЈЕ 1952–1990.

Статистика и документација

Програмски одбор научној скупи

Академик Часлав Оцић, председник
Проф. др Гојко Рикаловић
Проф. др Миленко Целетовић
Проф. др Бојан Димитријевић

Организациони одбор научној скупи

Академик Часлав Оцић
Академик Зоран Кнежевић
Проф. др Дејан Молнар
Бранка Поповић

Издавач

Српска академија наука и уметности
Кнеза Михаила 35, Београд

За издавача

Академик Владимир С. Костић, председник

Лектура и коректура

Технички уредник

Припрема и њрелом

Љубица Танасковић и Градимир Кнежевић

Штампа

Тираж

©

СРПСКА АКАДЕМИЈА НАУКА И УМЕТНОСТИ ♦ SERBIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS
АКАДЕМИЈСКИ ОДБОР ЗА СРПСКО ПИТАЊЕ ♦ SASA COMMITTEE FOR SERBIAN QUESTION

Чланови ♦ Members

Владимир С. Костић, председник Одбора ♦ Vladimir S. Kostić, Committee President

† Нинослав Стојадиновић ♦ † Ninoslav Stojadinović

Светислав Божић ♦ Svetislav Božić

Злата Бојовић ♦ Zlata Bojović

Владимир Бумбаширевић ♦ Vladimir Bumbaširević

Драган Војводић ♦ Dragan Vojvodić

Михаило Војводић ♦ Mihailo Vojvodić

Слободан Вукосавић ♦ Slobodan Vukosavić

Миро Вуксановић ♦ Miro Vuksanović

Љубодраг Димић ♦ Ljubodrag Dimić

Милош Ђуран ♦ Miloš Đuran

Зоран Кнежевић ♦ Zoran Knežević

Александар Костић ♦ Aleksandar Kostić

Зоран Кривокапић ♦ Zoran Krivokapić

Милан Лојаница ♦ Milan Lojanica

Љубомир Максимовић ♦ Ljubomir Maksimović

Драган Мицић ♦ Dragan Micić

Градмир Миловановић ♦ Gradimir Milovanović

Часлав Оцић ♦ Časlav Očić

Зоран Љ. Петровић ♦ Zoran Lj. Petrović

Стеван Пилиповић ♦ Stevan Pilipović

Зоран В. Поповић ♦ Zoran V. Popović

Владимир Стевановић ♦ Vladimir Stevanović

Љубинко Раденковић ♦ Ljubinko Radenković

Зоран Радовић ♦ Zoran Radović

Мира Радојевић ♦ Mira Radojević

Небојша Радуновић ♦ Nebojša Radunović

Љубиша Ракић ♦ Ljubiša Rakić

Гојко Суботић ♦ Gojko Subotić

Славенко Терзић ♦ Slavenko Terzić

Владица Цветковић ♦ Vladica Cvetković

Коста Чавошки ♦ Kosta Čavoški

Косово ће у 21. веку бити мера и провера свих нас – од скромних трудбеника свакодневице до патријарха и вођа српског племена. Не будемо ли достојни Косова, нећемо бити ни свог земаљског постојања. Нестаћемо као да нас није било, а на нашем месту живеће неко други.

Патријарх Павле

CONTENTS САДРЖАЈ

Book One
Proceedings of the scientific conference
ECONOMIC, OWNERSHIP AND DEMOGRAPHIC
ASPECTS OF THE KOSOVO-METONIA ISSUE
(SASA, February 25, 2022)

Свеска прва
Зборник радова с научног скупа
ЕКОНОМСКИ, СВОЈИНСКОПРАВНИ И ДЕМОГРАФСКИ АСПЕКТИ
КОСОВСКОМЕТОХИЈСКОГ ПИТАЊА
(САНУ, 25. фебруара 2022)

Časlav Očić
THE KOSOVO AND METONIA ISSUE AS A *PAR EXCELLENCE* PARADOXICAL
STRATEGIC QUESTION
КОСОВСКОМЕТОХИЈСКА НАПЕТОСТ – *PAR EXCELLENCE* СТРАТЕШКО ПИТАЊЕ
ТИПА ПАРАДОКС
Часлав Оцић
1–36

Gojko M. Rikalović and Dejan S. Molnar
MAIN DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN KOSOVO AND METONIA
IN THE FIRST TWO DECADES OF THE 21ST CENTURY
ГЛАВНЕ ДЕМОГРАФСКЕ И ЕКОНОМСКЕ ПРОМЕНЕ НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ
У ПРВЕ ДВЕ ДЕЦЕНИЈЕ 21. ВЕКА
Гојко Рикаловић и Дејан Молнар
37–91

Milenko Dželetović and Bojan Dimitrijević
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF THE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
OF THE FUTURE OF KOSOVO AND METONIA
ЕКОНОМСКА И ДРУШТВЕНА ОДРЖИВОСТИ МОГУЋИХ СЦЕНАРИЈА
БУДУЋНОСТИ КОСОВА И МЕТОХИЈЕ
Миленко Џелетовић и Бојан Димитријевић
93–113

- Dragoslav Slović
 „KOSOVO”S DEBTS AND THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF SERBIAN INVESTORS
 „КОСОВСКИ“ ДУГОВИ И ВЛАСНИЧКА ПРАВА СРПСКИХ ИНВЕСТИТОРА
 Драгослав Словић
 115–125
- Sandra Davidović
 HOW SERBIAN PROPERTY IN KOSOVO AND METONIA WAS USURPED
 КАКО ЈЕ НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ УЗУРПИРАНА СРПСКА ИМОВИНА
 Сандра Давидовић
 251–257
- Slobodan Vujić and Milinko Radosavljević
 MINING RESOURCES OF KOSOVO AND METONIA
 РУДНИЧКИ РЕСУРСИ КОСОВА И МЕТОХИЈЕ
 Слободан Вујић и Милинко Радосављевић
 127–139
- Dušan Mrkobrad
 SERBIAN MINING IN KOSOVO AND METONIA DURING THE MIDDLE AGES
 РУДАРСТВО КОСОВА И МЕТОХИЈЕ У СРЕДЊЕМ ВЕКУ
 Душан Вукобрад
 141–158
- Jovan Kršić
 ETHNIC ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO AND METONIA: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES,
 1948–2021
 ЕТНИЧКИ АЛБАНЦИ НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ, 1948–2021.
 Јован Кршић
 159–191
- Siniša Ljepejević
 KOSOVO AND METONIA: AMBIENCE OF THE CRISIS
 КОСОВО И МЕТОХИЈА: АМБИЈЕНТ КРИЗЕ
 Сениша Љепојевић
 193–223
- Časlav Očić
 KOSOVO AND METONIA ISSUE
 Draft Proposal for the International Multidisciplinary Research Project
 КОСОВСКОМЕТОХИЈСКО ПИТАЊЕ
 Нацрт предлога међународног мултидисциплинарног пројекта
 Часлав Оцић
 225–229

ПРИЛОГ ♦ ANNEX

Скулић, Давидовић?, Вемић, Ловић, Челић, Џомић...)
 (Дискусије: ху, ху, ху, ху, ху,)

ABBREVIATIONS ♦ СКРАЋЕНИЦЕ
 BIBLIOGRAPHY ♦ БИБЛИОГРАФИЈА
 NAME INDEX ♦ ИНДЕКС ИМЕНА
 SUBJECT INDEX ♦ ПРЕДМЕТНИ ИНДЕКС

Свеска друга
 РАЗВОЈ КОСОВА И МЕТОХИЈЕ 1952–1990.
 Статистика и документација

Book Two
 DEVELOPMENT OF KOSOVO AND METONIA, 1952–1990
 Statistics and Documentation

СКРАЋЕНИЦЕ ♦ ABBREVIATIONS
 ИНДЕКС ИМЕНА ♦ NAME INDEX
 ПРЕДМЕТНИ ИНДЕКС ♦ SUBJECT INDEX

THE KOSOVO AND METOHIA ISSUE
AS A *PAR EXCELLENCE*
PARADOXICAL STRATEGIC QUESTION

ČASLAV OCIC

Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, Serbia
caslav.ocic@gmail.com ♦ caslav.ocic@sanu.ac.rs

SUMMARY: How much pluralism can democracy withstand? ♦ Global context 1: Quantity vs. quality ♦ Global context 2: Militarization (might vs. right) ♦ Global context 3: Commercialization and corporatization (skill vs. virtue) ♦ Stabilocracy and the new imperialism: Crisis as a permanent situation ♦ Varoufakis: Kosovization of Europe ♦ Hofbauer: Experiment Kosovo ♦ The Return of Colonialism ♦ Is there hope? ♦ Can smaller countries determine their (economic) fate at all? ♦ Strategology: Origins and purpose ♦ The nature of strategy ♦ Three dimensions of strategy ♦ The Kosovo and Metohia issue as a par excellence paradoxical strategic question ♦ From anti-strategy to optimal strategy ♦ Kosovo and Metohia 20 years after the NATO aggression: The situation and recommendations.

KEY WORDS: Kosovo and Metohia, Serbia, the Balkans, Kosovization of Europe, new imperialism, strategology, paradox

HOW MUCH PLURALISM CAN DEMOCRACY WITHSTAND?

One of the most important (existential) questions in contemporary pluralist democracies, most pregnantly asked by the prominent Austrian political philosopher Peter Graf Kielmansegg, is: “How much pluralism can democracy withstand?” According to him, it is “necessary... to differentiate between at least three types of pluralism: pluralism of interests, pluralism of values, and pluralism of identities.

♦ Pluralism of *interests* deals with the issue of how to (re)distribute divisible assets;

♦ Pluralism of *values* deals with the question of which values to accept as valid;

♦ Pluralism of *identities* deals with a question whom the word “we” includes; “Whom do I constitute a community with?” [Kielmansegg 1991: 30–40].

Kielmansegg is of the opinion that “democracy can withstand a substantial amount of pluralism of interests; that it has difficulties with pluralism of values, while it has the greatest problem with pluralism of identities.”¹

For the Serbs, the Kosovo Issue has for centuries stood “at the very foundations of [their] identity” [Пипер 2017: 281–283]. One’s answer to that prerequisite either lifts him up or brings him down². These who try to make deals concerning it, or do actually make them, will not fare well³.

GLOBAL CONTEX 1: QUANTITY VS. QUALITY

At the end of the past century most western and east European (*perestroyka*, transition-era) intellectuals believed that instead of a *Hungtintonian clash of civilizations*, the time of universalization, the *era of global civilization*, was coming. This is the period when global power-mongers also intensified their work on a specific kind of historical engineering meant to create an uncontested world order with “new rules of the ‘game’” which would guarantee the survival and expansion of the global civilization under the sign of Capital⁴. According to them, no authentic policy and culture should stand in the way of transnational capital’s economic expansion. Not even at the cost of this civilization’s self-destruction, as the global,

1 “Why is that so? Where divisible assets and goods are concerned, there is a possibility for agreement and compromise. The rules of the democratic political process are relatively suitable for reaching such agreements. Where values are concerned, however, there are no like prospects. Where values clash, decisions must follow the ‘either...or’ imperative, they cannot travel the comfortable road of the ‘like this... like that’ solution. Values, on the other hand, have a different, more existential meaning for people than interests do; because of that, the forming of their space of tolerance in this area is much more difficult. Finally, the pluralism of identities means that the consciousness of the ‘we’ is missing. This questions the readiness of all to accept the common rules of the game as an obligation both for us and the others in the case of defeat. Thus, democratic consensus is threatened at its very core from the outset.” [Kielmansegg 1991: 39].

2 As the Bishop of Ras-Prizren and Kosovo-Metohia Diocese, Teodosije, put it: “For some, Kosovo and Metohia can at the same time be a blessing as well as damnation. Those who live aware of that blessing, who cherish and uphold it, will be happy to have safeguarded what our ancestors have bequeathed us as a token of our choice of the Heavenly Kingdom over the kingdom of this world, which is transient.” [https://kossev.info/vladika-teodosije-kosovo-i-Metohia-moze-nekom-biti-blagoslov-ili-prokletstvo/]

3 “For those, though, who will make bargains with their inheritance even at the cost of the people’s ruin this blessing will become their damnation, staying with them during their lifetime in this world, as it will for all eternity. Their name will be written down among the names of those who were destroyers of the Living Church, perjurers and deceivers, whose hypocritical words say one thing but mean something else, who work clandestinely, so as to hide their shame. But may the Lord grant them reason and repentance so that they might turn to Him and understand that their inheritance is not just land, but this part of the heaven on earth, our sacred Kosovo and Metohia, which had for centuries unified our devout people wherever they lived.” [http://www.eparhija-prizren.com/sr/episkop-rasko-prizrenski-i-kosovo-metohijski-g-teodosije]

4 “We rush head on into destruction created by the market system which *transferred the problems from society into the sphere of the market*. For this reason the interests of the capital, transnational corporations and financial institutions in the U.S. are placed above the interests of the people.” With these words Noam Chomsky recently warned his fellow countrymen that the U.S. is facing a collapse “because of neoliberalism and the market economy”. [Chomsky 2018].

turbo-capitalist civilization battles against everything that is, in its essence *singular*, authentic – against nation and national states, against law, science, upbringing and education, against family, religion, tradition in general, and even against work itself. Or, to put it simply, it seems to be innately against quality and in favor of quantity! It disdains value and upholds usefulness, it stands against creativity and favors imitation and simulation, it strives for uniformity and has little use for diversity, the bleakness and dullness of mediocrity disturb it none, as it reaches for maximization of quantity and speed...⁵

GLOBAL CONTEXT 2: MILITARIZATON (MIGHT VS. RIGHT)

Carl Schmitt used to claim that *war is a way out of the crisis*: the way out of a small crisis being a small war, and a big war out of a big one! Creating crisis hotspots and launching *no-win wars* and *wars by proxy* became, after the Korean War of the mid-20th century (the first such war), a routine approach by the global potentates. Apparently, it was also a necessity, because the structure of production and consumption, in the U.S. for example, changed drastically in favor of the military-industrial complex, so that intensifying economic activity to overcome a crisis implies an increase in the production of tools, weapons and ammunition. Moreover, demand too can go up only if a new war is launched. This is where the profits are biggest, and the returns quickest. In other words, in the economies structured in such a way, *investments in wars* are *the most profitable ones*⁶.

Terms used in the contemporary economic debates are to a great extent defined by the semantic legacy of previous debates. In addition, economic terminology shows a noticeable influence of other, so-called exact sciences: above all physics (“equilibrium”, “oscillatory trends...”), then biology (“circular flow” or “circulation”, “growth”, “development”, “seed capital”), medicine (“shock therapy”) and, increasingly, military science (“economic sanctions”, “economic security”, “economic war”, “hybrid war”, “cost-benefit” analysis of strategic migrations as a weapon of

5 In fact: “Victory and doing business are its sole imperatives. The tiniest devotion, feeling, law, love, emotion, religion – everything that can endanger the total freedom [of choice, added by Č.O.] is a concession to competition, the stumbling stone, and a sign of defeat. Anything goes, but only once the economic victory is ensured, only once the prevailing [of the capital, added by Č.O.] becomes certain,” writes Roberto Saviano in his novel *Gomorra* [Saviano 2010].

6 How this impacts the job market? In addition to increased demand for tools, weapons and ammunition, the demand for mercenaries (“Janissaries”), prostitutes and both willing and unwilling organ donors is also on the rise. But, given that for a long time now we have been living in a post-heroic world, all this is considered “normal,” and those who become successful in the field of such “new” services, become the heroes of the “New Reality” (such for example being dr Bernard Kouchner, the head of one of global organizations trafficking in human organs, who is frequently in conflict of interest with NATO’s organizational units engaged in similar “missions”).

war, “strategic management”... etc.). This semantic militarization of *economics* is undoubtedly a consequence of the *economy’s* militarization. Many criticize the use of military terms in the economic sphere considering such militarization as an expression of neo-mercantilism and economic nationalism; according to them, this unavoidably leads to conflicts. Because the real and “surreal” – speculative, or better still, scheming economies based on military and political power instead on economic efficiency – permanently disturb the balance of capital and production necessary for sustainable economic and overall development.

GLOBAL CONTEXT 3: COMMERCIALIZATION AND CORPORATIZATION (SKILL VS. VIRTUE)

At the same time, the tendencies of commercialization and corporatization are becoming ever stronger. Everything is for sale, including people, their organs, even their souls. Local and regional markets are becoming part of global flea market of lost souls. The mainstream neoliberal doctrine legitimizes this by citing freedom of choice in the only true, worldwide labor market: of people who, without remorse, “honestly” work for those who pay more. Moreover, this market is becoming overcrowded: supply is growing exponentially, that going hand in hand with the general trend of massive impoverishment. That is, most countries of the Second World have descended into the Third World owing to transitional plunder, whereas the gap between the traditionally developed countries and the underdeveloped ones is deepening – with the price of treason, true to theory, plummeting⁷.

In this case as well, maximum quantity and maximum speed are the supreme (and only) values, replacing every skill and virtue. *Die Schnellen fressen die Langsamen* (“The swift gobble up the slow”) wrote Heike Leitschuh-Fechte in a 1997 article entitled “One day we’ll all be The First,” defining the essence of (turbo)capitalist ideology. In other words, *more and ever more, faster and faster!* That is the only criterion of success. And in order to be successful, we have to be *incorporated*.

Governments have become corporations, parties have become corporations,

⁷ What used to be a common opinion on the issue? “A nation can survive its fools, even its overly ambitious men. But it cannot survive treason from within. An enemy at the gates is less formidable, for he is known and carries his banner openly, while a traitor moves inside the city walls freely, his sly whispers rustling through all the alleys, reaching [...] the very halls of the government. For the traitor appears not a traitor; he speaks in accents familiar to his victims; his face and apparel are similar to theirs, he appeals to the baseness that lies deep in the hearts of all men. The traitor rots the soul of the nation, he works secretly and unknown in the night to undermine the pillars of the city, he infects the body politic so that it can no longer resist. A murderer is less to be feared – the traitor is the plague!” wrote Cicero two thousand years ago. What has changed since? But, following the end of the Second World War much has changed, as can be seen from the example of England, as documented in *The Meaning of Treason* by the unsurpassable Rebecca West [West 2013]. See also: [Чворовић 2006].

hospitals are corporations as well; corporations are schools, scientific and research institutes, even the Church; armies have become professional, i.e. paid (consisting of soldiers who kill for *soldi*, as Italians call money)... A corporation’s goal is *maximum profit*. In other words, the school no longer educates and forms, scientists do not search for the truth, soldiers do not defend their country, politicians do not take care of public good (statesmanship being derided as an atavism), priests do not attend to the believers’ souls, the economy has taken the place of religion, in the business sector everyone is rushing to grab as much as possible. The dominant tendencies in the world are replacing culture with entertainment (in Slavic languages, that word is closely related to “oblivion”), training replaces education, *mind changing* persuasion techniques (Mind Genomics) suppress and even abolish science, while the political scene increasingly resembles a circus or a cattle market. By such discrediting, the *autonomy* of certain social spheres (politics, science, health care, education, sports, media...) is being lost, their quality degraded, their authenticity and *raison d’être* on the way to disappear. More and more people are becoming reduced to “individuals”, their human worth limited to being mere taxpayers and consumers – whereas the number of producers available for taxation and able to use their earnings to create demand on the consumer market is dwindling. Budget revenues are dropping, as is the demand – all adding up to the reason why *crises* occur.

STABILOCRAZY AND THE NEW IMPERIALISM: CRISIS AS A PERMANENT SITUATION

What are our chances to see the end of the world economic crisis in our lifetime? Not very great, since it has become a permanent situation that one has to get used to. (For example, this is what TV reality shows are supposed to train us for.) The post-modern ideology relativizes everything, equalizing all values and, by deconstructing the present as well as the past, prepares us all for a post-human – or posthumous – future.

Meanwhile we are being incessantly told that peace and stability should be our ultimate goals. In this context, “stability” – a Newspeak euphemism for “control” (even surveillance⁸) – actually means that “everything is under control”, i.e. under *our*⁹ control, which is *the essence of both old and new imperialism*. Under the old imperialism control was executed directly – through application of firm power such as, for instance, a ground invasion – while in the case of the new, so-called economic imperialism, it assumes a subtler form of “soft” and smart power, as de-

⁸ See [Zuboff 2019].

⁹ Who are *ours*, and who *stabilocrats* – see [Bieber 2018: 176–185].

financed by Joseph Nye. We use the term “economic imperialism” when one country controls another by using its resources for the purpose. The controller ideologically *justifies* that by claiming cost-benefits for the victim-country which, therefore, “accepts” such control. Moreover, according to such argumentation, the victim-country can always say “no”, there being no long-term solution, i.e. no permanent economic imperialism, since the domination can last only as long as the resources needed for it are available. The solution, from the point of view of the imperial power’s interests, is to make the victim-country dependent on the “controller’s” resources by, for example, pushing it into *indebtedness*¹⁰ – a classical occupation being much riskier and costlier.

VAROUFAKIS: THE KOSOVIIZATION OF EUROPE

Before our very eyes the “old order” is crumbling or already lies in ruins under the forces of arrogance which see themselves as “the creators of history” as they cynically engage in the “deconstruction” experiment. With burgeoning loss of sovereignty, that is, with the historical loss of national subjectivity, the less numerous and economically less powerful nations are becoming an object (“guinea pigs”) of the “New Order”¹¹: “The policies of Europe as it now stands lead to fragmentation. The worst-case scenario of the crisis would be the *Kosovization* of Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy, i.e. their turning into protectorates which use the Euro, are ruled by European commissioners and local kleptocrats, and whose youth is their only relevant export asset.”¹²

HOFBAUER: EXPERIMENT KOSOVO – THE RETURN OF COLONIALISM

Hannes Hofbauer’s book *Experiment Kosovo: The Return of Colonialism (Experiment Kosovo: Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus)* [Hofbauer 2008, henceforth referred to as EK] is an intellectually honest attempt to understand the current Kosovo situation within a wider historical and international context. The author is not siding with any party to the conflict, nor is he favoring the current “international”

10 The case of the Greek debt bondage is indicative and paradigmatic. Yanis Varoufakis, a former Greek finance minister, summarized the problem on February 6, 2015 in a single sentence: “The confused and muddled political actors, *negating the systemic nature of the crisis*, follow a policy similar to carpet bombing proud European nations in order to salvage them.”

11 The use value of the term „new world order“ (or „globalization“) seems to be rapidly „evaporating“; therefore Claus Schwab (and other Davos ideologues) are trying to replace it with new one: *Great Reset* [Schwab and Malleret 2020].

12 This is how at the end of 2014 Varoufakis described Europe’s and Greece’s post-crisis development would look like unless a radical way out of the gravest financial and economic crisis after WWII is found.

rule, neither whose *Weltanschauung* does he share. He rightfully perceives it not as a genuine ideological belief, but as a cover for extremely pragmatic and aggressive goals. To understand what has led to the creation of the current state of affairs in Kosovo and Metohia – a Mafia state thriving under the thin layer of a colonial, military, police, and political administration – it is necessary to understand its background, i.e. the historical and political context of the Kosovo region and of its immediate surroundings, while not neglecting the wider, geopolitical context [Павић 2009].

Commendably, Hofbauer allows the facts to speak for themselves, which is reason enough to quote him without major interventions.

As an economic and social historian, he is critical of the European Project and examines the Balkans specifically, as a region wherein an imperial policy was pursued by Austro-Hungary in the past and by the EU and the U.S. today. The consequences of such approach are tragic: a major war in former Yugoslavia, hundreds of thousands of lives lost, millions of displaced persons, enormous material destruction, the final blow being the attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the forcible separation of Kosovo and Metohia from the sovereign state of Serbia in 2008. Then, “through a unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence, the *international law* was violated and substituted by the *rights of man* (human rights). The international law is quite clear, while the rights of man can be interpreted in many ways. They are a reflection of economic and military power. What had been resolved in 1945, was again geopolitically reshuffled”¹³ i.e. “the bombing of Yugoslavia without a U.N. mandate, initiated the violation of international law, while the recognition of the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo marked an end of the epoch that began in 1945.” [An interview with Hofbauer at www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=79495]

In other words, the main thesis of *Experiment Kosovo* is the U.S.’s and EU’s new imperial policy, primarily reflected in NATO’s activities. According to Hofbauer, however, Kosovo is not the first but the second stage in such new installation of imperial rule on the territory of former Yugoslavia, the first occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In both cases a similar scenario was employed: military engagement came first, followed by the introduction of a unique type of rule over the occupied territories: they were subjected to a specific political, social and economic *experiment* under *merged* “executive and administrative branches of government” which *only as separated powers* constitute “the essence of democracy in the West”.

13 “By this decision (to build its base Bondsteel in Kosovo and Metohia) [the U.S. has shown that it] is planning its military presence in Kosovo in the decades to come and has openly demonstrated that [this action] is a final point of a geopolitical strategy, long in preparation, that should correct the division of Europe into spheres of influence agreed at the beginning of 1945 at the Yalta Conference.” From the 2000 letter sent by Willi Wiemer to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, available at http://starisajt.nspm.rs/PrenetiTekstovi/arhivanspm/2008_vimer1.htm, published also in the weekly *NIN* on February 8, 2007.

[An interview with Hofbauer at www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=79495]. *Double standards* were obviously employed – ones for “civilized” Western democracies, and very different ones for the “semiliterate belligerent savages” in the Balkans, who have to be ruled by an iron fist¹⁴.

The great powers will take advantage of the latest Balkan ethnic turmoil to further their own interests. They have been pulling the strings of all major events in the region since the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century – including the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars, the 1912 creation of Albania, the 1918 creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and the Slovenes (from 1929, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) and the 1943 revolutionary formation of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia... For, according to Michael Weithmann cited by Hofbauer [EK: 45], “all Balkan states have always been the *objects* and not the *subjects* of big policies,” i.e. “not one of the ethnic problems has ever been solved. The borders drawn there appear to be a part of a system bound to create ever new hostilities so that the great powers, depending on the situation, could keep the Balkan people cornered and use their discord for their own goals.” [Weithmann 1997: 327]

After describing the past of Kosovo and its inter-ethnic relations from the 14th century until the forming of the first and the second Yugoslavia, Hofbauer proceeds to consider the reasons for the destruction of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, stating that “the Yugoslav catastrophe was generated from within and from the outside.” [EK: 76] He, however, immediately recalls that without understanding world economic relations and dependences, the dissolution of this multi-ethnic state cannot be fully comprehended. For, after the collapse of communism, a *redistribution* of assets and *resources* was to be made, and the territory of the Balkans divided into the exclusive *zones of interest* of certain countries and big capital. In the light of this, “the division into nations and ethnic communities was not only of assistance to, but a precondition for achieving these goals. For, *social stratification unavoidably leads to class struggle during the division of the existing pie, while national struggle, on the contrary, leads only to the division of the market.*” [EK: 77] In short, *disintegration was necessary* for new economic integration, to enable “an unhindered circulation of goods, people, ideas and capital.”¹⁵ But, even a mere glance at the winners in the long-lasting clash reveals everything: *multinational capital* and *local elites* emerged as the only profiteers.

That is, during the (world) economic crisis of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Yugoslav economy began rapidly to sink under the heavy burden of

14 See [Kuper 2007]. The EU mediator in the dialogue between Belgrade and Priština, Robert Cooper, is a British diplomat and senior intelligence officer, security expert, the head of the Foreign Office Service for Political Planning, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Overseas Affairs, a person close to Tony Blair, and the author of the doctrine of the “new liberal imperialism” and the “new liberal empire” to be installed in the Yugoslav territory. More on him, his ideas and activities in: [Кљаквић 2011].

15 “Disintegration” followed by “integration” follows the alchemic formula of *solve et coagula*.

foreign debts and high inflation. Jeffrey Sachs, an IMF expert for curing such economic woes, proposed a plan to establish “the dinar’s convertibility in the country through a social shock therapy by depriving state money of economic life, thus putting to death ‘the Yugoslav socialist self-management.’” [EK: 79].

Hofbauer summarizes the fatal formula guiding the West in resolving the problem that resulted in the tragedy of the Yugoslav peoples in a single slogan: “Solidarity with the national right to self-determination.” Thus, radical demands by the suddenly “nationally and democratically aware” Slovenes, Croats, Muslims and, eventually, Albanians, directed against the Yugoslav federation, found strong supporters and allies in Germany, Austria, France, and U.S. The reason why the West’s politicians, media, leading thinkers and theoreticians interpreted national self-determination as social emancipation can be explained as “a purely colonial aspiration, a colonial call.” In fact, Hofbauer believes that “*the war was premeditated and deliberately provoked.*”¹⁶ The only element missing was a suitable “philosophical” justification, which was found in a demand that human rights be respected, and followed by military interventions to protect them. These rights thus served to ideologically justify all military actions dubbed “humanitarian interventions.” It is clear today that something entirely opposite lay behind this missionary logic of universally applicable “human rights.” The actual goal was to impose a form of material and social reproduction with “freedom” as its center, but such “liberty” boiled down to license of trade. Capital, i.e. the logic of capitalist expansion, was both the *causa efficiens* and the *causa finalis* of the events that took place. This logic of capitalist relations was camouflaged by the West’s advocacy of “universal values” and “human rights”, as *a universal world religion of the market and the free flow of people, ideas and goods* inseparable from it.

Hofbauer takes a clear stand concerning the war the West launched against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the pretext of protecting human rights and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe: “This undeclared NATO war against Yugoslavia was an aggression lacking all legal basis and acceptable reason. It violated all norms of international law, all provisions of the U.N. Charter, the NATO statute, and the constitutions of all member states, especially the German Constitution.” [EK: 118].

In the night of June 9, 1999 an agreement was signed between the FRY and NATO in Kumanovo, (Northern) Macedonia, on the cessation of hostilities, after

16 Writing about what was behind Yugoslavia’s dissolution, Hofbauer clearly states: “The war, in fact, was planned in advance, it was provoked deliberately. Foreign forces believed in that solution more than the local nationalists did. They even adopted a philosophical justification for it: the rights of man, i.e. their violation... The vagueness and elasticity of the concept of human rights provided for its use depending on political expediency, so it served to interpret what is good and what is not as one pleased. Debates *about values* that were held in connection with this not only did not allow any discussion *about interests*, but prevented it.” [EK: 86]

which, based on the Agreement's provisions and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo was placed under the administration of the U.N. , i.e. KFOR ("Kosovo Force"), whose largest contingent consisted of NATO troops. The Serb province of Kosovo was then divided into occupation zones under the jurisdiction of the U.S., German, Italian, British and French forces, and a U.N. civilian mission, UNMIK, was installed. According to the UNHCR [EK: 123], its population "protected" by Western armies, in the months that followed an Albanian pogrom of non-Albanians took place: innumerable acts of pillage, arson, murder, rape, and abduction were committed, reaching a climax in the expulsion ("ethnic cleansing") of some 250,000 Serbs, Muslim Slavs, Roma, Egyptians, Ashkalis (the last three categories being self-designations of the minorities previously called "Gypsies"). To illustrate how the operation was conducted, Hofbauer quotes a former Albanian teacher bragging to a reporter of a French news agency: "We went from home to home, giving the Serbs 15 to 30 minutes to disappear."¹⁷ A U.N. civilian administration was introduced in Serbia's province which was gradually transformed into a protectorate with "supervised independence". The UNMIK, established immediately after the war, rested on four pillars: as Hofbauer put it, it is "a state in totality" [EK: 140], because it carries out the executive, judicial, police, and administrative tasks necessary to "build democracy and its institutions." Over this structure presides the SRSG – a Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General with unlimited powers.

After "Kosovo" (its full title being "Kosovo and Metohia" /*metoh* = Orthodox Christian Church Property/) illegally declared its independence, the Eulex mission replaced UNMIK. According to Hofbauer, in addition there are some 4,500 non-governmental organizations holding various training courses and allegedly building institutions and democracy, while "protecting human rights"... The planetary bible of the free market was put to work as soon as the war ended. Namely, the High Representative Bernard Kouchner seized all movable and immovable property of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Kosovo. Privatization followed, under the command of the Kosovo Trust Agency and ending in the Heist of the Century¹⁸ from which only mafia structures and the foreign factor¹⁹ profited [EK: 212]. It

17 The fact that after the entry of NATO forces in the province, the Jewish Municipality in Priština no longer exists testifies to the true nature of the "new" Kosovo as a multi-ethnic community, which was the proclaimed objective of the war.

18 In his work "Socially Owned Companies in Kosovo and Metohia in 1990" (a part of the collection of papers titled *The Kosovo Vertical or a Neocolonial Horizontal* [КВилиНХ 2019: 140] Miodrag Skulić asks a relevant question: What is the ownership structure of the Kosovo economy today?

19 According to Czech media, "The former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made 20 million Euros from the sale of Kosovo Telekom". The Prague-based portal *Parlamentarni listy* reported that she was guided solely by personal interests when advocating the bombing of the FRY in 1999, and the creation of so-called independent Kosovo. The portal also said that after the international administration in Kosovo and Metohia was instituted, and owing to her close ties to Kosovo Liberation Army leaders, most of all Hashim Thaçi, she privatized the Kosovo telephone company IPKO, which her company later sold to the Telecom

should also be kept in mind that while poverty and over 60 percent unemployment reign supreme in Kosovo, the international elites enjoy enormous income in exchange for their efforts to establish "peace and democracy." The economy practically does not exist²⁰, except for the black market²¹ ruled by local mafia clans²².

To such Kosovo, with its economy devastated and its society in shambles, its foreign tutors granted independence in February 2008. Violating international law, they forcibly took away a part of the sovereign state of Serbia under the excuse that it was a case *sui generis* with unforeseeable consequences and, by applying the ancient *divide and rule* adage, continue to determine the fate of small nations...²³

"Cooperation of UNMIK and EUPT exists in all areas and at all levels. The EUPT, together with the chief of ICO PT, holds bimonthly meetings with SRSG and P/DSRGS."²⁴ Hofbauer quotes this statement from a June 2008 communication between international administrators in Kosovo and Metohia to depict "money leakage" channels in occupied Serbian territory, i.e. to show where the numerous billions spent on "The Kosovo Experiment" end up. That is perhaps the best and the most adequate illustration of the cold neocolonial rule over that part of ancestral Serbian lands [Павић 2009]. And its essence lies in the following: "Monitored or supervised independence' was envisaged in advance as joint action of the ruling

Slovenija. [https://www.espreso.rs/vesti/drustvo/362957/olbrajtova-debelo-zaradila-od-nezavisnog-kosova-zgrnula-milione-cifra-je--vrtoglava?utm_medium=push&utm_source=pushpushgo&utm_campaign=CampaignName]

20 The share of [Kosovo's] industry in GDP dropped in the 1998–2006 period from 47 percent to 17 percent. In 2006, goods worth 1.25 billion Euros were imported, while its export was worth 77 million! See [EK: 202–203]. The first part of the collection *The Kosovo Vertical or a Neocolonial Horizontal* (pp. 29–88) contains two seminal (and in many elements pioneering) works that in a systematic way offer information on the demographic, economic, social and ecological changes in Kosovo in this century (Gojko Rikalović and Dejan Molnar: (Un)Success of the Euro-Atlantic State Formation Project: Demographic, Economic, Social and Ecological Changes in Kosovo and Metohia in the First Two Decades of the 21st Century: [Рикаловић and Молнар 2019: 21–62]), which deal with the scenarios of future changes in the context of Kosovo's economic and social sustainability (Milenko Dželetović and Bojan Dimitrijević: Possible Scenarios for the Future of Kosovo and Metohia in the Context of Its Economic and Social Sustainability: [Джелетовић and Димитријевић 2019: 63–80]).

21 In 2007 the annual value of illegal deals in Kosovo reached some half a billion Euros! See [EK: 228].

22 Who has the main say in Kosovo and who actually rules it is stipulated by one of the articles of the "Kosovo Constitution" based on the Martti Ahtisaari Plan: "In the event of discord between the constitutional provisions, the laws and provisions of the Draft Agreement on the Status of Kosovo of March 26, 2007 (provisions of the Ahtisaari Plan, XX), the latter, i.e. the Ahtisaari document, shall hold precedence."

23 German politician Willi Wiemer, onetime vice-president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and a former German deputy defense minister, included in his May 2000 letter to the then German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, the conclusions of a security conference held shortly before in Bratislava, Slovakia, where U.S. representatives presented their reasons for bombing Yugoslavia by quoting, among other, the correction of the already mentioned "Dwight Eisenhower's mistake" from 1945. The bombing of Yugoslavia, thus, can be seen in this light, and not as an expression of any "humanitarian" concerns: the goal was the (re)distribution of market and the integration of this part of post-Socialist Europe in a new (victorious), neoliberal, globalist economic order, and the already mentioned use of the Kosovo and Metohia case as a blueprint for future colonial expansion in other regions.

24 The EUPT stands for the European Union Planning Team for Kosovo, ICO PT is the abbreviation for the International Civilian Office, Preparation Team, and SRSG – the Special Representative of the Secretary General (of the United Nations), while DSRSG stands for the latter's deputy.

factors which control the instruments of world-wide rule. A combination of various instruments of direct and indirect foreign governance serves as a pledge for state independence. In that respect, Kosovo/*Kosova* (Albanian version of the original Serb toponym “The Field of Blackbirds” [*Kosovo polje*]) offers ideal conditions for experimenting.”²⁵ [EK: 234] This, of course, is to be achieved with the supporting role played by the former UÇK/KLA (“Kosovo Liberation Army”) commanders, who in 1999 “acted as NATO ground troops, and now, after changing their guerilla uniforms for civilian suits, are allowed to pose as authorities.” [EK: 6]

Hofbauer’s analysis dispels all the idealists’ illusions – if such still exist – that an “enlightened” international administration can benefit any area under its “care”. “A colonial administration loves abbreviations,” writes Hofbauer [EK: 276], “but behind these anaesthetizing acronyms hides a veritable hell on earth of cynical, colonial pillage²⁶, of open looting of Serb property by the ‘International Community’ and in favor of Western big capital²⁷ – and of the omnipresent Albanian mafia which pervades all nooks and crannies of the Kosovo Albanian society.”²⁸

Hofbauer particularly points out that given the text of U.N. Resolution 1244, which “guarantees territorial inviolability of the FRY... *there was, in fact, nothing to negotiate about*” [EK: 236], and wonders “why has Serbia agreed to participate in this obviously premeditated game” [EK: 239] of which the results were: “From the viewpoint of international law, the principles most clearly sacrificed by the establishment of a new order in the Balkans are, in addition to the U.N. Charter and various U.N. resolutions, the final acts of the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation.” He stresses, once again, that “negotiations on the status of Kosovo were held contrary to all the principles and in violation of all the cited points of the Helsinki Conference” [EK: 242–243]. Still, Russia’s and China’s firm

25 “The constitution maker expresses his ‘intention for the state of Kosovo to fully participate in the process of Euro-Atlantic integrations” [EK: 286] It is clear that “the constitution maker,” is the so-called international community, which Hofbauer always places inside quotation marks. Also indicative are recommendations by the “International Commission on the Balkans,” which in its 2005 report proposed “independence without full sovereignty” for a Kosovo under the EU supervision, which, later on, should lead to “association, i.e. absorption” (International Commission on the Balkans, *The Balkans in Europe’s Future*, 2005, quoted in [EK: 279]). According to Hofbauer, these ambitions will not be limited to Kosovo: “Supervised independence’ is a seed of the New Order that in the future could be imposed on other periphery states if the dominant powers find convenient political, financial, and military means to achieve that.” [EK: 244]

26 The seizure of Kosovo’s natural resources by foreign capital... has been planned in every detail and much in advance.” [EK: 217] On the other hand, “trade unions in Kosovo are perceived as insignificant non-governmental organizations: ‘Our views are simply ignored, they pass, so to say, unnoticed.’” Hofbauer was told by Haxhi Arifi, chairman of the Association of Independent Trade Unions in occupied Kosovo [EK: 216].

27 “With incomes tenfold higher than the locals can earn, people from non-governmental organizations [so-called MANGOs, i.e. Mafia NGOs] have become a special stratum outside the society they allegedly want to help” [EK:155–156]. In addition, “Senior UNMIK officials and EULEX personnel are paid 5,000 Euros or more per month” [EK: 231].

28 “The only branch of the economy that is flourishing is grey economy and the illegal sector – i.e. the mafia economy” [EK: 200], while the title of an article in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on March 16, 2008, says: “The crime actually pays off. With the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, organized crime has obtained a state of its own” [EK: 226].

rejection of the unilaterally declared Kosovo independence created “major difficulties for the Western ‘international community of states,’” because “as long as Resolution 1244 exists, there will be two realities in the world community” [EK: 256].

In agreeing with this appraisal Hofbauer believes that his book “strikes at the very center... of the colonial administration in Kosovo,” and that it offers a solution for the future, wherein the focus should be on “potential joint activities in economic development” [EK: 298]²⁹.

IS THERE HOPE?

Does the bleak landscape of the world as it is offer any hope for difference and diversity, for universal principles and rules, for common values, to the small, the weak and the poor, to “the gifted but out of luck”?

Pessimists do not discern it (as Wilde’s weaver, describing the human condition, puts it, “In war, the strong make slaves of the weak, and in peace the rich make slaves of the poor”), while scientists and techno-bureaucrats, shining with *optimism*, continue to preach uncontested faith in an inevitable bright future.

And what about the *realists*? They roll up their sleeves!

CAN SMALLER COUNTRIES INFLUENCE THEIR (ECONOMIC) FATE AT ALL?

In the economic science (understood in positivistic terms as exact) it is generally accepted that *the size* of a country is measured by the number of its inhabitants, its territorial extension, and its aggregate economic power. But, in addition to such *quantitative* indicators of a country’s (nation’s) size, the *qualitative* ones – though difficult or impossible to measure – should also be considered for a more complete and deeper insight. They can be determined by a quality analysis through “spiritual” scientific disciplines (Diltay), which emphasize the *understanding* of the purpose and the significance of processes and manifestations, and pays less attention to their *explanation* – which is the primary task of science as traditionally understood in the West. Thus, cultural, social, economic, political, and geographic particularities of various countries and peoples are interpreted from a *historic perspective*. *Contextualization in space and time*, in this sense, analyzes the character

29 This position could be considered valid, were it not for the legacy of the past 60 years which irrefutably reveals that not even Josip Broz Tito’s policy of “brotherhood and unity of nations and nationalities” – backed by considerable financial funds – could stop the Kosovo Albanians’ aspirations to secede, or their mass intolerance of all non-Albanians. For, as Hofbauer puts it, “The religion of Albanians is Albanianhood.” [EK: 187]

and quality of relations between countries, their value systems, their aspirations and ambitions, their strategic outlook and actions or a lack of them (i.e. allowing for a free course of events, spontaneity, going along with the forces of nature, or with the “logic of history,” submitting to dictates³⁰ etc...)

IVKOVIĆ'S FREEDOM-SLAVERY SCALE

Relevant is Vladan Ivković's attempt to offer a typology of relations between countries (nations, i.e. their elites) on a *freedom-slavery* scale: “If we were to categorize European nations as political communities by ambition and by roughly outlined political mentality, I would propose the following four basic categories: the slaves, the dependents, the independents and the conquerors. Falling into these categories, of course, would be conditioned by historical periods and observation during several epochs, and most nations would be found to belong to more than one category.”

[...] Therefore, “the basis of this categorization is *ambition*: [...] there are nations which are not doing their best, are not capable, or think they have no right to pull themselves out of the claws of subservience to other nations and empires.

There are those who love to rely on the might of others, who think something is owed to them, but seek a higher power to provide them with what they seek [...] or cannot gain what they want without reliance on protector forces. There are those who know that freedom or material gain belongs to them and are ready to organize into a defensive order even if their country, due to geopolitical conditions, is not fully capable of making decisions completely independently – if this is possible anywhere and at all. [...]

The strongest are those nations who snatch and grab regardless of whether they think that belongs to them or not, i.e. those who think that everything in their possession belongs to them, including that which they still haven't laid their hands on. [...]

To lack the freedom-loving ambition, however, is not the same as to lack material stability. There are nation-slaves who can say that from the material point of view they live quite well. [...]

Conqueror nations have to know how to build civilization based on sustainable administration. Slave nations, on the other hand, have to be of use to the con-

30 “The study [*Geopolitical Constraints on Development Policies of Small Countries*] ends up with a recommendation that small countries should aspire to fit themselves into the interests and policies of the great powers, to invest equally in choosing suitable allies, as well as to pragmatically adjust their pretensions, and – depending on given circumstances – even to follow their orders.” [Madžar 2017: 11]; See also [Madžar 1979] and [Madžar 2013]. As a counterweight to this servile attempt at mind-changing, see: Slobodan Antonić's papers “Serbia's road toward the status of a colony” [Антонић 20017a] and “Self-occupation in culture” [Антонић 2017b]. See also: [Томаш 2016], [Оčić 1996, 1998, 2017] and [Senior and Singer 2011].

querors in order to survive. Dependent nations are best recognized by their aspiration toward progress in one sense, for instance, material, because of which they sacrifice their independence and their freedom to fight for non-material interests. Independent nations are always *on the verge of war*; they cannot survive without fighting, wars against them are always waged because they are *the target*. [...] This [‘experimental’] classification is one of the paradigms within a broad geopolitical matrix built on historical experience and the role and potential of individual European nations. With the passage of time, nations as nominal political communities may *change their capacities, appetites, degrees and the form of organization, as well as the quantity of control over their elites*. These changes, created from within and from the outside, position and re-position nations inside geopolitical dynamics of might. Thus, the basic elements of mentality of historical nations and the knowledge of them, including self-knowledge, are the key pillars in building a strategy that is to serve either as an obstacle and enemy to such elements, or as their ally or vassal” [Ивковић 2017].

All this forms a field of research for a new scientific discipline – *strategology*³¹.

STRATEGOLOGY: ORIGINS AND PURPOSE

“Strategology... attempts to understand the strategies of all participants in the game of their mutual cooperation and/or competition. It considers conflicts equally possible as is eventual cooperation between various subjects. It does not accept a morally suitable strategy, but exclusively the one that was chosen – either well or wrongly –without any guarantee, and with arguments and chances of failing and losing as much as succeeding.

Strategology offers the most promising chance to those actors who grasp, with the least bias, the rules of the game of which the outcome cannot be fully comprehended. Those blinded by their own ideology have significantly smaller chances to win.” [Konrad 1999: 61].

THE NATURE OF STRATEGY

Since there are so many differing opinions on strategy, instead of reviewing all its definitions or searching for a unified designation, it seems more appropriate to try to identify *various strategic issues* and the *perspectives of their resolution*.

31 As an insight into an attempt to formulate a contemporary Serbian strategology, see [Оčić 2015, 2017] and [MCPC 2014].

For, sundry strategic perspectives, that is, points of view, lay different emphasis on the significance of contrasting strategic tensions. It is customary, therefore, to first hear all pro and con arguments, and then proceed to resolve the tensions. Thus, there are four general approaches to determining and interpreting a strategic tension. It may be perceived in several ways:

1. As a *riddle*. A riddle comes up in an attempt to solve a problem with a single, optimal solution. Strategic tension can arise in this form, its cause usually stemming from being baffled by the riddle, and not from the riddle's inherent, contradictory premises;

2. As a *dilemma*. A dilemma appears when facing a problem with *two possible solutions*. The most well-known is the "prisoner's dilemma."³² All those who face an *either-or* problem face a dilemma, each solution having its advantages and disadvantages – none, however, being clearly superior to the other. Strategic tensions may also take the form of a dilemma. In such cases, the strategist has to choose one of the options, for example, *either* to cooperate ("cooperative strategy") *or* to compete ("competing" or "conflict strategy");

3. As a *compensatory relation*. A compensatory relation (or "trade-off") is a situation with *many possible solutions*, each representing a different ratio of conflicting pressures, wherein more of the one signifies less of another, in a "zero-sum game" i.e. a set-up where what one player gains, the other loses. The outcome may also be described as redistribution with no superior solution, and strategic tensions as compensatory relations resulting from one of the many balancing solutions to a conflict.

4. As a *paradox*. A paradox is perceived when two ostensibly contradictory or even mutually exclusive factors (A and B) simultaneously appear both truthful and valid. Paradox has *no real solution* because there is no way to logically integrate the two opposites into a consistent understanding of the problem. As opposed to the *either-or* dilemma, it can be defined as an "*and-and*" problem – one factor being as "true" as the opposing one. Thus, both the A and the contradicting B may be desirable: both competition *and* cooperation; both the market *and* the plan; more of the market *and* more of the plan; a better market *and* a better plan! Strategic tensions can be seen as a paradox too, having no real ("traditional") solution not only because decisions are made in conditions of *risk* and *uncertainty* of a present, but because every strategy is inevitably opened toward a *future*, which is most frequently unpredictable and unfathomable. Although a successful strategy always contains a futuristic aspect, it is always its weakest part, as it is impossible to make a strategy of innovations. Caught between permanence and changeability, a way out may be found by combining various solutions in a *functional compromise* to *temporarily* overcome a paradox. In this case the term "temporarily" implies *con-*

³² The "prisoner's dilemma" is a standard example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why two completely rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so.

stant wrangling with a problem (Njegoš's "unending struggle") without ever reaching a final solution. Thus, there are *no final solutions* (which was Dr Strangelove's³³ dream, known to the Nazis as *Endlösungen*, and ever so enticing to other ruthless power-mongers the world over), and no strategy that can do away with similar approaches to getting rid of a problem "once and for all".

But, when a tension does emerge as a paradox³⁴, the strategist has to try to accommodate both the A and the B simultaneously. He must search for new (heterodox) ways to reconcile the opposites in the best possible manner, using the advantages of both options ("the best of both worlds;" "have the cake and eat it"), while trying to minimize their damaging effects. In its nature, the new approach of combining the opposites provides incentive to innovation and, in general, to creativity. It is the most difficult and challenging way to solve a strategic problem, but also the most successful, because at the end everyone gains, this being a situation described as a "non-zero-sum game".

Thus, by its very nature, the Kosovo-Metohia tension is a *par excellence* example of a strategic question of the paradox type.

THREE DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY

There are, therefore, *three essential dimensions of strategy*:

1. *Strategic process*, which answers the questions of *how*, *who*, and *when*: *How is*, and *how should* a strategy be imagined, formulated, analyzed, constructed, controlled, and if need be changed? *Who* are the participants? *When* the necessary activities should occur? The *product* of the strategic process is:

2. *Strategic content*, which answers the question of what strategy *is* and what it *should be* for an individual, a household, a job, a company, an economic sector, a local community, a region, a national economy, a global company, or for a macro-regional integration, whereas:

3. *Strategic context* shows *where*, i.e. in *what environment*, a strategic process is taking place – that is, *what it fits into*.

Moreover, *process*, *content* and *context* are not parts but *dimensions* of strategy. For, strategy is a *three-dimensional phenomenon* and all its three dimensions should be considered *simultaneously*.

³³ An insane U.S. general who orders a first strike nuclear attack on the Soviet Union in Stanley Kubrick's 1964 eponymous political satire – black comedy – movie that found its place in the first group of films deserving preservation in the U.S. National Film Registry for being of cultural, historical or aesthetic significance.

³⁴ And this happens invariably, especially when small countries and freedom-loving nations are concerned. For them it is a *matter of survival*, while for the big and the powerful it a question of prestige and/or material interests – guaranteed by absolute concentration of might, domination, hegemony, exploitation... See [Robinson 2012].

Further, a *strategic process* consists of *strategic thinking*, *strategy building*, and *strategic change*. They are marked by the following elements of *strategic tension*, and the corresponding opposites of *strategic perspective*:

The strategic content defines the level of strategic thinking and action. It can appear on the level of a function or a job, on a corporate level, a *regional* or network level, or on a national and international level... In a market economy subjects begin performing strategically on the micro level, the higher levels gradually following suit, whereas in a central plan economy or society strategic policy is dictated from above, to be followed by lower levels divested of all autonomy.


In other words, there exists, and always did exist, some kind of strategy³⁵ at some level – either competitive or cooperative...

Strategic context, upon which both the theoreticians and the practitioners agree that each is unique, unrepeatable, specific, one of a kind, becomes the subject of contention among them only when the type of contextual influence on strategy is concerned. Thus, *determinists* believe that the strategists³⁶ have scant freedom of choice, since both the process and the content are usually the outcome of circumstances which they cannot control. *Voluntarists*, however, are of the opinion that strategies are not influenced so much by context as by their will to determine and follow a certain course of action. They claim that a strategy should, and can, create “its own” circumstances, instead of accepting the “marching orders” of the conditions it faces. That is, in their view context can be defined by the strategist, instead of being perceived as a given. At the organizational plane the issue is described as “control vs. chaos”, while at the sector level the situation becomes more complex and is seen as “compliance vs. choice.” At the national level, the dilemma intensifies into a “compliance vs. choice” type of a conundrum, which is to say that in that case there is a confrontation of two perspectives, of “(de)evolution vs. creation”³⁷.

35 It appears that present-day Serbia is an exception, especially when it comes to a so-called grand or state strategy. Numerous “stillborn” sector strategies – some 200 of them – are not considered here. See [СБССАНУ 1: 3–12]

36 For what an optimal strategist should look like, see chapter “Strategist – Homo Paradoxicus” in: [Оčić 2015, 2017: 16–18].

37 This is very well illustrated by numerous “public debates” about a “new” reality which leaves us powerless, and with no option but of bowing down (as suggests the name of some *liberal imperialism* NGOs, for example, The Flexitarian Society Foundation, London).



SERBIA: FROM ANTISTRATEGY TO OPTIMAL STRATEGY

The following three proverbs – *Pray to God that our goat gets the wolf* (Georgian); *If the earth shakes under your feet, grab for the skies* (Bulgarian), and *When the devil knocks on your door, don't stop doing what you're at* (Serbian) – well illustrate some possible approaches in devising and implementing a development strategy.

These three proverbs, however, can be interpreted in various ways:

One way to react when facing an unavoidable challenge is to take the *nihilist or delaying and appeasing approach*. If someone utters the first proverb as a wishful “let-it-be,” instead of something like Njegoš's “May it be as it cannot be!” call to battle, that person does not believe in the positive outcome of his plea and by doing nothing annuls the very idea of strategic thinking and action.

The second proverb's *escapist or potentially mobilizing* meaning is also unintelligible outside the context of the times of troubles and defeat, when it may express a need for comfort, a cry for heavenly justice, or a belief that Good will prevail over Evil in this world or the Other one, and may even invigorate the spirit to act and overcome the troubles and misfortune.

The third saying is *activist*, but does not imply that action should exclude thoughtfulness (in Russian, that word – *promishl'nost* – being a synonym for industry), also contemplation, analysis, judgment, reasoning, etc.

In short, “*Pray to God, but sail towards the shore!*” is a Russian proverb that pragmatically, and paradoxically, synthesizes the “*Action and a meaning/purpose*” answer to the issue of devising, and the feasibility of realizing a development strategy in a spatial *and* a historical context.

But, how to think strategically in Serbia, and act accordingly? How are we to transform our 20th century historical experience into a lesson for a successful future? Where is our “Ship of Future” sailing to? This publication³⁸ is one of the answers to those questions, wherein competent authors have amalgamated their thoughts on the subject by analyzing the established facts and proposing solutions through defining our strategic options of thought and action.

For, “In their actions, the Serbs... have to be not only in full agreement, but persistent and persevering, and not trustful of mere promises even if they are written down and signed, as experience shows that, unfortunately, not even the most hallowed principles have been honored.” This is what a young PhD candidate, Milovan Milovanović, understood over a century ago, sending a message to the Balkan peoples to always keep their powder dry, and their swords honed – the two things no guarantees can replace. For, only those nations which know how to fight will find champions for their cause [Milovanovitch 1888: 4]. We should never forget these metaphorical words of the future advocate of Balkan cooperation and the founder of the Balkan Alliance which, after five hundred years, achieved the most profound transformation of the Balkans. Even in the radically changed circumstances something remains the same – by mobilizing all our physical and intellectual potentials this should be taken advantage of in *the moments that may prove crucial*. The principles and rules of international law may prove to be the strongest argument in the hands of those who know how to use them “to their own, and general benefit.” [Милојевић 2006: 247]

For, rare were the moments in the turbulent Serbian history that were not crucial. This is especially true today, in conditions of burgeoning global interdependence, and the condensation and acceleration of history, when the Balkans is once more turning into a “seismograph” of world-wide relevance. Therefore, the question-answer “When, if not now?” is of utmost importance since for bureaucrats and quasi-politicians The Moment never comes. As an old adage says: “For soldiers it is always too soon, and for officers ever too late.” Or, as Søren Kierkegaard put it: “To dare may mean to lose ground under your feet for a moment, but not to dare means to lose life itself.”

38 This text was initially (in an abridged version) published as an introductory essay to *The Kosovo Vertical or a Neocolonial Horizontal* collection of essays [KBuNuHX 2019].

КОСОВСКОМЕТОХИЈСКА НАПЕТОСТ – PAR EXCELLENCE СТРАТЕШКО ПИТАЊЕ
ТИПА ПАРАДОКС

ЧАСЛАВ ОЦИЋ

Сажетак

Колико плурализма подноси демократија? У савременим плуралним демократским друштвима једно од најважнијих (егзистенцијалних) питања гласи: „Колико плурализма подноси демократија?“ које је најпрегнатније поставио чувени аустријски политички филозоф Петер гроф Килмансег. Он сматра да је „неопходно ... направити разлику између најмање три врсте плурализма: плурализма интереса, плурализма вредности и плурализма идентитета.

- ◆ Плурализам *интереса* бави се питањем: како (пре/рас)поделити дељива добра?
- ◆ Плурализам *вредности* бави се питањем: које вредности треба да важе?
- ◆ Плурализам *идентитета* бави се питањем: кога укључује реч ‘ми’? С ким ‘ја’ чиним заједницу?“ [Kielmansegg 1991: 30–42].

Килмансег сматра да „демократија подноси приличну количину плурализма интереса; теже јој иде с плурализмом вредности, а најтеже с плурализмом идентитета“.

Косовско питање је вековима у Срба „у темељу идентитета“ [Пипер 2017: 281–283]. У одговору на то питање се уздиже или пада. Лоше ће се провести онај ко с тим (покушава да) тргује.

Глобални контекст 1: квантитет и квалитет. Крајем минулог столећа већина западних и источноевропских (‘транзиционих’) интелектуалаца веровала је да наступа време универзализације, уместо *ханџинионовској сукоба цивилизација*, да долази *ера глобалне цивилизације*. То је време када и глобални моћници интензивирају рад на својеврсном историјском инжењерингу: безусловна заповест новог Правила Службе која гарантује опстанак и ширење глобалне цивилизације у знаку је Капитала и гласи: аутентична политика и култура не смеју да стоје на путу економској експанзији транснационалног капитализма. И по цену саморазарања ове цивилизације, којој је изгледа то иманентно, јер апсолутна, глобална турбокапиталистичка цивилизација бори се против свега што је у основи *сингуларно*, аутентично: против нације и националне државе, против права, против науке, против васпитања и образовања, против породице, против вере, против традиције уопште, па и против рада. Упрошћено речено: против квалитета, а за квантитет! Против вредности, а за корисност; против креативности, а за имитацију и симулацију; за униформност, а против диверзитета; за сивило и досаду медиокритетства; максимизацију количине и брзине...

Глобални контекст 2: милиитаризација (сила и право). Још је Карл Шмит тврдио да је *рај излаз из кризе*: излаз из мале кризе је мали, а из велике – велики рат! Стварање кризних жаришта и покретање ратова без победника (*no win war*) и преко опуномоћеника (*war by proxies*) после Корејског рата средином минулог века (први такав рат) постало је ствар рутине моћника. А изгледа и нужност, јер се структура производње и потрошње, на пример, у САД, драстично променила у корист војноиндустријског комплекса, тако да било каква динамизација привредне активности, односно излазак из кризе, подразумева раст производње оруђа, оружја и муниције. А тражњу је могуће повећати само ако се крене

у неки нови рат. Ту су и профити највећи и брзо се остварују. Дакле, *инвестиција у рати* је у привредама такве структуре *најисплаћивија* инвестиција¹.

Изрази који се користе у данашњим економским расправама у знатној мери дефинисани су семантичким наслеђем из ранијих дебата. При томе, у економској терминологији видљив је утицај других тзв. егзактних наука: најпре физике (равнотежа, осцилаторна кретања...), затим биологије (кружни ток или циркулација, раст, развој, семенски капитал), медицине (шок терапија) и све више војне науке (економске санкције, економска безбедност, економски рат, хибридни рат, кост-бенефит анализа стратешких миграција као оружја рата, стратешки менаџмент...). Милитаризација економије (науке о привреди) несумњиво је последица милитаризације економије (привреде). Многи критикују употребу војних термина у економској сфери; они ту милитаризацију сматрају изразом неомеркантилизма и економског национализма; по њима, она нужно води у конфликте. Јер, реална и „надреална“ (спекулативна) економија (заснована на војној и политичкој моћи, а не на економској ефикасности) перманентно нарушава равнотежу (пре свега капитала и рада) потребну за одржив привредни (и укупни) развој.

Глобални контекст 3: комерцијализација и корпоративизација (вештина њро-тив врлине). Истовремено су све снажније тенденције комерцијализације и корпоративизације. Све је предмет купородаје, укључујући и људе, њихове органе, па и душе. Локалне и регионалне пијаце узглобљују се у глобални бувљак проданих душа. Mainstream неолиберална доктрина то легитимизује слободом избора на светском – једином правом – тржишту (рада): дакле, („поштено“, без гриже савести) радим за онога ко ме више плати. На том тржишту у последње време је све већа гужва: понуда расте експоненцијалним трендом, јер, све већа понуда прати општи тренд масовног осиромашења (већина земаља другог света транзиционом пљачком претворена је у земље трећег света, а расте и јаз између традиционално развијених и неразвијених), па цене издаје, у складу с теоријом, рапидно падају².

Максимална количина и максимална брзина врхунске су и (једине) вредности; оне замењују сваку вештину – и, дакако, врлину. Die Schnellen fressen die Langsamen (брзи прождиру споре) записала је 1997. Хајке Лајтшу-Фехт у чланку који се зове: *Сви ћемо једној дана бити Први*, дефинишући тако суштину (турбо)капиталистичке идеологије. Дакле: *што*

1 Како се то одражава на тржиште рада? Осим повећане тражње за оруђем, оружјем и муницијом, расте тражња и за плаћеницима (јаничарима), проституткама и (вољним и невољним) донаторима људских органа. А с обзиром на то да већ дуже време живимо у постхеројском добу, то се сматра „нормалним“, а ко у домену тих „нових“ услуга успе, он је јунак нове реалности (пример: Бернар Кушнер, челник једне од глобалних организација за трговину људским органима, неретко у сукобу интереса с организационом јединицом НАТО-а која има исти делокруг „пословања“).

2 Шта се некад о томе уобичајено мислило? „Нација може да преживи своје будале, па чак и амбициозне. Али нација не може да преживи издају изнутра. Непријатељ пред вратима је мање страшан, јер је познат и носи своју заставу отворено, док се издајник креће слободно унутар градских капија; његов лукави шапат шири се свим улицама и чује се [...] у кулоарима владе. Такав издајник нам се не појављује као издајник, он прича гласом који је жртвама близак и пријатан; његово лице и начин одевања сличан је њиховом и он оживљава ону поквареност која лежи дубоко у срцу сваког човека. Издајник разара душу нације, подрива темеље града, шири заразу у телу политике, све док она не подлегне његовој болести. Мање се треба плашити убица – издајник је куга!“ писао је Цицерон пре две хиљаде година. Шта се отада променило? Много тога, нарочито од краја Другог светског рата, што се на примеру Енглеске може видети у књизи *Значење издаје* ненадмашне Ребеке Вест [West 2013]. 06].

више, што држе! То је једино мерило успеха. А да бисмо били успешни морамо се *инкорпорирајти*³.

Стабилнокрајница и нови империјализам: криза као њерманентно стање. Какви су изгледи да за нашег живота видимо крај светске економске кризе? Веома слаби. Криза је фактички постала перманентно стање на које се треба привикавати. Томе служе различити reality shows. Посмодернистичка идеологија све то релативизује, све вредности поравнава и, деконструишући прошлост и садашњост, припрема нас за постхуману (или: постхумну) будућност.

У међувремену нам се стално саветује да треба да живимо у миру и стабилности. „Стабилност“ овде стоји као еуфемизам за „контролу“. У новомовору, дакле, „стабилност“ може да значи (и најчешће значи): све је под контролом! Тачније: под *нашом*⁴ контролом. То је *суштина* и *сјај* и *новој империјализма*. У старом империјализму контрола се врши директно (применом тврде силе; копненом инвазијом, на пример) а у случају новог, тзв. економског империјализма много суптилније: применом *најевски* дефинисане (реч је о Џозефу Нају) – меке и паметне силе. Економски империјализам се јавља када једна земља контролише другу и користи потребне ресурсе за ту контролу. Идеолошко *ојравање* контролора гласи: то је јефтинеће за земљу-жртву, стога она „дозвољава“ да буде контролисана. Критичко *ојравање* контролисаних: земља-жртва увек има могућност да каже „не“, нема дугорочног решења, тј. одрживости економског империјализма, јер доминација траје док трају ресурси који се користе за контролу. Са становишта интереса империјалне силе решење је: учинити земљу-жртву зависном од ресурса „контролора“, на пример, *задуживањем*⁵. (Класична окупација је много ризичнија и скупља.)

Варуфакис: косовизација Европе. Пред нашим очима „стари поредак“ се мрви (или је већ у развалинама) пред силама ароганције (*Ми правимо историју!*) и цинизма (експеримент деконструкције). У све снажнијем процесу десуверенизација, тј. историјске десубјективизације, бројчано мали и економски немоћнији народи постају објект („заморчићи“) „новог“ поретка: „Текућа политика Европе води је распарчавању. Најгори сценарио кризе је *косовизација* Грчке, Шпаније, Ирске, Португалије, Италије итд. у протекторате који користе евро,

3 Влада је постала *корпорација*, партија је постала корпорација, и болница је корпорација, то је и школа, и научноистраживачки институт, чак и црква, војска је професионална, плаћеничка (солдати убијају за солде)... Циљна функција корпорације је *максималан њрофит*. Дакле, школа више не образује и не васпитава, научници не трагају за истином, војници не бране земљу, политичари не брину о општем добру (сматра се да је државничко понашање атавизам прошлости), свештеници не брину о душама верника, економија је постала нова религија, сви су у бизнис сектору у трци за максималном добити. У свету доминирају тенденције замене културе забавом (тј. заборавом; ове речи у словенским језицима имају исти корен: забит = заборавити), обука замењује образовање, технике убеђивања (*ѡреумљивањем*) потискују, чак укидају науку, а политичка сцена поприма све више обележја циркуса и сточне пијаце. Њиховим дискредитовањем губи се *аутономија* појединих друштвених сфера (политике, науке, здравства, просвете, спорта, медија, ...), срозава се њихов *квалитет*, губи се њихова *ауθενцијност* и разлог постојања. Личности постају све више индивидуе (редуковане на функцију пореског обвезника и потрошача); међутим, све мање је произвођача који би могли бити опорезовани и који би се својим зарадама на тржишту потрошних добара појавили као носиоци ефективне тражње. Падају буџетски приходи, пада тражња; зато настају *кризе*.

4 Ко су *наши*, ко стабилнократи в. [Bieber 2018: 176–185].

5 Актуелан је (и парадигматичан) случај грчког дужничког ропства. Јанис Варуфакис, бивши грчки министар финансија, 6. фебруара 2015. сажео је проблем у једној реченици: „Збуњен и брљив политички персонал, *неирајући системску ѡрироду кризе* следи политику сличну тепих-бомбардовању поносних европских нација да би их тобож спасао.“

„филозофско“ оправдање: био је то захтев за поштовањем људских права, а иза тога су следиле војне интервенције у циљу заштите тих права. Људска права као идеолошко оправдање свих војних акција под називом „хуманитарне интервенције“. Испод ове мисионарске логике људских права која имају да важе универзално крило се и крије нешто сасвим друго и то је данас јасно. У игри је било нешто много више, наиме, наметање једног облика материјалне и друштвене репродукције, где је слобода у центру пажње, и то слобода тржишне размене. Оно што је *causa efficiens*, али и *causa finalis* догађања о којима је реч јесте капитал, односно логика капиталистичке експанзије. Дакле, иза западног универзализма вредности и људских права стајала је логика капиталистичких односа: тржиште и њему инхерентна слобода кретања људи, идеја и робе као универзална светска религија.

Хофбауер има јасан и одлучан став поводом агресије и рата који је Запад повео против СРЈ, под изговором заштите људских права и спречавања хуманитарне катастрофе: „Овај необјављени НАТО рат против Југославије представљао је агресију која није имала никакву правну основу, нити било какав реалан разлог. Прекршене су све норме међународног права, све одредбе Повеље УН, НАТО статут и сви национални уставни земаља чланица, посебно немачког устава.“ [ЕК: 118].

У Куманову је у ноћи 9. јуна 1999. потписан споразум између СРЈ и НАТО о прекиду дејстава, након чега је по одредбама споразума и Резолуцији 1244 СБ УН Косово предато на управљање УН, односно КФОР-у, чији је највећи контингент сачињавала НАТО војска. Оно што је следило јесте подела Космета по окупационим зонама између америчких, немачких, италијанских, британских и француских снага, успостава цивилне мисије УН (УНМИК). Наредних месеци, под покровитељством западних војски, следи албанска одмазда која је за последицу имала небројена убиства, киднаповања, злостављања неалбанског становништва и која врхуни у протеривању, према извештају УНХЦР-а [ЕК: 123], 250.000 Срба, муслимана словенског порекла, Рома, Египћана, Ашкалија. „Ишли смо од куће до куће и давали Србима 15 до 30 минута да нестану“, наводи Хофбауер речи којима се бивши албански наставник хвалио репортеру француске новинске агенције¹¹.

За јужну српску покрајину била је припремљена цивилна управа коју ће спроводити УН, градећи постепено идеју независног надгледаног протектората. Непосредно након рата УН успоставља мисију УНМИК која почива на тзв. четири стуба. У ствари, „УНМИК је држава у тоталитету“ [ЕК: 140] јер обухвата и извршне, законодавне, судске, полицијске, административне и управне и послове на изградњи демократије и институција. А на врху пирамиде стоји SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary General), специјални представник генералног секретара УН који влада неограничено.

После проглашења противправне независности дошао је Еулекс да одмени УНМИК. А ту је и, како наводи Хофбауер, око 4.500 невладиних организација које држе разне курсеве, обуке, изграђују демократију и институције, штите људска права...

односно њихово кршење... Мекоћа и растељивост појма људских права омогућавали су њихово једноставно коришћење у зависности од потреба, тако да се могло лако тумачити шта је добро, а шта није, по сопственом нахођењу. Расправе које су с тим у вези вођене о *вредностима*, не само да нису дозвољавале дискусију о *интересима*, већ су их спречавале.“ [ЕК: 86].

11 О карактеру „новог“ Косова као мултиетничке заједнице, дакле, наводног разлога због кога се водио рат, сведочи и чињеница да у Приштини, након уласка НАТО снага, Јеврејска општина више не постоји.

Планетарна вулгата о слободном тржишту примењена је одмах по окончању рата. Наиме, високи представник Бернар Кушнер запленио је целокупну покретну и непокретну имовину СРЈ на Косову. Потом се прешло на приватизацију којом је руководила КТА (Kosovo Trust Agency), која се завршила као *йлачка века* и од које су користи имале само мафијашке структуре и спољни фактор¹² [ЕК: 212]. Не треба ни помињати да док Косметом хара сиромаштво и незапосленост од преко 60 одсто, међународне елите уживају у огромним примањима за њихов напор на успостављању мира и демократије. Привреда практично не постоји¹³ осим црног тржишта¹⁴ којим руководе локални мафијашки кланови¹⁵.

Том и таквом Косову, с девастираном привредом, руинираним друштвом, у фебруару 2008. страни тутори додељују независност. Противно међународном праву, отимају сувереној држави Србији део територије, под изговором да је у питању случај *sui generis* и с последицама које су несагледиве, уз примену старог правила *divide et impera*, настављају да кроје судбину малих народа...¹⁶

„Сарадња УНМИК и ЕУПТ одвија се на свим пољима и на свим нивоима. Заједно са шефом ИЦО ПТ, шеф ЕУПТ одржава двомесечне састанке са СРСГ и П/ДСРСГ.“¹⁷ Ову реченицу из комуникација међународних управљача на Косову и Метохији из јуна 2008. Хофбауер користи како би на једном месту сажео у којим правцима све „цури новац“ у окупираној српској покрајини, тј. куда све иду силне милијарде које се троше на „Експеримент Косово“. Та реченица је уједно можда и најезгровитија слика ледене неоконијалне владавине над тим делом древних српских земаља [Павић 2009], коју на више него адекватан начин пред-

12 „Бивша државна секретарска САД Мадлен Олбрајт од продаје Телекома Косова зарадила 20 милиона евра“, пишу чешки медији. Прашки портал *Парламентарни лист* наводи да се Олбрајтова водила искључиво личним разлозима у свом залагању за бомбардовање СРЈ 1999 године, као и за стварање тзв. независног Косова. Портал наводи да је она захваљујући својим блиским везама с лидерима терористичке ОВК, пре свега с Хашимим Тачијем, после доласка међународне управе на Косово и Метохију, приватизовала косовску телефонску компанију Ипко, а коју је њена компанија касније продала словеначком оператеру Телеком Словенија. [https://www.espreso.rs/vesti/drustvo/362957/olbrajtova-debelo-zaradila-od-nezavisnog-kosova-zgrnula-milione-cifra-je-rtoglavava?utm_medium=push&utm_source=pushpushgo&utm_campaign=CampaignName]

13 Удео индустрије у БДП-у је у периоду 1989–2006. опао са 47 одсто на 17 одсто. У 2006. увезенио је робе у вредности од 1,25 млрд. евра, док је извезено 77 милиона! Види: [ЕК: 202–203].

14 Годишњи обим илегалних активности у 2007. је достигао вредност од око пола млрд. евра! Види: [ЕК: 228].

15 О томе ко води главну реч и ко заправо влада Косметом, довољно говори и један од чланова „Устава Косова“ заснованог на Ахтисаријевом плану: „Уколико би дошло до несагласности између уставних одредби, закона или одредби предлога за Споразум о статусу Косова од 26. марта 2007. (одредбе Ахтисаријевог плана, X. X), ово друго, тј. Ахтисаријев документ, има предност.“

16 Немачки политичар Вили Вимер, некадашњи потпредседник Парламентарне скупштине ОЕБС и бивши Заменик министра одбране Немачке је у свом, сада већ легендарном писму упућеном тадашњем немачком канцелару, Герхарду Шредеру, у мају 2000. предочио закључке конференције о безбедности која је управо одржана у Братислави, а на којој су амерички званичници изнели разлоге због којих је бомбардована СР Југославија, између осталог и због исправљања поменути „Ајзенхауерове грешке“ из 1945. У том светлу – а не у светлу било каквих „хуманитарних“ обзира – може се, дакле, посматрати и бомбардовање СРЈ: циљ је, дакле, био (прерас)подела тржишта и интегрисање овог дела постсоцијалистичке Европе у нови, (победнички), неолиберални, глобалистички економски поредак, па до већ поменутог коришћења Косова и Метохије као матрице за колонијално ширење на другим просторима.

17 Притом, „скраћеница ЕУПТ стоји за European Union Planning Team for Kosovo, ICO PT је скраћеница за International Civilian Office, Preparation Team (Међународни цивилни биро, тим за припрему), а SRSG... за Special Representative of the Secretary General (Специјални представник генералног секретара ОУН), DSRSG је скраћеница за његовог ’заменика’, дакле, Deputy.“

ставља Хофбауер. А суштина те владавине састоји се у следећем: „Надзирана односно надгледана независност’ унапред је замишљена као заједничка акција владајућих чинилаца који држе у својим рукама инструменте владавине широм света. Залогу државне независности представља комбинација различитих инструмената непосредне и посредне стране владавине. Косово/Kosova пружа у том погледу идеалне услове за експериментисање.“¹⁸ [ЕК: 234]. Разуме се, уз споредну (бар на папиру) улогу некадашњих команданата ОВК, „који су играли улогу копнених снага НАТО 1999, [и] герилску униформу сада заменили за цивилне функције у управљању“, тако да им је сад „дозвољено... да глуме власт“ [ЕК: 6].

О Хофбауерову немилосрдну анализу се разбијају снови свих идеалиста – ако они уопште више постоје – о томе да „просвећена“ међународна управа над било којим простором може том простору донети ишта добро. „Колонијална управа воли скраћенице,“ пише Хофбауер [ЕК: 276], али се иза тих анестезирајућих акронима крије својеврстан пакао на земљи – цинично колонијално черупање, огољена отимачина српске имовине од стране „међународне заједнице“ а у корист западног крупног капитала¹⁹, метастазирајућа страна бирократија састављена од људи чији је главни циљ да што више зараде у што краћем периоду уз најмањи могући додир с локалним становништвом²⁰, и, наравно, свеприсутна косовско-албанска мафија, која је продрла у све поре косовско-албанског друштва²¹.

Хофбауер посебно истиче да, с озбиром на текст Резолуције 1244, у којој се „гарантује територијална неповредивост СР Југославије... уствари није било ничега о чему је требало преговарати“ [ЕК: 236], и чуди се: „зашто је Србија уопште пристала да учествује у овој очигледно унапред срачунатој игри“ [ЕК: 239]. А резултат те „игре“ је следећи: „Оно што је с међународноправног становишта, поред Повеље ОУН и разних резолуција најјасније жртвовано успостављањем новог поретка на Балкану били су завршни акти Хелсиншке конференције о безбедности и сарадњи (КЕБС)“, а „преговори о статусу Косова су вођени мимо свих оних начела и у њима су прекршене све наведене тачке Хелсиншке конференције“ [ЕК: 242–3]. Ако је за утеху, чврст став Русије [и Кине!] о неприхватању једнострано проглашене косовске не-

18 „Уставотворац изражава намеру да држава Косово у потпуности учествује у процесу евро-атлантске интеграције.“ [ЕК: 286]. Притом је јасно да је „уставотворац“ тзв. међународна заједница – коју, Хофбауер, иначе, неизоставно обележава наводницима. Такође упутне у том смислу су и препоруке „Међународне комисије за Балкан“, која у свом извештају из 2005. за Косово предлаже „независност без пуног суверенитета“ под надзором ЕУ, што касније треба да доведе до „придруживања односно усисавања“. International Commission of the Balkans, *The Balkans in Europe's Future*, 2005, цитирано у [ЕК: 279]. И, према Хофбауеру, амбиције се не завршавају на Косову: „Надгледана независност’ представља заматак новог поретка, који се може убудуће применити и на друге периферне државе ако то само моћније силе нађу за сходно као одговарајуће политичко, финансијско и војно средство.“ [ЕК: 244].

19 „Отимање косовских природних извора које спроводи страни капитал је... до детаља унапред испланирано“ [ЕК: 217]. С друге стране, „на синдикат се на Косову гледа као на безначајну невладину организацију; једноставно, наше мишљење се ни на који начин не уважава, такорећи не примећује,“ каже Хофбауеру Хаџи Арифџи, председник Удружења независних синдиката на окупираном Косову [ЕК: 216].

20 „С примањима десетоструко већим од локалних, ови људи из невладиних организација [МАНГО, тј. „мафија НГО“] су већ створили посебан социјални слој изван нормалног друштва, које наводно желе да помогну“ [ЕК: 155-6]. Уз то, „виши службеници УНМИК и ЕУЛЕКС персонала примају по 5.000 евра и више месечно“ [ЕК: 231].

21 „Једина економска грана која је у процвату јесте сива економија и илегални сектор – то јест мафијашка привреда“ [ЕК: 200], док *Франкфуртска алгемајне цајтунг* текст од 16. 3. 2008. насловљава: „Злочин се ипак исплати. Од проглашења независности Косова организовани криминал је добио сопствену државу“ [ЕК: 226].

зависности створио је „знатне тешкоће западној ’међународној заједници држава“ јер „све док постоји Резолуција 1244, постоје и две стварности у светској заједници“ [ЕК: 256].

С овим се Хофбауер слаже, сматрајући да његова књига „погађа у саму срж... колонијалне владавине на Косову“, као и да нуди решење за будућност, у којој би се требало усредсредити на „потенцијално заједничке могућности за економски развој“ [ЕК: 298]²².

Има ли наде? Има ли још у суморном светском пејзажу изгледа за различитост и разноликост, за универзална начела и правила, за опште вредности, за мале, слабе и сиромашне, „талантљиве а нешчасћиве“? *Песимисти* их не виде (јер, како општу судбину тумачи Вајлдов ткач: „У рату, јаки од слабих праве робове, а у миру то чине богати од сиромашних“), *оптимисти* чки озарена лица сцијентиста и технократата проповедају безрезервну веру у неминовну светлу будућност. А *реалисти*? Они – сучу рукаве!

Моју ли мање земље уопште утицају на своју (економску) судбину? У егзактној (позитивистички схваћеној) економској науци опште је познато да се *величина* земље мери бројем становника, квадратуром површине и агрегатном економском моћи. Поред *квантитативних* показатеља величине земље (нације) ради целовитијег и дубљег увида неопходно је узети у разматрање и *квалитативне* (тешко мерљиве или немерљиве) показатеље величине. Они се могу установити квалитативном анализом у кључу „духовних“ научних дисциплина (Дилтај) које нагласак стављају на *разумевање* (смисла) појава и процеса, мање на њихово *објашњење* (што је примарни задатак на Западу традиционално схваћене науке). Ту се у *историјској њерсејкџиви* тумаче културне, социјалне, економске, политичке, географске *специфичности* земаља и народа. *Контекстуализација у њерсејору и времену* тиче се анализе карактера (квалитета) односа земаља, вредносних система, стремљења (аспирација/амбиција), стратешког мишљења и делања или одсуства стратешког мишљења и делања (тј. препуштања самолеку, спонтаности, стихији, „логици историје“, покоравања диктату...).

То је све предмет истраживања нове научне дисциплине – *стратејологије*²³:

Стратејологија: ојкуд и чему? Стратејологија ... покушава да разуме стратегије свих учесника игре у њиховој међусобној кооперацији и надметању. Конфликте између субјекта стратегијологије сматра исто толико вероватним, као и њихову међусобну кооперацију. Не прихвата готову и морално подобну, већ искључиво изабрану стратегију, која може да буде и добра и рђава, није ничим осигурана, али има своје аргументе, има своје шансе – може да пропадне или да изгуби исто тако, као што се може показати успешном.

Стратејологија даје највеће шансе оном играчу који најнепристрасније сагледава правила ове игре несагледивог исхода. Онај ко бива заслепљен властитом идеологијом, има знатно мање шансе да буде на добитку. ... [Konrad 1999: 61].

Природа стратејологије. О томе шта је стратегија постоје толико различита мишљења тако да је, уместо излагања свих њених дефиниција или трагања за новим јединственим општим њеним одређењем, упутније покушати идентификовати *стратејешка њишња* и сагледати *њерсејкџиве њиховој решавања*.

22 И тај став би се можда и могао бранити, да није историјске позадине од претходних 60-ак година, која више него јасно показује да чак и титоистичко „братство и јединство народа и народности“ подржано обилатим трансферима средстава није зауставило косовско-албанске тежње за отцепљењем, као ни њихову масовну нетрпељивост према свим не-Албанцима. Јер, како сам Хофбауер истиче: „Религија Албанаца је албанство“ [ЕК: 187].

23 За покушај утемељења српске савремене стратегијологије в. [Очић 2015, 2017] и [МСРС 2014].

Различите стратешке перспективе, односно углови сагледавања, другачије наглашавају значај једне или друге стране стратешких тензија. Уобичајено је стога најпре саслушати све аргументе за и против, па онда прићи решавању напетости. Четири су општа приступа утврђивању и тумачењу стратешке напетости. Она се посматра:

1. као *загонетка*. Загонетка је изазовни проблем с *једним оптималним решењем* („одгонетком“). Стратешка напетост може се појавити и у овом облику, при томе, њен узрок настанка најчешће је у неразумевању загонетке, а не у њеним контрадикторним премисама.

2. као *дилема*. Дилема је узнемиравајући проблем с *два моћна решења*. Најпознатија је затвореникова дилема. С дилемом се суочавају они који покушавају да реше тај проблем с тешким *или–или* избором, при чему свака опција има своје предности и недостатке, али није недвосмислено супериорнија од друге. Стратешке напетости могу се појавити и у виду дилема. У том случају стратег се мора определити за једну од опција, на пример, *или* да сарађује (кооперативна стратегија) *или* да се такмичи (конкурентна или конфликтна стратегија).

3. као *компензацијска релација*. Компензацијска релација (или *trade-off*) је проблемска ситуација у којој има много *моћних решења*, од којих свако представља другачију равнотежу конфликтних притисака, при чему, увек више једнога значи за исто толико мање другога, односно оно што је за једног играча добитак то је за другога губитак. Ова игра која описује редистрибутивну ситуацију позната је као игра с нултом сумом (*zero-sum game*). Ниједно решење није супериорно. Стратешке напетости могу се посматрати и као компензацијска релација. У том случају оне се превазилазе неком од могућих равнотежа конфликтних солуција.

4. као *парадокс*. Парадокс је ситуација у којој се два наизглед противречна или чак узајамно искључива – чиниоца (А и Б), у исто време јављају као истинита или ваљана. Парадокс *нема реалног решења*, јер не постоји начин да се два опозита логично интегришу у консистентно разумевање проблема. За разлику од *или–или* природе дилеме, парадокс се може окарактерисати као *и–и* проблем – један фактор је истинит, али и противречни фактор је истовремено „прави“. И А и Б које противречи А-у су пожељни (*И* конкуренција и кооперација! *И* тржиште *и* план! Више тржишта и више плана! Боље тржиште и бољи план!). Стратешке напетости могу се посматрати и као парадокс. Оне немају („традиционално“) реално решење не само због тога што се одлуке доносе у условима ризика и *неизвесности* у садашњости, него и стога што је свака стратегија нужно отворена према *будућности*, а о будућности је тешко говорити, јер је она најчешће непредвидива и недокучива. Иако успешна стратегија увек садржи неки футуристички аспект, он је нужно најслабији, јер је готово немогуће сачинити стратегију иновација. У процепу између сталности и променљивости, решење се налази у комбинацији солуција која представља *функционални компромис* којим се *привремено* излази на крај с нерешивим парадоксом. Ово „привремено“ практично подразумева *сталанно рвање с проблемом* (Његош: борба непрестана!), а да се никад не стигне до дефинитивног решења. *Нема*, дакле, *коначних решења* (*Endlösung*-а у нацистичком и неонацистичком смислу), а нема ни *стабилности која би једном заувек укинула све групе стабилности* (о чему је др Стрелцов сањао и што неки хипермоћници прижељкују).

У случају када се напетост јавља као парадокс²⁴, стратег, дакле, мора да се труди да истовремено изађе у сусрет и А-у и Б-у. Он ће трагати за новим (хетеродоксним) путевима

24 А данас се јавља код свих, а поготово код мањих земаља и (слободољубивих) народа: за њих је то *ишћење ојштанка*, док је код великих и моћних то питање престижа *и/или* (материјалног) интереса: апсолутне концентрације моћи, доминације, хегемонизма, експлоатације..., в. [Robinson 2012].

у циљу помирења супротности на најбољи могући начин, користећи предности и једне и друге опције (*The best of both worlds*; „и јаре и паре“), а настојећи да минимизује штете обеју. По својој природи, нов, „оригиналан“ начин комбиновања опозита делује подстицајно, он доприноси иновативности и, уопште, креативности. То је најтежи и најизазовнији приступ решавању стратешког проблема, али и најуспешнији, јер би на крају требало да сви буду на добитку, с обзиром на то да је реч о ситуацији која се описује као игра с ненултом сумом (*non-zero-sum game*).

Косовско-метохијска напетост је *par excellence* стратешко питање типа парадокс.

Три димензије стабилности. Треба правити разлику између *три* суштинске *димензије стабилности*. То су:

1. *Стабилности процес* – одговара на питања *како, ко и кага*: Како је и како би требало стратегија да буде сачињена, анализирана, сањана, формулисана, примењивана, мењана и контролисана? Ко су учесници? Када треба да се десе неопходне активности? Производ стратешког процеса је

2. *Стабилности садржај* – одговара на питање *шта* је и шта треба да буде стратегија за појединца, домаћинство, посао, фирму, привредни сектор, локалну заједницу, регион, националну привреду, глобалну компанију, макрорегионалну интеграцију, ...

3. *Стабилности контекст* – показује *иде*, у коме окружењу, тече стратешки процес, односно где је уклопљен стратешки садржај.

Процес, садржај и контекст нису делови него *димензије* стратегије. Из чињенице да је стратегија тродимензионалан феномен следи да све три димензије треба разматрати *истовремено*.

Стабилности процес сачињавају стратешко мишљење, стратешко формирање и стратешка промена. Њих обележавају следећи полови стратешких напетости и одговарајући опозити стратешких перспектива:

Стабилности садржај дефинише *ниво* стратешког мишљења и делања. То може бити ниво функције, ниво посла, корпоративни ниво, ниво мреже (*регионалне* или неке друге), национални или интернационални, ... У тржишном моделу стратешки почињу да се понашају субјекти на микро нивоу, а потом на вишим нивоима (*down-top*), а у централнопланским привредама и друштвима апсолутни приоритет има „стратегизација“ на врху, а према доле (*top-down*) она је више формална него стварна, због одсуства аутономије нижих нивоа. Увек, дакле, постоји и постојала је нека стратегија, у овој или оној равни, конкурентска или кооперативна...

Стабилности контекст. Сви се слажу – и теоретичари и практичари – да је *сваки контекст јединствен*, непоновљив, специфичан, уникатан... Разлике међу њима јављају у погледу тога који утицај врши контекст на стратегију. *Детерминисти* верују да стратегија, немају много слободе у свом избору, јер су процес и садржај најчешће резултат околности које они не могу да контролишу. *Волунтаристи* верују да на стратегије не утиче толико контекст колико њихова *воља* да одреде и следе (неки) правац активности. Они тврде да стратегија треба (и да може) да створи („сопствене“) околности, уместо да буде заробљена околностима које затиче. Укратко контекст се може одредити уместо да се пусти да он одређује. У организационој равни та се ствар релативно једноставно дефинише као „контрола versus хаос“, док се на секторском нивоу ситуација већ усложњава и одређује као „повиновање или избор“ (*Compliance versus Choice*), а дилема се на националном нивоу такође драматично исказује

као „покораване или слободан избор”, односно ту се супротстављају две перспективе: (д) еволуција versus креација.

Србија: од антиисторије до ојштималне сторије. Следеће три пословице: *Дај, Боже, да наша коза ухвати вука* (грузијска); *Ако ти се земља љуља, држи се за небо* (бугарска) и *Кад ђаво куца на врати, ти – ради!* (српска) илуструју могуће приступе у замишљању и спровођењу стратегија развоја:

Нихилистички или кунктијорски (антиисторијски). Прва пословица се може тумачити као пука пројекција жеља (*лесеферистички wishfull thinking*, а не његошевско: „нека буде што бити не може!“), где ни сам молилац баш не верује у позитиван исход своје молбе (а ништа и не предузима да му се такав исход деси). Она, у ствари, поништава идеју стратешког мишљења и деловања...

Ескапистичка или њошеницијално мобилизативна. Друга пословица је вишезначна и једва да се може интерпретирати ван контекста: у тренуцима страдања и пораза она може бити израз потребе за утехом, вапај за (небеском) правдом и знак вере у коначну победу добра над злом (на овом или оном свету), а може да буде и надахнуће које крепи дух и мобилизативски прикупља снагу за акцију којом се невоље и неприлике превазилазе.

Активистичка. Трећа је директно делатна (про-активна), наизглед једносмерна и једнозначна, иако не шаље изричиту поруку да радиност искључује промишљеност (на руском језику ова реч управо означава индустрију) – контемплативну, анализу, просуђивање и расуђивање...

Акција и мисао (сврха): Дакле: *Боју се моли, а ка обали њлови!* Можда ова руска пословица (формулисана парадоксално у стилу Нејзбитовог и...и мегатренда) прагматично синтетизује одговор на питање примерености конципирања и успешности остваривања неке стратегије развоја у неком просторном и повесном контексту.

Како да се у Србији стратешки мисли и шта да се стратешки ради? Како да историјско искуство 20. века послужи као поука за успешнију будућност? Куда плови „будућности српске брод“? Забринуте и компетентне аутори сабрали су своје радове у овај Зборник; на максимално професионалан начин они анализирају непомерљиву фактографију и предлажу решења, односно дефинишу стратешке правце расуђивања и деловања:

„У свом деловању Срби ... морају да буду не само сложни већ и упорни и истрајни, да не верују обећањима ни на папиру, искуство је показало да, нажалост, ни најсвечаније проглашена начела нису примењивана. То је пре више од једног века спознао млади докторанд Милован Миловановић који је балканским народима поручио да увек имају сув барут и добро зашиљен мач, две ствари које никаква гаранција не може да замени. Само народи који знају да се боре наћи ће браниоце своје ствари²⁵. Није сувишно да се данас подсети ових метафоричних речи будућег поборника балканске сарадње и творца балканског савеза који је извршио највећу промену на Балкану после пет столећа. И у коренито измењеним приликама нешто остаје исто. Мобилизацијом свих физичких и умних снага то треба искористити у тренуцима који могу да буду њресудни, начела и правила међународног права могу да буду најјачи аргумент у рукама оних који умеју да их употребе. На своју и општу корист.“ [Милојевић 2006: 247]

25 М. Milovanovitch, *Les traités de garantie au XIXe siècle. Étude de droit international et d'histoire diplomatique*, Paris, 1888, p. 408.

У српској турбулентној историји ретко када тренуци нису били пресудни. Поготово данас у време растуће глобалне међузависности, згушњавања и убрзавања историје када Балкан поново (и све више) постаје светски сеизмограф. Зато: кад ако не – сад. Јер за бирократе и политиканте никад није Тренутак: „За војнике је увек рано, а за официре увек касно.“ „Одважити се значи за тренутак изгубити тло под ногама, не одважити се значи изгубити сâм живог“, написао је својевремено чувени дански мислилац Серен Кјеркегор.

REFERENCES

- Антонић 2017а → Антонић, Слободан (2017а). Пут Србије у статус колоније, in: [СБССАНУ 1: 353–355].
- Антонић 2017б → Антонић, Слободан (2017б). Самоокупација у култури, in: [СБССАНУ 1: 363–366].
- Баста 2017а → Данило Баста. Слобода је српско становиште, in: [СБССАНУ 1: 367–370].
- Баста 2017б → Данило Баста. Отимање Косова и Метохије, in: [СБССАНУ 1: 294–299].
- Вест 2013 → Ребека Вест. *Значење изгаје*, translated by Ана Селић, Београд: Алгоритам, 2013.
- Ивковић 2017 → Ивковић, Владан. *Теорија класификације народа* (<http://www.carsa.rs/teorija-klasifikacije-naroda/>)
- Кљакић 2011 → Љубомир Кљакић. Роберт Френсис Купер – империјални стратег и администратор, *Печаш* 14.7.2011. (a part of an essay titled *Евројска Унија као “мека” империја и Срби*, 2010).
- КВилиНХ 2019 → *Косовска веришквала или неоконијална хоризоншвала. Демографски, економски, социјални, њравни, њеополишчки и еколошки ашкешки косовскомешохијско ишшња.* Уредник академик Часлав Оцић, Грачаница, Цетиње, Београд, Зрењанин: Институт за европске студије, Светигора, Градска народна библиотека „Жарко Зрењанин“, Дом културе „Грачаница“, ТВ Храм, 2019. (друго, допуњено, издање) ISBN 9788682057727, COBISS.SR-ID 279632140.
- Кршић 2019 → Јован Кршић. Етнички Албанци на Косову и у Метохији: Демографске промене, 1948–2011, in: [КВилиНХ 2019: 81–106].
- Маџар 1979 → Љубомир Маџар et al. Кидричева визија система планирања, *Марксистичка мисао*, № 4, 1979: 75–90.
- Маџар 2013 → Љубомир Маџар. Стратегија и ограничења, *Полишшка* 25. 12. 2013.
- Милојевић 2006 → Момир Милојевић. Срби на Косову и у Метохији и начела међународног права, in: *Срби на Косову и у Мешохији*, edited by Стеван Карамата and Часлав Оцић, Београд: САНУ.
- МСРС 2014 → *Мошше сторије развоја Србије.* Edited by Часлав Оцић / Српска академија наука и уметности, Одељење друштвених наука, Београд 2014. ISBN978–86–7025–643–9; ISBN978–86–7025–643–9; COBISS.SR-ID212200972.–XVI+1152 pp., graphs, reviews, maps, tables; 25cm.–(Економски зборник, Vol. 13). (<http://www.sanu.ac.rs/Izdanja/ElIzdanja.aspx>)
- Његош 1995 → Петар Петровић Његош. *Горски вијенац*, Београд, Књижевне новине-Енциклопедија, 1995.
- Оцић 1996, 1998, 2017 → Часлав Оцић. Просперитет и слобода; *Економика* 11–12, 1996;

- reprinted in: Часлав Оцић, *Метњаекономика кварежи*, Београд 1998. and in: [СБССАНУ 1: 356–358].
- Оцић 2015, 2017 → Часлав Оцић. *Ка обали йлови. Стырайтйеолошка размайтйрања*, Београд: Друштво за привредну историју, 2015, ²2017.
- Павић 2009 → Александар Павић, Косово као лабораторија новог светског поретка, *Зборник Майтйице срйске за друштйвене науке*, № 128, 2009.
- Пипер 2017/2008 → Предраг Пипер. У темељу идентитета, in: [СБССАНУ 1: 281–283].
- СБССАНУ 1 *Ѕйорови о бдућностйи Срдије и САНУ: куда и како даље? Први гео: Ойтйанак и развој* (2017). Edited by Часлав Оцић, ИСТЕР 21 – Београд и СКП–Нови Сад, Београд 2017. ISBN 978-86-81128-00-8, COBIS-SR.ID 253387276.
- Рикаловић and Молнар 2019 → Гојко Рикаловић Дејан Молнар. Неуспех евроатлантистичког State Formation пројекта: демографске, економске, социјалне и еколошке промене на Косову и у Метохији у прве две деценије 21. века, in: [КВилиНХ 2019: 81–106].
- СБССАНУ 2 *Ѕйорови о бдућностйи Срдије и САНУ: куда и како даље? Друји гео: Истйина и слобода* (2018). Edited by Часлав Оцић, Београд: ИСТЕР 21 and 4 СЕ. ISBN 978-86-81128-01-5, COBIS-SR.ID 264086796.
- Скулић 2019 → Миодраг Скулић. Друштвена предузећа на Косову и Метохији 1990. године, in: [КВилиНХ 2019: 125–140].
- Томаш 2016 → Рајко Томаш. Могу ли мале земље имати властите стратегије развоја у условима глобализације?, *Глас СДХХVI Одељења друштвених наука*, Vol. 32, (2016). Београд: САНУ.
- Хедин 1943 → Свен Хедин. *Америка у борди конйтйиненайтйа*, Београд: Просветна заједница а.д., 1943.
- Чворовић 2006 → Зоран Чворовић. *Издаја* (<https://srbin.info/2019/02/06/zoran-cvorovic-izdaja/>)
- Чомски 2018 → Ноам Чомски. Америка иде у пропаст! *Србининфо*, 5.3.2018. (<https://srbin.info/2018/03/05/noam-comski-amerika-ide-u-propast/>)
- Џелетовић and Димитријевић 2019 → Миленко Џелетовић and Бојан Димитријевић. Могући сценарији бдућности Косова и Метохије у контексту његове економске и друштвене одрживости, in: [КВилиНХ 2019: 63–18].
- Bieber → Bieber, Florian (2018). The Rise (and Fall) of Balkan Stablocracies, *Horizons. Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development*, Winter 2018, Issue № 10: 176–185.
- Dick Marty Report 2010 → Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights: *Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo**. Report. Rapporteur: Mr Dick Marty, Switzerland, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, 12 December 2010.
- Hofbauer 2009 → Hanes Hofbauer. *Eksperiment Kosovo : povratak kolonijalizma*, Beograd: Albatros plus, 2009.
- KFOR Handbook → KFOR Handbook, s.a.
- Kielmansegg 1991 → Peter Graf Kielmansegg. Koliko pluralizma podnosi demokratija, *Gledišta*, №3–4/1991.

- Kuper 2007 → Robert Kuper. *Raspad nacija*. Beograd: „Filip Višnjić“ (Robert Cooper. *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, Atlantic Press, 2003).
- Madžar 2017 → Ljubomir Madžar. Geopolitical Constraints on Development Policies of Small Countries / Геополитичка ограничења на(?) развојну политику малих држава, *Acta Economica* (Бања Лука), Volume XV, № 26 / June 2017: 11–54.
- Milovanovitch 1888 → Milovanovitch, M. *Les traités de garantie au XIXe siècle. Étude de droit international et d'histoire diplomatique*, Paris 1888.
- Očić 1999 → Časlav Očić. Kosovo and Metohia: Investing in Ethnicity, in: *Discourse on Multilingual Cultures : Popular Cultures, Societies and Arts* / ed. by Yuichi Midzunoe. Tokyo : Taga Shuppan. ISBN 4–8115–5351–9 C 1095, 1999: 341–364.
- Savijano 2010 → Roberto Savijano. *Gomora*, Beograd: Geopoetika, 2010.
- Schwab and Malleret 2020 → Klaus Schwab and Thierry Malleret. *COVID-19: The Great Reset*, ISBN Agentur Schweiz, 2020.
- Senior and Singer 2011 → Dan Senior and Sol Singer (2011). *Nacija u usponu: priča o izraelskom ekonomskom čudu*, Beograd: Klub Plus, 2011.
- Vejl 1995 → Simon Vejl. *Ukorenjivanje: Uvod u deklaraciju o dužnostima prema ljudskom biću*, Beograd: BIGZ, 1995.
- Vojvodić and Marković 2017 → SANU / SASA. *Serbian Artistic Heritage in Kosovo and Metohija: Identity, Significance, Vulnerability*, Dragan Vojvodić and Miodrag Marković, eds., SASA Belgrade 2017.
- Weithmann 1997 → Michael W. Weithmann. *Balkan-Chronik: 2000 Jahre zwischen Orient und Okcident*, Regensburg: Pustet; Graz–Wien–Köln: Verl. Styria, 1997.
- Wiener's letter 2000 → Wiener's letter to Schröder from 2000, in: [СБССАНУ 2: 439–446].
- Zuboff 2019 → .Shoshana Zuboff. *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power*, Public Affairs, New York 2019.

INTERNET SOURCES

- <http://www.eparhija-prizren.com/sr/episkop-rasko-prizrenski-i-kosovsko-metohijski-g-teodosije>
- <https://kossev.info/vladika-teodosije-kosovo-i-Metohia -moze-nekom-biti-blagoslov-ili-prokletstvo>
- http://starisajt.nspm.rs/PrenetiTekstovi/arhivanspm/2008_vimer1.htm
- https://www.espreso.rs/vesti/drustvo/362957/olbrajtova-debelo-zaradila-od-nezavisnog-kosova-zgrnula-milione-cifra-je-vrtoglava?utm_medium=push&utm_source=pushpushgo&utm_campaign=CampaignName
- www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=79495

MAIN DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA IN THE FIRST TWO DECADES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

GOJKO RIKALOVIĆ

University of Belgrade, Faculty of Economics
gojko.rikalovic@ekof.bg.ac.rs

DEJAN MOLNAR

University of Belgrade, Faculty of Economics
dejan.molnar@ekof.bg.ac.rs

SUMMARY: The paper analyzes the demographic, economic, social and environmental aspects of the development of Kosovo and Metohia during the first two decades of the 20th century. At the beginning of the paper, an overview of the basic macroeconomic indicators of Kosovo and Metohia and their dynamics is provided. The main goal of the paper is to get an objective assessment of development trends in Kosovo and Metohia, to the extent that available data allow. The research is based on data from the World Bank database, other relevant international sources, as well as from the Kosovo Agency of Statistics, which is under control of the provisional authorities in Kosovo and Metohia. Insight is provided into the results and findings of empirical research that have examined in more detail the relationship between economic growth (and development) and its main determinants in Kosovo and Metohia. In that sense, the influences that foreign direct investments, remittances from abroad, public expenditures, international trade, etc. have had on the economic growth of Kosovo and Metohia are also considered. Also, the presence of the *gray* (informal sector of the) economy in total economic activity is considered. A brief overview of the specifics and results of the process of privatization of socially owned enterprises in Kosovo and Metohia is also given. In addition, relevant conclusions on the development characteristics of Kosovo* are drawn from the analysis of relevant global composite indices. To the extent possible, development trends in the area of Kosovo and Metohia are viewed from the standpoint of their characteristics before and after the self-proclamation of “state independence” (on 17 February, 2008)¹.

KEY WORDS: development indicators, global composite indices, integration, Kosovo*, Serbia, Western Balkans

¹ For more see: Саветодавно мишљење МСП није „ставило печат“ на независност тзв. Косова; напротив! / The ICJ Advisory Opinion on “Kosovo’s” Unilateral Declaration of Independence did not “seal” the Independence of Kosovo* – Quite The Contrary! [Павић 2019] in: [Оцић 2019: 163–171].

INTRODUCTION

The Province of Kosovo and Metohia occupies an area of 10.9 thousand km². This area is characterized by a continental climate, warm summers and cold winters. There are significant differences in terms of the precipitation schedule and the temperature of its various parts.

Significant reserves of nickel, lead, zinc, magnesium, kaolin, chromium, bauxite, and especially lignite are present on the territory of Kosovo and Metohia. Agricultural land extends over more than 50% of the territory, half of which is arable land. Forests occupy 2/5 of the total territory of Kosovo and Metohia. The main economic sectors are agriculture, forestry and mining.

The population of Kosovo and Metohia (according to the available “official” data²) is about 1.9 million people, of which the most numerous are Albanians (more than 90%), while the rest are Serbs, Bosniaks, Turks, Ashkali, Egyptians, Gorans, etc.

The Muslim religion prevails (more than 95% of the population), while members of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox religions are much fewer in number. The average age of the population is about 29.6 years, while the age structure is very favorable (from 0 to 14 years of age, 24.7%, 15–64 years, 67.9%, and 7.4% older than 65 years). From 1961 to 2011, the total number of inhabitants of Kosovo and Metohia increased from around 964,000 to 1.74 million. During this period, significant changes in the ethnic structure of the population occurred: the share of the Albanian population rose from 67% to 93%, the share of the Serbian population decreased from 23.5% to only 1.5%, while members of other ethnic groups also saw a decline in participation from 9.4% to 5.6%, according to “official” data [KAS 2016: 12].

According to the regulations of the provisional authorities of Kosovo and Metohia (which unilaterally declared independence of the so-called Republic of Kosovo on February 17, 2008), there are 38 municipalities and 1469 settlements.

From the geoeconomic point of view, the cause of conflict in this part of the Balkans has always been the wealth in the ores, waters, land and favorable geographical features of Kosovo and Metohia. Apart from identity reasons (cradle of Serbian spirituality, culture and statehood) the territory of Kosovo and Metohia and its development potentials have been of great importance to Serbia too. Under the pretext of humanitarian crisis, 19 NATO members, pursuing Anglo-American and German geopolitical and geoeconomic goals, savagely bombed Serbia in 1999 for 78 days. As a result of NATO’s aggression, about 13 thousand people lost their lives, hundreds of thousands of them (mostly Serbs from Kosovo and Metohia) left

² For real data see: Jovan Kršić, Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia: Demographic Changes, 1948–2021 in this book.

their homes due to bombings, armed conflicts and UÇK atrocities while a significant part of physical infrastructure was destroyed.

The military action of the North Atlantic Alliance resulted in the installation of a protectorate under the administration of the United Nations (UNMIK), and represents the root cause of the current Kosovo crisis.

The fact that natural and built potentials on the territory of Kosovo and Metohia are at the moment beyond Serbian jurisdiction, a 100% increase in fees for importing goods from the territory of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and other unilateral acts of the provisional authorities in Kosovo^{*3} have posed obstacles to accelerating development throughout the region.

BASIC DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA, 2003–2020

Table 1 contains some more important development indicators that relate to the conditions of doing business and life in the territory of Kosovo and Metohia. The source of data is the World Bank. The period from 2003 to 2020 was analyzed, with the original annual data being used to calculate the average values of the selected indicators for the whole period observed (2003–2020), as well as for two periods within it – until the so-called independence (2003–2008) and thereafter (2009–2020).

Table 1. Kosovo and Metohia: Important Development Indicators, 2003–2020

SELECTED GENERAL INDICATORS	KOSOVO AND METOHIA		
	Average 2003–2020	Average 2003–2008	Average 2009–2020
Surface area (sq. km)	10,887	10,887	10,887
Arable land (% of land area)	27.56	27.56	27.56
Arable land (hectares per person)	0.17	0.17	0.17
Agricultural land (% of land area)	52.36	52.36	52.36
ECONOMIC INDICATORS			
External balance on goods and services (% of GDP)	-32.15	-42.35 (2008)	-31.30
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	55.82	59.54 (2008)	55.52

³ This name is without prejudice to the status and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo (see: Government of the Republic of Serbia: <https://www.srbija.gov.rs/kosovo-metohija/index.php?id=168200> (accessed 16.12.2021)).

SELECTED GENERAL INDICATORS	KOSOVO AND METOHIA		
	Average 2003–2020	Average 2003–2008	Average 2009–2020
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)	33.21	37.28 (2008)	32.87
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	29.90	29.76 (2008)	29.91
Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP)	17.65	12.43 (2008)	18.08
Gross national expenditure (% of GDP)	132.15	142.35 (2008)	131.30
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	23.67	17.19 (2008)	24.21
Final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)	98.94	105.07 (2008)	98.43
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)	16.78	20.20 (2008)	16.49
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	5.82	10.40 (2008)	5.41
ICT service exports (% of service exports, BoP)	7.82	6.41 (2004–2008)	8.60
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-8.71	-17.84 (2008)	-7.95
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP)	0.62	0.71 (2008)	0.61
Military expenditure (% of GDP)	0.69	0.02 (2008)	0.75
Trade in services (% of GDP)	26.59	19.89 (2008)	27.15
Total tax and contribution rate (% of profit)	16.64	n.a.	16.64
Labor tax and contributions (% of commercial profits)	5.60	n.a.	5.60
Firms competing against unregistered firms (% of firms)	47.87	n.a.	47.87
Short-term debt (% of total external debt)	32.24	8.94	33.14
External debt stocks (% of GNI)	30.18	13.09 (2008)	31.60
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate)	36.88	44.92	31.53
Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15–24) (national estimate)	54.24	n.a.	54.24
Gross savings (% of GDP)	24.71	22.12 (2008)	24.92
GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international \$)	9,294	7,356 (2008)	9,455
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	9,236	6,840 (2008)	9,435
GNI per capita growth (annual %)	3.50	n.a.	3.50
GNI per capita (constant 2015 US\$)	3,504	2,921 (2006–2008)	3,650
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)	40.33	36.09 (2008)	40.68
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	1.61	1.80	1.52
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (national estimate)	25.46	26.75	24.68

SELECTED GENERAL INDICATORS	KOSOVO AND METOHIA		
	Average 2003–2020	Average 2003–2008	Average 2009–2020
Services, value added (% of GDP)	46.23	44.96 (2008)	46.33
Industry (including construction), value added (% of GDP)	27.28	27.04 (2008)	27.30
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)	13.42	14.04 (2008)	13.37
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP)	8.13	11.26 (2008)	7.87
GNI growth (annual %)	3.64	n.a.	3.64
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international \$)	9,092	7,032 (2008)	9,263
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	3.68	n.a.	3.68
GDP per capita (constant 2015 US\$)	3,253	2,602	3,579
GDP, PPP (constant 2017 international \$)	16,255,156,878	12,288,387,592 (2008)	16,585,720,985
GDP growth (annual %)	3.82	n.a.	3.82
DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS			
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)	2.25	2.46	2.14
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	70.41	68.94	71.22
Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people)	18.01	19.50	17.19

Source: author's calculations based on the World Bank database – <https://data.worldbank.org/> (accessed 27.01.2022).

When considering the economic dimension, it is important to highlight some of the following facts⁴. The gross overall capital formation (as % of GDP) decreased in the period after 2008 compared to the interval from 2003 to 2008, while gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) remained unchanged. In addition, since the gross fixed investment rate from private sources has increased, it follows that the main carrier of the investment activity in Kosovo and Metohia in the period after 2008 was the private sector.

The foreign trade deficit (expressed as % of GDP) was reduced from 42.35% to 31.30%. Exports of goods and services (expressed as a percentage of GDP) increased from around 17.2% (2003–2008) to around 24.2% (2009–2020), while the share of imports into GDP decreased from 59.5% (2003–2008) to 55.5% (2009–2020), which was favorable to the improvement of the balance of exchange of goods and services⁵. It should be noted that the share of exports of ICT services in

⁴ For more details about economic, but also of demographic, social and ecological processes in the area of Kosovo and Metohia see [Рикаловић и Молнар 2019: 29–70].

⁵ For more detailed analysis about interdependence of foreign trade and economic growth in Kosovo* see: [Topxhiu and Krasniqi 2011: 97–107].

total export of services increased from 6.4% to 8.6% in the second, compared to the first subperiod.

However, what probably caused the economic dynamics to be slower was the drop in personal remittances and FDI inflows⁶. Namely, in the period from 2009 to 2020, the share of remittances in GDP was reduced by almost 3.7 percentage points compared to the period from 2003 to 2008, while at the same time the share of FDI in GDP fell by around 5 percentage points.

What is notable is that military spending has increased considerably in the period after the illegal proclamation of the so-called independence from 0.02% of GDP (2003–2008) to 0.75% of GDP (2009–2020).

The volume of gross domestic product and gross national income, as well as their per capita amounts increased in the second compared to the first subperiod, while the unemployment rate was reduced. Growth of total GDP and GDP per capita is relatively dynamic in the period from 2009 to 2020.

Regarding the economic structure, it is noticed that there is a relatively high share of services (which is even increasing in the second in relation to the first sub-period – by about 1.4 percentage points), while at the same time the share of industry is almost unchanged, and the share of agriculture decreases (by about 3.5 percentage points).

In the area of external indebtedness, there are worrying movements: the amount of external debt expressed as a percentage of gross national income has been increased by about 2.4 times in the second subperiod, compared to the first one, while the short-term debt expressed as a percentage of total external debt rose at the same time by 3.7 times, while the amount of interest paid on external debt (expressed as a percentage of gross national income) is higher.

Regarding demographic and social indicators, the number of inhabitants increased during the period 2009–2020 (by around 13 thousand), with the population growth rate (annualized) as high as 0.13%. Poverty has declined significantly according to available data, as the poverty gap rate (at the level of \$ 3.2 equivalent of purchasing power per day) has been reduced from 4.37% (2003–2008) to 1.63% (2009–2020). The distribution of income is more equitable, as evidenced by the decrease in the Gini coefficient from 30.2 (2003–8) to 28.6 (2009–20). However, there is still a high degree of the informal (gray) economy⁷. The rate of deliberate murders is almost halved. The life expectancy has increased, but fertility rates and birthrates, although relatively high, are nevertheless decreasing during the period 2009–2020, compared to the period 2003–2008.

6 More about the role and impact of remittances on the economic growth in Kosovo* see: [Zogjani and Badivuku-Pantina 2014]; for more detailed insight in impact of foreign direct investments on economic growth in Kosovo* see: [Thaçi and Rushiti 2018: 129–154].

7 For more details about impact of informal economy on development process in Kosovo* see: [Skenderi et al. 2017].

As far as energy and environmental performance are concerned, a significant increase in electricity consumption (even by about 25%) in the second observed subperiod (2009–2020) is noticeable compared to the first one (2003–2008). What can be drawn from the comparison of the appropriate indicators in these two sub-periods is that the share of energy consumption derived from fossil fuels has increased (from 87.31% to 88.36%), while the share of energy consumption from renewable sources in total of final energy use slightly decreased from 22.46% to 22.39%. What is, however, positive is that energy intensity is reduced, that is, the GDP unit needs less energy in the second (6.98 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP) compared to the first sub-period (7.23 MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP). When it comes to the sectoral structure of carbon dioxide emission sources, it did not change significantly⁸.

The following Table 2 shows the structure of Kosovo*'s GDP in the period 2008–2020, by sectors.

What can be concluded from the previous table is that the main economic sectors are agriculture, forestry and fisheries, then manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, construction, real estate, and public administration, defense and compulsory social security.

At the same time, the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector significantly reduced its share in GDP in 2020 compared to 2008 (by 3.9 p.p.), as well as the real estate sector (by 2.5 p.p.) and wholesale and retail trade (by 1 p.p.), while some sectors have increased their share: state administration (by 3 p.p.), electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (by 1.5 p.p.), human health and social work activities construction (by 1.3 p.p.) etc.

The following Table 3 shows the structure of GDP in the period 2008–2020, by using the expenditure approach.

8 Author's calculations based on World Bank data see: <https://data.worldbank.org/> (accessed 27.01.2022).

Table 2. Sectoral structure of the GDP of Kosovo and Metohia, period 2008–2020

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing	11.3	8.3	9.5	8.1	7.4	8.4	8.3	7.7	8.2	7.4	6.5	7.2	7.4
B Mining and quarrying	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.0
C Manufacturing	14.0	14.9	13.8	13.1	13.3	13.5	13.5	13.3	13.1	12.8	13.1	12.9	13.4
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.9	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.9
E Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6
F Construction	7.5	7.3	7.7	8.4	8.5	8.0	7.3	7.6	7.3	8.1	8.4	8.2	7.7
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	13.8	13.7	13.0	12.6	12.7	12.4	12.2	12.3	12.3	12.5	12.5	12.8	12.8
H Transportation and storage	3.9	4.1	4.0	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.5	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.4	3.9
I Accommodation and food service activities	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.1	1.6
J Information and communication	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0
K Financial and insurance activities	3.7	3.6	3.8	3.8	4.1	4.3	4.2	3.8	3.0	3.1	3.6	3.9	4.1
L Real estate activities	9.8	10.0	8.8	7.9	8.0	8.0	7.8	7.8	7.5	7.3	7.2	7.1	7.0
M Professional, scientific and technical activities	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.6
N Administrative and support service activities	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
O Public administration and defence; compulsory social security	3.6	4.3	5.1	5.5	5.7	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.7	5.6	5.8	5.9	6.6
P Education	3.4	3.8	3.6	3.9	3.9	3.8	4.1	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.8
Q Human health and social work activities	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.7
R Arts, entertainment and recreation	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2
S Other service activities	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
T Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of households for own use	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Gross Value Added	83.3	83.1	82.4	81.0	81.5	82.4	81.9	81.3	80.3	80.3	80.6	80.8	82.6
Taxes on product	16.7	16.9	17.6	19.0	18.5	17.6	18.1	18.7	19.7	19.7	19.4	19.2	17.4
Subsidies
Gross Domestic Product	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: askdata, Structure of Gross Domestic Product by economic activities 2008–2020, available at: https://askdata.rks-gov.net/PXWeb/pwweb/en/askdata/askdata_07%20National%20and%20government%20accounts__National%20accounts__Annual%20national%20accounts/gdp10.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=ad787284-363a-44a5-bb3d-0f067afa36b7 (accessed 28.01.2022).

Table 3. Structure of GDP of Kosovo and Metohia, expenditure approach, 2008–2020

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
GDP at current prices	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Final consumption expenditure	105.1	106.7	105.7	100.2	100.4	99.1	102.2	98.7	93.8	91.1	91.9	92.6	98.8
Final consumption of households	94.3	94.7	92.8	86.9	86.9	85.7	88.1	84.7	81.3	78.8	79.4	79.7	84.4
Final consumption of Government	10.1	11.3	12.3	12.7	13.0	12.9	13.6	13.6	12.1	11.8	12.1	12.5	13.9
Government of Kosovo	10.1	11.3	12.3	12.7	13.0	12.9	13.6	13.6	12.1	11.8	12.1	12.5	13.9
Final Consumption expenditure of NPISH	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5
Gross capital formation	37.3	32.6	33.1	36.1	31.9	30.0	27.8	30.4	33.5	34.7	36.3	34.6	33.4
Gross fixed capital formation	29.8	30.7	31.0	31.2	30.7	29.2	27.5	28.3	28.0	30.0	31.7	31.0	29.7
Changes on inventories	7.5	1.9	2.1	4.9	1.2	0.8	0.3	2.2	5.5	4.7	4.6	3.5	3.7
Net export	-42.3	-39.3	-38.8	-36.2	-32.3	-29.1	-30.0	-31.0	-31.0	-30.7	-35.3	-35.9	-41.0
Exports of goods and services	17.2	19.2	21.7	25.0	24.5	23.0	23.5	23.9	27.0	32.6	36.4	38.8	27.6
Exports of goods	6.0	4.8	7.4	6.9	5.9	5.7	6.1	6.1	5.8	7.1	7.1	7.4	8.9
Exports of services	11.2	14.5	14.2	18.0	18.6	17.3	17.4	17.9	21.2	25.5	29.3	31.5	18.7
Imports of goods and services	59.5	58.5	60.5	61.2	56.8	52.1	53.5	55.0	58.0	63.4	71.7	74.8	68.6
Imports of goods (FOB)	52.5	50.4	50.6	51.9	48.6	45.1	44.7	45.7	48.8	53.4	58.5	60.7	57.2
Imports of services	7.1	8.2	9.9	9.3	8.2	7.0	8.8	9.3	9.2	10.0	13.3	14.1	11.3

Source: <https://ask.rks-gov.net/en/kosovo-agency-of-statistics/add-news/gross-domestic-product-by-expenditure-and-production-approach-q3-2021> (accessed 28.01.2022).

Based on the insight into the presented data, when it comes to growth generators, it can be concluded that the situation has been changing since 2008. Namely, the share of final consumption decreased (by 6.3 p.p.) as well as of final private consumption (by 9.9 p.p.), but state consumption increased (by 3.8 p.p.). Investments share (by 0.1 p.p.) and deficit in foreign trade share (by 1.3 p.p.) decreased. It can be also concluded that the value of imports is continuously much higher than the value of exports (measured by its share in GDP). But the situation is improving, since at the beginning of the period (2008) imports were about 3.5 times higher than exports, while in 2020 the situation is better, as imports are about 2.5 times higher than exports. Although the share of imports in GDP increased in the observed period (by 9.1 p.p.), the share of exports increased more (by 10.4 p.p.). What is important to note is that the share of exports in GDP has grown by 1.6 times.

For the analysis of economic activities in the area of Kosovo and Metohia, it is important to consider the degree of involvement of the economy in the international environment. For these purposes, Table 4 provides an overview of the volume and structure of exports and imports of Kosovo and Metohia in 2020, with the main trading partners.

Table 4. Exports and imports with the main trading partners, 2020

Country	Exports		Imports	
	value (in thousands of euros)	%	value (in thousands of euros)	%
Albania	110,231	23.2	190,980	5.8
Northern Macedonia	44,082	9.3	188,589	5.7
Serbia	30,522	6.4	174,029	5.3
Montenegro	18,577	3.9	24,331	0.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	7,286	1.5	36,516	1.1
Switzerland	38,852	8.2	23,986	0.7
Turkey	11,040	2.3	409,373	12.4
EU-27	163,498	34.4	1,511,255	45.8
Other partners	50,798	10.7	737,575	22.4
TOTAL	474,884	100	3,296,635	100

Source: Kosovo in Figures 2020, p. 66.

The previous table shows that the largest and most important trade partner of Kosovo* is the EU, since 34.4% of total exports and as much as 45.8% of total imports Kosovo* realizes with EU-27 member states. Of the analyzed countries in

the region, the most important export partners are Albania, Serbia and Northern Macedonia, although these are relatively low exports values (in these three countries in 2020, the export value of goods was only about 184 million euros). Serbia participates in the export of Kosovo* with 6.4%, respectively the export to Serbia in 2020 amounted to about 30 million euros. Regarding imports, it should be noted that Kosovo* has a much higher value of imports than exports. Apart from the EU, Kosovo* imports most goods and services from Turkey. The value of imports from Serbia in 2016 was about 387 million euros and 2020 around 174 million euros, thus reducing the share of imports from Serbia by 2.6 times.

At the end of this part of the paper, we give a brief overview of the international position of the economy of Kosovo and Metohia compared to the surrounding countries, according to the most important macroeconomic indicators (Table 5).

It can be concluded that, for example, Kosovo* has the highest customs rate (7.1%), followed by Serbia (6.5%), while the average customs rate for this group of countries is 3.2%. When it comes to income tax rates, Kosovo* has among the lower rates, and also in the case of corporate income tax rates. Additionally, it is also interesting to note that among the selected countries/entities, Kosovo* has the lowest tax burden, measured as a percentage of GDP (23.5%), and that it has the lowest share of public spending in GDP (27.2%). According to the size of the economy, Kosovo* occupies the penultimate position (GDP value of 19.6 billion dollars, PPP), just behind Montenegro (GDP is 11 billion dollars, PPP).

Table 5. Basic macroeconomic indicators for Kosovo and Metohia and selected countries/entities

Country / Territory	Customs rate (%)	Income tax rate (%)	Profit tax rate (%)	Tax burden (% of GDP)	Public (government) consumption (% of GDP)	Population (in millions)	GDP (in billion dollars, purchasing power parity)	GDP growth rate (%)	5-year GDP growth rate (%)	GDP per capita (in dollars, purchasing power parity)	Unemployment (%)	Inflation (%)	FDI inflow (in millions of dollars)	Public debt (% of GDP)
Albania	1.1	23.0	15.0	24.9	29.5	2.9	36.0	3.9	2.5	12,507	13.9	2.0	1,119.1	71.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.2	10.0	10.0	37.0	42.4	3.5	44.6	2.7	2.5	12,724	25.6	1.3	425.2	41.0
Bulgaria	2.0	10.0	10.0	28.0	34.7	7.1	153.1	3.6	2.7	21,687	6.2	1.2	1,070.7	23.9
Croatia	2.0	40.0	18.0	37.9	47.1	4.1	101.3	2.8	1.5	24,424	11.2	1.1	2,104.2	78.4
Kosovo*	7.1	10.0	10.0	23.5	27.2	1.9	19.6	4.1	3.4	10,515	N/A	1.5	3.6	20.9
North Macedonia	4.0	10.0	10.0	24.8	31.6	2.1	31.0	0.0	2.7	14,914	22.4	1.4	256.3	39.3
Montenegro	2.6	9.0	9.0	36.1	47.4	0.6	11.0	4.2	3.2	17,736	16.1	2.4	545.9	67.5
Romania	2.0	10.0	16.0	26.0	32.1	19.6	481.5	7.0	4.5	24,508	4.9	1.3	5,160.0	36.9
Serbia	6.5	10.0	15.0	38.4	42.8	7.0	105.5	1.8	1.2	15,000	14.1	3.1	2,866.7	61.5

Source: [2019 Index of Economic Freedom], available at: <https://www.heritage.org/index/explore> (accessed 29.01.2019)

When it comes to economic growth, Kosovo* has the fastest growing economy, right behind Romania. Kosovo* also has the lowest share of public debt in GDP (20.9%), while the average for these nine countries is 49%. Inflation rate in Kosovo* can be evaluated as low (recalling that the euro is used as a currency in the province). However, all this is still not enough for Kosovo* to move from the last position in this group of countries/entities when it comes to the level of economic development, as it has the lowest value of GDP per capita (10,515 dollars, PPP), while the average for this group of countries is 17,113 dollars. It is evident that the limiting factor of growth and development is the low amount of foreign direct investment, so this issue should be in the focus of future economic and overall policy of Kosovo*.

KOSOVO* AND WESTERN BALKAN

A global insight into the basic development characteristics of the Western Balkans (5 states + Kosovo* entity) in the late 2020s can be achieved by analysing the data presented in the Table 6:

Table 6. Selected macroeconomic and other indicators in the Western Balkans

INDICATORS	ALBANIA	BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	MONTENEGRO
General indicators			
Land area (sq. km), 2020	27,400	51,200	13,450
Arable land (% of land area), 2018	22.3	20.1	0.7
Arable land (hectares per person), 2018	0.21	0.31	0.01
Agricultural land (% of land area), 2018	42.8	43.2	19.1
Economic indicators			
External balance on goods and services (% of GDP), 2020	-14.7	-14.0	-35.0
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP), 2020	37.9	48.5	61.0
Gross capital formation (% of GDP), 2020	24.0e	23.0	31.0
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), 2020	23.0	22.0	28.0
Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP), 2020	-	10.0a	20.0f
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP), 2020	23.1	34.5	26.0
Gross national expenditure (% of GDP), 2019	115.0e	117.0	135.0

INDICATORS	ALBANIA	BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	MONTENEGRO
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP), 2020	9.8	9.3	12.6
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), 2019	7.8	2.2	7.5
ICT service imports (% of service imports), 2020	0.0d	0.2	0.5d
Current account balance (% of GDP), 2020	-8.8	-3.8	-25.9
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP), 2020	0.3	0.4	-0.1
Military expenditure (% of GDP), 2019	1.5	0.9	2.1
Trade in services (% of GDP), 2020	26.2	9.7	28.4
Profit tax (% of commercial profits), 2019	14.1	8.4	8.3
Labor tax and contributions (% of commercial profits), 2019	18.8	13.6	13.4
Short-term debt (% of total external debt), 2020	6.2	13.6	3.3
External debt stocks (% of GNI), 2020	74.2	72.1	200.6
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate), 2020	11.7	15.9	17.9
Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (national estimate), 2020	27.0e	36.6	36.0
Gross savings (% of GDP), 2020	11.0	16.0	5.0
GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international \$), 2020	13,485.3e	14,381.6	18,546.1
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$), 2020	13,670	15,600	20,870
GNI per capita growth (annual %), 2020	1.4e	-3.1	-14.8
GNI per capita (constant 2015 US\$), 2020	4,430.4d	5,385.2	6,621.5
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP), 2020	38.7	58.5	60.0
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), 2020	1.6	-1.1	-0.3
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (national estimate), 2020	52.5	40.1	43.8
Services, value added (% of GDP), 2020	48.4	55.8	58.0
Industry (including construction), value added (% of GDP), 2020	20.1	24.6	17.3
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP), 2020	6.0	13.0	4.0
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP), 2020	19.1	6.1	7.6
GNI growth (annual %), 2020	0.9e	-3.7	-14.9
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international \$), 2020	13,192	14,509	18,259

INDICATORS	ALBANIA	BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	MONTENEGRO
GDP per capita growth (annual %), 2020	-3.4	-2.6	-15.2
GDP per capita (constant 2015 US\$), 2020	4,424.3	5,367.0	6,522.6
GDP, PPP (constant 2017 international \$), 2020	37,436.79	47,602.20	11,344.41
GDP growth (annual %), 2020	-4.0	-3.2	-5.3

Table 6 : continued

INDICATORS	KOSOVO*	NORTHERN MACEDONIA	SERBIA
General indicators			
Land area (sq. km), 2020	10,887c	25,220	87,460
Arable land (% of land area), 2018	27.6b	16.6	29.5
Arable land (hectares per person), 2018	0.17b	0.2	0.37
Agricultural land (% of land area), 2018	52.4b	50.1	39.6
Economic indicators			
External balance on goods and services (% of GDP), 2020	-32.2	-12.8	-8.3
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP), 2020	53.9	70.9	56.5
Gross capital formation (% of GDP), 2020	33.0	30.0	24.0
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), 2020	30.0	21.0	21.00
Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP), 2020	20.0	16.0	16.0
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP), 2020	21.7	58.1	48.2
Gross national expenditure (% of GDP), 2019	132.0	113.0	108.0
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP), 2020	18.6	3.4	7.3
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), 2019	3.6	4.4	8.3
ICT service imports (% of service imports), 2020	-	0.7	1.0
Current account balance (% of GDP), 2020	-7.0	-3.4	-4.1
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP), 2020	0.9	-1.4	0.2
Military expenditure (% of GDP), 2019	1.1	1.3	2.1
Trade in services (% of GDP), 2020	23.8	23.1	24.2
Profit tax (% of commercial profits), 2019	9.3	11.0	13.0
Labor tax and contributions (% of commercial profits), 2019	5.6	0.0	20.2
Short-term debt (% of total external debt), 2020	30.9	14.2	6.1
External debt stocks (% of GNI), 2020	39.3	89.9	74.4
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate), 2020	26.2	17.2	9.0
Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (national estimate), 2020	49.7	37.0	26.6

INDICATORS	KOSOVO*	NORTHERN MACEDONIA	SERBIA
Gross savings (% of GDP), 2020	27.0	26.0	21.0
GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international \$), 2020	11,062.2	15,310.8	17,665.4
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$), 2020	11,660	16,360	18,780
GNI per capita growth (annual %), 2020	-4.4	-4.2	2.0
GNI per capita (constant 2015 US\$), 2020	4,094.7	4,886.2	6,329.9
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP), 2020	51.6	56.2	45.5
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), 2020	0.2	1.2	1.6
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (national estimate), 2020	24.3	43.4	49.1
Services, value added (% of GDP), 2020	47.6	57.0	51.9
Industry (including construction), value added (% of GDP), 2020	27.6	22.6	24.9
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP), 2020	13.0	13.0	13.0
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP), 2020	7.4	9.1	6.3
GNI growth (annual %), 2020	-5.2	-4.4	1.5
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international \$), 2020	10,795	15,931	18,231
GDP per capita growth (annual %), 2020	-4.6	-5.0	-0.4
GDP per capita (constant 2015 US\$), 2020	3,993.0	5,092.7	6,533.20
GDP, PPP (constant 2017 international \$), 2020	19,166.08	33,018.28	125,943.87
GDP growth (annual %), 2020	-15.3	-5.2	-0.9

^a 2004, ^b 2007, ^c 2017, ^d 2018, ^e 2019

Source: [Рикаловић и др. 2021: 18–19] and authors' calculations based on the World Bank database <https://data.worldbank.org/>.

Empirical tests of convergence in Central and Eastern Europe (CEEs) and the Western Balkans have relied on the neoclassical growth model⁹. To test the convergence hypothesis between 16 Central and Eastern European countries (CEEs), annual data on the value of real gross domestic product per capita (in constant dollars from 2017, PPP method) in the period 2000–2026 were used. The data were taken from the World Bank database, and the projected values for the period until 2026 were also considered.

There are two main hypotheses tested in the empirical research: (1) H1: CEEs countries are not a homogeneous group of countries; and (2) H2: The Western Balkans is a relatively homogeneous regional integration. Although the first hy-

⁹ See: [Рикаловић и др. 2021: 12–39].

pothesis was confirmed, this did not mean that convergence did not exist in the case of the narrower clubs of the countries within CEEs.

Based on the obtained results, *three clubs of countries* were identified: *the first* – Hungary, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia; *the second* – Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia; and *third* – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and Kosovo*.

Since the possibility of merging the identified clubs (first and second; second and third) was rejected in the research, the initial classification of clubs is also final. This confirmed the second hypothesis that the Western Balkans (not considering Serbia, which is in the second club together with Bulgaria and Croatia) is a relatively homogeneous entity. It could be concluded that Serbia is the “locomotive” of the Western Balkans and that all countries in this area should join the regional initiative for cooperation *Open Balkans*. The data presented in Table 6 and the findings of the mentioned research indicate that there is a justification for including all the countries of the Western Balkans, as well as Kosovo* in the initiative for regional cooperation *Open Balkans*¹⁰. In fact, the entire Western Balkans could count on significant gains in terms of freedom of movement of people, goods and capital, co-operation in the field of disaster protection and lasting peace, as well as accelerating European integration.

ANALYSIS OF KOSOVO*’S POSITION AND ITS RANKING ACCORDING TO SELECTED GLOBAL INDICES IN RELEVANT DOMAINS

Although today there are many global indices that evaluate different aspects of social and economic life of the modern world and certain countries, determined on the basis of different methodological approaches and cover the dimensions to which they refer, the basic intention of their designers is to provide a consistent framework and analysis, and monitoring modern political, economic, social, environmental and security processes. A brief overview of some of the mentioned indices will be given here, with the aim to point out the quality of the institutional and developmental capacities of Kosovo and Metohia and their position in relation to our country and its close surroundings.

The status of political rights and civil liberties is determined according to the Freedom Index published by Freedom House. When assessing freedoms in a coun-

¹⁰ As a result of the economic forum on regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, held in Skopje in July 2021, the initiative for regional cooperation Mini Schengen was renamed in the *Open Balkan initiative*. Also, the forum was marked by the signing of the three agreements on the movement of goods, access to the labor market and cooperation in natural catastrophe by the leaders of Albania, Northern Macedonia and Serbia (*Memorandum of understanding and cooperation on facilitating import, export and movement of goods in the Western Balkans; the Memorandum on free access to the labor market and the Agreement on cooperation in disaster protection*). *Open Balkan initiative* provides support for the creation of a common regional market for 12 million people and the abolition of border controls between Serbia, Northern Macedonia, and Albania from January 1, 2023, *ibid*, p. 13–16.

try, the situation is considered in two domains: political rights (10 indicators) and civil liberties (15 indicators). The maximum number of points that can be awarded for political rights is 40, while for civil liberties it is 60 points. Thus, the total number of points can theoretically range from 0 (no freedom) to 100 (complete freedom). Then, depending on the number of points scored, the country is assigned an appropriate rating on a scale from 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7 (lowest degree of freedom) for both observed areas (political rights and civil liberties).

Then these two country ratings are combined into one. The combined state rating can also take a value from 1 (maximum degree of freedom) to 7 (minimum degree of freedom), when countries with a rating of 1 to 2.5 are considered as free, those with a rating of 3 to 5 being partially free, while those with a rating of 5.5 to 7 are among the countries in which there are no freedoms¹¹.

The combined rating of Kosovo* in 2018 and 2019 is 3.5, which puts this area among the partially free. The following table (Table 7) provides an insight into the movement of the freedom index in the period from 2018 to 2021 for the countries of the Western Balkans, and on this basis it can be noted that this area belongs to the category of partially free.

Table 7. Value of the Freedom Index, Western Balkans, 2018–2021

Country / Territory	Aggregate value of the Freedom Index (0–100), 2018	Aggregate value of the Freedom Index (0–100), 2019	Aggregate value of the Freedom Index (0–100), 2020	Aggregate value of the Freedom Index (0–100), 2021	Sub-index: Political Rights, 2021	Sub-index: Civil freedoms, 2021	Status
Kosovo*	52	54	56	54	23	31	Partly free
Northern Macedonia	58	59	63	66	27	39	Partly free
Bosnia and Herzegovina	55	53	53	53	19	34	Partly free
Albania	68	68	67	66	27	39	Partly free
Serbia	73	67	66	64	22	42	Partly free
Montenegro	67	65	62	63	24	39	Partly free

Source: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores> (accessed 05.09.2021).

It can be seen that Kosovo* together with Bosnia and Herzegovina belongs to the very back of the list of Western Balkans countries, when it comes to freedoms.

¹¹ See more about this index at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores> (accessed 30.01.2019).

Freedom House also measures the level of democratic governance in 29 countries in Central Europe and Central Asia in its annual report *Nations in Transit*¹². Democracy assessment includes separate assessments in 7 categories / areas that largely represent the institutional basis of liberal democracy: democratic governance at the national level, electoral process, civil society, media independence, democratic governance at the local level, judicial framework and independence, as well as corruption.

The assessment of democracy, which represents the average for these 7 categories, ranges from 1 (lowest level of democracy) to 7 (highest level of democracy). Countries can be classified into one of the following five categories depending on the level of assessment: consolidated democracies (score 5.01 to 7), semi-consolidated democracies (score 4.01 to 5), transitional or hybrid regimes (score 3.01 to 4), semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes (score from 2.01 to 3) and consolidated authoritarian regimes (score from 1 to 2).

Since 2020, Freedom House has introduced the “percentage of democracy” indicator, which translates the democracy score from 0 to 100, with 0 representing the lowest and 100 the highest level of democracy.

Table 8. Level of Democracy, Western Balkans, 2021

Country / Territory	Total score	Status	Democracy Percentage	Democracy Score
Kosovo*	36	transitional or hybrid regime	35.71	3.14
Northern Macedonia	47	transitional or hybrid regime	47.02	3.82
Bosnia and Herzegovina	39	transitional or hybrid regime	39.29	3.36
Albania	46	transitional or hybrid regime	45.83	3.75
Serbia	48	transitional or hybrid regime	48.21	3.89
Montenegro	47	transitional or hybrid regime	47.02	3.82

Source: <https://freedomhouse.org/countries/nations-transit/scores> (accessed 13.01.2022).

It turns out that Kosovo* has the lowest percentage (35.71) and reach (3.14) of democracy in the Western Balkans.

The Heritage Foundation in Washington has been publishing the Index of Economic Freedoms for more than two decades. The index covers 12 types of freedoms, from property rights to financial freedoms in 186 countries. Economic freedoms are measured on the basis of 12 quantitative and qualitative factors, grouped into four major categories, the so-called pillars of economic freedoms: rule of law, state size, efficiency of regulatory framework and market openness. Each of the twelve types of economic freedoms within these categories is rated on a scale from

¹² See more: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit> (accessed 20.01.2022).

0 to 100. The overall score for the country is obtained by calculating the simple (unweighted) arithmetic mean of the values for these 12 pillars¹³.

Countries can also be found in one of the following categories: free (index value greater than 80), mostly free (index value 70–80), moderately free (index value 60–70), mostly non-free (index value 50–60) and countries in which repression is present (index value less than 50)¹⁴.

The following Table 9 presents data on the value of the index of economic freedoms for the territory of Kosovo* and the countries of the Western Balkans for 2021. There are data on the total value of this index, but also by its individual segments/pillars.

The average value of the index of economic freedoms for the countries/territories of the Region in 2021 is 65.6, so the Region as a whole can be considered moderately free. Kosovo* with an index value of 66.5 belongs to the group of moderately free territories and is slightly above the average value of the respective index of the Region.

At the same time, Kosovo* has the worst performance in the area of rule of law, followed by market openness. The most unfavorable dimensions of the Kosovo* Economic Freedom Index are financial freedoms and government integrity.

Table 9. Economic Freedom Index (total and by individual segments), Western Balkans, 2021

Country / Territory	Rang (from 180 countries), 2021.	Value of the Index, 2021	Property Rights	Judicial Effectiveness	Government Integrity	Tax Burden	Gov't Spending	Fiscal Health	Business Freedom	Labor Freedom	Monetary Freedom	Trade Freedom	Investment Freedom	Financial Freedom
Albania	66	65.2	46.1	22.8	40.6	89.0	74.6	86.6	66.1	51.6	82.0	82.8	70	70
Bosnia and Herzegovina	82	62.9	44.1	33.7	42.4	93.8	49.5	97.1	48.2	67.8	84.1	69.2	65	60
Kosovo*	58	66.5	54.5	55.9	46.4	92.6	75.0	90.5	71.2	64.4	75.7	77.2	65	30
Montenegro	80	63.4	57.8	56.2	51.0	83.6	35.3	37.2	73.5	78.0	83.4	79.4	75	50
North Macedonia	46	68.6	62.6	40.4	41.9	94.9	71.0	87.8	77.8	65.2	78.7	77.4	65	60
Serbia	54	67.2	57.9	50.6	45.0	92.5	49.6	94.6	71.0	67.3	81.1	77.2	70	50


Source: [2021 Index of Economic Freedom], available at: <https://www.heritage.org/index/explore> (accessed 05.09.2021).

13 See more about this index at: <https://www.heritage.org/index/explore> (accessed 20.02.2019).

14 For more details: <https://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-3> (accessed 20.02.2019).

However, in 2021, Kosovo* is ahead of Serbia and Albania in terms of the quality of the judiciary, government integrity and state spending. Graph 1 presents a comparative analysis of the dimensions of the index of economic freedoms in 2021 for Serbia (without Kosovo), Albania and Kosovo*.

Graph 1. Pillars of Economic Freedom Index – comparison of Serbia, Albania and Kosovo*, 2021



Source: Authors based on: [2021 Index of Economic Freedom] available at: <https://www.heritage.org/index/explore> (accessed 05.09.2021).

One of the important indicators used for international comparisons is a group of six indicators that measure the quality of governance (Worldwide governance indicators – WGI)¹⁵. They were designed for the needs of the World Bank project, and have been monitored since 1996 (for more than 200 countries). Each of the indicators (voice and accountability; political stability; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law and control of corruption) can be presented on a scale from 0 (worst case) to 5 (best situation)¹⁶. Table 10 below shows the position of the Western Balkan countries in relation to the average of the Region, according to each of the indicators in 2019.

15 See more about this indicator at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home> (accessed 28.01.2019).

16 This is a modification that was applied in [Tanasković 2018], for easier understanding and interpretation of the index itself. Namely, the original values of the indicators range from -2.5 to 2.5, but due to the simplicity of monitoring, they are often modified by reducing the value of 2.5 to the lowest and highest value to indicators ranging from 0 to 5.

Table 10. WGI, position of the Western Balkan countries in relation to the Region (Western Balkans = 100), 2019

	Voice and accountability	Political stability	Government effectiveness	Regulatory quality	Rule of law	Control of corruption
Albania	106.85	110.70	103.54	105.73	91.47	95.25
Bosnia and Herzegovina	92.74	88.73	79.35	88.17	99.34	91.38
Kosovo*	95.56	89.15	91.23	82.06	92.34	93.80
Montenegro	102.02	106.06	112.87	109.54	113.79	119.42
Northern Macedonia	100.81	103.52	106.08	114.89	98.91	101.05
Serbia	102.02	101.83	106.93	99.62	104.16	99.11

Source: author's calculation based on the database available at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home>

Based on the previous table, it can be shown that the area of Kosovo* in 2019 achieves lower values than the average for the Region in all 6 dimensions. In addition, compared to other countries (average period 2013–2017)¹⁷, Kosovo* has the worst position in the area of participation and responsibility (2.25), and in the field of rule of law (1.89). If we compare the situation in Kosovo* in the observed six dimensions of the quality of state governance, the worst assessments (below 2) are in the field of rule of law and corruption control. Serbia is better than Kosovo* (although not much) in all observed dimensions, except in the quality of the regulatory framework. The quality of governance can be assessed as poor.

The following Table 11 supports the previous statement, which lists the aggravating factors for doing business in Kosovo*.

Table 11. Aggravating factors in business (index 0–100)

Barrier	2014	2010
1. Expensive sources of funding	83.7	84.2
2. Corruption	81.2	82
3. Insufficient state support	81.1	82.3
4. Unfair competition	80.1	80.2
5. Dysfunctional justice	76.2	77.8
6. High tax rates	74.8	76.3
7. Crime	71	72.7

¹⁷ Author's calculation based on the database available at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home>

Barrier	2014	2010
8. Insufficient number of parking spaces	49.8	70.8
9. Small market	68.8	67.8
10. Unavailability of funding sources	65.7	67.5

Source: Riinvest Institute (2014). *Business Climate in Kosovo*, p. 30, according to: [Давидовић и др. 2018].

The previous table clearly shows that the situation has not improved significantly and that the biggest problems are reflected in expensive and/or inaccessible sources of financing and high interest rates due to distrust in the banking sector, as well as high levels of corruption.

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) was created by The Institute for Economics & Peace. According to this indicator, terrorism is defined and understood as the use of illegal force or violence by non-state actors in order to achieve a certain political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation. The GTI index rates each country on a scale from 0 (there is no impact of terrorism) to 10 (the most measurable impact of terrorism). 163 countries and territories are assessed and ranked, with countries being ranked on a declining scale – the lower the rank of the state, the lower the risk of terrorism. The following Table 12 presents the situation in this area in the Western Balkans for 2017, 2018 and 2020:

Table 12. Global Terrorism Index, Western Balkans, 2017, 2018 and 2020

Country / Territory	GTI (0–10), 2017	GTI (0–10), 2018	GTI (0–10), 2020	Rank 2017 (from 163 countries)	Rank 2018 (from 163 countries)	Rank 2020 (from 163 countries)
Kosovo*	2.548	2.694	0.000	70	71	135
Northern Macedonia	1.186	0.649	0.105	92	106	124
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.029	1.339	0.677	78	91	95
Albania	1.487	1.008	0.677	90	97	95
Serbia	0.043	0.229	0.057	126	116	126
Montenegro	0.078	0.038	0.420	122	132	107

Source: [Global Terrorism Index 2017: 10–11], [Global Terrorism Index 2018: 8–10] and [Global Terrorism Index 2020: 8–9].

What can be concluded on the basis of the presented data is that in the observed group of countries in the first two mentioned years (2017 and 2018), the greatest threat from terrorism exists in the territory of Kosovo*. However, in 2020 there is no impact of terrorism in Kosovo* (GTI = 0), which means that this area

has the most favorable position in the Region. It is noted that Northern Macedonia, Serbia, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina have made corresponding progress in this area in 2020 compared to 2018.

The Global Peace Index has been published since 2007 by the Institute for Economics and Peace, which develops measurement methodology and quantifies the economic benefits of peacetime situations. This index¹⁸ shows the degree of peace/tranquility achieved in a country, taking into account developments in three areas: 1) existing domestic and international conflicts, 2) social security and safety, and 3) militarization¹⁹. The Global Peace Index is a composite indicator that includes 23 indicators classified into the three areas mentioned above [Global Peace Index 2018: 79]. All ratings of these indicators are normalized on a scale from 1 to 5. During the construction of this index in 2007, a group of independent experts assigned each of these 23 indicators an appropriate weight (from 1 to 5) in accordance with their relative importance²⁰.

The data from the following table (Table 13) indicate that the situation in the area of peace/tranquility in the Western Balkans has improved in 2021. compared to the previous period.

Table 13. Global Peace Index, Western Balkans, 2008–2021

Country / Territory	GPI (0–5), 2008	GPI (0–5), 2017	GPI (0–5), 2018	GPI (0–5), 2021
Kosovo*	/	2.007	2.078	2.017
Northern Macedonia	2.119	2.133	2.058	1.744
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.974	2.035	2.065	1.970
Albania	2.044	1.908	1.849	1.824
Serbia	2.11	1.888	1.851	1.797
Montenegro	/	1.950	1.893	1.847

Source: Authors based on: [Global Peace Index 2008, 2017, 2018 and 2021].

18 For more details see: [Rikalović i dr. 2019: 59–78].

19 The first area concerns the assessment of the extent to which a country is involved in internal and external conflicts, as well as the evaluation of its role in these conflicts and the duration of its involvement in these conflicts. The second area is the assessment of the degree of harmony/discord within the state. The third domain refers to the valorization of the connection between the level of militarization of society and the availability of weapons and the achieved degree of peace / tranquility in one country, both domestically and internationally.

20 The expert team consisted of: Prof. Kevin P. Clements (New Zealand), Sabina Alkire (UK), Ian Anthony (Sweden), Isabelle Arradon (Belgium), Manuela Mesa (Spain), Ekaterina Stepanova (Russia), see: [Global Peace Index 2018: 78].

It is noted that the situation regarding peace / tranquility in 2021 is the most unfavorable in Kosovo*, and the best in Northern Macedonia.

Since 2012, the global anti-corruption coalition Transparency International has been monitoring and publishing data on the level of corruption. The level of corruption is measured using the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)²¹. The mentioned index aggregates data and information from numerous sources which express the perception of business people and experts on the level of corruption in the public sector in a particular country. The Corruption Perceptions Index can take a value from 0 (state of complete corruption) to 100 (complete absence of corruption). So, the lower the value of this index, the worse the situation regarding corruption in the country. Table 14 presents the values of the Corruption Perceptions Index for the observed countries, as well as the ranking of these countries in 2020.

Table 14. Corruption Perceptions Index, Western Balkans, 2020

Country / Territory	CPI (0–100), 2020	Rank 2020 (from 180 countries)	Barometer of global corruption (%)*
Montenegro	45	67	10%
Serbia	38	94	15%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	35	111	20%
Kosovo*	36	93	8%
Northern Macedonia	35	111	/
Albania	36	104	25%

Source: 2020 – CPI – Transparency.org (accessed 13.01.2022).

* Percentage of public service users who have paid bribes in the last 12 months.

The previous table shows that the Corruption Perceptions Index in Kosovo* in 2020 is 36, which together with Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania ranks it among those with the highest perceptions of corruption (average value of the Index for the Region is 37.5)

The following Table 15 presents a time series of data on the value of the Corruption Perceptions Index in the analyzed countries during the period from 2012 to 2020. What can be seen from the previous table is that Kosovo* has improved its position in this area compared to 2012, and that in the last year the value of the Index remained at the level of the previous year, 2019. Looking at the entire period, the average value of this index for Kosovo* is very low (35.2), which is at the level of the corruption perception index in Albania, i.e. Kosovo* and Albania are characterized by the highest level of corruption perception in the Region.

21 More about the Corruption Perceptions Index at: <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018> (accessed 30.01.2019).

Table 15. Corruption Perceptions Index, Western Balkans, 2012–2020

Country / Territory	Corruption Perceptions Index									
	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	average 2012–2020
Montenegro	45	45	45	46	45	44	42	44	41	44.1
Serbia	38	39	39	41	42	40	41	42	39	40.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	35	36	38	38	39	38	39	42	42	38.6
Kosovo*	36	36	37	39	36	33	33	33	34	35.2
Northern Macedonia	35	35	37	35	37	42	45	44	43	39.2
Albania	36	35	36	38	39	36	33	31	33	35.2

Source: <https://www.transparency.org>

In a globalized world, residency (nationality) is becoming increasingly important, so the Quality of Nationality Index (QNI)²² is monitored using a single composite index. A value of 0 indicates the worst, and a value of 100 indicates the best condition. Table 16 given below presents the value of the Citizenship Quality Index for the Western Balkans in 2017 and 2018, the ranking of these countries in the world according to this Index in the same years, as well as the change in the value of this indicator from 2013 to 2017.

Table 16. Quality of Nationality Index (QNI), Western Balkans

Country / Territory	Quality of Nationality Index – QNI, 0–100, 2018	Quality of Nationality Index – QNI, 0–100, 2017	QNI change 2013–2017.	Rank 2017 (from 167 countries)	Rank 2018 (from 159 countries)
Kosovo*	25.30	23.80	1.40	137	128
Northern Macedonia	39.30	37.10	3.00	74	67
Bosnia and Herzegovina	38.80	36.80	3.60	76	71
Albania	38.70	36.70	4.50	77	72
Serbia	42.10	39.70	4.00	66	61
Montenegro	40.90	38.60	3.60	68	64

Source: [Henley & Partners 2017] and [Henley & Partners 2018]

From the previous table it can be seen that the quality of citizenship is the lowest in the case of Kosovo* in the Western Balkans. The value of this indicator

²² See more in: [Henley & Partners 2017].

for the area of Kosovo* in 2018 reaches about two thirds (about 67.5%) of the average of the Region. In the period from 2013 to 2018, Kosovo* is increasingly lagging behind the countries of the Region in terms of the quality of citizenship. This can be seen in the ranking on the global ranking list according to this criterion.

The Human Development Index (HDI) is an aggregate indicator that expresses the country's average achievements in three basic dimensions of human development: long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. The value of the Human Development Index ranges from 0 (lowest level of human development) to 1 (highest level of human development)²³. The following Table 17 presents the value of HDI in 2019 for the countries of the Region, as well as their position on the global ranking list, which includes a total of 189 countries.

Table 17. Human Development Index, Western Balkans, 2019

Country / Territory	HDI (2019)	Rank (2019), from 189 countries	Change in rank, 2014–2019
Kosovo*	0.75	/	/
Albania	0.795	69	-4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.78	73	8
Northern Macedonia	0.774	82	2
Montenegro	0.829	48	2
Serbia	0.806	64	3

Source: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (accessed 16.01.2022). and for Kosovo* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_districts_of_Kosovo_by_Human_Development_Index (accessed 16.01.2022). (as there is no data for Kosovo* in the official Human Development Report 2020).

The comparison leads to the conclusion that Kosovo* has the lowest level of quality of human development (0.75) compared to other countries (the average of the Region is 0.789).

Standard and most commonly used economic and social indicators are not able to best describe the quality of life in a country. Researchers Helivel, Laird and Sachs have created the Gross National Happiness (GNH) indicator, which is explained, measured and monitored for more than 150 countries in a document/study entitled "World Happiness Report"²⁴. The following Table 18 provides data on the value of the Happiness Index for the countries of the Region, as well as their position on the unique ranking list of 156 countries.

²³ More about the Human Development Index see: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>

²⁴ For more on the Gross National Happiness Concept (GNH), see [World Happiness Report 2018].

Table 18. Happiness Index, Western Balkans, 2017–2020

Country / Nation / Territory	Rank, 2020	Rank, 2017–2019	Happiness Index (0–10), 2020	Happiness Index (0–10), average 2017–2019
Kosovo*	31	32	6.294	6.325
Northern Macedonia	75	66	5.054	5.16
Bosnia and Herzegovina	58	54	5.516	5.674
Albania	63	75	5.365	4.883
Serbia	42	51	6.042	5.778
Montenegro	54	57	5.722	5.546

Source: [World Happiness Report 2021: 18–22].

Based on the data from the previous table, it can be concluded that people are the happiest in Kosovo*. The average value of the Happiness Index for the Western Balkans in 2020 is 5.67, which means that the mentioned index in the case of Kosovo* is ahead of the average by more than 11%. Kosovo* ranks in the 32nd place for the period from 2017 to 2019, and in 2020 it takes 31st position. In 2020, Albania ranks 63rd, Northern Macedonia 75th, and Serbia 42nd in the Happiness Index rankings.

“Reporters Without Borders” calculates and monitors the World Press Freedom Index²⁵. The index takes values from 0 to 100, where the situation is assessed as good if the index is in the range of 0 to 15 points, as quite good (15–25 points), as problematic (25–35 points), as bad (35–55 points) and as very bad (55–100 points). The following Table 19 contains data on the value of this index for the countries of the Region in 2020 and 2021, as well as the ranking of these countries on the global list of 180 countries and territories.

When it comes to media freedom, according to this organization and their index, the situation in Kosovo* has worsened in 2021 compared to 2020 (increase in the value of the index by 0.99 points). Also, it can be seen that on the global ranking list, Kosovo* recorded a decrease of 8 places in 2021 compared to 2020. At the same time, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina remained in the same positions as in 2020, while Albania, Montenegro and Northern Macedonia made progress in that regard. According to this index, the situation of media freedoms in the Region is problematic, except in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the situation in this area is assessed as quite good.

²⁵ See more about this index and the methodology of its calculation at: <https://rsf.org/en/detailed-methodology> (accessed 31.01.2019).

Table 19. World Press Freedom Index, Western Balkan, 2020–2021

Country / Territory	World Press Freedom Index, 2020	World Press Freedom Index, 2021	Rank 2020 (from 180 countries)	Rank 2021 (from 180 countries)
Albania	30.25	30.59	84	83
Bosnia and Herzegovina	20.51	20.34	58	58
Northern Macedonia	31.28	31.67	92	90
Montenegro	33.83	34.33	105	104
Serbia	31.62	32.03	93	93
Kosovo*	29.33	30.32	70	78

Source: https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table?sort=asc&order=Countries%20%26%20regions (accessed 05.09.2021)

The index that monitors the satisfaction of members of the gay population is another global indicator that we had in mind during our analysis. The aim of this index is to combine three basic dimensions that are important for assessing the situation in the country on this issue: a) public opinion (what do gay men think about society’s view of homosexuality?), b) society/community behavior (how gay men perceive it) the way other people treat them?) and c) life satisfaction (how satisfied are gay men with their lives and do they accept themselves?)²⁶

The following Table 20 shows the value of the Gay Happiness Index (GHI) for selected countries in the last year for which data are available (2015), as well as the position of these countries in the global ranking list that includes 127 countries.

Table 20. Gay Happiness Index – GHI, Western Balkan, 2015

Country / Territory	GHI (0–100), 2015	Rank (2015), from 127 countries
Kosovo*	29	116
Northern Macedonia	33	103
Bosnia and Herzegovina	33	102
Albania	34	94
Serbia	36	89
Montenegro	35	92

Source: <https://www.planetromeo.com/en/care/gay-happiness-index/> (accessed 29.01.2019)

²⁶ For more details see: <https://www.planetromeo.com/en/care/gay-happiness-index/> (accessed 31.01.2019).

The data from the previous table show that the position of members of the gay population is the worst in Kosovo* compared to other countries – the value of the Index is the lowest, and on the single list Kosovo* ranks only 116th out of 127 ranked countries. This indicates that there is a low level of tolerance in the territory of Kosovo*. According to this index, Serbia has the best position in the region, and is obviously tolerant towards members of the gay population, being ranked as 89th on the ranking list.

OVERVIEW OF SOME RESEARCH IN RELEVANT AREAS OF LIFE IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA

In recent years, there have been several studies conducted in order to analyze the determinants of economic growth in Kosovo and Metohia.

A study conducted by Jeton Zogjani, Myrvete Badivuku-Pantina [Zogjani and Badivuku-Pantina 2014] examines the impact of remittances on Kosovo's economic development. The main motive for this research was the fact that in 2013 the total value of remittances in Kosovo was 620.8 million euros, and that in 2011 Kosovo was among the top 10 countries with the highest level of remittances [Zogjani and Badivuku-Pantina 2014: 61]. The authors used secondary data, as well as the linear regression method (ordinary least squares method) processed in the STATA software.

The paper assumes that remittances are a very important source of funding in countries with lower levels of economic development and transition countries, such as Kosovo*. In Kosovo*, the share of remittances in GDP is very high, so that together with foreign direct investment and the financial sector they make up the dominant part of GDP (close to 65%). The paper emphasizes that remittances are very important for the territory of Kosovo, especially for stimulating consumption and private investment, and their impact is very important for improving the quality of life and economic activity in Kosovo. According to research conducted within the United Nations Program [UNDP 2010], there are over 25%, or over 400,000 people in Kosovo whose remittances are the main source of income, while the Kosovo Agency of Statistics [KAS 2013] reported that over 43% citizens of Kosovo have family members living abroad.

The mentioned Zogjani and Badivuku-Pantina paper examines the impact of remittances on economic growth in Kosovo during the period from 2008 to 2013. The data used in this study were of a secondary nature and were collected from official economic and financial institutions (Central Bank of Kosovo, Kosovo Agency of Statistics, World Bank Indicators).

Multiple regression analysis by the method of ordinary least squares (OLS) was applied to the collected data, where economic growth was set as a dependent

variable, and remittances, inflation rate and exchange rate were determined as independent variables.

The results of this study show that remittances ($\beta_1 = -0.017$) and the exchange rate ($\beta_3 = -0.322$) have a negative impact on economic growth, but that the obtained regression coefficient is not statistically significant (see Table 21), but that the inflation rate is positive, and a statistically significant ($\beta_2 = 0.245$) effect on economic growth. The coefficient of determination (R^2) is 84%, and the coefficient of Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics is 2.11, which means that there is no autocorrelation.

Table 21. Test results by OLS method

Economic growth	Coefficient value	Standard error	T- statistics	P - value	Coefficient of determination	Durbin-Watson test
Constant	36.679	35.717	1.03	0.412	0.839	2.11
Remittances	-0.017	0.203	0.09	0.94		
Inflation rate	0.245	0.097	2.53	0.127		
Exchange rate	-0.322	0.339	-0.95	0.443		

Source: [Zogjani and Badivuku-Pantina 2014: 68].

The same authors conducted another similar study that examined the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth in Kosovo* [Badivuku-Pantina and Zogjani 2015]. The paper started from the fact that in most Balkan countries (including Kosovo*), FDI is very important for the sustainability of economic growth, especially after the global financial crisis. It is pointed out that the share of FDI in GDP was over 10% in 2009, and that the sectors that absorb most of these investments are real estate (41.6%), telecommunications (13.2%), financial markets (11, 5%) and civil engineering (9.5%) [Badivuku-Pantina and Zogjani 2015: 32]. However, it is also stated that according to the World Bank Report for Kosovo* [World Bank 2014], the amount of FDI and exports still does not reach a stable level.

Institutions in Kosovo* have tried to protect foreign investors through the provisions of the Law on Foreign Investment. However, the Law was not applied due to various factors (costs of bureaucracy, long administrative procedures, bribery, etc.), so all this generated a discouraging environment for foreign investors. In the paper, it is considered that attracting foreign direct investment in Kosovo* requires systematic improvement in the field of political stability, economic growth, the fight against corruption, defining and respecting property rights, increasing the quality of justice, etc.

In the previous period, Kosovo* did not have an adequate environment for attracting FDI, due to political instability (frequent changes of governments), economic problems (high unemployment), high levels of corruption, unskilled laborers, etc. Therefore, one of the effects of the global financial crisis in 2008 was the reduction of the share of FDI in GDP from 13% in 2007 to 5% in 2013.

The main conclusion is that the institutions in Kosovo* need to create a favorable investment environment – political stability, administration of justice, protection of the rights of foreign investors, investment security, fair competition and appropriate institutional support. According to the authors, this should have a positive impact on FDI in the forthcoming period.

The paper also examines the impact of FDI on economic growth in Kosovo* during the period from 2008 to 2013. The data used in this study were of a secondary nature and were collected from official economic and financial institutions (Central Bank of Kosovo*, Kosovo* Agency of Statistics, World Bank Indicators).

The multiple regression analysis by the method of ordinary least squares (OLS) was applied on the collected data, where the economic growth was treated as a dependent variable, and foreign direct investment, inflation rate and exchange rate were treated as independent variables. The results of the regression are presented in Table 22 below.

Table 22. Test results by OLS method

Economic growth	Coefficient value	Standard error	T- statistics	T > t	Coefficient of determination
Constant	39.43	19.08	2.07	0.17	0.84
FDI	0.001	0.011	0.11	0.92	
Inflation rate	0.239	0.076	3.13	0.08	
Exchange rate	-0.347	0.182	-1.91	0.19	

Source: [Badivuku-Pantina and Zogjani 2015: 35]

The previous table shows that, along with other unchanged variables, an increase in FDI per unit leads to an increase in economic growth rate by 0.0012 points (positive impact), and that an increase in inflation rate per unit results in an increase in economic growth rate of 0.239 points (positive impact). However, an increase in the real effective exchange rate per unit causes the economic growth rate to fall by 0.347 points (negative impact). T-statistics explain the statistical significance of the obtained regression coefficients. It can be seen that only the coefficient with a variable inflation rate is statistically significant, while the coefficients with the variable FDI and the exchange rate ($T < 2$) are not statistically significant.

It is also important to consider the role that foreign trade plays in the process of economic growth in Kosovo. This issue was the subject of a research conducted by Topxhiu and Krasniqi [Topxhiu and Krasniqi 2011: 97–107]. In this paper, the authors analyze foreign trade trends in Kosovo* and their relationship with economic growth in the period from 2000 to 2010, in order to gain a more detailed insight into the dynamics and structure of exports and imports, and the foreign trade balance of Kosovo*, as well as to identify the main obstacles in this field. The paper starts from the fact that Kosovo's* economic growth has been solid since the end of the war in 1999, given that Kosovo's* economy has been hit hard by post-conflict uncertainties, broken foreign trade connections, long periods of underinvestment, collapsed infrastructure and numerous and various difficulties in other areas of economic and social life. First of all, with donor funds, the GDP growth rate was double-digit at the beginning of the observed period (2000–2001), followed by more moderate economic growth despite the continuous inflow of funds in the form of donations and remittances. Therefore, the authors state that Kosovo's* sustainable economic growth must rely to a much greater extent on export revenues and foreign investment. Although Kosovo* is not significantly involved in international trade flows, the negative effects of the global economic crisis were felt in 2009 due to declining exports (decrease 18%), FDI (decrease by 22%) and remittances (decrease by 8%).

Ribaj and Mexhuani examined the correlation between savings and economic growth in Kosovo* [Ribaj and Mexhuani 2021] during the period 2010–2017, from both a qualitative and quantitative research methodology. They used the augmented Dickey–Fuller tests, Johansen cointegration tests, and Ganger causality test. The test of the unit root confirms stationarity, and the regression results showed that deposits have a significant positive impact on Kosovo's* economic growth, because savings stimulate investment, production, and employment and consequently generate greater sustainable economic growth. The findings in this article showed that loans and remittances also help boost the economy of Kosovo* through their direct impact on investment. The results confirm the hypothesis that countries whose national savings rate is high are not dependent on foreign direct investment, so in the case of these countries the risk arising from volatile foreign direct investment decreases significantly.

The main goal of the paper by Ziberi and Hodaj was to analyze the fiscal policy in general and to estimate the impact of direct and indirect taxes on economic growth in particular in case of Kosovo* [Ziberi and Hodaj 2020: 112–121]. The authors used the secondary data taken from the Tax Administration of Kosovo*, the Ministry of Finance and the Kosovo* Agency of Statistics. For model estimation the IBM SPSS program was used. This study concludes that budget revenues from direct and indirect taxes mark an increasing and positive trend in case of Kosovo*.

Based on the Pearson Correlations authors conclude that direct taxes are strongly and positively correlated to GDP, however the results of OLS regression show no significance of the independent variables that means that direct and indirect taxes have no impact on economic growth of Kosovo*.

Gashi, Asllani and Boqolli analyse the effect of the tax structure in the economic growth of Kosovo* during the period from 2007 to 2015 [Gashi, Asllani and Boqolli 2018]. The study intends to examine the impact of specific types of taxes on economic growth. The authors used the methodology based on comparative analysis of primary and secondary data. Through the econometric model and linear regression analysis, the research. The econometric model used (hypotheses have been tested with STATA software) includes GDP as dependent variable and several independent variables (types of taxes). The results show that most of the taxes have a positive impact on GDP growth, but that not all taxes have the same impact on economic growth.

Govori and Fejzullahu analysed the impact that external financial flows have on GDP growth in Kosovo* as a new, small, and open economy [Govori and Fejzullahu 2020]. The authors started from that the remittances, foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign debt, and net exports may affect GDP in different ways. This determinants can be especially important for economic development process in the case of a new, small, and open economy. This research examined the direct effect of these factors on economic development as represented by GDP growth in Kosovo* during the period of 2012–2018. The relationships between remittances, net exports, FDI, external debt, and GDP are modeled. The findings suggest that in Kosovo*, remittances are the leading contributor to GDP growth. The authors assert that this contribution could be more valuable if remittances were invested in the manufacturing sector, because these investments could have positive effects on job creation, reducing the unemployment rate and decreasing Kosovo's* dependence on imports.

Besnik in his paper analyzed the effects of exports on economic development in the case of Kosovo* [Besnik 2021]. The findings of this research show that exports have an important role and have a positive impact on economic growth in Kosovo*, if the state continues to implement economic policies that promote economic growth or development. It is also stated in the article that the very high level of corruption in Kosovo*, and the lack of political stability as well have greatly affected the development of the country's economy.

The paper also presents the structure of Kosovo's* foreign trade. Kosovo's* total exports are dominated by the share of base metals (about 51%), followed by mineral products / raw materials (16.5%), fruits and vegetables (6.2%), alcoholic beverages (6.2%), machinery and equipment (3, 3%), textile products (3.1%), leather products (2.4%), etc. [Topxhiu and Krasniqi 2011: 101, Graph 2]. The structure of

imports in Kosovo* has not changed significantly over the years. Consumer goods, machinery and transport equipment are mostly imported. The relatively high share of semi-finished products in total imports indicates that production activity in Kosovo* is highly dependent on imports of raw materials from abroad. Also, the continuous increase in the share of consumer goods in total imports indicates a low level of domestic production. The pronounced foreign trade deficit in the food sector stands out. At the same time, the coverage of imports by exports, despite improvements in recent years, is still at a very low level of about 15%. Regarding export destinations, in the observed period, on average, almost half of Kosovo's exports go to EU countries, while exports to the EU increase their share in total exports (in 2010 it reached a share of 65%). An additional quarter of total exports are directed to CEFTA member countries, so that almost 75% of Kosovo's* exports go to EU and CEFTA member states, most of them to Italy (about 30%) and Germany (about 4%). As for imports, the most important partner of Kosovo* is the EU – half of imports are from these countries, with most from Germany (about 13%), then Greece (about 5%), etc. The paper states that Kosovo's economy is small, even in the regional context, and that long-term development plans will largely depend on the development of the export part of the economy. It is stated that increasing export competitiveness cannot be achieved by exchange rate policy, because Kosovo* uses the euro as its currency, but that it should rely on its own resources much more (human capital, favorable geographical location, wealth of natural resources, access to regional and European markets, etc.) that offer great potential for economic growth in the future. The authors take the view that reducing trade imbalances is a necessary condition for long-term economic growth in Kosovo*, and that the export growth strategy should be considered a key factor in building an open and free market economy and reducing Kosovo's huge foreign trade imbalance. Namely, imbalances in foreign trade create macroeconomic disparities with long-term implications for Kosovo's economic growth and macroeconomic sustainability. Therefore, mitigating such disproportions should be a priority. In doing so, improving the competitive position of Kosovo's exports will require appropriate investments in infrastructure, then improvements in legislation, institutional capacity building, and the development of “quality infrastructure” (standardization, accreditation, etc.) to ensure that products meet international requirements and standards. In an increasingly globalized world, success in export markets is increasingly influenced by the ability of economic policy makers to support an environment that promotes efficient and low-cost trade services and logistics.

An important segment of Kosovo's* economy is also the informal sector. The research of Skenderi, Islami and Mulolli focused on the relationship between the informal economy and the development of the SME sector in Kosovo* in the period from 2008 to 2012 [Skenderi, Islami and Mulolli 2017].

According to the National Strategy of Kosovo*²⁷, in 2012 the informal economy at the global level reached about 33% of GDP, while for the EU this indicator is 18.5%. According to the same report done in 2013, Kosovo's informal economy is estimated to be around 34% of GDP. Among the key factors for the growth of informal business in Kosovo* are high taxes, which are considered an obstacle to the growth of legal business. The results of this paper indicate that the informal economy is one of the key obstacles to the development of SMEs in Kosovo*. In the long run, the negative impact of informal business on society as a whole is greater than positive, so the authors emphasize the need for government intervention in the form of public policies that should be oriented towards a strategy to combat the informal (gray) economy and gradually transform it into a formal economy. The conclusion of the paper is that in Kosovo* the volume of the informal economy averages about 25–33% of GDP. Although this segment is important in this regard, the results of this analysis show that the informal economy has a negative impact on the development of small and medium enterprises, as well as on the overall economy in Kosovo*.

The research conducted by Knežević, Kvrđić and Ivković [Knežević, Kvrđić and Ivković 2014] performs a comparative analysis of the economies of Serbia (without Kosovo and Metohia) and Kosovo* during the period from 2007 to 2012, in order to determine what the effects of wider integration of Kosovo* into the Serbian economy would be. The paper starts from the fact that the economy of Kosovo* is small, so that its possible impact on the economy of Serbia is in any case irrelevant. On the other hand, it is stated that the wider integration of the Kosovo* economy into the Serbian economy is an essential precondition for reducing the gap in underdevelopment between Kosovo* and the rest of Serbia. The authors state that it is unacceptable that domestic economists do not pay enough attention to the area of Kosovo*, having in mind the strong and comprehensive interest of our public in this area. Therefore, the economic situation in the southern province is mostly unknown, so people often create an unrealistic picture, whether it is much better or much worse than it really is. Based on the available data, primarily from the World Bank, the authors concluded that the Serbian economy is almost twice as developed as the Kosovo* economy (measured by GDP per capita). Furthermore, although relatively high rates of economic growth are achieved in Kosovo*, this is not enough to reduce the inherited and decades-long gap in economic development. The economic structure of Kosovo*, which otherwise corresponds to a country with a higher level of development (agriculture 12%, industry 20%, services 68% [Knežević, Kvrđić and Ivković 2014: 116]) is the result of a completely spontaneous but very significant decline of the real sector, as well as

the result of delayed and chaotic transitions. The situation in Kosovo* is more complicated due to extremely high ethnic tensions, high levels of corruption and crime, the gray economy and demographic expansion, which greatly contributes to the high unemployment rate. Kosovo*'s credit rating is poor, and the volume of foreign direct investment is insufficient, primarily due to weak institutions. Finally, the question arises as to whether the integration of the Serbian and Kosovo* economies would be justified from the point of view of short-term economic gain, and for whom. Of course, the issue of Kosovo*'s status is much more than an economic issue, but the authors have tried, with all limitations, to see this aspect. The authors are of the opinion that for the rest of Serbia, the violent and illegitimate separation of the southern province and economic entities from its territory unequivocally represents enormous economic damage, but that in the long run it also does not limit its economic progress and development. Of course, the authors themselves state in the conclusion of this paper that all this should be taken very conditionally, because it is difficult to talk about these issues only from a narrow economic aspect. An important contribution of this paper could be the conclusion that domestic economists should be more involved in studying the economic reality and future of Kosovo*, and that further research should be developed towards a more detailed analysis of the Serb-majority Northern part of the province. In such analyzes, many non-economic aspects should be taken into account, which are an integral part of any discussion on all issues related to Kosovo*. In addition to the need for a more detailed study of this topic, it is stated that the limiting factor is certainly the lack of objectivity and unreliability of available data.

The subject of a research conducted by Sandra Davidović, Danilo Babić and Jelena Pejić [Давидовић и др. 2018] was a scientific consideration of the process of privatization of public sector enterprises in the territory of Kosovo and Metohia. The scope of this research is broader than the economic one, as both political and international aspects of this problem are considered. This research has raised a very important issue related to the Kosovo* problem, which certainly needs to be further processed. The book examines the privatization of socially-owned enterprises in Kosovo and Metohia from an economic, political and social point of view. It is pointed out that about 660 companies were privatized in the area of Kosovo and Metohia, which employed about 60,000 people. It is stated that privatization in the province had economic and institutional shortcomings, and that its main features are the absence of serious foreign investors, corruption, devaluation of companies, low selling prices, inadequate preliminary assessment of the value of company capital, loss of workers, etc. One of the main shortcomings is the fact that the citizens of Kosovo and Metohia were excluded from the privatization process and did not have the opportunity to buy the shares of their companies. Institutional shortcomings enabled the company's buyers to sell them immediately and lay

27 <https://mf.rks-gov.net/desk/inc/media/B2227717-B018-430E-9498-5DA32C104DD9.pdf>, p. 6.

off workers, because their goal was not to continue doing business, but to get land in attractive locations. The authors cite a list of examples of the transformation of “old” companies into “new” ones that were privatized by 2008 (spin off privatization model), including the following cases: Energoinvest – Priština, Žitopromet – Mitrovica, Kosovotrans – Kosovska Mitrovica, PKB Pečka pivara d.o.o. Peć, holding company cotton factory Jumko AD Vranje – plant in Priština – Kosovo Polje, DTP Voćar – Priština, etc.

The reasons why about a third of privatized companies do not function are various, from those related to the lack of funds for investments to those who basically have the investor’s decision to sell out the property than to continue doing business because it is cheaper that way. Table 23 shows data on inactive privatized companies in Kosovo and Metohia, by sectors and cities.

Table 23. Statistics of inactive privatized companies

Sector	%	Region	%
Trade	25	Priština	3
Production	22	Prizren	9
Agriculture	17	Peć	30
Catering	11	Mitrovica	24
Services	6	Đakovica	24
Objects	19	Gnjilane	9

Source: [Давидовић и др. 2018: 92].

Gashi, Gashi Ahmeti and Ziberi [Gashi, Gashi Ahmeti and Ziberi 2021] explored the impact of small and medium enterprises in generating new jobs in Kosovo*, with a special focus on the industry and services sector (it was one of the first researches for these sectors for that territory) during the period 2012–2018. This analysis has been based on the data collected by the World Bank and Kosovo Agency of Statistics. The authors used OLS regression model through Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Results show that the industry and services sector affect generating new jobs in Kosovo*, therefore there is a positive correlation between the presented variables. Also, it could be noticed a positive correlation between the GDP and employment rate.

Bajra, Krasniqi and Podvorica made the research about privatisation of socially owned enterprises – the methods used and the impact on economic growth in Kosovo* [Bajra, Krasniqi and Podvorica 2021]. This research employed an empirical test using a panel effects regression analysis on a sample of 571 socially owned enterprises (or 1,600 assets) over a 16-year period (2003–2018). The

authors find that privatisation at the aggregate level does not boost economic growth. In particular, the methods used to privatise socially owned enterprises or parts of them are not a determining factor. The findings in this article are that the quality of institutions is fragile, confirming a negative associations with economic growth. It is also shown that the effects of privatisation depending on the method used.

Rita Augestad Knudsen in her article analyzes internationally led privatization in Kosovo* during period from 1999 to 2008, as an example of international statebuilding [Knudsen 2013]. International statebuilding is typically sought justified with the idea of ‘liberal peace’, and this article shows how the tension between the political and economic tenets of the idea of liberal peace manifested itself in Kosovo’s internationally led privatization. The Augestad Knudsen’s research is based on around 50 original interviews which were conducted with local and international privatization officials, experts and observers in Kosovo*.

The paper of Mulaj [Mulaj 2005: 123–163] analyse causes, consequences and implications of delayed privatization in Kosovo*. It starts from a background of Kosovo* under former Yugoslavia and self-management socialism. After that author provides insights on the incidence of socially owned enterprises during 1990s – emergency measures, transformation through forced merger and their consequences. Special attention is given on the impact of privatisation limited to a number of enterprises in the Đakovica region. It was then treated appropriately privatisation addressed under new institutional settings after the war. A very important questions such as the difficulties to implementation of the privatisation process are discussed. The paper identifies the causes and implication of interim suspension of the ownership transformation process.

The aim of the paper written by Kotorri [Kotorri 2010] was to specify and estimate a model of a household planning to send at least one or one additional member abroad because of dissatisfaction with the national economic situation. The plan to emigrate is considered to be based on a household’s decision process whereby the household, as a whole, seeks to maximize expected future utility. The empirical research was based on a sample of 1,384 Kosovan households. One of the main finding was that there is no evidence found for the “migration hump”, so “brain drain” does not seem to be an issue. The probability of emigration from households is found to be influenced by relative wealth, type of area, and regional unemployment rates.

Hajdari and Krasniqi investigated the link between economic development and emigration from Kosovo* between 2015 and 2020 [Hajdari and Krasniqi 2021]. Firstly, they dealt with the empirical and theoretical debates on migration, as both an individual choice and a social decision. After that, the recent history of emigration from Kosovo* was analysed with the aim to understand if and how

the past has influenced present migration forms and models. This article aimed to unpick the threads connecting economic development, the labour market, educational disparities, unemployment, and EU integration. The authors argued that demographics, economics, and the political relationship between Kosovo* and the EU have all affected emigration trends in Kosovo*. This research examined the brain drain phenomenon and economic stability as two variables that permanently influence one another.

Besides the economic, we also had in mind research related to other important aspects of life in Kosovo*. At this point, we will briefly look at the basic findings of Fanaj and Melonashi [Fanaj and Melonashi 2014: 1–8]. The paper first states that Kosovo* is the area with the youngest population in Europe, with 45% of the population under the age of 25 [Fanaj and Melonashi 2014: 1]. However, in terms of economic development, this area is among the worst positioned in Europe. Comparable data indicate that in Kosovo*, the level of youth unemployment under the age of 25 is the highest in the world – as much as 73%. In addition, the socio-cultural context is still such that traditional cultural elements are still important, and that generational gaps or conflicts are quite obvious. To this should certainly be added the presence of war traumas, economic poverty, political instability, democracy in transition, which all together have a huge impact on social development and quality of life. In this context, the growing number of suicides in post-war Kosovo* has become an issue of interest to researchers and policy makers.

Kosovo* had the lowest suicide rate in Europe, which was 1.3 per 100,000 inhabitants (1981), while in 1985 it was 2.7. In the period from 2008 to 2012, the suicide rate calculated on the basis of data from the police services was 3.17 per 100,000 inhabitants [Drevinja, Berisha, Serreqi, Statovci and Haxhibeqiri 2013]. About 49% of reported suicides belong to the 15–34 age group. Studies are quite consistent with the findings on which sex is more prone to suicide – men commit suicide in larger number (2:1 for men) [ibid: 5].

The number of suicides in Kosovo* increased significantly in the post-war period (1998–1999). The aim of the study conducted by the mentioned authors was to identify, select and synthesize research on suicides in Kosovo*. The authors discussed published articles, dissertations and presentations at international and national conferences. 16 relevant studies were selected, including psychiatric, psychological, forensic, sociological, epidemiological and legal research, which met the selection criteria. However, the authors state that they failed to find any study of a qualitative, physiological or anthropological character, and that only two studies analyzed the predictors of suicide. Although the studies analyzed include much valuable data of an epidemiological nature, they did not provide enough input to develop an appropriate suicide model.

Nevertheless, the study met its primary goal – to provide a comprehensive review of the suicide literature in Kosovo*. A review of epidemiological data on suicides in Kosovo* suggests that, despite the increasing suicide rate in Kosovo*, this area may be classified as a low suicide rate in Europe (e.g. in Greece, Macedonia, Italy and Albania, the rate is less than 10 per 100,000 inhabitants). Indeed, the suicide rate for Kosovo* (3–4 per 100,000 inhabitants) is comparable to that for Albania (4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2003) or Greece (3.6 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2005). One aspect to note is that the suicide rate is low even in the case of the Albanian minority living in countries in the region (e.g. Albanians in Serbia), whose suicide rate is below 10 (4.9 per 100,000 inhabitants), as opposed to other parts of the country with a rate of 20 per 100,000 inhabitants [Penev and Stanković 2007: 6]. Explanations for these findings can be found in ethnic characteristics and religiosity. In terms of gender differences, data for Kosovo* are in line with data from other countries (males are at greater risk). Also, the most common methods of suicide by gender (e.g. hanging, firearms) are similar to those that occur in other countries in the region, such as Croatia, Slovenia, Italy and Greece [Injac-Stevović i dr. 2011]. However, there are differences by country in terms of age group. In Serbia, Montenegro and Slovenia, the elderly account for the largest number of suicides, while in Kosovo* the majority of cases in which persons who committed suicide were in the age group of 34 and younger. Regarding the frequency of adolescent suicidal ideas, the data indicate higher rates for Kosovo* compared to other countries (37.6% to 43%) [Penev and Stanković 2007: 25–62]. In terms of risk factors, this area should certainly take into account family mental health and suicide history, but also war trauma, hopelessness, depression, as well as socio-economic factors such as unemployment, low per capita income and family disunity.

However, in the context of protective factors, it is important to emphasize the traditional way of life (patriarchal society) and religion, which is very important. This can be explained by the family structure – extended families in Kosovo* (several generations living together, there are close relationships between them), which is related to the emotional and financial support that an individual enjoys, which can certainly serve as a protective factor for suicide.

The influence of religious beliefs on the act of suicide can also be important (the value of the life God has given to preaching Islam). However, in the end, the authors state that the given explanations are only provisional and that only a future research in the field should examine all specific factors. Despite the fact that war is mentioned in almost all studies, there is little evidence linking its consequences to suicide.

Rikalović and Molnar have conducted the research about basic development trends in Kosovo and Metohia during the period 2003–2017 [Rikalović and Molnar 2019: 9–23]. In the focus of the paper are missed opportunities for increasing

economic and social well-being in the Kosovo and Metohia area. Besides this, an important aspect of the analysis carried out in this paper relates to the quality of state governance and the building of institutional capacities. In the empirical analysis, three scenarios were used to show the backlog of the Kosovo and Metohia area, i.e. the lost GDP per capita of Kosovo* caused by the inability to take advantage of the wider space of our country. The results of the research show that special attention has to be paid to the rule of law, the efficiency of governance and the control of corruption in Kosovo*. The integration of Kosovo* into the educational, research and economic space of Serbia and the EU could be a good way for the overall progress of our country as a whole.

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA IN THE POST-YUGOSLAV CONTEXT

At the time of the 1991 collapse, the former SFR Yugoslavia was in the group of less developed European countries, with unsustainable economic and social disparities that existed between its federal units. After 1991 and the declaration of independence, the economic and social differences between the states that emerged from the disintegration of the SFRY became even greater. This situation, among other factors, was largely determined by the war conflicts that took place in certain areas of the former SFRY, as well as the different dynamics of approaching the European Union. The second column in Table 24 provides information on the value of GDP in the respective territories, and on the differences that existed in this regard in 2009. The next three columns testify to the level of economic development of the former federal units (AP Vojvodina was observed as an integral part of Serbia) in 1991 and 2009, as well as the growth of GDP per capita during the two decades after the breakup of SFRY.

What can be seen from Table 24 is that the economy of Kosovo* in 2009 was larger than the economy of Montenegro, and smaller than all others (measured by the value of GDP). However, what is evident is that the area of Kosovo and Metohia is still the least economically developed, having in mind that the value of GDP per capita was 3,059 dollars. Although Kosovo's GDP grew the fastest after the break-up of Yugoslavia (6.2% in the period from 1991 to 2010, and at a rate of almost 5% on average per year in the period from 2005 to 2010), this was not enough to reduce the gap in development. As a comparison, it should be noted that the average annual GDP growth rate at the global level was 3.7% (from 1970 to 1989), 2.59% (from 1991 to 2010) and 2.14% (from 2005 to 2010). In the same periods, the average annual GDP growth rate for the countries of the former SFRY was 3.45%, 3.28% and 3.34%, respectively [Štiblar 2013: 21, Table 2.13].

The last two columns in Table 24 represent projections of the value of GDP until 2022 in the countries that were once part of the SFRY. There are two scenarios given – one in which it is assumed that after 2010 the economies of these countries will continue to grow at the rate of growth they achieved in the period from 1991 to 2010, and another which predicts that the future growth rate in these economies will be equivalent to that during the period from 2005 to 2010. As can be seen, the projected Kosovo* GDP growth rate projected in this way is the highest in both cases (excluding the 12% growth rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1991 to 2010 due to the war), but will not lead to a significant relative economic position of Kosovo* compared to other former federal units of the SFRY. However, there would be some convergence, as Kosovo* lagged behind the average of these countries 5.03 times in 2009, while it would be 2.8 times (scenario 1) or 3.65 times (scenario 2).

Table 24. Dynamics of economic activity in Kosovo and Metohia and in the former Yugoslavia: achieved results and projections

Country / Territory	GDP, 2009. (billion. USD)	GDP per capita (in USD), 1991	GDP per capita (in USD), 2010	Accrual GDP per capita 1991–2010	Coefficient of growth GDP per capita 2010/1991	Average annual growth rate of GDP 1970–1989	Average annual growth rate of GDP 1991–2010	Average annual growth rate of GDP 2005–2010	GDP 2022 (in billion USD) 1. scenario	GDP 2022 (in billion USD) 2. scenario
Bosnia and Herzegovina	17	2057	4409	2352	2.1	3.5	12.0	3.55	21.5	26.8
Croatia	63	4026	13754	9728	3.4	3.1	0.5	1.53	68	76.7
Kosovo*	5.4	760	3059	2299	4.0	3.6	6.2	4.98	11.7	10.2
(Northern) Macedonia	9.2	2442	4460	2018	1.8	3.6	0.6	3.53	10	14.4
Montenegro	4.1	2247	6510	4263	2.9	3.4	2.5	4.53	5.7	7.3
Serbia	43	3355	5269	1914	1.6	3.4	-0.9	2.61	47.8	60.1
Slovenia	48.5	6331	22851	16520	3.6	3.6	2.3	2.28	64.8	65.0

Source: [Štiblar 2013: 8, 21 and 25].

CONCLUSIONS

Subject matter of this paper is the analysis of demographic and economic aspects of the development of Kosovo and Metohia in the first two decades of the 21st century. The main aim of the research was to obtain an objective assessment of development trends in Kosovo and Metohia, to the extent allowed by the available data.

The value of gross domestic product and gross national income, as well as their expressions per capita, increased in the period after the declaration of 'independence', in relation to the period before that (2003–2008). The unemployment rate has decreased; the deficit in the exchange of goods and services with other countries has also decreased, while the total investment rate has decreased. However, the presented data also lead to the conclusion that most of the investment after 2008 came from the private sector. For more dynamic economic growth, it is necessary to increase FDI inflows and use remittances more efficiently. In the period after 2008, poverty in Kosovo* was reduced, while the distribution of income was more egalitarian, as evidenced by the decrease in the average value of the Gini coefficient. Demographic indicators suggest that life expectancy has increased, but that fertility and birth rates, although relatively high, have declined slightly over the period 2009–2020 in relation to the period 2003–2008.

Regarding energy indicators, there is a noticeable increase in electricity consumption after 2008 (during the period 2009–2020). However, what cannot be assessed as positive is that the share of energy consumption from fossil fuels has increased, while the share of energy consumption from renewable sources in the total consumption of final energy has decreased. What is positive is the reduction of energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP).

By comparison the economy of Kosovo* with the economies of other neighboring countries (Albania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) it is concluded that Kosovo* has the highest customs rate, among the lowest income tax rates and rates of corporate income tax. The share of public debt in GDP is the lowest among the countries in this sample, as well as the inflation rate (although the euro is used as a monetary unit in Kosovo and Metohia). However, all this still does not mean that Kosovo* is moving from the last position (in relation to the neighboring countries) when it comes to the level of economic development, since it has the lowest value of GDP per capita. This is supported by the scenario analysis of future economic growth of the countries formed after the breakup of the SFRY, since the extrapolation of GDP growth at the rates achieved in the previous period (1991–2010 and 2005–2010) leads to the conclusion that Kosovo* will not succeed, not even by 2022, to significantly reduce the backwardness in the achieved level of economic development behind other former federal units of the SFRY.

That the future economic progress of Kosovo* will most likely not be extremely dynamic, can be anticipated from the whole spectrum of relevant findings obtained in this research by analyzing various composite indexes. Based on competent analyzes and research presented in the paper, it is concluded that Kosovo* belongs to the area that is classified as partially free, then that the situation is not favorable related to the field of participation and responsibility, and in the field of rule of law and corruption control. The situation in Kosovo* is worrying when it comes to the threat of terrorist activities (given the return of a number of fighters who fought for ISIS, as well as the deployment of more people from Afghanistan in transit to Western countries), as that the value of the Global Terrorism Index was high until 2018, and that Kosovo*, along with Serbia, was the only area in which in 2018, compared to 2017, there was an increase in the value of this indicator, i.e. a deterioration in this sector.

Also, the Corruption Perceptions Index in Kosovo* in 2020 takes a value of 36, which ranks this area among those with the highest perception of corruption in the selected group of countries.

According to the quality of nationality, Kosovo* is the worst positioned among the selected countries. The value of the Quality of Nationality Index for the territory of Kosovo is 25.3 in 2018, while in the same year the average value of the index for the countries of the Western Balkans is 37.5. In 2019, Kosovo* recorded the lowest level of the Human Development Index compared to other countries.

In terms of economic freedoms in 2021, Kosovo* with an index value of 66.5 belongs to the group of moderately free countries-entities. At the same time, Kosovo* has the worst performance in the area of rule of law, followed by market openness. The worst dimensions of Kosovo*'s index of economic freedoms are financial freedoms and government integrity.

Composite indicator Gross National Happiness (GNH), or so-called The Happiness Index, which is calculated and monitored for more than 150 countries in a study called the *World Happiness Report*, indicates that people in the Western Balkans are happiest in Kosovo*. In 2020, Kosovo* ranks relatively high 31st in the global ranking of happiness.

When it comes to press freedom, the conclusion is that the situation in this area in Kosovo* has gotten worse in 2021 compared to 2020. At the same time, it can be seen that in the global ranking list, Kosovo* dropped by 8 places. According to this index, the situation of press freedom in the Region is problematic, except in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the situation in this area is evaluated as quite good.

Regarding the degree of tolerance, the paper concluded that the position of the gay population is the worst in Kosovo* compared to other countries in the region, while on the single list Kosovo* ranks only 116th out of 127 ranked countries.

This indicates that there is a low level of tolerance and a high level of discrimination in the territory of Kosovo*. It was noted that the situation in Kosovo* is the most unfavorable in the region in terms of the scope of democracy, as well as peace/tranquility, at the beginning of the third decade of this century.

Kosovo* as well as the entire Western Balkans could count on significant gains in terms of freedom of movement of people, goods and capital, cooperation in disaster protection and lasting peace, as well as accelerating European integration through the *Open Balkans* Regional Cooperation Initiative.

ГЛАВНЕ ДЕМОГРАФСKE И ЕКОНОМСKE ПРОМЕНЕ НА КОСОВУ И У МЕТОХИЈИ У ПРВЕ ДВЕ ДЕЦЕНИЈЕ 21. ВЕКА

ГОЈКО РИКАЛОВИЋ И ДЕЈАН МОЛНАР

Сажетак

Косово и Метохија заузимају површину од 10,9 хиљада км². На територији Косова и Метохије присутни су значајне залихе никла, олова, цинка, магнезијума, каолина, хрома, боксита, а нарочито лигнита. Пољопривредно земљиште распростире се на више од 50 одсто територије, од чега половину чине обрадиве површине. Шуме заузимају 2/5 укупне територије КИМ. Главни привредни сектори су пољопривреда, шумарство и рударство. Становништво Косова и Метохије (према доступним „званичним“ подацима) износи близу 1,8 милиона лица (2020. г.), од чега су најбројнији Албанци (више од 90%), док преостали део чине Срби, Бошњаци, Турци, Ашкалије, Египћани, Горани, итд. Преовлађује муслиманска вероисповест (преко 95% становништва), а знатно мање су заступљени припадници римокатоличке и православне вере. Просечна старост становништва је око 29,6 година, док је старосна структура веома повољна (од 0 до 14 година старости 24%, односно 15–64 године 67% и 9% старијих од 65 година). Од 1961. до 2020. године укупан број становника на КИМ је повећан са око 964 хиљаде на 1.775 хиљада. У раздобљу 1961–2011. година десиле су се значајне промене етничке структуре становништва на овом подручју: заступљеност албанског становништва је порасла са 67% на 93%, удео српске популације се смањило са 23,5% на свега 1,5%, док су припадници осталих етничких група такође забележили пад учешћа са 9,4% на 5,6%. Према прописима привремених органа власти на Косову и у Метохији (које су неовлашћено прогласиле независност тзв. Републике Косово 17. фебруара 2008. године) постоји постоји 38 општина и 1.469 насеља.

С геоекономске тачке гледишта узрок сукоба у овом делу Балкана одувек је било и богатство у рудама, водама, земљишту и погодним географским обележјима Косова и Метохије. Осим базичних идентитетских разлога (колевка српске духовности, културе и државе) Косово и Метохија, њихови ресурси и развојни потенцијали од великог су значаја и за економску будућност Србије. Под изговором хуманитарне кризе 19 чланова НАТО-а остварујући англоамеричке и германске стратешке геополитичке и геоекономске циљеве 1999. године 78 дана су дивљачки бомбардовале Србију. Током НАТО агресије на нашу земљу око 13 хи-

љада људи је изгубило живот, више стотина хиљада њих је напустило своја пребивалишта услед бомбардовања и оружаних сукоба (највише Срби с Косова и из Метохије), док је значајан део физичке инфраструктуре био уништен. Агресија 1999. резултирала је окупацијом, тј. увођењем протектората под управом Уједињених нација и актуелном косовском кризом. Чињеница да су природни и изграђени потенцијали на подручју Косова и Метохије изван јурисдикције Београда, стопроцентно повећање такси на увоз робе с простора Србије и Босне и Херцеговине, као и други једностранни акти привремених власти на Косову*²⁸ представљају препреке за убрзање развоја на подручју целог региона.

Анализирани су развојни индикатори који се односе на услове привређивања и живота на подручју Косова и Метохије у периоду од 2003. до 2020. године. Израчунате су просечне вредности одабраних показатеља за цело посматрано раздобље, као и за два периода унутар њега – до проглашења тзв. независности (2003–2008) и након тога (2009–2020). Треба имати у виду неколико следећих чињеница. Стопа укупних бруто инвестиција опала је у периоду после 2008. године у поређењу с периодом 2003–2008, а стопа бруто фиксних инвестиција остала је непромењена. Пошто је стопа бруто фиксних инвестиција из приватних извора повећана, следи да је главни носилац инвестиционе активности на Космету у периоду након 2008. године био приватни сектор. Удео спољнотрговинског дефицита у БДП-у је смањен с 42,35% на 31,30%. Учешће извоза добара и услуга у БДП-у је повећано с око 17,2% (2003–2008.) на око 24,2% (2009–2020), док је удео увоза у БДП-у опао са 59,5% (2003–2008) на 55,5% (2009–2020), што је утицало на побољшање биланса размене добара и услуга. Удео извоза ИКТ услуга у укупном извозу услуга порастао је са 6,4% на 8,6% у другом у односу на први потпериод. На релативно спору привредну динамику утицао је пад прилива дознака и СДИ. У периоду 2009–2020. година удео дознака у БДП-у је смањен за готово 3,7 процентних поена у односу на период 2003–2008, док је истовремено учешће СДИ у БДП-у опало за близу 5 процентних поена. Издаци за војску знатно су порасли у периоду након нелегалног проглашења тзв. независности и то са 0,02% БДП-а (2003–2008) на 0,75% БДП-а (2009–2020). Обим БДП-а и БНД-а, као и њихови *per capita* износи су повећани у другом у односу на први потпериод, док је стопа незапослености смањена. Раст укупног БДП-а и БДП-а *per capita* је релативно динамичан у периоду од 2009. до 2020. године. У привредној структури је присутно релативно високо учешће услуга (које се чак повећава у другом у односу на прво подраздобље – за око 1,4 процентна поена), док је истовремено удео индустрије непромењен, а удео пољопривреде опада (за око 3,5 процентних поена). У случају спољне задужености присутна су забрињавајућа кретања: удео спољног дуга у БНД-у повећан је за око 2,4 пута у другом у односу на први потпериод, удео краткорочног у укупном спољном дугу је истовремено порастао за 3,7 пута, док је учешће плаћених камата на спољни дуг у БНД-у веће.

Број становника се повећао током периода 2009–2020. година (за око 13 хиљада), при чему је стопа раста становништва (упросечена годишња) износила око 0,13%. Сиромаштво је знатно смањено пошто је стопа јаза сиромаштва (на нивоу линије од 3,2 долара једнаке куповне моћи дневно) смањена с 4,37% (2003–2008) на 1,63% (2009–2020). Расподела дохотка је егалитарнија (смањен је Ђини коефицијент с 30,2 у првом на 28,6 у другом периоду). По-

28 Овај назив је без прејудирања статуса и у складу је с Резолуцијом Савета безбедности Уједињених нација 1244 и мишљењем Међународног суда правде о декларацији о независности Косова (видети: Влада Републике Србије: <https://www.srbija.gov.rs/kosovo-metohija/index.php?id=168200> (приступљено 16.12.2021).

стоји висок степен неформалне (сиве) економије. Стопа намерних убистава је готово преполовљена. Очекивано трајање живота се повећало, али се стопе фертилитета и наталитета, иако релативно високе, смањују током раздобља 2009–2020. у односу на период 2003–2008. година.

Што се тиче енергетских и еколошких перформанси видно је значајно повећање потрошње електричне енергије (чак за око 25%) у другом посматраном потпериоду (2009–2020) у поређењу с првим (2003–2008). Оно што се може закључити на основу поређења одговарајућих индикатора у ова два потпериода јесте да је порастао удео потрошње енергије која се добија из фосилних горива (с 87,31% на 88,36%), док је смањен удео потрошње енергије из обновљивих извора у укупној употреби финалне енергије с 22,46% на 22,39%. Енергетска интензивност је смањена, односно по јединици БДП-а се трошило мање енергије у другом (6,98 MJ/\$2011 ППП БДП) у односу на први потпериод (7,23 MJ/\$2011 ППП БДП). Секторска структура извора емисије угљен-диоксида се није значајније мењала.

Емпиријска тестирања постојања конвергенције у Централној и Источној Европи (ЦИЕ) и на простору Западног Балкана била су ослоњена на неокласични модел раста. За тестирање хипотезе о конвергенцији између 16 земаља Централне и Источне Европе (ЦИЕ) коришћени су годишњи подаци о вредности реалног бруто домаћег производа по становнику у периоду од 2000–2026. године. У истраживању су тестиране две хипотезе: 1. Земље ЦИЕ нису хомогена група земаља и 2. Западни Балкан је релативно хомогена регионална интеграција. Мада је потврђена прва хипотеза, то није значило да конвергенција не постоји у случају ужих клубова земаља унутар ЦИЕ. На основу добијених резултата идентификована су *три клуба земаља: њрви* – Мађарска, Пољска, Румунија, Естонија, Летонија, Литванија, Словачка и Словенија; *групи* – Бугарска, Хрватска и Србија; и *ирећи* – Албанија, Босна и Херцеговина, Црна Гора, Северна Македонија и Косово*.

Пошто је у истраживању одбачена могућност спајања идентификованих клубова (првог и другог; другог и трећег), почетна класификација клубова је и коначна. Тиме је потврђена и друга хипотеза да је Западни Балкан (не узимајући у обзир Србију која је у другом клубу заједно са Бугарском и Хрватском) релативно хомогена целина. Могло би се закључити да Србија заправо представља „локомотиву“ Западног Балкана и да би све земље овог подручја требало да се прикључе регионалној иницијативи за сарадњу *Ошворени Балкан*. Постоји оправданост укључивања свих земаља Западног Балкана, као и Косова* у иницијативу за регионалну сарадњу *Ошворени Балкан*. Заправо, читави Западни Балкан би могао рачунати на знатне добитке у погледу слободе кретања људи, робе и капитала, сарадње у области заштите од катастрофа и обезбеђивања трајног мира, као и на убрзање европских интеграција.

Данас постоји мноштво глобалних индекса који вреднују различите стране друштвеног и економског живота савременог света и појединих земаља, који се утврђују на бази различитих методолошких приступа и обухвата димензија на које се односе. Основна намера је да се помоћу њих пружи конзистентан оквир и начин за анализу и праћење савремених политичких, привредних, социјалних, еколошких и безбедносних процеса. Овде су узети у обзир неки од поменутих индекса (Индекс слобода, ниво/процент демократије, Индекс економских слобода, Индекс управљања државом (квалитет владавине), Глобални индекс тероризма, Глобални индекс мира, Индекс перцепције корупције, Индекс квалитета држављанства, Индекс људског развоја, Индекс среће, Глобални индекс медијских слобода, Ин-

декс задовољства (среће) припадника геј популације) са циљем да се укаже на квалитет институционалних и развојних капацитета Косова* и њихове позиције у односу на Србију и регион Западног Балкана.

Види се да Косово* заједно с Босном и Херцеговином припада самом зачељу на простору Западног Балкана, када је реч о слободама. Произилази да Косово* има најнижи домет демократије на Западном Балкану. Док се Регион, у економском смислу, као целина може сматрати умерено слободним, Косово* с вредношћу индекса од 66,5 спада у групу умерено слободних територија. При томе, најлошије перформансе Косово* има у области владавине права, а потом у домену отворености тржишта. Најнеповољније димензије индекса економских слобода Косова* су финансијске слободе и интегритет владе. Међутим, Косово* у 2021. години у поређењу са Србијом и Албанијом предњачи у погледу квалитета судства, владе и државне потрошње. Косово* у 2019. години има најлошију позицију у свих 6 димензија управљања државом. У односу на друге земље Региона Косово* има најлошију позицију у области партиципације и одговорности (2,25), те у домену владавине права (1,89). Најлошије оцене Косова* (испод 2) су у домену владавине права и контроле корупције. Србија је од Косова* боља (мада не много) у свим посматраним димензијама, осим у квалитету регулаторног оквира. Квалитет владавине на Косову* се може оценити као лош.

Највећа претња од тероризма постоји управо на подручју Косова*. Међутим, 2020. године Глобални индекс тероризма на Косову* је једнак нули. Запажа се да су и Северна Македонија, Србија, као и Босна и Херцеговина забележиле одговарајући напредак на овом плану у 2020. у односу на 2018. годину. Стање мира/спокојства у 2021. години најнеповољније је на Косову*, а најбоље у Северној Македонији.

У погледу ризика од корупције Косово* се, заједно са Северном Македонијом, Босном и Херцеговином и Албанијом, у 2020. години сврстава међу она подручја с највишом перцепцијом корупције. Косово* је поправило своју позицију у овој области у односу на 2012. годину. Када се сагледава период 2012–2020. година, просечна вредност овог индекса за подручје Косова* је веома ниска (35,2) што је на нивоу индекса перцепције корупције у Албанији, односно Косово* и Албанија се карактеришу највишим степеном перцепције корупције у Региону. Квалитет држављанства је најнижи у случају Косова* на простору Западног Балкана. Вредност овог показатеља за подручје Косова* у 2018. години достиже око две трећине просека Региона. У периоду од 2013. до 2018. године Косово* све више заостаје за земљама Региона у погледу квалитета држављанства. То се види и по рангу на глобалној ранг листи према овом критеријуму.

На Косову* је присутан најнижи ниво квалитета људског развоја (0,75) у односу на друге земље (просек Региона је 0,789). На глобалној ранг листи Индекса среће у 2020. години Косово* заузима 31. место, док су остали на знатно нижим позицијама – Албанија је на 63, Северна Македонија на 75, а Србија на 42. месту. У погледу Индекса среће, Косово* предњачи у односу на просек Региона за више од 11%, што значи да је стање среће у нашој јужној покрајини најповољније.

У области медијских слобода, на Косову* је погоршана ситуација у 2021. у односу на 2020. годину (повећање вредности индекса медијских слобода за 0,99 поена). Сходно томе на глобалној ранг листи медијских слобода Косово* је забележило пад за 8 места у 2021. у односу на 2020. годину. Истовремено, Србија и Босна и Херцеговина су остале на истим позицијама као 2020., док су Албанија, Црна Гора и Северна Македонија напредовале у том погледу.

Према овом индексу, стање медијских слобода у Региону је проблематично, изузев у Босни и Херцеговини у којој се стање у овој области оцењује као прилично добро.

Положај припадника геј популације најлошији је на подручју Косова* у поређењу с другим државама – вредност Индекса је најнижа. На јединственој листи Косово* заузима тек 116. место од укупно 127 рангираних држава, те је поменута популација највише угрожена, јер је на територији Косова* присутан веома низак степен толеранције. Најбољу позицију у Региону према овом индексу има Србија, те је очито толеранција према припадницима геј популације највећа у Србији, која заузима 89. место на ранг листи.

Последњих година је спроведено мноштво истраживања и објављено више научних радова у којима се анализирају релевантне области живота на подручју Косова*. У тим прилозима се анализирају и разматрају релације економског раста (и развоја) и других променљивих као што су прилив дознака, доток страних директних инвестиција, спољнотрговинска размена, штедња, директни и индиректни порези, пореска структура, међународни токови капитала, извоз, миграторна кретања итд. Један број истраживања за предмет је имао анализу неформалног сектора (сиве економије) на подручју Косова*. Такође, третиран је и процес приватизације на Косову*, са циљем да се утврде какве је ефекте имала закаснела приватизација која се одвијала под окриљем међународног фактора. Анализирани су и проблеми миграција. Поред економских, у научним радовима и истраживањима одговарајућа пажња је посвећена и другим битним аспектима живота на подручју Косова* (пропуштеним економским приликама Косова* изазваних сецесијом од Србије, демографским кретањима и другим социјалним питањима).

Премда су бившу Југославију карактерисале готово неодрживе економске и социјалне разлике између њених федералних јединица, након 1991. године оне су између држава које су настале распадом СФРЈ постале још веће. Овакво стање су у знатној мери определили ратни сукоби на појединим подручјима бивше СФРЈ, као и различита динамика приближавања Европској унији. Привреда Косова* је у 2009. години била већа од привреде Црне Горе, а мања од свих других (мерено вредношћу БДП-а). Подручје Косова* и даље је најмање економски развијено, имајући у виду да је вредност БДП-а по становнику износила 3.059 долара. Иако је привредни раст Косова* био најбржи након распада Југославије (6,2% у периоду од 1991. до 2010. године, што је 2,4 пута више од светског просека у истом раздобљу), то није било довољно да се смањи јаз у развијености.

У пројекцији БДП-а до 2022. године дата су два сценарија – један у којем је претпостављено да ће након 2010. године привреда земаља некадашњих југословнеких република наставити да расту по оној стопи раста коју су оствариле у периоду 1991–2010. и други који предвиђа да ће будућа стопа раста у овим економијама бити еквивалентна оној током раздобља 2005–2010. година. На овај начин пројектована стопа раста БДП-а Косова* је највиша у оба случаја (ако изузмемо стопу раста од 12% у периоду 1991–2010. у Босни и Херцеговини због ратних околности), што неће довести до значајније релативне позиције привреде Косова* у поређењу с другим бившим федеративним јединицама СФРЈ. До извесне конвергенције би ипак дошло, јер је заостајање Косова* за просеком ових земаља било 5,03 пута у 2009. години, док би оно износило 2,8 пута (1. сценарио) или 3,65 пута (2. сценарио).

Основни циљ био је да се дође до објективне оцене развојних токова на подручју Косова и Метохије, у мери у којој то дозвољавају расположиви подаци. За динамичнији привредни раст Косова* је неопходно повећавање дотока СДИ и ефикасније коришћење дознака. У

периоду након 2008. године сиромаштво на подручју Косова* је смањено, док је расподела дохотка егалитарнија, о чему сведочи смањење средње вредности Ђинијевог коефицијента. Демографски показатељи говоре у прилог томе да се очекивано трајање живота повећало, али да су стопа фертилитета и natalитета, иако релативно високе, незнатно смањене током раздобља 2009–20. у односу на период 2003–2008. година. Смањена је енергетска интензивност (потрошња енергије по јединици БДП-а).

Поређењем привреде Косова* с привредама других земаља из окружења (Албанија, Србија, Босна и Херцеговина, Македонија, Црна Гора, Румунија, Бугарска, Хрватска) долази се до закључка да Косово* има највишу царинску стопу, међу најнижима стопу пореза на доходак и стопу пореза на добит предузећа. Удео јавног дуга у БДП-у је најнижи међу земљама из овог узорка, као и стопа инфлације (мада се на Косову* као новчана јединица користи евро). Међутим, све то још увек не значи да се Косово* помера с последње позиције у окружењу када је у питању ниво привредног развоја, будући да има најнижу вредност БДП-а по становнику. Овоме у прилог говори и сценарио анализа будућег привредног раста земаља насталих распадом бивше СФРЈ, пошто се екстраполацијом раста БДП-а по стопама које су остварене у претходном периоду (1991–2010. и 2005–2010.) долази до закључка да Косово* неће успети ни до 2022. године да значајније смањи заосталост у достигнутом нивоу привредног развоја за осталим бившим политичким јединицама СФРЈ. Да будуће економско напредовање Косова* највероватније неће бити изразито динамично може да се наслути и из читавог спектра релевантних налаза до којих се у овом истраживању дошло анализом различитих композитних индекса.

Косово* као и читави Западни Балкан, поред динамичнијег економског раста, би могли рачунати на знатне добитке у погледу слободе кретања људи, робе и капитала, сарадње у области заштите од катастрофа и обезбеђивања трајног мира, као и на убрзање европских интеграција остваривањем иницијативе за регионалну сарадњу *Ошворени Балкан*.

LITERATURE

- Давидовић 2018 → Сандра Давидовић и др. *Приватизација друштвених њрезуећа на Косову и Метохији њод окриљем УНМИК администрације: ѡрепег, оцене, закључци*, Београдски форум за свет равноправних, Београд 2018.
- Оцић 2019 → Часлав Оцић (ур.) *Косовска вертикала или неоколонијална хоризонтала? : демографски, економски, социјални, ѡравни, ѡеополитички и еколошки аспекти косовске ѡеихојске ѡићања* (зборник радова), Дом културе „Грачаница“, Грачаница, Институт за европске студије: ТВ Храм, Београд и Градска народна библиотека „Жарко Зрењанин“, Зрењанин 2019.
- Рикаловић и Молнар 2019 → Гојко Рикаловић и Дејан Молнар. (Не)успех евроатлантистичког State Formation пројекта: демографске, економске, социјалне и еколошке промене на Косову и Метохији у прве две деценије 21. века, у: [Оцић 2019: 29–70].
- Рикаловић, Молнар и Јосиповић 2021 → Гојко Рикаловић, Дејан Молнар и Соња Јосиповић. Мини Шенген и изазови европских интеграција, у зборнику радова са Међународног научног скупа ЕКОМ 2021: *Значај Мини Шенгена за евроинтегра-*

- ције Зайадној Балкана (ур. Славољуб Вујовић), Економски факултет, Универзитет у Приштини с привременим седиштем у Косовској Митровици, 2021, стр. 12–39.
- 2019 Index of Economic Freedom → 2019 *Index of Economic Freedom*, available at: <https://www.heritage.org/index/explore> (accessed 29.01.2019)
- 2021 Index of Economic Freedom → 2021 *Index of Economic Freedom*, available at: <https://www.heritage.org/index/explore> (accessed 05.09.2021)
- Aliu 2021 → Besnik Aliu (2021). *The Effect of Export on Economic Development – Case Study Kosovo* (June 17, 2021). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3869191> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3869191>
- Badivuku-Pantina and Zogjani 2015 → M. Badivuku-Pantina and J. Zogjani. The Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth – Case Study for Kosovo, *Iliria International Review – 2015/2*, Felix-Verlag, Holzkirchen and Iliria College, Priština 2015.
- Bajra, Krasniqi and Podvorica 2021 → Ujkan Q. Bajra, Armand Krasniqi and Armend Podvorica. Privatisation of socially owned enterprises, the methods used and the impact on economic growth: empirical evidence from Kosovo, *Economic Research – Ekonomiska Istraživanja* 2021, DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2021.1893201
- Drevinja, Berisha, Serreqi, Statovci and Haxhibeqiri 2013 → F. Drevinja, B. Berisha, V. Serreqi, S. Statovci and S. Haxhibeqiri. Suicides in Kosovo in five year period 2008–2012, an overview for possible social motives (Abstracts of the 21th European Congress of Psychiatry). *European Psychiatry*, 28 (Suppl. 1), 1, 2013. Retrieved from <http://emcv2-consulte-preprod.jouve-hdi.com/article/656854/article/2310-%E2%80%9393-suicides-in-kosovo-in-five-year-period-2008>, according to: Fanaj and Melonashi [2014].
- Fanaj and Melonashi 2014 → N. Fanaj and E. Melonashi. A Systematic Evidence Review on Suicide in Kosovo, *SAGE Open*, January–March 2014: 1–8, DOI: 10.1177/2158244014528717
- Gashi, Asllani and Boqolli 2018 → B. Gashi, G. Asllani and L. Boqolli. The Effect of Tax Structure in Economic Growth, *International Journal of Economics and Business Administration*, Volume VI, Issue 2, 56–67, 2018 DOI: 10.35808/ijeba/157.
- Global Peace Index* 2008 → Institute for Economics & Peace. *Global Peace Index 2008: Methodology, results & findings*, Sydney 2008 (available at: <https://www.vredesmuseum.nl/download/vredesindex2008.pdf>, accesses: 06.04.2019.)
- Global Peace Index* 2017 → Institute for Economics & Peace. *Global Peace Index 2018: Measuring Peace in a Complex World*, Sydney, June 2017, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-peace-index-2017> (accessed 26.03.2019).
- Global Peace Index* 2018 → Institute for Economics & Peace. *Global Peace Index 2018: Measuring Peace in a Complex World*, Sydney, June 2018. Available at: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports> (accessed 27.03.2019).
- Global Peace Index* 2021 → Institute for Economics & Peace. *Global Peace Index 2021: Measuring Peace in a Complex World*, Sydney, June 2021. Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports> (accessed 14.01.2022).
- Global Terrorism Index* 2017 → Institute for Economics & Peace. *Global Terrorism Index 2017, Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism*.

- Global Terrorism Index* 2018 → Institute for Economics & Peace. *Global Terrorism Index 2018, Measuring the impact of terrorism*, (available at: <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2019).
- Global Terrorism Index* 2020 → Institute for Economics & Peace. *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*, Sydney, November 2020. Available at: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports> (accessed 13.01.2022).
- Govori and Fejzullahu 2020 → F. Govori and A. Fejzullahu. External Financial Flows and GDP Growth in Kosovo, *Journal of Developing Societies*. 36 (1) 2020, 56–76. doi:10.1177/0169796X19898964
- Hajdari and Krasniqi 2021 → L. Hajdari and J. Krasniqi. The economic dimension of migration: Kosovo from 2015 to 2020, *Humanities and Social Sciences Communication* 8, 273 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00923-6>
- Henley & Partners 2019 → Henley & Partners · Kochenov. Quality of Nationality Index, *General Ranking Nationalities of the World in 2017*. available at: https://www.nationalityindex.com/assets/QNI_2017_GENERAL_RANKINGS_180411.pdf (accessed 29.01.2019)
- Henley & Partners 2018 → Henley & Partners · Kochenov. Quality of Nationality Index, *General Ranking Nationalities of the World in 2018*. available at: <https://www.nationalityindex.com/qni-rankings> (accessed 05.09.2021).
- Injac-Stevović, Jašović-Gašić, Vuković, Peković and Terzić 2011 → L. Injac-Stevović, Jašović-Gašić, M., Vuković, O., Peković, M., & Terzić, N. Gender differences in relation to suicides committed in the capital Montenegro (Podgorica) in the period 2000–2006. *Psychiatria Danubina*, 23 (1), 2011, 45–52.
- KAS 2013 → KAS. *Study for Remittances in Kosovo*: Departament for Social Polls. Priština 2013.
- KAS 2016 → KAS, *Kosovo in Figures*, 2016.
- KAS 2020 → KAS. *Kosovo in Figures 2020*, <https://ask.rks-gov.net/media/6451/kosovo-in-figures-2020.pdf> (accessed 28.01.2022).
- Knežević, Kvrđić i Ivković 2014 → V. Knežević G. Kvrđić i D. Ivković. Kosovo's economy and Serbian economy, *Faculty of Business Economics and Entrepreneurship International Review* (2014 № 1–2), UDK: 330.341:32(497.11), ID broj: 208502540
- Knudsen 2013 → Rita Augestad Knudsen. Privatization in Kosovo: 'Liberal Peace' in Practice", *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 7:3, 2013, 287–307, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2012.734559
- Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2018 → Kosovo Agency of Statistics. Gross Domestic Product 2008–2017, Publisher: Kosovo Agency of Statistics (KAS), Publication date, September 2018 ; <http://ask.rks-gov.net>
- Kotorri 2010 → Mrika Kotorri. The Probability of Economic Emigration in Kosovo, *Eastern European Economics*, 48:6, 2010, 17–35, DOI: 10.2753/EEE0012-8775480602
- Mulaj 2005 → Isa Mulaj. Delayed Privatization in Kosovo: Causes, Consequences, and Implications in the Ongoing Process, in *Path-dependent Development in Western Balkans: The Impact of Privatization*, Siniša Kušić, ed., Peter Lang, Frankfurt 2005, pp. 123–163.
- National Strategy* 2014–2018 → *National Strategy of the Republic of Kosovo for the Prevention of and Fight Against Informal Economy, Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes 2014–2018*, available at: <https://mf.rks-gov.net/desk/inc/media/B2227717-B018-430E-9498-5DA32C104DD9.pdf> (accessed 05.02.2019)

- Penev and Stanković 2007 → G. Penev and B. Stanković. Samoubistva u Srbiji početkom 21. veka i kretanja u proteklih pedeset godina [Suicides in Serbia at the Beginning of the 21st Century and Trends in the Past Fifty Years]. *Stanovništvo*, 2, 2007, 25–62.
- Ribaj and Mexhuani 2021 → A., Ribaj and F. Mexhuani. The impact of savings on economic growth in a developing country (the case of Kosovo), *Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship*, 10, 1 (2021) <https://doi.org/10.1186/s13731-020-00140-6>
- Rikalović and Molnar 2019 → Rikalović G. and D. Molnar. Development Trends and Institutional Capacities in Kosovo and Metohia through the First Fifth of the 21st Century, *Acta Economica*, Volume XVII, № 30, June 2019, doi 10.7251/ACE1730009R UDC 334.72.021:316.334.3(497.11), pp. 9–23.
- Rikalović, Molnar i Josipović 2019 → G. Rikalović, D. Molnar i S. Josipović (2019). Makroekonomski učinci mira: koncept i merenje, u: *Svet i Srbija – Ekonomska i društvena gibanja* (2019), (ur. S. Grk i D. Molnar), CID, Ekonomski fakultet u Beogradu, Beograd. 2019 str. 59–78, ISBN 978-86-403-1602-6.
- Gashi, Gashi Ahmeti and Ziberi 2021 → Rrezarta Gashi, Hana Gashi Ahmeti, Besime Ziberi. Impact of small and medium enterprises in generating new jobs in case of Kosovo, Vol. 39 № 3 (2021): *Sustainable Economics*, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.25115/eea.v39i3.4118>
- Skenderi, Islami and Mulolli 2017 → N. Skenderi, X. Islami and E. Mulolli. The Impact of Informal Economy in the Development of SMEs – Evidence from Kosovo (2008–2012), *International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics*, Vol. 4, № 5, May, 2017, ISSN 2383-2126 (Online).
- Štiblar 2013 → Franjo Štiblar. *Economic Growth and Development in Post Yugoslav Countries*, Wilson Center, Global Europe Program, June 2013.
- Thaçi and Rushiti 2018 → L. Thaçi and M. Rushiti. Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in the Republic of Kosovo – Empirical Evidence, *Applied Science and Innovative Research*, ISSN 2474-4972 (Print) ISSN 2474-4980 (Online), Vol. 2, № 4, 2018, pp. 129–154.
- Topxhiu and Krasniqi 2011 → R. M. Topxhiu and F. X. Krasniqi. Foreign trade and economic growth in Kosovo: trends and some features, *International Journal of Economics and Management Sciences*, Vol. 1, № 5, 2011, pp. 97–107.
- 2010 → UNDP. (2010). *Study Remittances in Kosovo 2010*. Priština 2010.
- World Bank 2014 → World Bank. *The World Bank Group in Kosovo: Country Snapshot, the World Bank Country Office in Kosovo*, World Bank in Kosovo: Publication Service, pp. 1–27. (according to: Badivuku-Pantina, M. and J. Zogjani, 2015).
- World Happiness Report* 2018 → *World Happiness Report 2018*, (edited by John F. Helliwell, Richard Layard and Jeffrey D. Sachs), available at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/happiness-report/2018/WHR_web.pdf (accessed 30.01.2019)
- World Happiness Report* 2021 → *World Happiness Report 2021*, (edited by John F. Helliwell, Richard Layard, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, Lara B. Aknin, and Shun Wang), 2021, pp.18–22, available at: <https://worldhappiness.report/ed/2021/#appendices-and-data>, (accessed 05.09.2021).
- Ziberi and Hodaj 2020 → Besime Ziberi and Adelina Hodaj. The fiscal policy and economic growth of Kosovo: An econometrical analysis, *Economics, Management and Sustainability*, [S.l.], v. 5, n. 2, p. 112–121, nov. 2020. ISSN 2520-6303. Available at: <<https://jems.sciview.net/index.php/jems/article/view/114>>. Date accessed 21 jan. 2022. doi: <https://doi.org/10.14254/jems.2020.5-2.8>.

- sciview.net/index.php/jems/article/view/114>. Date accessed 21 jan. 2022. doi: <https://doi.org/10.14254/jems.2020.5-2.8>.
- Zogjani and Badivuku-Pantina 2014 → J. Zogjani and M. Badivuku-Pantina. The Role and Impact of Remittances on the Economic Growth – Kosovo Case Study, *Iliria International Review* – 2014/2, Felix-Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Priština 2014.
- Tanasković 2018 → S. Tanasković. Dometi i ograničenja rangiranja Srbije prema različitim indeksima poslovnog okruženja, *Kvartalni monitor* br. 54, FREN, jul–septembar 2018.

INTERNET SOURCES

- askdata, Structure of Gross Domestic Product by economic activities 2008–2020, available at: https://askdata.rks-gov.net/PXWeb/pxweb/en/askdata/askdata__07%20National%20and%20government%20accounts__National%20accounts__Annual%20national%20accounts/gdp10.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=ad787284-363a-44a5-bb3d-0f067afa36b7 (accessed 28.01.2022).
- <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (accessed 16.01.2022).
- <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home> (accessed 28.01.2019)
- <http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/countryinfo/>
- <https://ask.rks-gov.net/en/kosovo-agency-of-statistics/add-news/gross-domestic-product-by-expenditure-and-production-approach-q3-2021> (accessed 28.01.2022).
- <https://data.worldbank.org/> (accessed 10.11.2018)
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index#Non-UN_member_states_\(latest_UNDP_data\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index#Non-UN_member_states_(latest_UNDP_data)) (accessed 30.01.2019)
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_districts_of_Kosovo_by_Human_Development_Index (accessed 16.01.2022).
- <https://freedomhouse.org/countries/nations-transit/scores> (accessed 13.01.2022).
- <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores> (accessed 30.01.2019).
- <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit> (accessed 20.01.2022).
- <https://rsf.org/en/detailed-methodology> (accessed 31.01.2019).
- https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table?sort=asc&order=Countries%20%26%20regions (accessed 31.01.2019)
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/happiness-report/2018/WHR_web.pdf (accessed 30.01.2019)
- <https://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-3> (accessed February 20, 2019)
- <https://www.heritage.org/index/explore> (accessed 20.02.2019)
- <https://www.planetromeo.com/en/care/gay-happiness-index/> (accessed 31.01.2019)
- <https://www.srbija.gov.rs/kosovo-Metohia/index.php?id=168200> (accessed 16.12.2021).
- <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018> (accessed 30.01.2019).

(UN)SUSTAINABILITY OF KOSOVO AND METOHIA'S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

MILENKO DŽELETVIĆ

Belgrade Faculty of Security Studies,
University of Belgrade
milenkodz@telekom.rs

BOJAN DIMITRIJEVIĆ

Belgrade Business School
dbojan1@mts.rs
♦ dbojan1@open.telekom.rs

SUMMARY: Thinking about *the Region* (recent fashionable substitute for *the Balkans*) at the crossroad between East and West, which has in the last 25 years suffered wars, hyperinflation, struggle with economic problems in the neoliberal and transition conditions, unsuccessful or bad privatization, inefficient institutions – raises the question what the present generations are leaving to future generations. The Southeast Europe or the Western Balkans is the region of small markets and economic instability. The sustainable economy of each individual country in the Southeast Europe is fragile. The best example of unsustainable economy is the self-proclaimed state of Kosovo. After 10-years euphoria of declared independence, Kosovo is facing the unsustainability of the overall economic system.

KEY WORDS: Kosovo and Metohia, sustainable development, privatization, employment, corruption, direct foreign investments, foreign trade deficit, economic balkanization

INTRODUCTION

Considering the global market the economic growth is reflected in creating a gap between rich and poor economies, where rich economies create/conquer new markets aimed at increasing the profit, grabbing the resources, pursuing their geopolitical goals under the condition of shortage of “profitable projects” while having no concern if those projects make any benefit to future generations. For that reason, no wonder the Province of Kosovo and Metohia (hereinafter: K-M), the region with estimated less than 2 million (*de facto* less than one million) population, but the region with the largest lignite mine in Europe (along with other mining and energy resources) – is an interesting “project”.

Reserves of lignite coal in the Kosovo basin are estimated to 9.8 billion tons, which supports the fact that it is rich lignite mine; so far only 0.13 billion tons has

been exploited. If modern technology is applied and converting to gas or other energy products, the value is estimated to reach even USD 500 billions [Dželetović 2004: 142].

In geopolitical terms (within spheres of interest), the microeconomic and macroeconomic processes are dictated and created mainly by USA, NATO, EU and UN, where both Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs have been primarily an object but not the subject of geo-economic processes and relations [Vasić 2004: 40].

According to the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia is now under interim administration of the United Nations (UNMIK), whereas communication and interaction between spheres of interest are administrated by UNMIK and KFOR (Kosovo Force). Nowadays, in terms of geo-economic position the Autonomous Province of K-M, under international protectorate of the UN, and within the constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia¹, has been threatened by limited legal security and law enforceability, as well as high risks (business, banking, financial and corporate) [Vasić 2004: 34–35].

Besides UNMIK and KFOR in K-M there is also EULEX mission (The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) that should support Kosovo's judicial authorities and other authorities in the law enforcement i.e. rule of law in full co-operation with the European Commission Assistance Programs and through its basic goals of monitoring, mentoring and advice. EULEX judges and prosecutors adjudicate and prosecute constitutional, civil justice (property disputes and privatization matters), and selected highly sensitive criminal cases (war crimes, terrorism, inter-ethnic crimes, organized crime and corruption) both exclusively and jointly with the Kosovo counterpart [EULEX].

It is interesting to view K-M in terms of sustainable economic development now when the whole world, but first and foremost the creators of geo-economic relations, has been oriented to implementation of the United Nation 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which was adopted in New York in 2015. According to the Agenda there are *three pillars of sustainable development: economy, society and environment* which include 17 basic goals and 169 integrated and comprehensive targets/tasks that make a framework for the member states. The Agenda refers both to developed and to developing countries [Agenda for Sustainable Development 2016: 6–9]. This paper mainly refers to economic sustainability of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia.

¹ Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, *Official Gazette of RS*, no. 98/2006 The Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia reads: "Considering the state tradition of the Serbian people and equality of all citizens and ethnic communities in Serbia, considering also that the Province of Kosovo and Metohia is an integral part of the territory of Serbia, that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia and that from such status of the Province of Kosovo and Metohia follow constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohia in all internal and foreign political relations."

TRANSFORMATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF K-M ECONOMY

Transformation, restructuring and privatization are reasonable solutions of any market economy where the fundamental property right is fully respected. UNMIK conducts privatization process through Kosovo Property Agency (KPA). Restructuring of the Kosovo economy is necessary, but UNMIK's *spin off* privatization model is incorrectly chosen way which has nowhere in the world been implemented. This restructuring model implies allocation and sale of the former enterprise assets to establish a new enterprise, whereas the factual owners are excluded from the whole process [Vasić 2004: 160–161].

In legal terms, one can say that this privatization process is particularly problematical especially concerning UNMIK's competence-mandate for privatization issues, re-examination of restructuring the companies in K-M in the 90s and taking decisions about those processes. Those illegal privatizations imply that even though the property right is determined as undisputable, it does not mean that the owner will retain the property. Above all, there is no right to lodge a complaint about decision of the special court (special council) for resolving disputable issues – appeals against the privatization process [Radosavović 2004: 31–32].

Introducing the discriminatory legal principles of privatization has been aimed at breaking the relations between the enterprises in K-M and enterprises or other legal entities in the Republic of Serbia, and enforceable takeover (expropriation) of legal entities' whole property (land, factories, premises, equipment) in order to be sold to the third party. As for neglecting the basic human rights, UNMIK is conducting the privatization although there are more than 280,000 persons displaced from homes or jobs (displacement still continues because of disrespected right to live and work).

The UNMIK regulations have enabled the privatization of the state-owned enterprises without participation of displaced people who were mostly employed in those enterprises; therefore they have been deprived of the acquired right of existence and consequently of the right to return.

The Republic of Serbia's claims to ownership right have been based on *legal and economic arguments*.

From a legal point of view the property in Kosovo which was not privately owned was transformed into the ownership of the state of Serbia or other state-owned companies in Serbia according to the 1995 Law on Assets in the Ownership of the Republic of Serbia. The economic arguments are based on investments that were directed to Kosovo by FR Yugoslavia, State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and Republic of Serbia.

According to available data, the K-M cadaster includes 2,575,448 lots in 1,299 cadastral municipalities; there are ownership documents for 641,071 hectares of

the total 1,090,410 hectares, which is 57.79 per cent of the Kosovo and Metohia territory, of the Serbia's state and socially owned property, the Serbia's privately owned property and the property of the Serbian Orthodox Church [Strategy of Sustainable Living and Returns in Kosovo and Metohia 2010]. Those are the only property records in Kosovo and Metohia, therefore those are the only ownership records. Any changes in ownership can be recorded only in the original documents and the Republic of Serbia has not recorded any changes since 1999, Serbia has undisputable evidence of the ownership.

Before 1999 in K-M were registered 837 enterprises, whereof 39 were state-owned, 309 were joint-stock or limited liability companies and 489 were socially-owned companies or social capital partnership with major social ownership (the capital structure in the mentioned type of enterprise is 30% state-owned, 15% the Development Fund of the Republic of Serbia, 10% the enterprises with headquarters in Central Serbia or Vojvodina, 5% the owners from former republics (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) [Strategy of Sustainable Living and Returns in Kosovo and Metohia 2010]. According to the Capital and Ownership Transfer Agreement the SFRY is the owner of capital and property in 163 Kosovo's enterprises based on the Company Law then in force (1992–1993). Under unsettled loans of the company Agrokosovo, the companies Elektrokosmet, Trepča... owe nearly EUR 250 million to Development Fund of the Republic of Serbia [Stojanović 2006: 424].

According to data once submitted to the Belgrade Chamber of Commerce, the Central Serbia's enterprises have 1218 facilities in Kosovo and Metohia, and the Vojvodina's enterprises have 140 (a total of 1358 facilities), whereas only PTT has 130, Railways 55, Electrical Industry (EPS) 18 and Srbijašume 45 facilities [Džurić 2004: 130], the value of which is estimated at approximately USD 1.5 billions. The value of the state-owned property that is not in possession of the public enterprises is enormous including 24,500 hectares agricultural land, forestry land and construction land, 1,240,000 m² office space, 145,000 m² business premises, 25,000 m² of apartment buildings, 4,000 m² of special-purpose facilities, 750,000 m² of other buildings, restaurants, resorts and sports facilities [Strategy of Sustainable Living and Returns in Kosovo and Metohia 2010]. Some of them are the following:

NIS has 25 petrol stations and 5 warehouses, and during bombing the facility of 1000m² was destroyed. NIS Petrol-Jugopetrol was transformed into Kosovo Petrol, and NIS is a major owner of the company Plastika.

PE PTT Serbia has 130 facilities in Kosovo and Metohia, most of them are post offices.

PE Srbijašume has a total of 335,050 hectares of land in Kosovo and Metohia.

The book value of the property held by PE Railways of Serbia in Kosovo amounts to approximately EUR 211.8 million making 7.6 per cent of Serbian Rail-

ways' total assets [Most likely Serbia will lose its state-owned enterprises in Kosovo]. Certainly, the market value is much higher. The Serbian Railways have 330 km of rails, 33 railway stations, 19 diesel locomotives, 15 diesel motor vehicles, 570 cargo and 45 passenger wagons in Kosovo. The Railways settle their liabilities against loans which in the 80s were granted to a railway-transportation organization of Priština – two loans amounting to around USD 33.2 million by the World Bank, and Canadian USD 4.2 by the Paris Club [Popović 2008: 223].

The value of PE EPS facilities in Kosovo and Metohia amounts to over USD 3,000,000,000. The EPS and the Republic of Serbia invested a lot in maintenance and equipment for the power supply system in K-M, but the system has been usurped by the Kosovo's power supply corporation. Besides, since 1999 EPS has allocated between EUR 20 million and EUR 22 million p.a. to compensate 8,000 employees displaced from job [Popović 2008: 223]. Within EPS there are still 3 public enterprises: Kopovi Kosovo, Termoelektrane and Elektrokosovo distribucija, however, they have also been usurped. One should note that EPS produced averagely 4.2 billion kWh per year, considering that the lowest price of one kWh is USD 3.93, EPS's income loss is minimum USD 165 million per year.

PE Putevi Srbije (Roads of Serbia) is in possession of seven motorways and 48 regional roads of 1,800 km total length in K-M, but maintains only 422 at the moment. It is state-owned property. At the moment the PE Putevi Srbije maintains motorways and regional roads. The enterprise also has the headquarters building in Kosovska Mitrovica [Popović 2008: 223].

Telekom Srbija (Telecommunications Company) has suffered huge material losses due demolition of equipment and illegal disconnection although the license was duly paid (DM 125 million in 1997) [Popović 2008: 223–224]

According to assessment the value of the fixed telephony of Telekom Srbija amounted to over EUR 77 million in 1999 [Most likely Serbia will lose its state-owned enterprises in Kosovo]. The Telekom Srbija's ownership of the property in Kosovo and Metohia takes 7.5 per cent of the overall property of this enterprise, and about 13 per cent of profit has been lost. In the period 2000–2007 the total damage for Telekom Srbija amounted to around EUR 1.4 billion [Popović 2008: 224].

Serbian Army is in a possession of substantial property. Only the Slatina airport is worth about EUR 95 million. The area within the airport covers around 4.5 million square meters of land with 568 facilities, whereof 156 high rise buildings cover 47,024m² [Popović 2008: 225].

The K-M economy was financed by the Development Fund of the Republic of Serbia. Of 193 important Kosovo's enterprises, the Development Fund of the Republic of Serbia takes a major ownership share (over 51%) in 88 enterprises; 76 enterprises are owned by related companies from Serbia, whereas 29 enterprises

are taken over from Development Fund of the Republic of Serbia and from some Serbian enterprises [Djuric 2004: 130].

According to data of the Kosovo Privatization Agency (PAK), which is established as the successor of the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), PAK mainly founds new enterprises from socially-owned ones offering for sale the current property and liabilities of socially-owned enterprises (as determined for accounts receivable in the last three months and for unpaid VAT in the last year). According to available data PAK generated revenue of EUR 542,887,929 through privatization of the enterprises applying the *spin-off* method (59 privatization circles), then EUR 87,103,895 revenue through sale of property possessed by socially-owned enterprises in liquidation (26 waves), and EUR 30,440,000 through direct negotiations. The revenue totaling EUR 660,431,824 was generated from sale of socially-owned enterprises and their property [Report on Sale of Socially-Owned Enterprises and Property of Socially-Owned Enterprises]. By the end of 2007 there were sold 300 socially-owned enterprises, most of them were bought by the Albanians from K-M (over 90%) or some foreign buyers.

During the whole post-WWII period the region of Kosovo and Metohia had a special treatment in economic and development policy of Serbia and former Yugoslavia. In the document for regional development planning Kosovo and Metohia was treated as insufficiently developed area from 1957, whereas from 1966 it was considered as extremely insufficiently developed area, so enormously financially supported in economic and social development. Based on planning documents and legal resolutions, enormous amount of capital was invested in the Southern Serbian Province through in 1965 established Federation Fund for Initiating Development of Insufficiently Developed Republics and Provinces. For the same incentive purpose the funds were also provided through banks, foreign loans (the International Bank for Development and Reconstruction, the World Bank...), and Federation's funds that were invested in fixed and permanent current assets in order to contribute to faster development [Bukvić 2006: 412–417].

In the period 1981–1988 the Central Serbia recorded the biggest outflow transfer of funds (211.811 million dinars at the 1980 prices), whereas the biggest inflow was recorded in Kosovo and Metohia (112.501 million dinars), so that K-M participated 12.14 times more in receiving than in contributing to those funds [Ocić 1999: 342].

Table 1 Participation of the ex-Yugoslav Republics and Provinces in the total contributions and funds received according to federal regulations, 1981–1988, in %

Total funds received = 100			
Republics and Provinces (R and P)	Contributed	Received	2:1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	11.22	19.00	1.69
Montenegro	2.02	5.76	2.84
Croatia	25.01	13.86	0.55
Macedonia	5.53	9.14	1.65
Slovenia	19.48	10.51	0.54
Serbia	35.14	35.87	1.02
Central Serbia	23.98	11.95	0.50
Kosovo and Metohia (K-M)	1.68	20.42	12.14
Vojvodina	9.48	3.49	0.37

Source: Časlav Ocić. Kosovo and Metohia: Investing in Ethnicity, *Discourse on Multilingual Cultures: Popular Cultures, Societies and Arts*, ed. by Yuichi Midzunoe. Taga Shuppan, Tokyo 1999, p. 346.

In the period 1966–1970 the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia received 30% of the total funds granted by the Fund for Development of Insufficiently developed Republics and Provinces, whereas in the period 1971–1975 it was 33.3% [Bursać and Ilić 2007: 464], in the period 1976–1980 it was 37.1%, in the period 1981–1985 it was 43.5%, in the period 1986–1990 it was 48.1% [Popović 2008: 224]. Besides, the Province has taken 41.3% share in the loans granted by the World Development Bank [Bursać and Ilić 2007: 464].

Table 2 Participation of insufficiently developed regions in distribution of Fund's investments, in %

Insufficiently developed regions	1966–1970	1971–1975.	1976–1980	1981–1985	1986–1990
Bosnia and Herzegovina	30.7	32.4	30.5	27.4	25.2
Montenegro	13.1	11.4	10.8	9.7	7.8
Macedonia	26.2	22.9	21.8	19.4	18.9
Kosovo and Metohia	30.0	33.3	37.1	43.5	48.1


Source: Nenad Popović. *Openly About Kosovo and Metohia Economy*, ABC Fond, Belgrade 2008, p. 95.

Even though enormous funds were invested in the Province of K-M, it was bottom-ranked according to economic development indicators, which is an evidence of inefficient use of funds, not for the specified purpose i.e. for economic

development but for social development and enrichment of privileged local elite [Ocić 1999: 343–347]:

- The value of investment was higher compared to GDP value (any investment exceeding 1/3 of the social product is considered as unreasonable). In 1953, for example, the investment efficiency in Kosovo and Metohia was equal to an average investment in Serbia, and thereafter was continuously declining, and in 1987 it was 63% of said average (figure 1);
- Negligible number of bankruptcies and liquidations of companies (in the period 1986–1988 not even one case of bankruptcy or liquidation was recorded, which indicates that the Fund's investments were used to cover losses and salaries);
- 1/4 of employees worked in the government-owned enterprises and in state administration (24.8%, whereas the Yugoslavia's average was 16.8%);
- 1/5 of employees in K-M belonged to the category of "experts and artists", whereof 50% was teaching staff, which was 7 times more than the Yugoslavia's average;
- As for a number of students ranked first per 1,000 population.

Figure 1 Kosovo and Metohia: average output–capital ratio



Source: Časlav Ocić. Kosovo and Metohia: Investing in Ethnicity, *Discourse on Multilingual Cultures: Popular Cultures, Societies and Arts*, ed. by Yuichi Midzunoe. Taiga Shuppan, Tokyo 1999, p. 355.

In the period 1960–1990 around USD 17 billion was invested in the Province on various grounds (direct investments, exemptions, allowances, subsidies) [Vasić 2004: 157]. So, during the 1980s and the 1990s USD 1 million entered Kosovo on daily basis. Those were not only the funds of the Federal Fund (which took about 70% in the investment structure) or general and additional funds as grants to the social (public) services, but also many subsequent measures and exemptions in

the field of economic relations with foreign countries (customs allowances and exemptions), financial consolidation of economy and banks, taking over the liabilities against the foreign loans, the budget allowances [Dželetović 2004: 145].

Within the whole volume of investments in the economic development of Kosovo and Metohia, the Serbia's contribution reaches nearly 50% since all solutions within Federation were based on permanent proportions in the social product (GDP) distribution, and after the Federal Fund ceased to work, the overall financing of Kosovo's development was transferred to the Republic of Serbia. As well, the enterprises from other parts of Serbia made direct investments in construction of numerous facilities.

UNMIK and KPA, which conduct the privatization processes, do not admit a fact that a large number of facilities, either socially or state owned by Serbia, were constructed with the loans of the World Bank. Until 30 June, 1991 Yugoslavia was granted 30 loans totaling USD 6.114 billion. Major part of those loans was intended for development of traffic, structural adaptation, and development of insufficiently developed areas. According to the international standards, that is one of the reasons Serbia and Montenegro are classified as heavily indebted countries with middle national income. According to the National Bank of Yugoslavia data, by the end of 1998 the total external debt of the Federal Republic of amounted to over USD 11 billion, whereof the largest debt (47%) is owed to western countries' governments (Paris Club), and then around 30% to the international commercial banks (London Club), to IMF and to the World Bank [Stošić 2004: 212].

In 1990 Serbia introduced a special contribution from employees' salaries (employed both in public and in private sectors). In the period 1990–1992 Serbia allocated 10 billions of dinars for Kosovo. Serbia was incurred a special charge for payment of pensions and social grants to employed Albanians. The ethnic Albanians did not recognize the state of Serbia, but, of course, did not refuse to receive the social grants and pensions. Serbia allocated DEM 1,568,000,000 for payment of pensions in the 10 years period – 1993–2003 [Dželetović 2004: 146].

Accordingly, although in most cases the state of Serbia was a founder and major owner of capital in mentioned enterprises, the privatization process went on without its participation. At the same time Serbia remained in USD 1.5 billion debt with external creditors, which was used for financing the economic development of the Province, whereas the privatization and other gains come into the Kosovo's budget. It is also indicative that Serbian government gave guarantees for USD 411 million to the International Bank for Development and Reconstruction, and those loan-based funds were forwarded to the most important enterprises in K-M in the foregoing period. It means that the electrical industry, railways, water industry and traffic infrastructure were main beneficiaries [Dželetović 2004: 147].

For above said reasons, the K-M economic potential is big, but the Kosovo Albanian society supported by the International Community has not been in transition or restructuring, but in the phase of *organized crime* and *economic deterioration*. Exclusive of public enterprises such as PTT and Telecommunications Company, Kosovo Energy Corporation, Kosovo Railways (now UNMIK Railways) and public utility companies, 90 per cent of former socially-owned enterprises in K-M do not work [Gulan 2013].

It is not clear who is going to compensate all rights of owners or trustees, UNMIK or interim Government of Kosovo i.e. citizens in K-M. *What is going to happen after the interim UN mission leaves Kosovo?*

DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINTS AND (UN)SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH

According to Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 1,783,531 people live in K-M. According to 2011 census 1,780,021 people lived in K-M. In 2012 and in 2013 there was an increase in population, then decline, whereas in 2016 the population was almost the same in number as in 2011 [KAS, The Statistical Year Book 2017: 28]. Some of the main results of the Workforce Survey for the 2017 Q2 2017 conducted by the Kosovo Agency of Statistics are the following [KAS, Workforce Survey 2017: 10–11].

- Almost two thirds of the K-M population is of the working age (aged 15–64). K-M belongs to the regions with the youngest population in Europe, so that the ability to work will grow in the coming period;
- 57.0% of those able to work are not economically active, it means that they are unemployed and have not been actively looking for a job;
- Of 43.0% economically active population, 30.6% is unemployed. It means that 69.4% of economically active persons are employed, which has resulted in employment rate of 29.9%;
- 57.0 % of population able to work is inactive;
- The unemployment of young population is very high (among those able to work aged 15 – 24, 50.9% is unemployed);
- Almost one third (27.1%) of population aged 15–24 is neither employed nor attend the schools or training courses;
- Only 29.0% of employees had permanent employment contracts for their main jobs, whereas 71.0% had temporary employment contracts;
- As for the types of contracts the survey respondents had, most of them (76.4%) had individual contracts, whereas others worked without having a labor contract. As for young population (aged 15–24) 49.4% worked without having a

labor contract. For that reason K-M is unsurprisingly facing the outflow of the workforce i.e. the human capital (as the whole region), and, in the circumstances of high unemployment and absence of economic-social development the young population has no trust in the institutions and wants to build the future in the EU countries. According to estimates, over 200,000 people left Kosovo, whereof over 50,000 people illegally left in 2015 when the whole region faced the migrant crisis. The “Kosovo Government” has been stunned, whereas the EU countries, which are occupied with mass migration of the Kosovo Albanians, require stopping migration and announce they will refuse asylum applications and return migrants to Kosovo [Hisari 2015]. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) research, since 2016 satisfaction of the K-M population with effectiveness of key executive, legislative and judicial institutions has generally declined. At the moment only 21% of population expresses satisfaction [Puls javnosti 2016: 2]. More than 76 % of K-M population considers *unemployment* (48 %), *poverty* (21 %) and *corruption* (7%) as three major problems that affect their social welfare. Since the K-M public sector is the biggest employer, most population (77 %) considers nepotism, bribe, coalition of political parties, and other factors that are not based on merits as very useful for getting employment in the public sector [Puls javnosti 2016: 10–11]. In K-M population’s perception the most corrupted institutions are healthcare staff, the Kosovo’s courts, the central administration, the Kosovo Privatization Agency, police, but in addition to mentioned ones it is interesting that citizens think that the international organizations are also heavily involved in corruption [Puls javnosti 2016: 12].

According to *Transparency International* Kosovo is ranked the 95th out of 176 countries for corruption in the public sector with index 36 out of 100 (free of corruption) [2016 Corruption perceptions index 2017: 9].

Further analysis of the economic sustainability of the K-M Province should include a fact that K-M has been traditionally economically dependent area only oriented to external sources of financing both in the past and nowadays. The economy has been built with external and state loans, which have never been repaid and now charging the Serbia’s tax payers. Although the economy is under continuous infusion of international donations (ongoing slide in donations), and permanently financed by Kosovo Albanians’ diaspora, all funds are directed to consumption but not to economic development. The economy and population depend on remittances and salaries of employees in Western European economies.

It seems that economic development has been “predestinated” for donations, external loans and investments. Foreign direct investments (FDI) in K-M in 2016 declined by 24% compared to 2015. The investments received before September 2016 amounts to EUR 182.3 million, which is less than in the same period 2015 (EUR 268.5 million). The foreign investments are much lower than in 2006 when

amounted to almost EUR 300 million or in 2007 when amounted to EUR 440 million or in the period 1999–2005 when over EUR 2.5 billion was invested in building the economic potential for faster economic growth [KAS External Trade Statistics 2017: 12–13]. Foreign direct investments are expected to decline also in 2017.

Table 3 Direct Foreign Investments per Countries

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
First five countries	<i>EUR million</i>					
Switzerland	31	44	42	38	73	62
Turkey	35	66	89	20	55	35
Great Britain	80	14	11	(40)	27	33
Germany	67	50	22	29	45	29
Albania	11	5	19	20	40	29
First five countries total	224	178	182	69	240	187
Other countries	161	51	98	83	69	48
TOTAL	384	229	280	151	309	235

Source: KPMG in Kosovo, Investment in Kosovo 2017, Priština, 2017, p. 13.

The funds were not directed to an increase in a number of jobs (employment) or growth of production and services to create added value, but, as a rule, to most profitable sectors (fixed and mobile telephony, energetics/mining, construction, trade and import of oil, cigarettes and food), which were illegally taken from the Republic of Serbia's ownership and now in the possession of the companies that started the „Republic of Kosovo Project”.

The unresolved status of K-M, absence of the rule of law or disrespect of the fundamental international law principles, standards, political instability, high corruption, discriminatory functioning of institutions, inefficient economy structure, uneducated and inactive population are the factors that prevent foreign investments. Even though K-M is ranked 40th according to 2018 *Doing Business Report* [World Bank 2018: 4], the investors still consider K-M as high-risk area.

Owing to inefficient institutions and the tax system, developed illegal economy and grey economy, a large amount of funds do not come into the budget so causing a disturbance in distribution of income and realization of economic goals. Therefore the K-M institutions are forced to take loans from the international institutions. From 2012 general debt recorded strong growth in the international debt segment as well as at the end of 2014 when it amounted to EUR 582.87 million due to domestic debt growth. Also, in 2015 the total debt increased by 28% compared to previous year and amounted to EUR 748.95 million. At 2016 end debts recorded

an amount of EUR 852.74 million, if compared with the 2015 amount, an increase amounts to 14% [Kosovo Treasury, 2016 Year Book on Public Debt 2017: 5–6]. As of the close of Q3 2017 the external debt and the domestic debt recorded growth, so the total debt amounts to EUR 965.36 million.

Table 4 Total Debt

Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	TM3 2017
<i>EUR million</i>									
External debt	249.01	260.42	253.60	336.60	323.76	326.35	371.17	373.77	425.96
Domestic debt	0.00	0.00	0.00	73.31	152.51	256.52	377.78	478.97	539.40
Total debts	249.01	260.42	253.60	409.92	476.27	582.87	748.95	852.74	965.36
State guarantees	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.00	10.00	20.00	44.00
Total debts (% GDP)	6.12	5.92	5.27	8.10	8.94	10.65	13.07	14.58	15.75

Source: Ministry of Finance / Kosovo Treasury, 3-month data on total debt / 2017 Q3, Priština, Oct. 2017, p. 5.

The Kosovo and Metohia economy is facing a big problem with the trade deficit which keeps growing and tends to grow continuously. For example in 2001 the trade deficit amounted to EUR 10,559,000, and export amounted to EUR 684,500,000. In 2010 Kosovo and Metohia exported products and services totaling EUR 295,957,000, whereas import amounted to EUR 2,157,725,000. So far the major trade deficit was recorded in 2016 amounting to nearly EUR 2.5 billion (-EUR 2,479,864,000), but according to December 2017 data the 2016 deficit will be exceeded. According to available data the 2017 deficit will amount to around EUR 2.7 billion.

Table 5 International Trade in Goods

Year	Export	Import	Trade Balance
(000 EUR)			
2001	10.559	684.500	-673.941
2002	27.599	854.758	-827.159
2003	35.621	973.265	-937.644
2004	56.567	1.063.347	-1.006.780
2005	56.283	1.157.492	-1.101.209
2006	110.774	1.305.879	-1.195.105
2007	165.112	1.576.186	-1.411.074

Year	Export	Import	Trade Balance
2008	198.463	1.928.236	-1.729.773
2009	165.328	1.937.539	-1.772.211
2010	295.957	2.157.725	-1.861.769
2011	319.165	2.492.348	-2.173.184
2012	276.100	2.507.609	-2.231.509
2013	293.842	2.449.064	-2.155.221
2014	324.543	2.538.337	-2.213.794
2015	325.294	2.634.693	-2.309.399
2016	309.627	2.789.491	-2.479.864
12/2017	378.010	3.047.207	-2.669.196

Source: Kosovo Agency of Statistics, External Trade Statistics – December 2017, Priština, 2017, p. 10.

Obviously, in 2017 the trade deficit will be higher than in 2016 because in December 2017 a deficit was higher by 8.5% compared to the same period 2016. In December 2017 the import recorded EUR 297.3 million which is 9.5% growth compared to the same period 2016. (EUR 271.4 million) [KAS External Trade Statistics 2017: 14–15: 8].

Table 6. Export and Import per Countries in December 2016 and 2017

	December 2016	%	December 2017	%
EXPORT				
Total	24.520	100.0	29.481	100.0
28 EU countries	5.077	20.7	6.869	23.3
CEFTA	11.991	48.9	11.932	40.5
EFTA	1.145	4.7	1.607	5.5
Other European countries	665	2.7	1.092	3.7
Other non-European countries	93	0.4	203	0.7
Countries in Asia	4.792	19.5	7.275	24.7
Other	758	3.1	503	1.7
IMPORT				
Total	271.473	100.0	297.316	100.0
28 EU countries	121.739	44.8	137.637	46.3
CEFTA	70.399	25.9	79.686	26.8
EFTA	2.441	0.9	2.440	0.8
Other European countries	30.751	11.3	26.516	8.9

	December 2016	%	December 2017	%
IMPORT				
Other non-European countries	9.519	3.5	7.155	2.4
Countries in Asia	26.565	9.8	32.082	10.8
Other	10.060	3.7	11.801	4.0

Source: Kosovo Agency of Statistics, External Trade Statistics – December 2017, Priština, 2017, pp. 13–14.

According to the Kosovo Agency of Statistics, the export of Kosovo and Metohia is oriented mostly to CEFTA countries and amounts to 40.5%, to EU countries the export amounts to 23.3% of the total export, whereas to other countries it records only 36.2%. The main partners for export are India (24.4%), Albania (17.7%), Macedonia (9.6%), and Germany (6.2%). The South Province of Kosovo and Metohia mostly imported from the EU member countries recording 46.3%, CEFTA countries 26.8%, whereas from other countries the import recorded 26.9%. The main partners for import are Serbia (15.7%), Germany (14.6%), China (9.6%), Turkey (8.5%), Italy (5.7%), and Macedonia (4.2%) [KAS External Trade Statistics 2017: 14–15].

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the aforesaid K-M has been traditionally economically dependent area oriented only to external sources of financing both in the past and nowadays. The economy has been built with external and state loans, which have never been repaid, now mostly charging the Serbia's tax payers. Even though enormous funds were invested in the Province of K-M, it was bottom-ranked according to economic development indicators, which is an evidence of inefficient use of funds for social development, but not for economic development. The basic goal of introducing the discriminatory law grounds has been to discontinue any relations with of the enterprises in K-M with enterprises or other legal entities in the Republic of Serbia and expropriate the entire property possessed by the legal entities (land, factories, worksites, equipment) for sale to third parties.

If privatization is conducted in absence of legal, economic, or democratic potentials, where state, social or private property is sold to interest groups so creating new privileged enterprises, surely it will not make healthy market but cause consequences that will affect future generations.

High natural population increase, inefficient administration in providing the fundamental human rights of movement and work under international community umbrella will have an impact on negative migration of population in the Province, finally affecting the GDP growth.

The crucial condition for K-M to be a place where people would like to live is the sustainable economic development. In other words, a disrespect of the sustainability concept creates inefficient economy and affects the economic growth so resulting in decline of the living standard and welfare of population in Kosovo and Metohia.

This paper addresses the issues of economic and social sustainability of Kosovo-Metohia (K-M), considering two possible key scenarios: *first* – full independence of K-M, *second* – strong autonomy within the state of Serbia. Economic and social sustainability is analysed from the perspective of economic indicators (foreign direct investments, foreign trade imbalance, public debt, privatization effects) and from the perspective of social indicators, particularly demographic trends and economic migrations, citizens' discontent, the quality of health care and the problems related to sustainable development of environment, among other things. All arguments, especially economic and demographic ones, drive to logical conclusion that in the long run the probability of accepting the second scenario within the Albanian community grows, as the first scenario is economically and socially unsustainable.

Addendum. What happened since March 2019 when this paper was written?

1. In political terms, there have not been any significant political events that have changed earlier made statements about possible scenarios on Kosovo's future. The UN-mediated negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo* are in situation referred to as a *frozen conflict*. There is a growing trend in the ties between Albania and the false state of Kosovo tending to eliminate borders and establish the joint (unitary Greater Albania) state. Serbia, Albania and Northern Macedonia have signed three agreements on Open Balkan Initiative (mini Schengen) for free movement of capital, goods, people and services among those three countries. The initiative has economic, not political character. Kosovo has not joined the Initiative.

2. There is not any significant improvement in economic indicators. According to the *Country Report*, Kosovo is the second poorest area in Europe after Moldova with the young population unemployment rate of almost 60% and overall unemployment rate that varies from 25% to 33%, which is the highest rate in Europe. The trade deficit is even 33% of GDP, but it is covered by diaspora remittances (17%) and foreign donations (10% of GDP); in case it is discontinued, the foreign trade imbalance will be unsustainable. According to IMF Country Report for February 2021, the foreign direct investments amount to only 1% of GDP and do not exceed EUR 250 million in the years before *covid* pandemic. The GDP declined by 5.34% in 2020 due to pandemic. In the period 2016–2021, per capita GDP increased from USD 3,202 to USD 3,772, which is USD 550 in 5-year period

or below 2% annually. The *IMF Report* states that Kosovo has a low revenue generating basis and low fiscal capacity, low level of social protection, small scope of public investments, low efficiency of public enterprises, large infrastructure gaps in traffic and power supply and growing gap in education and health care compared to the countries in the region.

3. According to the *2020 European Commission Report*, fight against corruption, organized crime, the public sector reform and economic reform are in an early phase. There is poor implementation of the environmental laws. Declining demographic trends continue, however, despite the natural population growth there was a population decline by 13 thousand in Kosovo in 2019. The European Union's and Kosovo's official institutions overestimate the number of people stating that in Kosovo in 2019 there lived 1.7 million people and that the number will keep declining down to 1.66 million until 2050. However, based on those data, 2.2 million people lived in Kosovo in 2010, and in 2011 the number dropped to 1.79 million population. Such decline of over 400,000 people has never been explained. For that reason, such demographic assessment should be considered as unreliable except for trend assessment.

4. According to the *Public Pulse* research conducted on a sample of 1.307 interviewees by UNDP and USAID, the key problems still existing in Kosovo are high rates of corruption, unemployment and poverty, health care problems. Doing Business, a World Bank Group publication, which is assessing the business and investment climate in economies worldwide, has not recognized Kosovo as more attractive for investments.

(НЕ)ОДРЖИВОСТ КОСОВСКОМЕТОХИЈСКЕ ПРИВРЕДЕ И ДРУШТВА

МИЛЕНКО ЏЕЛЕТОВИЋ ♦ БОЈАН ДИМИТРИЈЕВИЋ

Сажетак

Рад се бави питањима економске и друштвене одрживости Косова и Метохије (КиМ) имајући у виду два могућа основна сценарија: *први* – пуна независност КиМ, *други* – јака аутономија унутар државе Србије. Економска и друштвена одрживост анализирају се из угла економских показатеља (стране директне инвестиције, спољнотрговинска неравнотежа, јавни дуг, ефекти приватизације) и друштвених показатеља међу којима се посебно разматрају демографска кретања и економске миграције, незадовољство грађана, квалитет здравства и проблеми одрживог развоја животне средине. Сви аргументи, а нарочито економски и демографски, упућују на логичан закључак да у дугом року међу косовским Албанцима расте вероватноћа прихватања другог сценарија, јер је први сценарио економски и друштвено не-одржив.

Напомена: Рад је завршен марту 2019. године, али у фебруару 2022. године ажуриран додатним подацима и исказима везаним за протекле две године:

1. У политичком смислу нема битнијих догађаја који мењају раније изнете констатације у раду у вези могућих сценарија будућности Косова. Разговори („преговори“) Београда и Приштине под патронатом Европске уније налазе се у стању замрзнутог конфликта. Бриселу. Наставља се зближавање Албаније и лажне државе Косово с тенденцијом брисања граница и успостављања јединствене великоалбанске државе. Србија, Албанија и Северна Македонија потписале су три споразума у вези с иницијативом *Ошворени Балкан (Мини Шенген)* која треба да обезбеди слободан проток капитала, роба, људи и услуга између ове три земље. Иницијатива има првенствено економски, мање политички карактер. Косово се није придружило овој иницијативи.

2. Нема значајних побољшања у погледу економских показатеља. Косово је према извештају Country Report-а друго најсиромашније подручје Европе иза Молдавије са стопом незапослености младих од близу 60% и укупном незапослености која варира од 25% до 33% и највећа је у Европи. Дефицит трговинског биланса је чак 33% БДП, али се покрива дознакама дијаспоре (17%) и страним донацијама (10% БДП) који би, у случају престанка, спољноекономску неравнотежу учинили неодрживом. Према IMF Country Report-у за фебруар 2021. године, стране директне инвестиције су тек 1% БДП и не прелазе 250 милиона евра у годинама пре *ковид* пандемије. Пад БДП услед пандемије у 2020. години износио је 5,34%. У периоду од 2016. до 2021. БДП по становнику порастао је са 3202 долара на 3772, што је раст од 550 долара за 5 година или мање од 2% годишње. Извештај ММФ констатује да Косово има ниску приходну основу и мале фискалне капацитете, низак ниво социјалне заштите, мали обим јавних инвестиција, ниску ефикасност јавних предузећа, велики јаз у потребама инфраструктуре у области саобраћаја и енергетике, а да расте дискрепанција у образовању и здравству у односу на земље региона.

3. У свом извештају – European Commission Report из 2020. године, Европска комисија констатује да су у раној фази борба против корупције, организованог криминала, реформа јавног сектора и економске реформе. Низак је ниво примене закона у области заштите животне средине. Настављају се негативни демографски трендови па је упркос природном прираштају, на Косову 2019. било 13 хиљада становника мање. Званичне институције Европске уније и Косова прецењују број становника, наводећи да 2019. на Косову живи 1,7 милиона становника, а да ће тај број опасти на 1,66 милиона до 2050. године. Међутим, према тим подацима на Косову је 2010. живело 2,2 милиона становника, а већ 2011. године тај број је пао на 1,79 милиона становника, а нема јасног објашњења за пад од преко 400 хиљада становника. Зато се ове процене морају сматрати непоузданим, осим када је реч о трендовима.

4. Према истраживању *Пулса јавности* који на узорку од 1307 испитаника спроводе UNDP и USAID, и даље су кључни проблеми Косова широко распрострањена корупција, висока незапосленост и изражено сиромаштво, а затим проблеми у здравству. Ни публикација *Doing Business* Светске банке која прати услове пословања, претежно за стране инвеститоре, не бележи значајне помаке Косова на лествици атрактивности улагања.

REFERENCES

- [Bukvić 2007] → Rajko Bukvić, Institutional Frameworks of Economic Development of Kosovo and Metohia 1945–1990, in: Stevan Karamata and Časlav Očić (eds.), *Serbs in Kosovo and in Metohia*, book 26, Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, Beograd, 2006, pp. 397–418.
- [Bursać and Ilić 2006] → Milan Bursać and Nenad Ilić, Intensity of Prosecution and Returns of Serbs and Other Non-Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia after 1999, in: Stevan Karamata and Časlav Očić (ed.), *Serbs in Kosovo and in Metohija*, book 26, Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, Beograd, 2006, pp. 461–467.
- [Constitution of the Republic of Serbia 2006] → Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, *Official Gazette* no. 98/2006.
- [Corruption perceptions index 2016] → Transparency International, *Corruption perceptions index 2016*, Berlin 2017.
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016
- [Djuric 2004] → Zvezdan Djurić, Wealth and Economic Potential of Kosmet, Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, *Ekonomski pogledi*, vol. IV, nos. 1 & 2, book I, Faculty of Economics, Priština, Zubin Potok, June 2004, pp. 121–132.
- [Dželetović 2004] → Milenko Dželetović, Geopolitical Position and Natural Resources of Kosovo and Metohia – International Aspect, *Ekonomski pogledi*, vol. IV, nos. 1 & 2, book II, Faculty of Economics, Priština, Zubin Potok, June 2004, pp. 137–152.
- [EULEX] → European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo – EULEX, Executive Division.
<http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu>
- [Gulan 2007] → Branislav Gulan, Privatization in Kosovo and Metohia, *Макроекономија*, 9 May 2013. <https://www.makroekonomija.org/unmik-kosovo/privatizacija-na-kosovu-i-metohiji/>
- [Hisari 2007] → Bashkim Hisari, Life in Kosovo – Political Crises and Mass Migrations: Kosovo Spring Announcement, *Vreme*, no. 1260, 26 February 2015.
- [Investment in Kosovo 2017] → KPMG in Kosovo, *Investment in Kosovo 2017*, Priština, 2017
<https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/bg/pdf/Investment-in-Kosovo-2017.pdf>
- [KAS Statistical Yearbook 2017] → Kosovo Agency of Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2017*, Priština 2017. <http://ask.rks-gov.net/media/3637/statistical-yearbook-of-the-republic-of-kosovo-2017.pdf>
- [KAS External Trade Statistics 2017] → Kosovo Agency of Statistics, *External Trade Statistics - December 2017*, Priština 2017. <http://ask.rks-gov.net/media/3826/external-trade-december-2017.pdf>
- [KAS Workforce Survey 2017] → Kosovo Agency of Statistics, *Workforce Survey – K2 – 2017*, Priština 2017. <http://ask.rks-gov.net/media/3613/anketa-o-radnoj-snazi-k2-2017.pdf>
- [Kosovo Treasury June 2017] → Kosovo Treasury, *2016 Year Book on Public Debt*, Priština, June 2017, <https://mf.rks-gov.net/page.aspx?id=3,44>, pp. 5–6.
- [Kosovo Treasury October 2017] → Ministry of Finance / Kosovo Treasury, *Three-month data on total debt / 2017 Q3*, Priština, October 2017.
- [Most likely Serbia will lose its state-owned enterprises in Kosovo] → E-Kapija, Most likely Serbia will lose its state-owned enterprises in Kosovo and won't be compensated for

- such loss, <https://www.ekapija.com/news/154995/srbija-ce-po-svemu-sudeci-ostati-bez-imovine-javnih-preduzeca-na-kosovu>
- [Ocić 1999] → Časlav Ocić. Kosovo and Metohia : Investing in Ethnicity, in: *Discourse on Multilingual Cultures : Popular Cultures, Societies and Arts* [多言語文化のディスコース — 民衆文化と社会と芸術], ed. by Yuichi Midzunoe. Taiga Shuppan. ISBN 4-8115-5351-9 C 1095, Tokyo 1999, pp. 341–364. [Paper presented at the International Scientific Conference “Diverse Cultures Interacting within Monolingual and Multilingual Societies”, held on December 18–21, 1997, in Chiba, Japan]
- [Popović 2008] → Nenad Popović, *Openly About Kosovo and Metohia Economy*, ABC Fond, Belgrade, 2008.
- [Property in Kosovo and Metohia registered as the Republic of Serbia's ownership 2017] → Where to invest, Property in Kosovo and Metohia registered as the Republic of Serbia's ownership: land, enterprises, infrastructure..., <http://gdeinvestirati.com/2017/03/15/imovina-na-kosovu-i-metohiji-registrovana-na-republiku-srbiju-zemljiste-preduzeca-infrastruktura/>
- [Puls javnosti May 2016] → United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Kosova/USAID, *Puls javnosti XII*, Priština, May 2016. http://www.ks.undp.org/content/kosovo/en/home/library/democratic_governance/public-pulse-12.html
- [Radosavović 2004] → Nikola Radosavović, Legal Evaluation of Privatization in Kosovo and Metohia, *Ekonomski pogledi*, vol. IV, nos. 1 & 2, book II, Faculty of Economics, Priština, Zubin Potok, June 2004, pp. 29–84
- [Report on Sale of Socially-Owned Enterprises and Property of Socially-Owned Enterprises] → Kosovo Privatization Agency Report on Sale of Socially-Owned Enterprises and Property of Socially-Owned Enterprises, <http://www.pak-ks.org/desk/inc/media/597B677B-DF-41-4CB3-9520-55FA6E021CF7.pdf>
- [Stojanović 2006] → Ivica Stojanović, Actual State of Transition of Kosovo and Metohia Economy within Serbia's Economy, in: Stevan Karamata and Časlav Ocić (ed.), *Serbs in Kosovo and in Metohia*, book 26, Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, Beograd, 2006, pp. 419–426.
- [Stošić 2004] → Nebojša Stošić, Validity of Coase Theorem in UNMIK Privatization Process in Kosovo and Metohia, *Ekonomski pogledi*, vol. IV, nos. 1 & 2, book II, Faculty of Economics, Priština, Zubin Potok, June 2004, pp. 205–238.
- [Strategy of a long-term development of the Serbian community in Kosovo and Metohia 2007] → Government of the Republic of Serbia, Strategy of a long-term development of the Serbian community in Kosovo and Metohia, RS *Official Gazette* no. 21/07
- [Strategy of sustainable living and returns in Kosovo and Metohia 2010] → Government of the Republic of Serbia, Strategy of sustainable living and returns in Kosovo and Metohia, RS *Official Gazette* no. 32/10.
- [The 2030 agenda for sustainable development] → United Nations (UN), *Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development*, A/RES/70/1, <http://www.ciljeviodrzivograzvoja.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Agenda-for-Sustainable-Development.pdf>
- [Transparency International: 2016 Corruption perceptions index 2017] → Transparency

- International, *2016 Corruption perceptions index*, Berlin, 2017. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016, p. 9.
- [Vasić 2004] → Nenad Vasić. Geo-economic Position of Kosovo and Metohia in the Beginning of the 21st Century – Challenges and Prospects, *Ekonomski pogledi*, vol. IV, nos. 1 & 2, book II, Faculty of Economics, Priština, Zubin Potok, June 2004, pp. 33–47.
- [Vasić 2007] → Milena Vasić, Economic (un)sustainability of Kosovo and Metohia: The Model Applied to the Euroregion – a way to overcome development constraints, *Ekonomski pogledi*, vol. IV, nos. 1 & 2, book II, Faculty of Economics, Priština, Zubin Potok, June 2004, pp. 153–174.
- [What do cadastral records show in Kosovo and Metohia] → *Južna Srbija Info*, What do cadastral records show in Kosovo and Metohia – whose is the land? <https://www.juznasrbija.info/lat/drustvo/sta-katastarske-knjige-kazu-na-kosovu-i-metohiji-cija-je-zemlja.html>
- [World Bank 2018] → International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), *Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs*, World Bank, Washington 2018.

“KOSOVO” DEBTS AND OWNERSHIP RIGHTS OF SERBIAN INVESTORS

DRAGOSLAV SLOVIĆ

Finodit, Belgrade, Serbia

office@finodit.co.rs

SUMMARY: Debts and ownership rights stemming from mutual legal transactions cannot be disputed. That is the reason why the Serbian as well as the international public should be acquainted with this issue. The matter should be presented clearly so as to help compensate those who invested their capital in economic and other sectors in Kosovo and Metohia. The paper focuses on the following: different forms of capital investment in Kosovo and Metohia, the balance of debts according to the breakdown of (consolidated) balance sheets on the day of Kosovo’s secession, ownership rights based on the investment in securities, financing the development of Kosovo and Metohia from the Development Fund of the Republic of Serbia, the participation of Serbia in financing development of Kosovo and Metohia’s economy from federal development funds, direct financing of infrastructural projects in Kosovo and Metohia, activated guarantees for unpaid debts of the Kosovo economy and provincial administrative organs and methodological questions of debt calculation.

KEY WORDS: Serbia, Kosovo and Metohia, debts, ownership rights, Development Fund of the Republic of Serbia, Federal Fund for Financing Accelerated Development of Underdeveloped Republics and Autonomous Provinces

INTRODUCTION

It is an undeniable fact that the Republic of Serbia has participated in the financing of overall social development of its southern province of Kosovo and Metohia, especially the construction of its economic facilities and infrastructure ever since the end of WWII. This can be proved by unquestionable material evidence. This fact and the pertaining evidence are the subject matter of this analysis. The political dimension has been deliberately excluded from this paper. We are not dealing with the issue of the *entity* (Kosovo*) status in the manner the Kosovo-Metohia question is predominantly tackled today. Our focus is on the debtor–creditor relations and the acquired capital and ownership rights based on financial investments made in accordance with the fundamental principles of corporate law.

For these reasons we will proceed guided by the principle of “clear accounts” regardless of eventual political implications and various interests burdening the reality of the current moment. It is also important to stress that it is the political interest of secessionist structures in Kosovo and Metohia to promote the strategy of moving economic, financial and especially ownership relations out of focus and thus cover the previously created capital rights and debts from the eyes of the local and international public with debates about fabricated problems. Serbia’s economic interests, and especially its ownership rights stemming from capital investment are literally mentioned nowhere and are treated as if they had never existed. In that way the economic reality has remained in the shadow of political relativisations, marginalized and even fully excluded from any relevant debate. Because of that, one of the objectives of this paper is to put this matter in the foreground, where it belongs.

The arguments on which the claim that a conscious denial of Serbia’s acquired capital rights and debts incurred by Kosovo institutions is convenient for Kosovo organs are corroborated by the fact that it is not mentioned anywhere that enterprises from Serbia have ever invested significant funds in Kosovo and Metohia. Enterprises and banks made such investments partly with an aim of acquiring ownership rights over the companies in Kosovo and Metohia. In addition, the Republic of Serbia financed and issued loans to key infrastructural facilities, while also subsidizing the provincial administration and a part of so-called social services.

In a situation where these facts have been pushed to the background and are not interpreted as legal arguments for recognizing the existing ownership rights, all other questions are transferred to the political terrain. In that way the opposite thesis prevails, according to which Serbia and its enterprises, which had acquired those rights, cannot be present in Kosovo and Metohia, and are thus deprived of their long established rights.

Since the data about financial investments and acquired rights in the field of capital investment can be found in numerous different documents, it is necessary to systematize them and present them according to criteria and standards valid in the modern world. This is the way to avoid their relativization and marginalization, and, consequently, unnecessary disputes.

FORMS OF CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA

In the whole post-WW2 period the investment in Kosovo and Metohia was made with an aim to conduct development programs of the province, which, according to all economic criteria, was rightfully regarded as an underdeveloped area. The development of Kosovo and Metohia was in the focus of the development policy

of Yugoslavia as a whole, as well as Serbia. In the process of the realization of this policy, enormous funds were invested in the province, which this paper is about to confirm.

It is important to point out that both material and financial investments were made in the following legal forms:

- As a capital direct investment – financing the construction of local facilities by the companies from other parts of Serbia
- As capital investment in securities
- As capital investment by the acquisition of other ownership rights,
- As issuing of loans, and
- As financial aid.

This paper focuses mainly on capital investments, that is, a source from which the rights of investors and creditors originate. These are in the focus because financial assistance is treated as data, not as concrete claims. This is the reason why only the funds of investment–credit and ownership character are in the subject matter of this paper. This means that this form of investment includes only those assets which have the character of ownership and receivables coming from creditor–debtor relations.

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BALANCE OF DEBTS FROM (CONSOLIDATED) BALANCES ON THE DAY OF SECESSION

In economic theory and practice, legal–financial relations involving assets and liabilities occur every minute. These relations indicate debtor–creditor relations between entities whose balances are subject to consolidation. Such a breakdown on the day of Kosovo’s secession was not formally made, but there are balances from the period prior to it. In them, debts were clearly listed on both sides, the debtor’s and the creditor’s. This means that both in total and consolidated balances, in balances of certain business entities which were in business relations the amount of payables was clearly shown, as were the receivables on the other side. These are payables and outstanding receivables which stemmed from the current business activities shortly before the secession. This data was presented in balance sheets, both on the side of business entities from the Republic of Serbia, which were mainly creditors, as well as in the balances of Kosovo business entities, which were mainly debtors.

It is the fact that these documents have been harmonized, so there is no doubt as to the regularity of the amount of debts incurred in the current financial relations. The key legal and political argument lies in the fact that debtor–creditor relations have been harmonized, which means that the liabilities are recognized as

such. For this reason the act of political secession gives no right to anyone to annul and deny the short-term debts incurred in the course of current business activities. It should be underlined that the debts in question were duly shown and balanced in the debtors' financial statements. In that respect the secession as a political act was abused and used as an act of unilateral exemption from the obligation to repay due debts. These are debts incurred from the sale of goods and services executed in the current trade. From the legal perspective this act meant that the debtor stopped paying his debts of his own free will (unilaterally).

For this reason the evidence of these debts should mainly be taken from financial reports of business and other sectors in Kosovo and Metohia to the amount of debts which had already been due on the day of secession. In that way all objections to the accuracy of data are eliminated from the methodological as well as from the legal perspective, since what is demanded had already been listed as a recognized due debt.

The legal proof of this assumption is the fact that the original documents showing the incurring of these debts are undeniable. This means that they were confirmed and acknowledged by both sides. There are no indications that could challenge the existence of these debts, and that is the reason why they cannot be "forgotten." There is no grounds for them to be written off or unrecognized, as one side – the debtor – would like to have it.

DIRECT CAPITAL INVESTMENTS AND RIGHTS ACQUIRED THEREFROM

It is an undeniable fact that numerous business entities from Serbia directly invested in the construction of facilities in Kosovo and Metohia. They built them for their own needs, for the purpose of expansion. Major systems from Serbia were mostly involved, constructing factories and developing distribution centres. Investments went the other way, too, as some major economic systems based in Kosovo and Metohia invested in central Serbia. They, too, were expanding their facilities in this way. These facts are also undeniable: there is no legal basis to challenge them on the basis of reciprocity. The only difference is that the investments of Kosovo's economy outside Kosovo and Metohia were significantly smaller. Serbia, of course, cannot and should not deny these investments. We should also bear in mind the fact that the investments coming from central Serbia were far bigger.

It should be highlighted that some of those facilities had a status of business units of parent companies, and that others were considered legal entities according to the Law of Associated Labor that was in effect at the time. The Centre for Economic Research of the Institute for Social Sciences in which I was employed,

and where later I became an associate, worked on a study of direct capital investments in Kosovo and Metohia. Following are a few key investors from the territory of Serbia which should be mentioned:

- PKB (Belgrade Agricultural Combine), which set up seventeen business entities
 - Jumko Vranje, which built three factories,
 - Bambi Požarevac,
 - Simpo Vranje,
 - Agrokoka Žitište,
 - Zastava Kragujevac, three factories,
 - Mašinska industrija Niš, (Mechanical Industry from Niš), two factories,
 - Elektronska industrija Niš (Electronic Industry from Niš), two factories,
 - Prva petoletka Trstenik, two factories
 - Minel Belgrade, two factories

All these investments, from the legal perspective, were made in production facilities that still exist. The key issue which should be clarified is in the legal character of these investments which each company made in its own name and on its own behalf. Because of that, their legal character cannot be challenged, bearing in mind that they were treated as the investors' permanent capital.

OWNERSHIP RIGHTS STEMMING FROM INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES

After the Company Law was adopted in the first decade of this century, there were some significant capital investments which from the legal perspective had a form of acquired corporate ownership rights. A large number of business entities from Kosovo and Metohia issued stocks and shares in order to ensure more lasting sources of financing and overcome the difficulties which were related to servicing debts. That was the reason why many legal entities from Kosovo and Metohia converted their liabilities into capital. Among the companies which issued stocks and shares were the following:

- Trepča, Kosovska Mitrovica
- Fabrika amortizera Priština (Factory of Shock Absorbers)
- Balkan, Suva Reka
- Metalika, Djakovica
- Elektroprivreda Obilić (Electrical Industry Obilić)
- Ibar–Lepenac

The ownership rights based on investing capital were duly registered and had a legal basis. This means that they were in full accord with the rules and standards applicable in the modern world. There is documentation corroborating this claim,

and proving the existence of such acquired rights over business entities which received those investments is very easy.

The conversion of receivables into permanent capital was an important source of financing the economy of Kosovo and Metohia, and it was executed exclusively by banks and business entities from the Republic of Serbia. As a financial consultant engaged in Kosovo and Metohia, I never came across a case of capital conversion being conducted by business entities and banks from other parts of Yugoslavia. It should also be pointed out that the biggest portion of the conversion of debts into capital was done in the first decade become independent states. This is to say that the status of investors as owners over the companies in which the capital was invested in this way is also indisputable.

FINANCING DEVELOPMENT OF KOSOVO AND METOHIA ECONOMY FROM THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA'S DEVELOPMENT FUND

The Development Fund for Kosovo and Metohia has existed in different organizational forms throughout the whole post-WWII period. It was founded to provide sources for financing the development of Kosovo and Metohia in accordance with the policy of ensuring accelerated economic advancement of underdeveloped regions. The fund regularly issued financial reports showing who the funds were granted to and under what conditions, along with terms of repayment.

These reports include a detailed documentation on the beneficiaries of said funds, providing additional evidence that the investments in question did exist. In addition, there are also written decisions which were made by the fund's organs, as well as the documents on the adoption of financial reports, confirming that the beneficiaries received the funds and spent them.

It should be noted that the investments in question were funded by the Republic of Serbia, meaning that Serbia directly financed the development of Kosovo and Metohia. We are pointing this out because in addition to the business entities and banks which participated in all other forms of financing, the Republic of Serbia in this case appears as a creditor. There is ample documentation confirming this: decisions by state bodies on the adoption of the afore-mentioned financial reports, as well as reports on the realization of development programs the funds were allocated for.

The reason we are placing a special emphasis on this fact is that the relations in question cannot be viewed only in political terms, i.e. as existing between two equal subjects of international law or international economic relations. What we are saying, in view of the way the aforementioned financial assets were formed and placed, is that this involves obvious contractual obligations, i.e. relations between

a creditor and debtor. In other words, we are not trying to determine the holder of rights but the situation stemming from numerous financial transactions taking place for decades.

THE PARTICIPATION OF SERBIA IN FINANCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF KOSOVO AND METOHIA ECONOMY THROUGH FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS

The Republic of Serbia appears as a financier, or a creditor of the development of Kosovo and Metohia's economy through the Federal Development Fund as well. Serbia accounted for the biggest share in that Fund (about 40%). This paper will not deal with Serbia's investments in the development of other underdeveloped republics in former Yugoslavia but only with the funds directly invested in Kosovo and Metohia. What should also be noted is that the Federal Development Fund's financial records contain a detailed documentation on the granted funds as well as financial statements from the Kosovo beneficiaries. There are documents on the Fund's adoption of such statements, as well as on the realization of development programs which were also of political importance, i.e. pursuing the goal of laying "the economic foundations for the equality of nations and ethnic minorities".

DIRECT FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURAL PROJECTS IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA

The biggest infrastructural projects in Kosovo and Metohia were financed from the Republic of Serbia's sources. This was the case with key road networks, the Ibar–Lepenac system, the power industry, as well as with tourist facilities built on the territory of the province, which was called an Autonomous Kosmet Area in the first phase (AKA/AKMO)¹.

There is a well-maintained database confirming the way of financing Kosovo and Metohia's infrastructure. Unlike direct investment in facilities which gives a direct ownership right to business entities from Serbia, the latter cases involve legal activities and debts which cannot be disputed in any way, above all because they were duly recognized by the funds' beneficiaries.

¹ The author of this paper was employed in a company which built some of these facilities, and was a witness of the way in which their construction was financed. For example, I was engaged as an employee in the construction of the Mitrovica–Stari Trg road, the road networks in Mitrovica and Zvečan, the stadium of the Rudar soccer club from Kosovska Mitrovica, as well as in the construction of the Metohija–Prizren railroad. Thus, as a direct participant I know how these facilities were financed and in what way the funds for the works were collected.

GUARANTEES FOR DEBTS OF KOSOVO ECONOMY AND STATE ORGANS

As a subject of international law, Serbia was a guarantor for many debts incurred by the organs of the province, as well as the companies which it financed. Most of these guarantees were activated and paid from the assets of the Republic of Serbia. Some were paid before and some after the province's secession. Serbia is still paying these debts, without being reimbursed.

Many guarantees are yet to be activated meaning that Serbia may face additional repayments of such debts.

Such economic facts are the least disputable. The right of the guarantor who paid somebody's debts to request reimbursement and compensation is unquestionable. It is important to stress that in the case in question we are talking about the debts of concrete debtors, and this situation can in no way be considered in the context of relations between states. The debtors are named and it is clear who is the debtor and who the guarantor. No discussion will change the nature of these arrangements since they involve relations between the known entities, which concluded concrete credit arrangements, each of them willingly accepting the conditions of the contract.

In most cases, the creditors that activate Serbia's guarantees are from abroad. But although the guarantees clearly specify who the loan beneficiaries are, the issue of Serbia's reimbursement has yet to be raised.

All the aforementioned is reason enough why this complex matter should be thoroughly and professionally analyzed in a scientific project that should also include the members of the Committee of Economic Sciences (CES/OEN) of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA/SANU).

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

It is favorable that the documentary basis for all the claims presented in this paper is properly prepared and legally verified. The documentation which is the evidence creating core material for such elaboration should be used. It is also favorable that the now defunct Public accounting Office (PAO/SDK) of Yugoslavia employed highly professional monitoring methodologies and kept well-organized records. Its reports were accepted and adopted by state organs without objections. All its reports are complete and encompass financial statements of all the entities which were obliged to keep business records.

Moreso, all its reports always covered two successive years, so that the latest year also included the data that was already adopted and verified by state institu-

tions, in accordance with the laws of Yugoslavia and Serbia. No dispute has ever arisen with regard to the veracity of these reports, which, fortunately, have been preserved in their original form.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE PROPOSED STUDY

Methodological problems cannot be an obstacle in a study of this kind. They are mentioned here in order to clarify the arguments which the proposed study should comprise. The first and most complex problem is that our economic system and the format of financial statements in the past were subject to frequent changes. For this reason the methodological reconciliation of different data will appear as the first practical problem for the generation of economists educated in the last 20 years. The current generation of economic researchers will have difficulty in conveying the economic categories of the past to the category system of the present time, as those they will have to deal with had undergone huge changes regarding both their content and definition. For example, we can mention the housing fund in which funds were invested in the workers' apartments were the property of all workers, not the individuals living in and the investment had the character of employed capital that was reported in balance sheets.

These are reasons why there should be an update and reconciliation of categories and items in these financial statements. One should bear in mind that all items and categories have to be conveyed in the manner understandable to the whole world, in a clear and universally accepted professional form. For example, in the first two balance sheets that I made in my life, the term which was used was gain (profit), whereas income appeared as an indicator of economic efficiency in the third and all other balance sheets.

With the introduction of self-managing interest communities in former Yugoslavia's social system, the situation became more complex, but this will not pose an unsurmountable obstacle in the realization of the proposed study.

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF RECONCILING PRESENTATIONS OF VALUE

It should be pointed out that the monetary system of Yugoslavia, namely the Serbian *dinar*, is insufficiently reliable for the realistic representation of the creditor-debtor relations in question, mostly because of its frequent devaluations. Studies show that the US dollar is the best reference currency, being quite reliable through-

out the period when Serbia invested in Kosovo and Metohia. But the dollar, too, was devalued: the inflation index for half a century is 847 according to the Bank of America sources. That is the reason why additional multi-currency homogenization should be carried out in order to express all economic indicators employed and all relations analyzed in this study using a dollar of constant value.

The experiences we already have are positive and they confirm that the application of a dollar equivalent to express creditor-debtor, as well as ownership relations, will be reliable enough.

CONCLUSIONS

When the political shadow over relations between Serbia and its southern province is removed, debts and ownership rights stemming from mutual legal transactions cannot be disputed. Because of that, the issue at hand should be clearly presented to the Serbian and international public and should also be utilized to ensure compensation of those who invested their capital in economic and other sectors in Kosovo and Metohia.

It is advisable that the proposed study also comprised the investments not requiring the repayment of debts nor resulting in ownership rights. The citizens of Serbia and Kosovo and Metohia have the to learn the complete truth in this matter. Yugoslavia used to conduct a reasonable policy of development of underdeveloped republics and Kosovo and Metohia, but it had never delved deeply in these relations for political reasons. Once the nature of these relations came to the fore, the situation became increasingly complex, ending up in a complete collapse of the state.

The aim of this study is significantly broader and more detailed, because sooner or later it will become a historical document. Undoubtedly, with substantial political implications.

КОСОВСКИ ДУГОВИ И ВЛАСНИЧКА ПРАВА СРПСКИХ ИНВЕСТИТОРА

ДРАГОСЛАВ СЛОВИЋ

Дугови и власничка права стечена у међусобном правном промету се не могу довести у питање. То је разлог да се ово питање представи нашој и светској јавности, и да се јасно прикаже а то значи и користи у сврху остваривања права оних који су давали новац и улагали свој капитал у привредне и друге субјекте на Косову и у Метохији (КИМ). У раду се разматрају: облици капиталних улагања на КИМ, стање дугова по пресеку (консолидованих) биланса на дан сецесије, власничка права заснована на улагањима у хартије од вредности,

кредитирање развоја привреде КИМ из Фонда за развој Републике Србије, учешће Србије у финансирању и кредитирању развоја привреде КИМ преко савезних развојних фондова, непосредно финансирање и кредитирање инфраструктурних пројеката на КИМ, гаранције за дугове косовске привреде и административних органа као основ настанка дугова и методолошка питања обрачуна.

MINING RESOURCES OF KOSOVO AND METOHIA

SLOBODAN VUJIĆ
MILINKO RADOSAVLJEVIĆ

Mining Institute, Belgrade, Serbia
slobodan.vujic@ribeograd.ac.rs

SUMMARY: The mining wealth of Kosovo and Metohia is a real, strategically significant capital with value growing due to the high and ever-increasing exhaustion of mineral resources in Europe and beyond. Evaluation of the mineral and raw material complex of Kosovo and Metohia is multifaceted, highly demanding, cannot be reduced only to indicators such as reserves, the content of useful components in ore or its current market value, without considering all the determining parameters. The paper is devoted to the mining resources of Kosovo and Metohia and their exploitation, primarily vast reserves of coal suitable for open-pit mining, polyminerals of non-ferrous and precious metal ores, non-metallic mineral raw materials and thermal mineral water.

KEYWORDS: mineral raw materials, ores, mines, Kosovo and Metohia

INTRODUCTION

Mineral wealth is one of the most important, even crucial current issues related to Kosovo and Metohia. Discussions and publications about the mineral wealth of Kosovo and Metohia are burdened with unverified and unreliable data, contradictory estimates made more emotionally and less expertly, wrong approaches and lack of knowledge about the mineral and raw material complex, static observation of its potentiality, construction of “arguments” by counting closed and active mines, their capacities, contradictory evaluation of mining resources, disregarding the importance of the mineral wealth of Kosovo and Metohia in the national and international context, and more. This narrow-minded conglomerate of improvisations has been continuously upgraded by disinformation that denies our science, expertise, and knowledge, serves falsehoods about the risks of geological exploration equaling them to gambling hazards, about lavish investments in geological exploration and opening of mines, about our financial impotence, and so on.

The goal is amnesia and somnolence in order for us not to remember and hinder predators in their intention to get ore wealth. [Vujić, Grubić et al. 2014].

Evaluation of the mineral and raw material complex is a multifaceted, professionally serious and demanding issue; it cannot be reduced to the level of indicators such as the quantity, the content of a useful component, and the market value of the raw material, without considering all the determining indicators – energetic, industrial, road, infrastructure, water management, demographic, social, health-care, education, cultural, regional and other, without allowing for the significance for the security and safety of the country, for lower vulnerability to geopolitical turmoil, external influences, for independence and sovereignty of the country [Vujić, Grubić et al. 2014; Vujić, Radosavljević and Maksimović 2018: 5–23].

The mining potentials of Kosovo and Metohia are indisputable; they primarily include all vast reserves of lignite favorable for exploitation, polymineral ores of non-ferrous and precious metals, non-metallic mineral raw materials, and thermal mineral water.

The mining wealth of Kosovo and Metohia is a real, strategically significant capital with value growing due to the high and ever-increasing exhaustion of mineral resources in Europe [Vujić, Grubić et al. 2014].




Figure 1, Mineral deposits in Kosovo and Metohia (S. Vujić, 2021.)

ORES AND MINES IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA

Until 1999, minerals of lead, zinc, silver, gold, nickel, aluminum (bauxite), chromium, magnesite, asbestos, kaolin, brick mineral raw materials, thermal mineral waters, and coal were exploited in Kosovo and Metohia, *Figure 1*. The occurrences of indium, gallium, thallium, cadmium, tin, and more have been recorded. [Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].

Coal

By distribution and quantities, the most significant resource is coal, spreading over about 60% of the territory of Kosovo and Metohia, *Figures 1 and 2*. As a result of research of many mineral raw materials in the coal-bearing area, the Kosovo-Metohia coal basin (some authors separate it into three basins: Kosovo, Drenica and Metohia), is geologically well explored, especially in peripheral parts.



Figure 2, Coal mines (S. Vujić, 2021.)

Legend: 1 Kosovo, 2 Kruševac, 3 Muhadžer Babuš, 4 Sibovac, 5 Dobro Selo, 6 Belačevac, 7 Sibovac

The coal basin is built of lake sediments of Pliocene; the coal is of xylite and or lignite type. The coal layer is 40–50 m thick, in some parts of the basin over 100 m thick; the *bank-shaped layer stretches* from the surface wedging out to a depth of about 300 m [Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].

The average lower heat value of open pit coal is 7,950 kJ/kg; the estimated geological reserves are 12.5–14 billion tons (energy-equivalent to 2.37–2.65 billion tons of oil). At the present level of coal consumption in Serbia, the exploitable coal reserves of the Kosovo-Metohia basin are sufficient for the next 180–200 years [Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].

Underground coal mining

At the beginning of the last century, one of the greatest Serbian industrialists, Miloš Savčić, was the first owner of a part of the coal basin in the area from Kosovska Mitrovica to Kačanik. In 1921, Savčić formed the Mining-Industrial Joint Stock Company of Kosovo, which was the largest joint stock company in Serbia before World War II. The Savčić and Acović families opened Kosovo mine with underground mining, built a cable car for transferring coal from the railway station in Obilić, thermal power plants (≈ 50 kW) and the first mining residential colony. By 1940, the Kosovo mine produced 647,127 t of coal. Two other mines were opened before World War II, Sibovac in 1930 that worked briefly and produced 990 t of coal, and small open pit mine Aleksander in 1937 (there is no data on its production).

After World War II, Kruševac mine was opened in 1948, mine production was restarted in Sibovac mine in 1952, and Nova jama and Muhadžer Babuš mines were opened in 1955 and 1970, respectively. After the fire (most likely sabotage) in Kruševac and Kosovo mines, production was stopped in 1968.

From 1922 to 1988, when the last mine with underground mining Muhadžer Babuš was closed, close to 10 million tons of lignite was excavated by underground mining in Kosovo and Metohia. Production of coal by underground mining is graphically shown in *Figure 3*. On several occasions, pits were modernized with new equipment and the introduction of new exploitation technologies [Vujić, Radosavljević and Maksimović 2018: 5–23; Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].




Figure 3, Production of coal in mines with underground mining, 1922–1988

Open pit coal mining

By intensifying the detailed geological investigations of the coal-bearing basin in 1952–1956, preparations were made for the opening of open pit mine (OPM) Dobro Selo and the construction Thermal power plant Kosovo A of a 65MW (Kosovo A: 1962 first phase up to 65 MW, then blocks 1964 125 MW, 1970 200 MW, 1971 200 MW, 1975 210 MW, total 800 MW. Kosovo B 2x339 MW, construction started 1977). The opening of OPM Dobro Selo of the annual designed capacity of 3.6 million tons of coal began in 1956, and the first tons of coal were obtained in 1961. 153,027,274 m³ of tailings was excavated, and 129,742,164 of coal was produced in OPM Dobro Selo from 1956 to 1999 (an average of 3,089,099 t of coal annually), and the highest production of coal amounting to 5,158,019 t was recorded in 1998. The average stripping ratio of 1.18 m³/t varies between 0.57 and 2.72 m³/t [Vujić, Radosavljević and Maksimović 2018: 5–23].

The opening of open-pit mine Belačevac and coal production therein began in 1964 and 1969, respectively. By 1999, 164,585,567 m³ of tailings was excavated, and 98,100 tons of coal was produced. The average annual production of coal was 3,164,530 t, the highest production of 6,465,234 t of coal was recorded in 1988. The average stripping ratio of 1.68 m³/t varies between 0.81 and 3.79 m³/t.

From 1956 to 1999 in Kosovo and Metohia, 317,612,841 m³ of tailings was excavated and 227,842,605 t of coal was produced using open-pit mining, *Figure 4*, energy-equivalent to 39,972,387 t of oil, with the average stripping ratio of 1.39 m³/t, which is, in terms of exploitation economics, very significant and significantly

more favorable relative to open-pit mines in Kostolac and Kolubara coal basins [Vujić, Radosavljević and Maksimović 2018: 5–23].

The opening of OPM Sibovac started in July 2007, and the supply of thermal power plants with coal from this open-pit mine began in September 2010. Production in open-pit mines Dobro Selo and Belačevac was suspended in 2012.

From 1922 to 1999, underground and open-pit mining in Kosovo and Metohia produced 237.563.665 t of coal, which is energy-equivalent to 45.078.494 t of oil. During the embargo, sanctions and many other problems imposed on Serbia, thanks to the expertise and dedication of the teams of the Electric Power Industry of Serbia, consisting of engineers from the Directorate for Coal Production and machine operators from Kolubara and Kostolac, from 1991 to 1999 61,524,334 t of coal was produced and 67,655,836 m³ of tailings was excavated, of which 35,943,509 t of coal and 40,347,419 m³ of tailings in OPM Dobro Selo, and 25.580.825 t of coal and 27.308.417 m³ of tailings in OPM Belačevac [Vujić, Radosavljević and Maksimović 2018: 5–23; Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].




Figure 4, Collective production of OPM Dobro Selo and Belačevac, 1956–1999

Lead and zinc

South of Kopaonik, in the area from Leposavić to Priština and Novo Brdo, the turbulent geological past has left the heritage of numerous deposits of lead, zinc, silver and gold ore, Figure 5. Due to the decades-long lack of investments in

geological exploration, the present state of mineral resources of non-ferrous and precious metals in Kosovo and Metohia is not reliably observable, especially in terms of spatial parameters, quantities and content of useful components in ores, so it makes no sense giving estimates of reserves. On the other hand, an assessment based on geological indicators, experience, and prior knowledge allows a general conclusion that the mineral-raw material potential of the area is significant. [Vujić 2019].



Figure 5, Mines, flotations and metallurgy plants of Trepča in Kosovo and Metohia (S. Vujić, 2021.)

Legend: 1 Belo Brdo mine, 2 Žuta prlina mine and Koporici open pit mine, 3 Crnac mine, 4 Leposavić flotation, 5 Zvečan lead smelter, 6 Stari Trg mine, 7 Prvi Tunnel flotation, 8 Kosovska Mitrovica zinc refinery, 9 Ajvalija mine, 10 Kišnica and Badovac mines, 11 Novo Brdo mine, 12 Badovac flotation.

In this ore-bearing area, the tradition of exploitation of zinc, silver and gold ore minerals can be traced back to the Roman era and medieval Serbia. Modern development began in 1924 with the research of mineral and raw material poten-

tials of Trepča and the establishment of Trepča Mines Limited company in 1927, owned by British capital. With the opening of Stari Trg mine, at the location of a medieval mine, production began in 1930 [Vujić, Grubić et al. 2014].

For 70 years, from 1930 to 2000, about 36 million tons of ore were produced in Trepča with an average content of lead 5.9%, zinc 3.9%, and silver 85 g/t. 2,143,515 t of lead metal and 1,414,975 t of zinc metal were produced.




Figure 6, Trepča, production of ore, 1930–1997

Average annual production was 514,552 t of ore, the highest quantity of 702,718 t was recorded in 1984 and the least of 10,712 t in 1993. In two periods, World War II and the last decade of the 20th century, the production was significantly lower, Figure 6. 292,281 tons of ore with the highest lead content of 12.6% was excavated in 1931, while 32,475 t of ore with the lowest lead content of 2.28% was recorded in 1994. 481,001 t of ore with the highest content of zinc, 8.8%, was excavated in 1932, while 647,078 t of ore with the lowest zinc content of 1.77% was recorded in 1986. Observed by a timeline from the beginning of the works in 1930 to the present, the metal content in the ore has dropped, identically to the world trends.

In the Trepča system in Kosovo and Metohia, there are two other groups of mines, Ajvalija, Kišnica, Badovac and Novo Brdo in the south with a joint flotation in Badovac with the annual capacity of 600,000 t of ore, and Belo Brdo, Crnac, Žuta Prlina and Koporić in the north with a flotation in Leposavić, with the designed



Figure 7, Trepča, production of Pb and Zn, 1930–1997

annual capacity of 350,000 t of ore; currently, the flotation processes 100–120 thousand t of ore annually. At the locations of these mines, the exploitation of non-ferrous and precious metal ores has been carried out with interruptions since the Middle Ages and the Roman era. After World War II, Belo Brdo mine produced 3,580,156 t of ore with an average content of lead and zinc of 5.48% and 4.48%, respectively, Crnac mine produced 1.826.821 t of ore with an average content of lead and zinc of 4.68% and 2.45%, respectively, Žuta Prlina mine produced 732,641 t of ore with an average content of lead and zinc of 2.88% and 2.50%, respectively, and Koporić mine produced 2,312,019 t of ore with an average content of lead and zinc of 2.22% and 2.25%, respectively. The highest average metal content of 9.96% was recorded in Belo Brdo mine ore, while the lowest was from Koporić, 4.47%. The ores of these mines as well are characterized by a drop in metal content [Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].

In the second half of the 20th century, there were more organizational mergers and separations of lead and zinc mines. In some periods, all lead and zinc mines in Serbia were part of the Trepča Mining and Metallurgical-Chemical Combine, which had a positive impact on investments in geological exploration, expansion of the mineral-raw material base, modernization, construction and development of mines.

Aluminum – bauxite

In the vicinity of Klina on the slopes of the Grebnik Mountain in a 15 km long zone of variable width of 0.5–3 km, there are 20 lens deposits of bauxite, of diasporic type, complex geological structure, wedging out up to 200 m. The roof and floor layers of the deposit consist of limestone. The content of Al_2O_3 is 46 – 48%, SiO_2 2 – 4%, the content of Fe_2O_3 is increased. The technologies of our alumina factories were not adapted to this type of bauxite, so the complete production achieved by open pit mining was exported to Romania [Vujić, Radosavljević and Maksimović 2018: 5–23; Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].

Nickel




Figure 8, Ferronickel plant Glogovac, production of ore, 1988–1994

Open pit mining of two silicate lateritic nickel ore deposits of Glavnica near Priština and Glogovac supplied a ferronickel plant in Glogovac. From 1988 to 1994, 3,191,497 t of ore with a nickel content of 1.082–1.25 % was produced, Figure 8 [Vujić, Radosavljević and Maksimović 2018: 5–23; Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].

Chromium

Poor chromite ores were excavated in Đakovica massif – Deva mine, in Brezovica, in Orahovac massif, with more than 80 occurrences of deposits discovered, and several other locations where small quantities were occasionally excavated. In the plant for the concentration of poor chromite ores in Deva mine near Đakovica, about 15,000 tons were processed annually. More than 500,000 tons of chromite ore was excavated in total [Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021; Janković, Jelenković and Vujić 2003].

Diatomite

The deposits of diatomite or diatomaceous earth Danjani, Ratkovci and Radosti are located near Orahovac. The estimated reserves of diatomite in the Metohia Basin are 25 million tons, of which 21 million is in Ratkovci [Vujić, Radosavljević and Maksimović 2018: 5–23; Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].

Other mineral raw materials

Deposits of kaolin, asbestos, magnesite, quartz sand, thermal mineral water, etc. in the territory of Kosovo and Metohia are also economically significant.

INVESTMENTS AND BENEFITS

The exploitation of mineral resources in Kosovo and Metohia, as well as in Serbia and Yugoslavia, rose considerably in the second half of the 20th century. About 20 million tons of mineral raw materials of different values were exploited annually in Kosovo and Metohia. Reliable valuation of this production is not feasible, for several reasons, primarily the variability in prices of stock products such as non-ferrous and precious metals, the conditionality of prices of mineral raw materials such as coal, then social, macroeconomic and political interests, the influence of local community interests, etc. [Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].

The mineral and raw material complex of Kosovo and Metohia has made a considerable contribution to solving employment, social problems, raising standards of living, education, development of road infrastructure, urbanization, housing construction, development of extractive industry, etc.

It is estimated that in the period from World War II to the end of the 20th century, \$ 10–11 billion was invested in geological exploration, opening, equipping and development of mines, procurement of equipment and machinery, introduction of new technologies, construction of infrastructures and logistic mining systems, construction of flotations, separations, plants for coal treatment and processing, coal gasification plants, construction of internal roads, power supply systems, regulation of water flows, etc. These investments include all accompanying investments necessary for initiating mining production, construction of railway, road, housing and water management infrastructure, investment in healthcare, education, culture, science, environmental protection, archeology, publishing, sports, etc. [Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].

CONCLUSION

The mineral and raw material potentials of Kosovo and Metohia are indisputably significant. This refers to lead, zinc, silver, gold, nickel, magnesite, bauxite, and primarily vast reserves of lignite with very favorable deposit conditions for exploitation. These are quantities significant by world standards; the current coal consumption in Serbia could be supplied by these quantities of coal in the following 180 to 200 years [Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].

The answer to the question whether ore wealth is the reason for seizing Kosovo and Metohia lies partly in the fact that the degree of exhaustion of mineral resources in most of the European countries is very high. With this fact come geopolitical, military and other hidden reasons. We are of the opinion that mineral resources in this conglomerate are a severe motive for seizing Kosovo and Metohia [Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021].

РУДНИЧКИ РЕСУРСИ КОСОВА И МЕТОХИЈЕ

СЛОБОДАН ВУЈИЋ
МИЛИНКО РАДОСАВЉЕВИЋ

Сажетак

Вредновање минерално-сировинског комплекса Косова и Метохије је вишезначно, веома захтевно, не може се упрошћено сводити само на показатеље као што су резерве, садржаји корисних компоненти у руди или њена тренутна тржишна вредност, без сагледавања свих опредељујућих параметара. Рад је посвећен минерално-сировинским потенцијалима Косова и Метохије, који су неспорни, пре свега то су велике резерве угља повољних лежишних услова за експлоатацију, полиметаличне и металичне руде, неметаличне минералне сировине и термоминерале воде.

Рудно богатство Косова и Метохије је реалан, стратешки значајан капитал чија вредност расте због високе и све веће исцрпености минералних ресурса многих земаља Европе. Мишљења смо да је поред геополитичких и војних разлога, и рудно богатство разлог отимања Косова и Метохије.

LITERATURE

- Janković, Jelenković and Vujić 2003 → S. Janković, R. Jelenković, S. Vujić. *Mineral Resources and Forecast of Potential of Metallic and Non-Metallic Mineral Raw Materials of Serbia and Montenegro at the End of the 20th Century*. Academy of Engineering Sciences of Serbia, Belgrade 2003, 876 p.
- Vujić 2019 → S. Vujić. The Mineral Industry of Kosovo and Metohia. In: *Kosovo Vertical or Neocolonial Horizontal? Demographic, Economic, Social, Legal, Geopolitical and Ecological aspects of the Kosovo and Metohia Issue*, Časlav Očić, ed., Institute for European Studies, Svetigora, Town Library "Žarko Zrenjanin", Home of Culture Gračanica, and TV Hram; Gračanica-Cetinje-Belgrade-Zrenjanin 2019, pp. 67–74.
- Vujić, Grubić et al. 2014 → Vujić, S., Grubić A. et al. *Serbian Mining and Geology in the Second Half of the 20th Century*. Academy of Engineering Sciences of Serbia, Matica srpska and Mining Institute, Belgrade, 2014, 563 p.
- Vujić, Jelenković, Rabrenović, Radosavljević, Čalić, Nikolić, Simić, Maksimović, Mojić, Komatina and Miladinović 2021 → S. Vujić, R. Jelenković, D. Rabrenović, M. Radosavljević, N. Čalić, B. Nikolić, S. Simić, S. Maksimović, S. Mojić, M. Komatina, B. Miladinović. *Mineral-Raw Material Complex of Kosovo and Metohia*. Mining Institute Belgrade and Geological Survey of Serbia, Belgrade 2021, 332 p.
- Vujić, Radosavljević and Maksimović 2018 → S. Vujić, M. Radosavljević and S. Maksimović. Ore and Mines of Kosovo and Metohia. *Bulletin of Mines*, Mining Institute Belgrade, Belgrade, 2018, pp. 5–23.

SERBIAN MINING IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA DURING THE MIDDLE AGES

DUŠAN MRKOBRAĐ

SUMMARY: On the economic map of the medieval Serbian state, Kosovo and Metohia was a region of farming settlements and vineyards, surrounded by zones of mining production and metal processing. These settlements had market squares – interconnected by a network of caravan roads – where local traders interacted with entrepreneurs from other regions attracted by the area's growing economy and promise of wealth. Addressing the full scope of the mining industry, from the mining process, smelteries and foundries, to transportation, entrepreneurs, customs, trade and crafts, the medieval mining law of Europe, and Serbia as well, stipulated strictly defined rules which were abided by everyone. Custom duties were an important source of revenue for the Nemanjić state, and, by extension, a measure of the volume of both trade in any given settlement and mining production in the area. Roman Catholic parishes began appearing in Serbian mining regions in the early 14th century, as one of the privileges Serbian rulers had granted the Saxon miners who settled there. If this data is considered from the standpoint of the economy as a whole, it can be said that the territory of Kosovo and Metohia, along with the surrounding areas, constituted an indivisible whole – and the central economic region of the medieval Serbian state.

KEY WORDS: Serbia, Kosovo and Metohia, Middle Ages, mining, technology, transportation

The most important economic branch in Serbian lands prior to the Ottoman invasion was mining, and it is widely accepted that the exploitation of minerals accelerated the development of the medieval Serbian society. The excavation of precious metals is usually linked to the arrival of Saxons in the Nemanjić state. Production grew due to the opening of new mines and reopening of old ones, concurrently transforming many other branches of the economy. This expansion attracted increasing numbers of people skilled in existing trades (smiths, hewers and tanners) as well as new kinds of tradesmen (smelters, coal-makers, ironworkers, cartwrights). A great number of craftsmen were locals and, by the mid-15th century, Serbian miners and smelters were already considered masters of their trade, receiving invitations to work in southern Italy and other countries. The development of crafts and of the trade in metals and other raw materials stimulated local commerce on the whole, with merchants from the coastal towns such as Kotor,

Dubrovnik and Bar, as well as local Serbs, finding increased economic interest in exchanging goods.

Historians and geologists have contributed the most to the study of the medieval mining in Serbian lands.


Drawing on historical sources, the first group of scientists (Jovan Rajić [Рајић 1974: 382–383], Čedomilj Mijatović [Мијатовић 1869: 152–219; Мијатовић 1873a: 191–249; Мијатовић 1873b: 79–140], Šime Ljubić [Ljubić 1875: 31], Konstantin Jiriček [Јиричек 1951; Јиричек 1959; Јиричек 1976], Stojan Novaković [Новаковић 1881: 263–355], Mihailo Dinić [Динић 1937: 119–146; Динић 1955: 31–100; Динић 1956: 247–250, Fig. 1–2; Динић 1956b: 328–329; Динић 1959; Динић 1960: 139–149; Динић 1967a: 3–10], Nikola Radojčić [Радојчић 1959: 248–255; Радојчић 1962], Sima Ćirković [Ћирковић 1976: 91–98; Ćirković 1977: 134–141; Ćirković 1979: 1–20; Ћирковић 1983: 151–156; Ћирковић 1997a; Ћирковић 1997b; Ћирковић (with Ковачевић–Којић and Ђук) 2002], Skender Rizaj [Rizaj 1968; Rizaj 1969: 369–372; Rizaj 1983, 135–138], to mention just a few) to provide a basic picture of the medieval Serbian mining and metal processing researched the following:

- Primary source materials regarding the most important mining centers of the time (Brskovo, Rudnik, Novo Brdo, Srebrenica);
- The role of Saxons in the opening and exploitation of mines,
- Metal processing, trade and the export of silver and non-ferrous metals.

The emerging picture formed by their investigations, however, constituted only a portion of what was to be discovered – which is the result of a glaring discrepancy between the data in historical records and the actual situation on the ground (Map 1). Namely, until the mid-15th century only the names of about 50 mines were recorded, while the existing written documents fail to mention the activity of numerous other mines. It is also unclear what the names of certain medieval mines actually referred to: were they, in fact, mining centers (in which case their scope and content remains unknown) or were they merely individual mining sites. As already noted in scientific literature, all the extraction sites of precious and non-ferrous metals from this period have yet to be determined.

What is known is that rich deposits of galena – a silver-containing lead ore – led not only to the formation of settlements but also of market squares, which were the centers of medieval economic life in Kosovo and Metohia. Most smaller settlements were destroyed during the Ottoman invasion, while those that survived languished under the Turkish rule only to eventually fall into oblivion. Any information that can be gleaned about their days of glory comes from written sources, the remains of ancient settlements and the very limited traces of mining works involving ore excavation and processing. The only location in Kosovo and Metohia to have preserved its medieval character until the modern times is Janjevo.

The discovery of medieval mines unmentioned in historical records (Map 1) is largely a result of studies into Serbia's mineral resources conducted by geologists, particularly Vasilije Simić [Simić 1951; Simić 1958: 357–393; Симић 1975: 77–78, fig. 1–4; Симић 1979: 87–96; Симић 1988].



Map 1. A chronological survey of the distribution of medieval mines (Drawing by G. Tomović)

The study of medieval mining could significantly benefit from archeological, specifically archeo-metallurgical, research. This new methodological approach focused on examining cultural remains can lead to the discovery of not only neglected mining sites but hitherto unknown ones as well. The method has helped uncover traces of excavation (e.g. the remains of various kinds of underground galleries and tunnels, but also of certain surface structures), traces of ore and metal processing (confirmed by the discovered remains of old smelting facilities, foundries and mine tailing and dross disposal sites), as well as the remnants of various mining tools and equipment, objects for everyday use etc. [Mrkobrad 1993, 105–107]. These finds are mostly held in private collections across Serbia, and only a portion is displayed in museums. No systematic, long-term multidisciplinary research projects have been carried out in this field, aside from the limited exploration of Mt. Rudnik. Individual investigations aimed at obtaining archeological material on the medieval mining in Serbia would be of benefit to other scientific disciplines as well, yet necessarily require field work. Given that this type of research is relatively new to our country, any significant data should not be expected too soon.

The medieval mining laws of Europe [De Re Metalica 1950], including Serbia, contained clear and well-formulated regulations which everyone abided by, regardless of whether they concerned excavation, smelting and casting, and transportation, or entrepreneurs, customs officers, merchants and craftsmen.

Based on Despot Stefan Lazarević's Mining Law pertaining to Novo Brdo [Радојчић 1962; Марковић 1985: 7–56], which was preserved in a later transcription, it can be assumed that all larger mines in medieval Serbia had similar laws composed in the like manner, with articles regulated the following areas:

- The social and legal position of miners;
- Real legal relations (mining concessions, property rights, inheritance);
- Obligational relationships (lease contracts, sale contracts, gift deeds); Legal disputes between miners, types of courts, judges and legal proceedings as per the law on mining (the customs court, the court of voivode or headman, the court proceedings with the presentation of evidence),
- Issues related to governing bodies in Novo Brdo as per the law on mines.


Kosovo and Metohia is a structural basin rimmed by the zones rich in ore deposits. The three such major zones, with numerous smaller ones lying in between, are as follows:

- Novo Brdo with Janjevo, at the eastern edge of the Kosovo basin;
- Trepča with the Kopaonik mines, in the north,
- Rogozna, at the far southwestern edge.

The Novo Brdo mining basin encompassed the Novo Brdo mines and Janjevo, the oldest mine in this zone (Map 1). The arrival of the Roman Catholics and

the establishment of their parish there in 1303¹, can only be ascribed to the beginning of mining in the area.

Staro Janjevo, meaning Old Janjevo as the place is still called, was located between the hills of Borelin and Surnjevica (Map 2). Its mines and settlement were defended by the now ruined fort at Veletin hill. Roman coins and traces of excavation on Ceove hill show that this ore mine dates back to Classical Antiquity. There is a glaring discrepancy between the written records on local mining and smelting and the actual situation on the ground. Distributed across an area of 12 km² are a dense network of shafts and traces of the ancient mining of silver, *argentum de glama* and lead. In the late 19th century, explorer R. Hofmann [Simić 1951: 230] analyzed local dross and found that, unlike in other sites, it contained no lead or precious metals. According to him, this meant that the dross was smelted twice, which indicates an advanced knowledge of metal processing. British prospectors have mapped some 650 locations which containing remnants of mining shafts or traces of smelting. Today, many toponyms contain indications of medieval mining – among others, the settlements of Glama and Plakanička Mahala, the Kiževica stream, the Ceove hill, and the village of Saškovce.



Map 2. Medieval mining works near Janjevo (Drawing by V. Simić)

¹ S. Ćirković [Ђирковић 1997a: 247; Ђирковић 2002: 42–43] believes that Gračanica was mentioned instead of Janjevo because initially the settlement and the mining shafts were located at the spot where the Kižnica river empties into the Gračanica, and were moved up the Kižnica later on. The Gračanica parish has a natural continuation in Janjevo, because the latter was registered in 1346 as a settlement with a Roman Catholic parish.

Located at an altitude of about 1,100 m, at the summit of Mt. Velika Planina, and dominating the entire area, Novo Brdo lies between the slopes of Mt. Kopaonik and Mt. Skopska Crna Gora, and above the Kriva Reka river, a left tributary of the Binička Morava [Географска енциклопедија 2004]. Despite its unfavorable position and lack of access to main roads, Novo Brdo grew from a small mining settlement into medieval Serbia's biggest mining and urban center (Map 3), becoming a symbol of the country's wealth and prosperity. Its economic strength allowed Novo Brdo to significantly contribute 15th-century Serbian art and eventually become one of the cultural hubs in this part of Europe. Well-known men of letters who lived and worked in the town included Demetrius Kantakouzenos, Vladislav the Grammarian and Konstantin Mihailović.




Map 3. A map of the world listing Novo Brdo (Made by Fra Mauro, 1460)

It is believed that the mining works in Novo Brdo commenced in the late 13th century, with records first mentioning the town's already widely known miners' market square in 1325. Much like in other market squares, a large role there was played by Saxon miners [Ђирковић; Ковачевић-Којић, Ђук 2002: 39–42], who were responsible for:

- Launching the mining works,
- Founding the settlement,
- Developing and improving production, and
- Organizing the town after towns in their homeland.

Lead and *argentum de glama* were processed in Novo Brdo, while iron was worked only for local needs. Traders from the Adriatic coast, especially Dubrovnik, contributed much to the town's prosperity – as evidenced by the existence of a mint where famous *groši*² were coined. Novo Brdo also boasted a fort, whose remains testify to its one-time greatness. Of the four destroyed smaller forts that protected the roads to the mines and the town, medieval documents mentioned only two – Prilepac and Prizrenac.



Map 4. Novo Brdo, old excavation sites (Drawing by V. Simić)

Traces of old mining activity are numerous and can be found over the wider Novo Brdo area (Map 4). On the slopes of Mt. Mala Planina alone, researchers have mapped around 640 locations containing shafts, evidence of digging or traces of structures whose purpose could not be determined. Large surfaces of the area are covered in dross, with the highest concentration found at Trničevac, Krnjevska Reka and Leštar. Again, many local toponyms testify to the area's main economic activity, including Glama by the village of Straža and Glama Mahala in the village of Brasaljce, as well as the village name Gvozdari, the locations Nišino kolo and

2 They were mentioned as "grossi di Novaverda" in 1349, or as "Novomonte moneta argentea conte Lazaro".

Rajkovo kolo in the village of Marevce, and the Stara Pudarija shaft among others (Maps 4 and 5).



Map 5. Settlements, mines and smelting facilities in the vicinity of Novo Brdo
(Source: Ђирковић, Ковачевић-Којић and Ђук 2002: 39)

The area of Trepča along with those Kopaonik mines that lay within Kosovo and Metohia (Maps 1 and 6) was another location of major mining activity during the Middle Ages and is the second of the three main mining zones surrounding Kosovo and Metohia, spanning around 1,400 km² (Map 1). Data from field explorations of this area was checked against historical records, revealing that, in addition to the large and small³ deposits that had been mined for centuries, there also existed numerous individual shafts and smelting structures which had operated only for a short time.

3 Badanj-Sastavci, Bajgorska reka, Belasica, Belo Brdo, Bećirovac, Vignjište, Vitušići, Vojetin, Gropovo, Guvništa, Guvniška reka, Zaplanina, Zlatna ravan, Jelakce, Koperić, Kiževina, Kremići, Latinsko Do, Lukovo, Madere, Mažići, Majdan, Majdanska reka, Meljnica, Ostraće, Olovarnik, Pravec, Predol, Rudare, Rudnica, Rudište, Rudnjak, Rudnjačka reka, Rudnica, Rupnička Reka, Smrekovica, Stari Trg, Srebrnac, Suva Reka, Suva Ruda, Suvo Rudište, Trepča, Trepčanska reka, Trstena, Carina, Ugljari, Šatorica, Šipačina, Šljaknište, Štovna. [Simić 1951: 208–216; Simić 1958: 357–393; Mrkobrad 2003: 251–254].

Gold-bearing ores were processed on Mt. Kopaonik since time immemorial. Every new stage of mining, regardless of chronology and exact location, began with prospecting for gold in river beds. In Kopaonik's gold ore zones (Map 1), alluvial deposits were panned for gold dust at Plana, Kremićka Reka, Kriva Reka, on the southern slopes of Mt. Goč, but most of all in the Rasina river basin.

In addition to the common iron ores used to make objects for everyday use, a better quality ore – containing varying quantities of nickel, chromium and molybdenum – was excavated at Rudnjak, Suvo Rudište and Suva Reka and used exclusively for making special mining tools: pickaxes, drills, chisels and hammers.

It was similar with silver-bearing lead ore. In addition to the classical lead and zinc deposits at Badanj-Sastavci and Mažići, there were also sites such as Šipačina, Belasica and Belo Brdo, where the ore contained gold as well.


Copper-bearing ores were also mined on Mt. Kopaonik, although to a lesser extent. They existed in pure form, as in Brzeće, were combined with lead and zinc, as in Planina, or were mixed with iron, as was the case in Suvo Rudište, Kremići and Suva Reka. It is believed that these locations were exploited since Classical Antiquity, with mining activity significantly intensifying during the Middle Ages. This opinion is supported by the 1996 archeo-metallurgical investigations at Kremići [Томовић, Богосављевић-Петровић 1996: 107–113].

All lead, zinc, copper, silver and gold mines on Mt. Kopaonik date exclusively from the Middle Ages. Decades-long geological investigations have confirmed the existence of over 15,000 medieval shafts and about 230 smelteries. It is likely that the full extent of medieval mining works in the area will never fully be determined or mapped, which indicates that the metallurgical knowledge of the time is in no way inferior to what is known today.

Kosovo and Metohia's third largest mining zone is located on the Rogozna plateau (Map 7), in the upper course of the Ibar, enclosed by the rivers Ibar and Raška. Both older literature and the on-site investigations have confirmed the existence of medieval mining works [Динић 1967b: 400]⁴ at Bare, Gluha Vas, Žežnica, Zlatna glava, Zlatare, Zlatni kamen, Kiža, Lipovice, Plakaonice, Rudine, Rupe, Saška reka, Čivutska rupa, Crnac, among others.


The Rogozna and Trepča mines were the initial locations where the Saxon miners began working in Kosovo and Metohia. Various ores were excavated there as early as the late 13th century [Динић 1967: 400; Динић 1955: 1–27; Томовић 1987: 44–45; Simić 1958: 360; Симић 1988: 170–174]. (Rogozna and Trepča had a Roman Catholic parish by 1303, while the Saxons from Trepča were mentioned in *The St. Stephen Chrysobull* issued by King Stefan Uroš II Milutin).

4 [Documentation of the Ras Project in the Archeological Collection of the School of Philosophy in Belgrade], [Mrkobrad 2006, 128–129].



Map 6. The Kopaonik mining area (Drawing by D. Mrkobrad. Computer rendering by N. Mrđić)

The congregation of the Roman Catholic parish in Rogozna was composed of Saxon miners and traders from Dubrovnik and other towns along the Adriatic coast. Documents from the Dubrovnik Archives from 1348 [Динић 1959: 5; Томовић 1987: 45–46] mention the mining settlement having a headman of German origin who – along with his goldsmith son, mining entrepreneurs Anjo Ivanović, Stjepko and Ilija Trpetić, Pripko Žoranović, and a tanner named Antonije – borrowed money from Dubrovnik resident Bratoje Radmilović.



Map 7. The Rogozna ore-deposit zone (Drawing by D. Mrkobrad. Computer rendering by N. Mrđić)

This data indirectly confirms that:
 – Rogozna had a mining settlement with an organized administration, led by a headman;
 – Its local masters developed a highly advanced technique in working silver;
 and

– The inhabitants had active business and financial ties with Dubrovnik [Томовић 1987: 45–46; Rizaj 1968: 169–180].

Mining settlements were formed by or in the vicinity of ore accumulations, gradually gaining importance as the rich deposits began attracting entrepreneurs from Dubrovnik and elsewhere.

As a result, miners' market squares became leading economic centers and hubs of crafts and trade (Maps 1 and 8). Novo Brdo was at the forefront of such settlements in Kosovo and Metohia, followed by St. Dimitrije at Zvečan, Trepča, Priština, Janjevo, Vučitrn, along with Plana, Livade and Koporići on Mt. Kopaonik. These market squares were connected by an entire network of caravan roads (Map 8) which followed routes that had existed since antiquity. Many important medieval Serbian trade roads crisscrossed Kosovo and Metohia [Јиричек 1976: 334; Урошевић 1935, 67–68; Урошевић 1950, 32; Шкриванић

1974: 103–109; Шкриванић 1955: 389, fig. 2; Ђирковић 1997: 91]. Among them, the most important routes were:

- Niš – Prokuplje – Kuršumlija – the Banjska and Lab river valleys – Priština – Lipljan
- Niš – the Toplica river valley – Ostraće – the Ibar river valley
- Vranje – Prilepnic – Gnjilane – Novo Brdo – Janjevo – Priština
- The Saxon road through the Binička Morava river valley that connected with the Vranje road
- Gračanica – Novo Brdo – Vranje
- Zvečan – Trepča – the Lab river valley
- Prizren – Kruša – Hoča – Golubovac – Trepča
- Dečani – Istok – Peć – Trepča
- Rudnik – Borač – Čestin – Žiča – Brvenik – Zvečan
- Studenica – Brvenik – Ras – Gluhavica – Dubrovnik
- The road from the Lim river valley via Sjenica to Ras, which continued on through Rogozna, to Banjska and Zvečan.

In addition to these highways, however, medieval mining and economic centers were also linked by a host of local roads. While the settlements have long been gone without a trace, these roads now *leading nowhere* throughout Kosovo and Metohia remain a significant Serbian research topic.

Certain stretches of these nameless roads passing through Rogozna [Mrkobrad 2006:130] and the Kosovo section of Mt. Kopaonik have been investigated. Since the task was only partially completed, the findings will be reported separately. Part of this research project explored the relationship between the road, the mine, the village and the city.

Custom duties were an important source of revenue for the Nemanjić state. Checkpoints were located at all major market squares and charged a fee equaling a

percentage of the value of the goods offered for sale. Serbian rulers usually leased such checkpoints to traders for a limited period, farming out customs tax collection. Customs officers were frequently people from Kotor or Dubrovnik (Luka Lukarević, Paskoje Gučetić, Novak Makedol), who were familiar with local economic circumstances. Once a lease expired, the officer was issued a written document confirming that all his financial obligations to the treasury were fulfilled. Customs checkpoints, therefore, provided quite accurate data on the volume of trade in any particular settlement, but also on the overall mining production in that area.

The first Roman Catholic parishes in Serbian mining areas were formed in the early 14th century⁵, as one of the privileges Serbian rulers had granted the Saxon miners at the time of their settlement. The full privileges included:

- The right to freely prospect and mine ore;
- Autonomy for mining municipalities;
- An autonomous judiciary,
- Religious freedom which implied the right to build churches.

A letter by Pope Benedict IX from 1303 mentions four other mining parishes in Serbia in addition to Brskovo: Rudnik, Rogozna, Trepča and Gračanica [Ђирковић 1997a: 244–247]. All the mentioned churches were dedicated to St. Mary, except for the one in Rogozna, whose dedication is not known. It is interesting that other mining areas also had churches dedicated to the Mother of God, such as Novo Brdo, the vicinity of Priština, and Crnča [Спремић 1994: 140–141]. This topic itself warrants separate research.

Reminders of the German origin of the Balkan Saxons can still be found in Serbian mining terminology [Рођић 1964: 137–146]. Among the dozens of examples, we will mention here only those beginning with the last letter of the Serbian alphabet – š:

- *šajbna* – vertical opening
- *šafar* – smelter
- *šipka* – iron bar
- *šihta* – a six-hour work shift
- *škripa* – the heavy iron socket a hammer handle was wedged into
- *šlag* – a horizontal tunnel
- *šnort* – the front part of a shaft
- *šoštub* – a mill race i.e. sluice directing water to a water wheel
- *špat* – powder coal for smelting
- *štolna* – a horizontal tunnel, a ditch draining water from a tunnel
- *šurf* – a probing trench
- *ščur* – powder coal for smelting.

⁵ These parishes disappeared following the destruction brought by the great Turkish War or the War of the Holy League (1688–1690).

The Saxons' longstanding presence in these parts, as well as their gradual assimilation into the Serbian culture, is further evidenced by Serbian proper nouns of Germanic origin, frequently encountered written in both Serbian and German. These include toponyms (e.g. Sase, Saš, Saška, Sasina, Sasovac, Sašinovac, Saška reka etc.), names (Sasin) and surnames (Hanzović, of brothers Pavle and Martin [Јовановић 2004: 30] and Sasinović, of brothers Petar, Toloje, Andra and Radi-voje) [Павловић 1960: 103–105]. Other contemporary Serbian surnames which testify to the country's mining roots are of non-Germanic origin, e.g. Vignjević, Vidnjević, Demirović, Zlatarević, Klinčarski, Kovačević, Kovačić, Kujundžić, Kuznički, Majdanić, Mijač, Plavaš, Rudarević, Samokovlija, Ugljarević, among others.

In conclusion: On the economic map of the medieval Serbian state, Kosovo and Metohia was a region of farming settlements and vineyards, surrounded by zones of mining production and metal processing. The latter areas had settlements with trade-based economies and market squares that served as gathering places foremost for local Serb merchants, but also for traders from cities along the Adriatic coast. If this data is considered from the standpoint of the economy as a whole, it can be said that the territory of Kosovo and Metohia, along with the surrounding areas, constituted an economically indivisible whole – and the central economic region of the medieval Serbian state.

LITERATURE

- Географска енциклопедија, Београд 2004, електронско издање [*Geographical Encyclopedia*, Belgrade 2004, electronic edition]
- Динић 1956 → Динић, М. (1956). Ново брдо, Кратак историјски преглед, *Старинар* V–VI, Београд [Dinić, M. (1956). Novo brdo, Brief historical overview, *Starinar* V–VI, Belgrade]
- Динић 1937 → Динић, М. (1937). Дубровачка средњевековна караванска трговина, *ИИЧ* III/1–4, Љубљана–Загреб–Београд [Dinić, M. (1937). Dubrovnik Medieval Caravan Trade, *ИИЧ* III / 1–4, Ljubljana – Zagreb – Belgrade]
- Динић 1960 → Динић, М. (1960). Дубровчани као феудалци у Србији и Босни, *Историјски часопис* IX–X, Београд [Dinić, M. (1960). The people of Dubrovnik as feudal lords in Serbia and Bosnia, *Historical Journal* IX – X, Belgrade]
- Динић 1959 → Динић, М. (1959). За историју рударства у средњевековној Србији и Босни II, *Гласник САН* XI/4, Београд [Dinić, M. (1959). For the history of mining in medieval Serbia and Bosnia II, *Glasnik SAN* XI / 4, Belgrade]
- Динић 1955 → Динић, М. (1955). Саси, За историју рударства у средњевековној Србији и Босни, I, *Гласник САН* Посебна издања ССXL, Одељење друштвених наука, Vol. 4, Београд [Dinić, M. (1955). Sasi, Za istoriju rudarstva u srednjevekovnoj Srbiji

- i Bosni, I, *Glasnik SAN* Посебна издања ССXL, Одељење друштвених наука, Vol. 4, Belgrade]
- Динић 1967а → Динић, М. (1967). Треча у средњем веку, *Прилози за књижевност, језик, историју и фолклор* књ. XXXIII/1–2, Београд [Dinić, M. (1967). Trepca in the Middle Ages, Contributions to Literature, Language, History and Folklore vol. XXXIII / 1-2, Belgrade]
- Динић 1967б → Динић, М. (1967). Треча у средњем веку, in: *Српске земље у средњем веку*, историјско-географска студија (у. С. Ђирковић), СКЗ, Београд [Dinić, M. (1967). Trepča in the Middle Ages, in: Serbian lands in the Middle Ages, historical-geographical study (edited by S. Ćirković), SKZ, Belgrade]
- Јиричек 1959 → Јиричек, К. (1959). Трговачки путеви и рудници Србије и Босне у средњем веку, *Зборник Констјантин Јиричека I*, Посебна издања САН СССXXVI, Београд [Jiriček, K. (1959). Trade routes and mines of Serbia and Bosnia in the Middle Ages, *Proceedings of Konstantin Jiriček I*, Special editions SAN СССXXVI, Belgrade]
- Јиричек 1976 → Јиричек, К. (1976). *Историја Срба I*, Слово Љубве, Београд [Jiriček, K. (1976). *History of Serbs I*, Slovo Ljubve, Belgrade]
- Јовановић 2004 → Јовановић, В. (2004). *Ново Брдо*, Републички завод за заштиту споменика културе, Београд [Jovanović, V. (2004). *Novo Brdo*, Republic Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments, Belgrade]
- Марковић 1985 → Марковић, Б. (1985). Закон о рудницима деспота Стефана Лазаревића, translation and a legal and historical study, *Сјоменик* СХХVI, Одељење друштвених наука 24, Београд [Marković, B. (1985). Law on Mines of Despot Stefan Lazarević, translation and a legal and historical study, *Monument* СХХVI, Department of Social Sciences 24, Belgrade]
- Мијатовић 1869 → Мијатовић, Ч. (1869). Финанције српског краљевства (Извори за финансијски доходак у XII и XIV веку), *Гласник Српској ученој друштва* XXV–XXVI, Beograd [Mijatović, Č. (1869). Finances of the Kingdom of Serbia (Sources for financial income in the XII and XIV century), *Gazette of the Serbian Academic Society* XXV–XXVI, Belgrade]
- Мијатовић 1873а → Мијатовић, Ч. (1873). Студије за историју српске трговине XIII и XIV века, *Гласник СУД*, XXXIII, Београд [Mijatović, Č. (1873). Studies on the history of Serbian trade in the 13th and 14th centuries, *Gazette of the Serbian Academic Society* XXXIII Belgrade]
- Мијатовић 1873б → Мијатовић, Ч. (1873). Студије за историју српске трговине XIII и XIV века, *Гласник СУД*, XXXVIII, Београд [Mijatović, Č. (1873). Studies on the history of Serbian trade in the 13th and 14th centuries, *Gazette of the Serbian Academic Society* XXXVIII Belgrade]
- Мркобрад 1993 → Мркобрад, Д. (1993). Прилози познавању проблематике српског средњевековног рударства, *Гласник Српској археолошкој друштва* 9, Београд [Mrkobrad, D. (1993). Contributions to the knowledge of the problems of Serbian medieval mining, *Gazette of the Serbian Archaeological Society* 9, Belgrade]
- Мркобрад 2003 → Мркобрад, Д. (2003). Значај Треча у оквиру копаоничког рударства средњевековне Србије, *Сјоменица Јована Ковачевића*, Филозофски факултет – српско археолошко друштво, Београд [Mrkobrad, D. (2003). The significance of

- Трепча within the Kopaonik mining of medieval Serbia, *Spomenica Jovana Kovačevića*, Faculty of Philosophy – Serbian Archaeological Society, Belgrade]
- Mrkobrad 2006 → Mrkobrad, D. (2006). Ибарски Колашин у привреди средњевековне Србије, *Косовско-Метихијски зборник* 3, Београд [Mrkobrad, D. (2006). Ibarski Kolašin in the economy of medieval Serbia, *Kosovo-Metohija anthology* 3, Belgrade]
- Новаковић 1881 → Новаковић, С. (1881). Ново Брдо и Врањско поморавље у српској историји XIV и XV века, *Годишњица Николе Чујића*, III, Београд [Novaković, S. (1881). Novo Brdo and Vranjsko pomoravlje in Serbian history of the 14th and 15th centuries, *Anniversary of Nikola Čupić*, III, Belgrade]
- Павловић 1960 → Павловић, М. (1960). Трагови Саса у српскохрватском језику, *Годишњак Филозофској факултету у Новом Саду*, V, Нови Сад [Pavlović, M. (1960). Traces of Sasa in the Serbo-Croatian language, *Yearbook of the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad*, V, Novi Sad]
- Радојчић 1962 → Радојчић, Н. (1962). Закон о рудницима деспоја Стефана Лазаревића, САНУ, Научно дело, Београд [Radojčić, N. (1962). Law on Mines of Despot Stefan Lazarević, SANU, Scientific Work, Belgrade]
- Радојчић 1959 → Радојчић, Н. (1959). Одакле је Јован Рајић преузео вест о отварању рудника у Србији за време краља Владислава, *Прилози за књижевност, језик, историју и фолклор* XXV–3–4, Београд [Radojčić, N. (1959). Where did Jovan Rajić take over the news about the opening of mines in Serbia during the reign of King Vladislav, *Contributions to literature, language, history and folklore* XXV–3–4, Belgrade]
- Рајић 1974 → Рајић, Ј. (1974). Историја разних словенских народа, *Болгар, Хорватов и Србов*, II [Rajić, J. (1974). History of various Slavic peoples, Bulgarians, Croats and Serbs]
- Ризај 1969 → Ризај, С. (1969). Три фермана из 1573. и 1574. године о рударству Србије, Косова и Македоније, *Врањски гласник* V, Врање [Rizaj, S. (1969). Three decrees from 1573 and 1574 on mining in Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia, *Vranjski glasnik* V, Vranje]
- Родић 1964 → Родић, Н. (1964). Рударска терминологија у старим српским текстовима, *Југословенски филолог* XLII, Институт за српскохрватски језик, Београд [Rodić, N. (1964). Mining terminology in old Serbian texts, *Yugoslav Philologist* XLII, Institute for Serbo-Croatian Language, Belgrade]
- Симић 1988 → Симић, В. (1988). *Рударство и војска средњевековне Србије и Босне*, Рударски институт, Београд [Simić, V. (1988). *Iron mining of medieval Serbia and Bosnia*, Mining Institute, Belgrade]
- Симић 1975 → Симић, В. (1975). Рударство гвожђа у Копаоничкој области, *Рударски гласник* 2/75, Београд [Simić, V. (1975). Iron mining in the Kopaonik area, *Rudarski glasnik* 2/75, Belgrade]
- Симић 1979 → Симић, В. (1979). Рударство и прерада гвожђа, *Ономастички прилози* I, Београд [Simić, V. (1979). Mining and processing of iron, *Onomatological Contributions* I, Belgrade]
- Спремић 1994 → Спремић, М. (1994). Црнча у средњем веку, *Зборник Филозофској факултету*, 18, Београд [Spremić, M. (1994). Crnča in the Middle Ages, *Proceedings of the Faculty of Philosophy*, 18, Belgrade]
- Томовић 1987 → Томовић, Г. (1987). Сопотски забел Чрмањ, *Историјски часопис* XXXIV, Београд [Tomović, G. (1987). Sopotski zabel Črmanj, *Historical Journal* XXXIV, Belgrade]

- Томовић, Богосављевић-Петровић 1996 → Томовић, М., В. Богосављевић-Петровић (1996). Зајачак-Кремићи, касноантички металуршки комплекс, *Гласник САД* 12, Београд [Tomović, M., V. Bogosavljević-Petrović (1996). Zajačak-Kremići, late antique metallurgical complex, *Herald SAD* 12, Belgrade]
- Ђирковић 1976 → Ђирковић, С. (1976). Дубровачка ковница и производња сребра у Србији и Босни, *Историјски гласник* 1–2, Београд [Ćirković, S. (1976). Dubrovnik Mint and Silver Production in Serbia and Bosnia, *Historical Herald* 1-2, Belgrade]
- Ђирковић 1983 → Ђирковић, С. (1983). Средњевековна прошлост данашњег Косова, *Зборник Филозофској факултету* VX/1, Београд [Ćirković, S. (1983). Medieval past of today's Kosovo, *Proceedings of the Faculty of Philosophy* VX/1, Belgrade]
- Ђирковић 1997 → Ђирковић, С. (1997). *Работници, војници, духовници – друштва средњевековној Балкана*, Београд [Ćirković, S. (1997). *Workers, soldiers, clergy – societies of the medieval Balkans*, Belgrade]
- Ђирковић 1997а → Ђирковић, С. (1997). *Католичке парохије у средњевековној Србији, работници, војници, духовници*, Београд [Ćirković, S. (1997). *Catholic parishes in medieval Serbia, workers, soldiers, clergy*, Belgrade]
- Ђирковић 1997б → Ђирковић, С. (1997). *Срби у средњем веку*, Београд [Ćirković, S. (1997). *Serbs in the Middle Ages*, Belgrade]
- Ђирковић 2002 → Ђирковић, С. (са Д. Ковачевић-Кojiћ и Р. Ћук) (2002). *Старо српско рударство*, Београд [Ćirković, S. (with D. Kovačević-Kojić and R. Ćuk) (2002). *Old Serbian mining*, Belgrade]
- Урошевић 1935 → Урошевић, А. (1935). Горња Морава и Изморник, *Насеља и порекло славјановаништва* 28, Београд [Urošević, A. (1935). Gornja Morava and Izornik, *Settlements and the Origin of the Population* 28, Belgrade]
- Урошевић 1950 → Урошевић, А. (1950). Новобрдска Крива Река, *Насеља и порекло славјановаништва* 32, Београд [Urošević, A. (1950). Novobrdaska Kriva Reka, *Settlements and the Origin of the Population* 32, Belgrade]
- Шкриванић 1955 → Шкриванић, Г. (1955). Мрежа путева према Светостефанској (1313–1318), Грачаничкој (1321), Дечанској (1330) и Светоарханђелској (1348–1352) повељи, *Историјски часопис* V, Београд [Škrivanić, G. (1955). Network of roads according to the St. Stephen's (1313–1318), Gračanica (1321), Decani (1330) and St. Archangel's (1348–1352) charters, *Historical Journal* V, Belgrade]
- Шкриванић 1974 → Шкриванић, Г. (1974). *Путеви у средњевековној Србији*, Туристичка штампа, Београд [Škrivanić, G. (1974). *Roads in Medieval Serbia*, Tourist Press, Belgrade]
- Ћирковић 1977 → Ћирковић, С. (1977). Mere u srednjekovnom rudarstvu Srbije i Bosne, *Zbornik radova Historijskog zavoda JAZU*, vol. 8, Zagreb [Ćirković, S. (1977). Measures in medieval mining in Serbia and Bosnia, *Proceedings of the Historical Institute JAZU*, vol. 8, Zagreb]
- Ћирковић 1979 → Ћирковић, С. (1979). Dubrovčani kao posrednici u rudarstvu Srbije i Bosne, *Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae*, Vol. 6, Zagreb [Ćirković, S. (1979). The people of Dubrovnik as intermediaries in the mining of Serbia and Bosnia, *Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae*, Vol. 6, Zagreb]
- De Re Metalica 1950 → *De Re Metalica*, Dover Publications, New York, 1950.

- Dinić 1956b → Dinić, M. (1956). Carine – Srbija, *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije* 2, 328–329, Zagreb [Dinić, M. (1956). Customs – Serbia, *Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia* 2, 328–329, Zagreb] Documentation → Documentation of the Ras Project in the Archeological Collection of the School of Philosophy in Belgrade.
- Jiriček 1951 → Jiriček, K. (1951). *Važnost Dubrovnika u trgovačkoj povijesti srednjeg vijeka*, Dubrovnik [Jiriček, K. (1951). *The importance of Dubrovnik in the trade history of the Middle Ages*, Dubrovnik]
- Ljubić 1875 → Ljubić, Š. (1875). *Opis jugoslavenskih novaca*, Zagreb [Ljubić, S. (1875). *Description of Yugoslav money*, Zagreb]
- Rizaj 1968 → Rizaj, S. (1968). Rudarstvo Kosova i susednih oblasti od XV do XVIII veka, *Studije* 6, Priština [Rizaj, S. (1968). Mining in Kosovo and Neighboring Areas from the 15th to the 18th Century, *Study* 6, Priština]
- Rizaj 1983 → Rizaj, S. (1983). Uloga Vlaha Primićura u rudarstvu Kosova i Srbije, *Pagovu* LXXIII Odeljenje društvenih nauka 22, ANU BIH Sarajevo [Rizaj, S. (1983). The Role of Vlaho Primićur in the Mining of Kosovo and Serbia, *Papers* LXXIII Department of Social Sciences 22, ANU BIH Sarajevo]
- Simić 1951 → Simić, V. (1951). *Istorijski razvoj našeg rudarstva*, Beograd [Simić, V. (1951). *Historical development of our mining*, Belgrade]
- Simić 1958 → Simić, V. (1958). Rejonizacija i karakteristike rudarske delatnosti u oblasti Kopaonika, *Vesnik zavoda za geološka i geofizička istraživanja* XV, Beograd [Simić, V. (1958). Regionalization and characteristics of mining activity in the area of Kopaonik, *Journal of the Institute for Geological and Geophysical Research* XV, Belgrade]

ETHNIC ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES, 1948–2021

JOVAN KRŠIĆ
jovankrsic@yahoo.com

SUMMARY: The true number of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia has been a subject of manipulation for quite some time.

Efforts have been made to magnify their numbers and to claim that their population is rapidly increasing, while at the same time claiming that the share of the Serbian population is already negligible and bound to get even smaller.¹ These claims are being used as a key argument to the effect that Kosovo has been “lost” and that it is a “myth” and a “burden,” which is why the current Serbian authorities must “save” us by amputating a part of Serbia (whose territorial integrity is guaranteed by UN SC Resolution 1244) and gifting it to a Greater Albania, which is currently *in statu nascendi*.

KEYWORDS: Kosovo and Metohia, Serbia, Greater Albania, ethnic Albanians in Serbia, demographic changes, 1948–2011

A BRIEF HISTORY

The first reliable data in the 20th century on the number of ethnic Albanians (Arbanasi/Kosovars/Sh[q=ch]iptars) in Kosovo and Metohia dates back to the population census conducted in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1921. According to the census, the population living in the territory of present-day Kosovo and Metohia at the time was 439,010. In terms of native language, the number of Albanian speakers was 288,907 (65.6%) and Serbian 114,095 (26%).

The 1931 census conducted in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia showed that 552,064 people lived in Kosovo and Metohia. According to the mother tongue: 331,549 (60.06%) spoke Albanian and 180,170 (32.6%) spoke Serbian. We see that over a 10-year period the population increased by 113,000 (25%). The number of Kosovo/ethnic Albanians (“Shchiptars”) rose by 43,000 (14%), but their share of the total population decreased from 65% to 60%. The number of Serbs increased by 66,000 (58%). Therefore, ahead of World War II the Shchiptar/Shiptar–Serb population ratio was 2:1.

All the population censuses in Kosovo and Metohia after World War II in communist Yugoslavia served the purpose of implementing the set policy of increasing the number of ethnic Albanians as the foundation of a secession that would happen when the time was right.

The first post-war census was carried out in 1953. According to that population count, the number of residents of Kosovo and Metohia was 808,141 – of whom 524,559 were ethnic Albanians and 221,312 were Serbs. We see that the number of ethnic Albanians had grown¹ by 193,010 (58%) relative to the 1931 count, while the number of Serbs had increased by 41,142 (22%).

According to the 1961 population census, Kosovo and Metohia had a total population of 963,988 – with 646,605 ethnic Albanians and 227,016 Serbs.

The censuses conducted in 1971 and 1981, organized by the Kosovo and Metohia provincial administration which was absolutely dominated by ethnic Albanians, show an alleged explosion in the number of ethnic Albanians. In that period, Serbia had no authority in Kosovo and Metohia whatsoever and there was unlimited data manipulation.

The ethnic Albanians boycotted the 1991 population census, as they were no longer the ones organizing it. The Serbian authorities publicized the data on population size based on an estimate (taking the results of the previous two censuses as credible).

After the occupation of Kosovo and Metohia and the arrival of Bernard Kouchner as UNMIK chief, the population count procedure was initiated for the sake of holding elections.

Information appeared then that the occupying authorities were surprised by the fact that there were not as many people there as it had been said. Over the course of four months they managed to list “just” 800,000 people (which was the actual number). Afterwards, a statement was released saying that the enumerators had been untrained, and so after “training” 2.2 million ethnic Albanians were listed (without Serbs), and the circus moved on. Here is an article from the July 15, 2000 edition of Belgrade weekly *Vreme* which deals with these facts:

Politics

The Vreme Dossier: Kosovo

Bernard Kouchner

The civil administrator has in the last few months had his working method and the work and results of the mission he leads strongly disputed. His report to the UN Security Council suffered the same fate, while UN Special Envoy for Human Rights Jiri Dinstbier subjected it to the harshest criticism. Announcing himself

¹ By immigration from Albania, among other things; v. [Živančević 1989], [Вилотић 2003 and 2009] and [Ocić 2006].

the possibility of stepping down soon from the office he is performing in Kosovo, Kouchner is desperately trying to do something “spectacular”, something that would silence all his critics. Of the many promises he has made, he has kept very few and is now fervently trying to achieve what he thinks will annul his failures so far in carrying out the first elections in Kosovo since the arrival of the KFOR troops.

However, the problem he is facing is the impossibility of conducting a population census and thereby registering voters in Kosovo – because none of the local Albanians are keen to do the job, and the Kosovo Serbs, neither those who have fled nor those who have stayed, want to take part in the census. The civil administration is only partially satisfied with the fact that since April 27, when the census began, some 800,000 people have been listed in Kosovo.

Vreme, № 497, July 15, 2000

According to the last population census organized by the ethnic Albanians in 2011, the Kosovo and Metohia population numbered 1,739,825 residents, of whom 1,616,869 were ethnic Albanians. I have conducted an analysis of this census and presented it at the end of this paper. The official number currently stated on the number of people living in Kosovo and Metohia, presented by the ethnic Albanians and the CIA World Factbook (hereinafter the CIA/SH “coalition”), is 1,889,000, with 95% being ethnic Albanians, meaning that there are around 1,800,000 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia. The United Nations uses these data, too.

Analyzing the data on vital events in Kosovo and Metohia, parameters related to the workforce, reports on various other censuses, I found data that undoubtedly show that the (*pre-*)*given* number of ethnic Albanians do not live in Kosovo and Metohia.

The sources of data on the Kosovo and Metohia population that were available to me are the following:

1. CIA World Factbook – data distributed by the CIA. I considered them unreliable because they are an instrument of manipulation and the achievement of set goals, rather than of accurately assessing the situation.

2. KAS – Kosovo Agency of Statistics, a body of the Kosovo* interim administration, their statistical agency.

3. The data from sources 1 and 2 are congruent and are marked further in the paper as CIA/SH data.

4. The UN – Department of Economic and Social Affairs. This UN agency’s data can be found on the website countrymeters.info. The website contains data on vital events for each individual state. In the data pertaining to Serbia, Kosovo and Metohia is treated as a part of Serbia, although there are separate data just for Kosovo and Metohia, under the name Kosovo. I considered these data more reliable, although I am aware that they, too, operate within a predefined framework.

5. Other international organizations: World Bank, the IMF.
6. Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia – its reports and publications.

When stating particular data in the paper, I immediately cited the source as well, so that the reader can follow the text more easily; for example, the designation KAS, Kosovan migration, 2014.

In that way, anyone can easily go to the source of the information, conduct a check and potentially supplement these findings.

THE NUMBER OF LIVEBORN CHILDREN (BIRTH RATE) IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA IS CONSIDERABLY SMALLER THAN THE OFFICIALLY PRESENTED DATA

According to UN sources (website countrymeters.info), about 13,000 births are registered annually in Kosovo and Metohia, while according to CIA/SH that number is around 30,000. Where does the difference come from?

Table 1 UMBER OF LIVEBORN CHILDREN IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA, 2014–2017

	source: UN	source: CIA/SH
2014	–	32.067
2015	–	29.290
2016	13.003	29.428
2017	13.011	–

The ethnic Albanians list all the children as liveborn in Kosovo and Metohia, regardless of their place of birth, therefore also abroad, if they are of Shiptar descent. Thus children born across Western Europe, America, in Macedonia, Montenegro and central Serbia are listed twice: in their respective place of birth and in Kosovo and Metohia.

The UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs, which tracks the statistics of population and vital events for all countries of the world, according to a revision from 2014 lists all children according to the mother's last place of residence.

Therefore, according to those clearly defined criteria that are common to the entire world, and according to data from an impartial source (UN), some 13,000 births were registered in Kosovo and Metohia in 2016 and 2017.

The ethnic Albanians reach the false number of 30,000 births by adding children born outside of Kosovo and Metohia, who are of Shiptar origin, to the number of those actually born in Kosovo and Metohia. For example: a Shiptar

child born in Zurich, Switzerland, with Zurich being the place of residence of the mother and the father, will be presented in the CIA/SH data as part of the birth rate in Kosovo and Metohia. Parents fill out the so-called DEM 1 form for reporting births (the form is filled out in Kosovo and Metohia, it is the obligation of all ethnic Albanians living abroad and they ardently fulfill it), and the Shiptar bodies immediately present it as a birth in Kosovo and Metohia. In that way they reach the figure of 30,000 births in Kosovo and Metohia per year.

The UN statistics will not register the aforementioned case as a birth in Kosovo and Metohia, but rather in Switzerland.

The aim of this manipulation is a false increase in the birth rate and a false inflation of the number of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia, which is their main argument in the struggle for territory.

I wish to point out that roughly 15,000 marriages are formed in Kosovo and Metohia per year, which correlates with the 13,000 newborns (since a marriage formed this year is the basis for the birth of a child next year).

Conclusion: The number of liveborn children in Kosovo and Metohia (source: UN agency) is approximately 13,000 per year.

THE NUMBER OF LIVEBORN CHILDREN DOES NOT FIT THE PROCLAIMED POPULATION SIZE

As stated in the previous part, there were around 13,000 live births in Kosovo and Metohia itself in 2016 and 2017 (according to UN data). The alleged number of ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo and Metohia is 1,800,000.

The aforementioned piece of information, that 13,000 children are born annually in a territory inhabited by a highly productive young population of 1.8 million is unexpected.

For that reason, I have compared the data on the number of births in other countries (entities or states) with similar population size. I have also analyzed the data for Albania as the ethnic Albanians' home country, as well as Turkey, seeing as it is the demographic model of a rapidly growing Muslim nation.

Table 2 MACEDONIA, SLOVENIA, LATVIA, TURKEY, ALBANIA AND KOSOVO AND METOHIA: NUMBER OF LIVEBORN CHILDREN

	Macedonia	Slovenia	Latvia	Turkey	Albania	Kosovo and METOHIA
Population	2.083.482	2.072.837	1.933.400	82.106.972	2.891.095	1.807.111
No. of births	23.445	21.671	194.671	394.504	38.003	13.003
	11	10,4	10,1	17	13	7

Latvia has approximately the same population as the one stated for Kosovo and Metohia. Its population is “old” (16.9% of the population is over the age of 65, whereas the share of the under 15 population is 13.5%). Kosovo and Metohia has a younger population (6.7% over 65 and 27.2% under 15). Latvia is a country with extreme depopulation, thus the number of residents decreased from 2.7 million in 1991 to 1.9 million in 2017. Such a population “gives birth” to 19,467 children, i.e. 50% more than Kosovo and Metohia. Latvia has 10.1 births per 1,000 residents.

One gets the same picture when comparing data from Slovenia, which has a population that is 10% bigger but also significantly older (16.8% over 65 and 13.4% under 15) than Kosovo and Metohia’s, and has 70% more newborn children, with an average of 10.4 births per 1,000 residents.

Macedonia, with a population 10% bigger and with a slightly older age structure (11.6% over 65 and 18% under 15) than the one in Kosovo and Metohia has 80% more newborn children than Kosovo and Metohia, and an average of 11 births per 1,000 residents.

The ethnic Albanians’ home country, Albania, has a population of 2.89 million. Its population is shrinking and over a 10-year period (from 2001 to 2011) it lost about 573,000 people². The percentage of the under 15 population is 21%, while 10% is over 65, which makes Albania’s population slightly older than that of Kosovo and Metohia. The number of children born in 2016 was 38,003, which equals 13 births per 1,000 residents.

Here I have also stated the indicators for Turkey, because it is the same type of society as the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia, i.e. a Muslim population, which is registering constant rapid growth at a rate of 1.6%. The average number of births per 1,000 residents in Turkey is 17.

If 1.8 million ethnic Albanians lived in Kosovo and Metohia and the annual number of births was 13,000, then that produces an average of 7 births per 1,000 residents, 50% less than Latvia, Slovenia and Macedonia and 90% less than Albania.

That, of course, is unrealistic. If we assume that the birth rate of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia is about the same as in Albania and Macedonia, we find that 13,000 births are produced by a population of 1 million, rather than 1.8 million.

² *Post-communist migration in Albania.* Albania currently has the highest rate of migration, relative to its population, in Central and Eastern Europe. ... During the period from 1989 to 2001, approximately 710,000 people, or 20 per cent of the total population, were living outside the country. As the 2011 Census captured (net) immigration information of the resident population, an estimate of the number of emigrants can be made, assuming that the population loss is due to net migration and not to under-enumeration. Thus, compensating for the net immigration of 57 thousand males and 39 thousand females in the period between the latest two censuses, the net number of emigrants over these years has been 573 thousand persons, 288 thousand males and 285 thousand females, that is, an annual average of about 54.5 thousand persons, and an average annual emigration rate of 2 percent. (<https://www.albania.ion.int/en/albania>)

Conclusion: The “official” data on the birth rate in Kosovo and Metohia fit the population of a million people.

THE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER YEAR (DEATH RATE) DOES NOT FIT THE PROCLAIMED POPULATION SIZE

It is much more difficult to lie about the dead than it is to register the newborn, that is why the data on the death rate in Kosovo and Metohia are such convincing proof that the pre-given number of residents do not really live in that territory. If one lives, one must also die. However, it seems that this rule does not apply to Kosovo and Metohia.

Table 3, taken from the Serbian Statistical Office, is presented here in its integral form, given that the data contained therein have often been used and will be used in the future.

Table 3 NUMBER OF LIVE BIRTHS AND DEATHS IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA BY NATIONALITY FROM 1948 TO 1999

YEAR	BORN			DIED		
	TOTAL	ETHNIC ALBANIANS	SERBS	TOTAL	ETHNIC ALBANIANS	SERBS
	1	2	3	4	5	6
1948.	27.792	18.899	6.698	10.324	7.020	2.488
1949.	31.643	21.517	7.626	12.927	8.790	3.115
1950.	35.222	23.951	8.489	12.991	8.834	3.131
1951.	29.299	19.923	7.061	14.833	10.086	3.575
1952.	35.619	24.221	8.584	13.867	9.430	3.342
1953.	34.595	23.525	8.337	16.726	11.374	4.031
1954.	38.595	26.245	9.301	13.201	8.977	3.181
1955.	36.736	24.980	8.853	15.292	10.399	3.685
1956.	37.819	27.950	5.230	13.692	10.349	2.399
1957.	34.159	23.997	7.114	15.300	11.996	2.365
1958.	39.285	28.452	7.513	11.598	8.885	1.901
1959.	37.364	26.707	7.339	12.878	9.860	2.188
1960.	41.631	30.545	7.509	13.365	10.426	2.114
1961.	40.561	29.931	7.115	11.759	9.139	1.931
1962.	41.366	26.710	6.156	15.024	11.776	2.368
1963.	41.525	31.706	6.463	12.423	9.803	1.845
1964.	42.557	32.748	6.473	12.731	10.219	1.774

YEAR	BORN			DIED		
	TOTAL	ETHNIC ALBANIANS	SERBS	TOTAL	ETHNIC ALBANIANS	SERBS
	1	2	3	4	5	6
1967.	44.001	34.937	5.984	11.308	9.070	1.636
1968.	44.627	35.434	6.069	10.781	8.557	1.709
1969.	46.480	36.905	6.321	10.892	8.539	1.714
1970.	44.496	36.409	5.030	10.829	8.246	1.792
1971.	47.060	38.923	5.111	10.312	7.979	1.558
1972.	47.943	39.936	4.990	10.270	7.845	1.702
1973.	47.714	39.647	4.984	10.358	7.963	1.527
1974.	49.847	41.733	4.944	10.075	7.906	1.473
1975.	49.310	41.334	4.870	10.018	7.792	1.528
1976.	51.355	43.379	4.819	10.149	7.945	1.530
1977.	49.849	42.244	4.549	9.811	7.646	1.460
1978.	49.027	41.663	4.368	9.776	7.642	1.459
1979.	48.125	41.255	4.012	9.575	7.368	1.507
1980.	53.147	45.584	4.256	8.909	6.846	1.368
1981.	48.111	41.263	3.675	9.677	7.457	1.445
1982.	52.865	45.288	4.140	10.479	7.925	1.687
1983.	49.645	42.400	3.778	11.040	8.501	1.445
1984.	55.243	47.172	4.065	10.573	8.017	1.551
1985.	53.925	46.309	3.714	11.826	8.905	1.801
1986.	54.519	47.087	3.636	10.446	7.819	1.585
1987.	56.221	48.830	3.645	10.307	7.864	1.576
1988.	56.283	49.063	3.454	10.257	7.770	1.608
1989.	53.656	46.809	3.242	10.181	7.637	1.654
1990.	55.175	47.865	3.458	8.214	5.840	1.437
1991.	52.263	45.313	3.368	8.526	6.432	1.324
1992.	44.418	38.511	2.862	8.004	6.038	1.242
1993.	44.132	38.263	2.844	7.804	5.888	1.211
1994.	43.450	37.672	2.800	7.667	5.784	1.190
1995.	44.776	38.822	2.885	8.671	5.749	2.030
1996.	46.041	39.918	2.967	8.392	5.482	2.008
1997.	42.920	37.212	2.766	8.624	6.506	1.339
1998.	41.752	36.324	2.463	8.123	6.450	1.295
1999.	data missing					

YEAR	BORN		DIED	
	TOTAL	ETHNIC ALBANIANS	TOTAL	ETHNIC ALBANIANS
2000.	38.687	36.658	7.115	6.720
2001.	37.412	35.548	6.672	6.071
2002.	36.136	35.174	5.654	5.357
2003.	31.994	30.917	6.417	5.987
2004.	35.063	33.812	6.399	6.137
2005.	37.218	35.982	7.207	6.825
2006.	34.187	32.977	7.479	7.072

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia

A) Number of deaths relative to population size does not add up:

YEAR	source UN	source CIA/SH
2016.	8.669	8.495
2017.	8.647	8.721

We can, therefore, see that there is not much difference between the UN data and the CIA/SH source in terms of the number of deaths. That shows us that the data from the UN source are reliable for both the death rate and for the birth rate, which we looked at previously. However, in this case it is not in the ethnic Albanians' interest to increase the number of deaths and so there is no additional manipulation and the data match.

If Kosovo and Metohia had a population of 1.8 million, with 8,669 deaths that would produce a death rate of 4.6 per mil.

That would be an area with the lowest death rate in the world. That society should be a young population with an explosive growth rate, a large and young immigrant population, swift economic growth, the highest economic status, with excellently equipped and organized health care (for example, Dubai and Abu Dhabi have such death rates).

Conversely, the socio-economic conditions in Kosovo and Metohia are disastrous. According to the EU's *Indicative Strategy Paper for Kosovo (2014–2020)* from 2014, 34.5% of the population lives on less than EUR1.55/day. Estimates also say that 48.6% of children under the age of 18 live in poverty. Kosovo and Metohia's health care sector employs 14,046 people. Out of that number 3,626 are medical doctors and pharmacists (with very little education), 8,950 are medical technicians and 1,472 comprise non-medical staff. It is known what results such a system can produce without money, organization and knowledge.

Kosovo and Metohia has the shortest life expectancy in Europe, averaging 69 years for both genders, which is lower even than the global average of 71.

Macedonia has a population of 2.1 million, a similar age structure, but the average life expectancy is 75 years. In 2016 the country registered 19,254 deaths, which means the death rate was 9.1 per mil. Albania has a death rate of 7.5‰.

As an example, I will use a table I took from a KAS report titled *Kosovo Population Projection 2011–2061*. The death rate is one of the four factors (the others being fertility, migration and life expectancy) based on which population trends in the coming period are predicted. We see that five different sources present three different death rates in Kosovo and Metohia. They all used the same basic data on the number of deaths (8,000) and population size (1.8 million).

Table 4 CRUDE DEATH RATE EXPRESSED IN PER MIL

Source of data	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
KAS Vital Statistics	2.8	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.6	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.4	
USA Censuses	7.1	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7.1	7	7
World Bank	7.08	6.98	6.95	7.02	7.01	6.99	7.02	7.03	7.05	7	
Population Reference Bureau (USA)							7	7	7	73	73
Eurostat	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.2	N/A	4.0	4.0		

KAS shows an (unbelievable) death rate of 3 per mil. Eurostat accepts that and presents the same data. USA Censuses, the World Bank and the Population Reference Bureau (USA) consider those results impossible and use different calculations to make the results as regular as possible. USA Censuses states that there would have to be at least 12,000 to 13,000 deaths per year in Kosovo and Metohia and makes that estimate based on the population's life expectancy. It explains the difference of 7,000 missing deaths by the likelihood of their not being registered by the competent service. The World Bank assumes the population size is overestimated, but does not say how it came to a 7 per mil death rate if the result of division is 3 per mil. If the result of division is higher, than the number being divided by is lower by a half:

Number of dead x 1000 / number of residents (1.8 million) = 3.5 per mil.

Number of dead x 1000 / half of the number of residents (0.9 million) = 7.1 per mil.

If we assume that mortality in Kosovo and Metohia is similar to the one in Macedonia or Albania, i.e. 8, and the population age structure is also similar, then 8,660 deaths correspond with a population of 0.9 million people.

B) The number of deaths should approximately correspond with the number

of births prior to the number of years that equal an average life expectancy. According to UN statistics, the average life expectancy in Kosovo and Metohia is 69 years.

Thus the number of deaths in 2017 ought to correspond with the number of births in 1948. Given that 18,899 ethnic Albanians were allegedly born that year, there should be approximately the same number of deaths in 2017. However, the number of deaths registered was 8,647 – 10,000 are missing. Of course, the congruence cannot be absolute and the number must vary 10% or 20%, but it cannot be half of the expected number either.

If we observe the death rate among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia from the period we have data from (1948) until present day, we see that over a period of 70 years (1948–2017) the number of deaths ranged around 8,000 per year. That means that was the average number of liveborn children during that period (from early to mid-20th century) and that population size was mostly the same during that period.

Aware of the fraud regarding false population size, the ethnic Albanians use two “explanations”:

They present data with a falsely extended average life expectancy, and so while the UN and the World Bank calculate the average life expectancy in Kosovo and Metohia at around 69 years, the ethnic Albanians extend it to 77 years. What is interesting, however, is that their 2011 population census also lists just 116,000 residents aged 65+.

The second “explanation” is that there is a considerable number of deceased citizens who are not registered, especially women. The assumption that 8,000 deaths are registered and 10,000 are not, i.e. more than a half, is unrealistic.

To refute the argument that the deaths of women in Kosovo and Metohia are not reported, I will state a fact from the KAS report *Kosovo in Figures 2016* which shows that women are paid 79,226 basic pensions from the budget (the money is received on the grounds of age, all persons over the age of 65 get it regardless of whether they ever had a job), along with 5,394 pensions on the grounds of employment. Seeing as all women are paid on these grounds, I am sure that life records are kept adequately, too, otherwise without death registration someone could continue to receive a pension indefinitely.

Table 5 PENSIONERS IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA

	2015.			2016.		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Basic pensions	46.053	85.947	132.000	40.791	79.226	120.017
Pensions from contributions	35.421	4.944	40.365	35.921	5.394	41.315

Source: *Kosovo in Figures 2016*, KAS

C) Another incredible oddity can be detected if the data on the death rate in Kosovo and Metohia are analyzed: that the absolute number of the dead drops by half when the population increases twofold. In 1960, according to official data, 947,000 people lived in Kosovo and Metohia, while the number of deaths was 13,365, and today there are allegedly 1.8 million residents and 8,600 deaths. A 50% larger population has 50% less deaths, that is impossible even if reduced infant mortality, development of the health care system and economic development are taken into account. Even in Kosovo.

Conclusion: The death rate in Kosovo and Metohia fits a population of no more than 1 million.

THE NUMBER OF ETHNIC ALBANINS IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA IS DECREASING DRAMATICALLY


Monitoring population trends requires the determining of the birth and death rates and migration (departure from and arrival in a territory, depending on the balance of these two factors, the result is added to or subtracted from population growth).

$$\text{Birth rate} - \text{Death rate} = \text{Population growth}$$

$$+/- \text{Migration} = \text{Population change}$$

According to a table from *The Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2017*, KAS, the population of Kosovo and Metohia has not been growing since 2011. (see also [Шаровић 2018])

Figure 1 KOSOVO AND METOHIA POPULATION GROWTH, BY CENSUSES 1921–2011



According to the UN source (website countrymeters.info), population trends in Kosovo and Metohia in 2016 look like this:

13,003 liveborn children in Kosovo and Metohia in 2016:

8,669 deaths

4,334 population growth

–3251 migration


+ 1,038 (0.06%) persons is the increase for 2016.

We can see from the data above, according to UN statistics, that if we subtract the 8,669 deaths from the 13,000 births, we get population growth in Kosovo and Metohia of 4,334 in 2016. The net amount of migration (in this case it is negative, because the number of people who moved out of Kosovo and Metohia was higher than the number of those who moved in) of 3,521 persons is subtracted from that number, and the result is that the population of Kosovo and Metohia increased by 1,038 people or 0.06%.

However, the data on migration provided here are neither accurate nor complete. What is the real result of migration in Kosovo and Metohia? How many ethnic Albanians leave Kosovo and Metohia per year?

According to Table 2.6 (here: Figure 2) from the *Kosovan Migration 2014*, KAS, from 2000 and 2010 between 8,000 and 13,000 people annually left Kosovo and Metohia. The arrival of between 2,000 and 3,000 people per year was also registered (predominantly returns from abroad). As a result, the annual loss of population is between 5,000 and 11,000 people and in any case exceeds population growth.

Figure 2 EMIGRATION BY YEARS EXPRESSED IN ABSOLUTE NUMBERS 1969–2010



The analysis titled *Population Projection 2011–2061*, carried out under the patronage of the World Bank, envisaged an annual loss of population in Kosovo and Metohia of 8,000 per year stemming from migration. However, in the period from August 2014 to February 2015 alone, an estimated 100,000 people left Kosovo and Metohia in a veritable stampede.

In its *Estimation of Kosovo Population 2015* report, KAS states that 74,434 people left the country in 2015 and that the migration balance was negative, specifically by –55,572 persons³.

The *Population Projection 2017–2061* lists data on emigration in the period from 2011 to 2016:

Year	2011.	2012.	2013.	2014.	2015.	2016.
Harmonization	–6.076	–5.725	–16.382	–39.609	–55.572	–8.940

These data show that over the observed five-year period 132,304 ethnic Albanians (13% of the population actually living in Kosovo and Metohia) left Kosovo, whereas in reality that number is probably even bigger.


KAS' *Kosovan Migration 2014* report included data on the actual number of people living outside Kosovo and Metohia. The report states that there is no municipality in Kosovo and Metohia with less than 20% of the population living abroad, except a few small newly formed ones, such as Ranilug, Parteš (two small Serb municipalities) and Mušutište (Turkish minority) (Figure 3).

³ “The extreme poverty, deadlock of political and legal system and corruption has brought darkness into Kosovo’s population and the normal function of the state.”

A recent and sudden wave of migration from Kosovo has likely been caused by this chaotic situation. Kosovans are the second largest group after Syrians to have migrated lately. It is estimated that 100,000 Kosovans left the country from August, 2014 to February, 2015.


Albania migration trends change, 52 percent mull leaving. Oct 19, 2018 – (Reuters) – More than half of Albania’s population would like to move to richer countries with better schooling, a study showed on Friday. (<https://www.reuters.com/...albania-migration.../albania-migration-trends-change-52-pe...>)

Figure 3 MUNICIPALITIES IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA: PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS IN TOTAL POPULATION



The record holder is the municipality of Suva Reka, where 45% of the population lives abroad, i.e. around 30,000 people. Priština, Đakovica and Kosovska Mitrovica have the same number of people living abroad, Prizren has 25,000 and so on. Figure 4 presents the number of migrants by municipalities.

Figure 4 NUMBER OF MIGRANTS FROM KOSOVO AND METOHIA MUNICIPALITIES




The same report estimates that roughly 550,000 ethnic Albanians emigrated from Kosovo and Metohia, and if their children who were born abroad are included, the number reaches around 703,978 by April 2011⁴. And the real “tsunami” was yet to come, in 2014, 2015 and 2016.

⁴ According to KAS’ estimates (based on vital statistics, natural growth, fertility, the KAS’ surveys in previous years, 2011 Population Census, population projections 2011–2061) starting from 1969, the representative

Here I would like to highlight another important change in the structure of emigrants from Kosovo and Metohia, which is underlined in the aforementioned report, too. While initially mostly men emigrated, the situation has now changed and an increasing number of women are leaving. Thus already in 2011 the emigrant population ratio was 56% of men to 43% of women.

Figure 5 EMIGRANTS BY GENDER (M = MALE, F = FEMALE) AND AGE



Practically entire families are leaving Kosovo and Metohia, which makes their potential return highly unlikely. The emigrants are mainly young people of working and reproductive age⁵.

Bearing in mind the non-existent prospect of a normal life in Kosovo and Metohia, which is ruled by organized (and globally connected) criminal gangs, petty criminals and various Western intelligence communities, one should expect that an increasing number of people will flee Kosovo and Metohia and will not have a desire to return once they have started a normal life abroad.

I mentioned earlier KAS' *Kosovo Population Projection 2011–2061*. That analysis was conducted under the assumption that Kosovo and Metohia has a population of 1.8 million, and three models were projected. According to the medium model (fertility 2.4, death rate 7, loss in emigration of up to 8,000 people per year and an extension of life expectancy to 77 years), 1.7 million people would live in Kosovo and Metohia in 2061, therefore the number would stay the same. According to the pessimistic model, population size would be halved, to 1 million, whereas according to the optimistic model it would rise to 2.3 million.

number of the Kosovan population who had emigrated from Kosovo (from all communities) until April 2011 was estimated to be around 550,000 residents.

KAS will use, for its needs as a representative value, the medium variant of natural growth which is 153,978 children born outside of Kosovo. Thus, the emigrated population of Kosovo and the population with Kosovan origin (1969–2011) was estimated to be around 703,978 residents.

⁵ In 2011, the sex ratio of Kosovan migrant population was: 56.67% male and 43.33% female. Early migration was dominated by males, due to the fact that in the past migration was more of a result of the export of labor force. More recent years have been characterized by a more female dominated emigration. This trend is shown by the fact that the migration gender ratio was roughly equal in 2000–2004, while in recent years females dominate emigration: 52.94% female and 47.06% male (marriages also had an impact on the latter).

Given that already in these first seven years (since the study was done) all the parameters have proved to be dramatically worse, a new analysis, titled *Kosovo Population Projection 2017–2061*, was carried out. It revised downwards the estimated fertility rates and raised the estimated losses through migration. According to those estimates, in the coming period Kosovo and Metohia will annually lose 10,000 residents through migration, with a 30% decline in fertility.

In line with these trends, a new population projection was made, where according to the medium variant the population will decrease from 1.8 million to 1.4 million. According to the lower estimate, that number will decrease to 0.68 million.

Table 6 KOSOVO AND METOHIA POPULATION BY AGE AND BY YEAR, PROJECTION FOR 2017–2061

Medium variant								
Year	Population by age group				Population by age in %			
	Total	0–14	15–64	65+	Total	0–14	15–64	65+
2017.	1.783.531	446.633	1.192.181	144.718	100	25	67	8
2021.	1.809.458	431.526	1.211.592	166.341	100	24	67	9
2031.	1.818.674	364.294	1.217.592	236.787	100	20	67	13
2041.	1.759.492	290.436	1.150.779	318.277	100	17	65	18
2051.	1.652.090	247.855	1.034.147	370.088	100	15	63	22
2061.	1.492.192	199.518	892.803	399.871	100	13	60	27
Low variant								
2061.	688.847	58.041	349.086	281.721	100	8	51	41
High variant								
2061.	2.697.455	447.847	1.675.620	573.988	100	17	62	21

Conclusion: The number of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia is decreasing and that process is accelerating.

DATA ON MARRIAGES SHOW THAT SPOUSES' AVERAGE AGE WHEN GETTING MARRIED HAS INCREASED CONSPICUOUSLY

According to the data presented in the *Kosovo Marriage Statistics in 2016*, published by KAS, in the course of 2016 14,976 marriages between people living in Kosovo and Metohia were registered, along with another 1,090 marriages between people from the Kosovar (Kosovo Albanians) diaspora, who organized weddings in Kosovo and Metohia.

Table 7 SPOUSES' AGE BY AGE GROUP

Age	16–19	20–24	25–29	30–34	35–39	40–44	45+
M %	1,1	17,9	30,4	21,4	13,1	7,9	8,2
F %	8,1	32,6	26,8	13,2	9,0	5,5	4,7

The average age of spouses is 29.8 years, with the groom's average age being 31.6 and the bride's 28.1.

If we compare these data with the data on marriages from 1955, when 6,815 marriages were registered in Kosovo and Metohia, the average age of the newlyweds at the time was 23.4, with 25.7 being the average age of the groom and 21.1 of the bride. (The data were taken from the table on page 47 of the *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2016*, KAS).

We see that there has been a dramatic change as regards the age of entering into marriage. The spouses' average age has gone up 6.4 years.

The groom is 5.9 years older on average and they are now a person in the fourth decade of their life, but the most prominent and most important change from the standpoint of fertility is that the bride's average age has gone up from 21.1 to 28.1 years. In the process, 7 years of peak female fertility are lost.

That change is irreversible.

Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia get married at the end of the third and beginning of the fourth decade of life, which indicates a complete social and economic change in the position of women and the perception of marriage and family.

THE INTERVAL IN WHICH WOMEN GIVE BIRTH HAS BEEN SHORTENED, WHILE THE NUMBER OF MULTIPLE BIRTHS HAS DROPPED TO THE AVERAGE EUROPEAN LEVEL

According to the *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2017*, the average age of a mother at the time of giving birth in 2016 was 28.

Table 8 MOTHER'S AGE AT TIME OF GIVING BIRTH, 2014–2016

Mother's age	15–19yrs	20–24yrs	25–29yrs	30–39yrs	40+yrs
2014 to 2016	3%	22%	36%	37%	2%

Source: KAS *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2017*

We see from the data listed above that a total of 73% of births took place within 15 years (mothers' age 25–39). Women giving birth at a younger age (under 20) and at an older age (over 40) are rare. That is a significant change relative to the period of demographic expansion (for example, in 1966 the percentage of births with the mother's age being up to 24 was 37%, while the over 40 group accounted for 9%).

Table 9 ORDER OF BIRTHS FOR THE PERIOD 2014–2016

Childbirth	First	Second	Third	Fourth and upwards
	38%	31%	19%	9%

Source: KAS *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2017*

These data correlate with the data from the next table, where we see that in the observed period, i.e. from 2014 to 2016, in 69% of cases the childbirth in question was the first or second. The third childbirth was registered in 19% of cases, while the fourth and upwards in 9%. This shows that the families of Kosovo ethnic Albanians are taking on the form of a modern European family with an average of two children.

THERE IS 50% LESS WORKFORCE IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA THAN IN COUNTRIES WITH SIMILAR POPULATION SIZE

A) The data on the workforce in Kosovo and Metohia and in countries of similar size were obtained from the website tradingeconomics.com, according to the World Bank data for the fourth quarter of 2017. The data are based on reports issued by KAS, which has been registering the workforce since 2014 via a survey on a representative sample of 4,800 households.

Table 10 KOSOVO AND METOHIA, MACEDONIA, SLOVENIA, LATVIA: POPULATION SIZE, EMPLOYED, UNEMPLOYED, OCTOBER–DECEMBER 2017

	Kosovo and METOHIA	Macedonia	Slovenia	Latvia
Population size	1.807.111	2.083.482	2.072.837	1.933.400
Age	1.192.181	1.460.000	1.448.000	1.328.000
Employed	305.849	743.451	861.009	903.000
Unemployed	102.623	211.361	82.379	63.122
Total	408.472	954.812	943.388	966.122

There are around 300,000 employed people in Kosovo and Metohia, which accounts for 27.5% of the working age population (people aged 15–65, of whom there are allegedly 1,192,181 in Kosovo and Metohia).

One would expect hundreds of thousands of unemployed citizens, however, according to the workforce survey there are just 102,623 of them. Where are the others?

We see from the data listed above that with this number of residents about 1 million people make up the active workforce (like in the case of Macedonia, Slovenia and Latvia). The World Bank data presented above say that population numbers just 430,000.

Kosovo and Metohia lacks 500,000 working age residents?!

B) The usual answer to the question of where the others are is – in rural areas.

According to the *Agriculture Census 2014 in the Republic of Kosovo*, carried out by the Siptar authorities and publicized by KAS, there are 130,436 registered individual farmstead owners and 159,000 working age household members in Kosovo and Metohia.

Table 11 AGE STRUCTURE OF FARMSTEAD OWNERS IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA AND WORKING AGE MEMBERS OF THEIR HOUSEHOLDS

Farmstead owners				Household members
130.436				159.000
3.110	2.4%	Under the age of 25	20,3%	
10.434	8.0%	Aged 25–35	6,6%	
27.130	20.8%	Aged 35–45	22,8%	
36.913	28.3%	Aged 45–55	19,4%	
28.826	22.1%	Aged 55–65	11,1%	
23.870	18.3%	65+	6,6%	10.494

Most reports state that the rural population accounts for 60% of the total population of Kosovo and Metohia. If there are 1.8 million residents living in Kosovo and Metohia, then the rural population should be 1,080,000. However, there are 130,436 registered farmstead owners and 159,000 household members over the age of 15 – 289,436 in total.

The data shown above tell us that 77,587 farmstead owners are aged 55 or under and if we assume that they all have two children of preschool and elementary school age (elementary education lasts 9 years, i.e. until the age of 15), that produces the number of 155,174 children.

If we add the adults and the children: $289,436 + 155,174 = 444,610$ people.

Therefore, the number of people living in rural areas is not 1.1 million. The Kosovo and Metohia countryside is missing 600,000 people?!

This census encompasses the territory of Kosovo and Metohia, except four municipalities in the north (Leposavić, Zubin Potok, Zvečan, North Mitrovica). Seeing as these data also include Serb-owned farmsteads and Serbs living south of the Ibar River, we will assume that they account for 10% of farmstead owners and 5% of the population, i.e. roughly 40,000.

In that way we reach the estimate that some 400,000 ethnic Albanians live in rural parts of Kosovo and Metohia.

It is interesting to point out that the census did not register farmstead owners by nationality or how much surface area they take up by nationality, even though the statistical authority routinely provides data on national structure for all statistics. The results probably do not suit them.

C) Kosovo and Metohia is run by the same structures as the other enslaved countries (former Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe), and so the local quisling structures are formed in the same way and following the same pattern. That is why the size of the public sector is also an indirect indicator of population size.

There are 80,000 people employed in Kosovo and Metohia's public sector, which is half the number in Slovenia or Macedonia, which have similar population size, and 7 times less than in Serbia (Serbia has a population of 7 million).

Table 12 NUMBER OF BUDGET SECTOR EMPLOYEES 2012–2016

Sectors	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
General services	13.030	13,824	13.813	14.111	14.287
Public order and peace	14.610	14,646	15.028	15.262	15.169
Education	34.205	34,405	34.596	34.074	33.720
Health care	13.519	14,095	14.351	14.292	14.295
Economy	1.289	1.324	1.343	1.361	1.491
Recreation and culture	1.026	1,034	1.015	1.195	1.214
Housing issues	1.124	1,125	1.105	1.102	1.049
Environment	378	363	367	380	404
Total	79.181	80,816	81.618	81.777	81.629

Source: KAS, *Kosovo in Figures 2016*

2011 POPULATION CENSUS IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA

In 2011, a population census was carried out in Kosovo and METOHIA; it was carried out by the ethnic Albanians under the patronage of Western mentors. The Serbs in the south largely boycotted it, whereas in the four northern municipalities it was not conducted at all.

The number of listed residents was 1,739,825.

The first question that is raised is whether this number pertains to the resident population (actually living in Kosovo and Metohia for the last 12 months) or if it also includes non-residents (who live in Western Europe and spend a portion of their vacation in Kosovo and Metohia)?

We get the answer to this question if we compare data on the population listed in a particular municipality and data from KAS' *Kosovan Migration 2014* report.

We see in the data on the population census (table below) that, for example, the municipality of Suva Reka is said to have 59,722 residents, whereas the table on emigration (pages 15 and 16) shows us that 30,000 of them live abroad and that accounts for 45% of the total population of the municipality. That means both the resident and non-resident population was listed and the 1.7 million pertains to both those actually living in Kosovo and Metohia and those living outside it, who are of Shiptar descent. Priština is said to have 198,897 listed residents, while the emigration report says that 30,000 residents of Priština live abroad, and that is 15% of the population. The same goes for other municipalities.

As I have already said, according to KAS' *Kosovan Migration 2014* report, the ethnic Albanians themselves estimate that some 700,000 ethnic Albanians originally from Kosovo and Metohia live as immigrants (predominantly in Western Europe), and they were also listed as residents of Kosovo and Metohia.

If we subtract the 700,000 emigrants from the 1,700,000 listed residents, we get about 1 million ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo and Metohia.

Table 13 KOSOVO AND METOHIA MUNICIPALITIES – 2011 POPULATION CENSUS, POPULATION AGE

Municipality	Total	0–4	5–9	10–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–34	35–39	40–44	45–49	50–54
Total	1,739,825	149,735	160,916	176,926	174,932	161,467	141,268	130,542	124,912	108,142	94,988	80,625
Dečani	40,019	3,363	3,293	3,815	4,181	3,876	3,397	3,122	2,917	2,614	2,161	1,709
Đakovica	94,556	7,133	8,293	9,874	10,453	8,946	7,133	6,450	6,490	5,935	5,353	4,627
Glogovac	58,531	5,613	5,613	6,069	5,886	6,230	5,302	4,625	4,059	3,271	2,842	2,364
Gnjilane	90,178	6,409	7,789	9,266	9,824	8,322	6,653	6,106	6,541	6,509	5,615	4,444
Dragaš	33,997	2,779	2,855	3,024	3,047	2,807	2,514	2,401	2,544	2,303	2,128	1,796
Istok	39,289	3,202	3,453	4,154	4,151	3,538	3,051	2,872	2,798	2,361	2,100	1,831
Kačanik	33,409	2,992	3,189	3,400	3,395	3,161	2,661	2,576	2,545	2,139	1,863	1,512
Klina	38,496	3,465	3,760	4,173	4,265	3,788	3,144	2,725	2,543	2,085	1,853	1,654
Kosovo Polje	34,827	3,321	3,297	3,378	3,207	3,133	2,954	2,720	2,533	2,147	1,914	1,704
Kosovska Kamenica	36,085	2,517	2,872	3,511	3,752	3,295	2,779	2,618	2,664	2,420	2,224	1,835
Kosovska Mitrovica	71,909	6,454	6,702	7,195	6,741	6,430	5,894	5,558	4,978	4,169	3,806	3,535
Leposavić												
Lipljan	57,605	5,253	5,889	6,053	5,704	5,468	4,277	4,101	3,519	3,006	2,499	
Novo Brdo	6,729	537	541	565	595	593	523	460	449	428	404	353
Obilić	21,549	2,088	2,144	2,187	1,998	1,999	1,855	1,617	1,526	1,236	1,213	992
Orahovac	56,208	4,597	5,162	6,322	6,253	5,380	4,425	4,330	4,371	3,572	2,886	2,305
Peć	96,450	7,724	8,150	9,119	9,395	8,697	7,754	6,972	6,947	6,203	5,666	4,992
Podujevo	88,499	8,473	9,287	9,048	8,499	8,277	7,535	7,009	6,323	5,086	4,352	3,810

Municipality	Total	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54
Priština	198.897	16.754	16.781	17.868	17.427	17.708	17.749	16.436	14.765	12.601	11.411	10.350
Prizren	177.781	15.252	16.065	17.882	17.946	16.553	14.363	13.407	13.055	11.712	10.069	8.383
Srbica	50.858	4.503	4.947	5.581	5.243	5.088	4.316	3.805	3.542	2.706	2.347	2.108
Štimlje	27.324	2.487	2.941	3.153	2.971	2.490	1.953	2.060	1.910	1.670	1.346	1.158
Štrpce	6.949	541	641	589	540	582	536	541	510	457	393	361
Suva Reka	59.722	5.198	5.612	6.599	6.466	5.784	4.550	4.128	4.260	3.687	3.163	2.499
Uroševac	108.610	9.531	10.599	11.436	10.985	9.850	8.656	8.155	7.923	6.827	5.995	4.827
Vitina	46.987	4.097	4.773	5.298	5.130	4.124	3.500	3.323	3.491	3.018	2.479	1.860
Vučitrn	69.870	6.051	6.473	7.110	7.085	6.607	5.947	5.374	4.829	4.116	3.715	3.212
Zubin Potok												
Zvečan												
Mališevo	54.613	5.795	6.306	6.739	6.121	5.231	4.162	3.889	3.563	2.828	2.434	1.920
Junik	6.084	566	551	564	572	552	537	557	475	389	302	252
Mamuša	5.507	623	586	617	522	510	490	441	427	300	254	168
Đeneral Janković	9.403	955	890	933	900	831	754	741	663	662	550	448
Gračanica	10.675	956	929	778	863	873	960	814	687	584	546	642
Ranilug	3.866	215	200	240	306	328	272	211	192	261	308	254
Parteš	1.787	99	126	115	197	172	113	88	114	140	130	114
Klokot	2.556	192	207	271	310	244	163	134	177	187	160	107

This population census also uncovered the fraud regarding the number of ethnic Albanians born in Kosovo and Metohia during communist rule. The fraud totals 509,000 people aged 25–65 at the time of the 2011 census.

The next two tables present the number of listed residents by age groups (groups of 5 years each) and I compared that data with the data on the number of liveborn ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia in those years (data from Table 13). Thus, for the group that was aged 25–29 in 2011 I added the data on the number of liveborn ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia between 1982 and 1986. From that number I subtracted the expected natural loss according to the death rate by age from the table on page 60 of *The Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2017*.

According to these data, in the period from 1982 and 1986 228,256 were allegedly born in the period 1982–1986 in Kosovo and Metohia. According to the population census the ethnic Albanians carried out in 2011, in this age group (25–29) 141,268 were listed.

I calculated the death rate according to the data on persons who died in the period 2008–2016, from the table on page 60 of *The Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2017*. According to that, in the generation aged 29 or under 530 people on average die, which over a span of five generations produces the result of 2,700 deaths. If we subtract 2,700 from 228,256 we get 225,556 people from this age group listed, whereas in reality 141,268 were listed. So, this age group is missing 84,288.

In the period from 1977 to 1981, 212,009 ethnic Albanians were registered as born (age group 30–34 at the time of the 2011 census) and 130,542 were listed in the 2011 census. The natural loss is 3,000. There are 78,467 people missing.

In the period between 1972 and 1976, 206,029 ethnic Albanians were registered as born (age group 35–39), while 124,912 were listed at the time of the 2011 census. The natural loss is 3,600. There are 77,517 people missing.

In the period 1967–1971, 182,608 were registered as born and 108,142 were listed, and so the natural loss equals 4,500 people. There are 69,966 people missing.

In the period from 1962 to 1966 (age group 45–49) 159,447 people were registered as born and 94,988 were listed in the census, which means a natural loss of 5,800 people. There are 58,659 people missing.

In the period from 1957 to 1961 (age group 50–54) 139,632 ethnic Albanians were registered as born, 80,625 were listed in the census, with a natural loss of 7,600.

There are 51,407 people missing.

In the period between 1952 and 1956 (age group 55–59) 126,930 ethnic Albanians were born, 65,539 were listed in the census, and the natural loss equals 9,900. There are 51,491 people missing.

In the period from 1947 to 1951 (I did not find any data for 1947, so I counted 1948 twice), 103,391 were born (during the 2011 population census they were in the 60–64 age group), 53,048 were listed, with a natural loss of 12,800. There are 37,543 people missing.

Summing up these data, we see that in the 25–65 age group there are 509,000 fewer people listed than allegedly born (when the expected natural loss is subtracted). Those non-existent people (“dead souls”) are the fruit of the ethnic Albanians’ and communist “Serbian” authorities’ deceit, they lived only on paper and served the secessionist purpose.

We also see from the table that 116,785 people were listed in the 65+ age group, and since I did not have the data on births for that period I did not process that group at all.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The statistics of vital events in Kosovo and Metohia indicate that the number of people living in that territory is not 1.8 million.

2. The number of liveborn children in Kosovo and Metohia is falsely augmented.

3. The number of liveborn children from an unbiased source fits a population of 1 million.

4. The death rate fits a population of 1 million.

5. Relative to the alleged population size, the active workforce is missing (500,000 people).

6. Relative to the alleged population size, the rural population is missing (600,000 people).

7. The indicators related to marriage and family (spouses’ average age 29.8 years, average age of the mother 28 years, 70% of mothers give birth to their first or second child, fertility is decreasing and has entered the rate of less than 2.14 when population growth is zero), reveal a society that is in the process of depopulation.

8. The number of people leaving Kosovo and Metohia is rising, women are leaving, too (43% of the emigrating population), as well as entire families.

9. Over a five-year period, 113,000 people left Kosovo and Metohia.

10. The level of poverty is high in Kosovo and Metohia (35% of people live on 1.55 euros/day).

11. The number of residents is dropping drastically.

12. A 60% population decline is expected by 2061.

Addendum

KOSOVO AND METOHIA: POPULATION STATISTICS (KAS OFFICIAL DATA)

Table 1 KOSOVO AND METOHIA: POPULATION SIZE, 2014–2020

Total Resident Population on December 31, 2014	1.804.944
Total Resident Population on December 31, 2015	1.771.604
Total Resident Population on December 31, 2016	1.783.531
Total Resident Population on December 31, 2017	1.798.506
Total Resident Population on December 31, 2018	1.795.666
Total Resident Population on December 31, 2019	1,782,115
Total Resident Population on December 31, 2020	1.798.188

Source: KAS. *Statistical Yearbook of Kosovo 2020 and 2021*

Table 2 KOSOVO AND METOHIA: NUMBER OF LIVE BIRTHS, 2014–2020

Number of live births in 2014 (liveborn only in K-M)	25.929
Number of live births in 2015 (liveborn only in K-M)	24.594
Number of live births in 2016 (liveborn only in K-M)	23.416
Number of live births in 2017 (liveborn only in K-M)	23.402
Number of live births in 2018 (liveborn only in K-M)	22.761
Number of live births in 2019 (liveborn only in K-M)	21.798
Number of live births in 2020 (liveborn only in K-M)	21.952

Source: KAS. *Statistical Yearbook of Kosovo 2020 and 2021*

Table 3 KOSOVO AND METOHIA: THE AGE OF MOTHERS WHO HAVE GIVEN BIRTH, 2020

	Number	%		Number	%
Total	21.907		30–34	6.370	29,1%
Until 14	1		35–39	2.913	13,3%
15–19	425	1,9%	40–44	730	3,3%
20–24	3.591	16,4%	45–49	47	0,2
25–29	7.825	35,7%	Over 50	5	

Source: KAS. *Statistical Yearbook of Kosovo 2020 and 2021*

Table 4 KOSOVO AND METOHIA: NUMBER OF DEATHS 2014–2020

	Mortality rate (per mille)	
Number of deaths (only persons deceased in K-M) in 2014	7.634	4.23‰
Number of deaths (only persons deceased in K-M) in 2015	8.202	4.62‰
Number of deaths (only persons deceased in K-M) in 2016	8.495	4.76‰
Number of deaths (only persons deceased in K-M) in 2017	8.721	4.84‰
Number of deaths (only persons deceased in K-M) in 2018	8.998	5.01‰
Number of deaths (only persons deceased in K-M) in 2019	9.430	5.29‰
Number of deaths (only persons deceased in K-M) in 2020	12.971	7.21‰

Source: KAS. *Statistical Yearbook of Kosovo 2020* and *2021*

Table 5 KOSOVO AND METOHIA: NUMBER OF MARRIAGES*, 2014–2018

Number of marriages in 2014	16.239
Number of marriages in 2015	16.274
Number of marriages in 2016	16.051
Number of marriages in 2017	17.112
Number of marriages in 2018	16.871

*Figures refer only to ethnic Albanian population

Source: KAS. *Statistical Yearbook of Kosovo 2020* and *2021*

Table 6 KOSOVO AND METOHIA: NUMBER OF PUPILS IN ELEMENTARY AND LOWER SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 2014–2021

Number of pupils in elementary and lower secondary schools, in 2014/2015 school year	273.649
Number of pupils in elementary and lower secondary schools, in 2015/2016 school year	263.779
Number of pupils in elementary and lower secondary schools, in 2016/2017 school year	255.093
Number of pupils in elementary and lower secondary schools, in 2017/2018 school year	247.614
Number of pupils in elementary and lower secondary schools, in 2018/2019 school year	243.177
Number of pupils in elementary and lower secondary schools, in 2019/2020 school year	237.959
Number of pupils in elementary and lower secondary schools, in 2020/2021 school year	229.664

Source: KAS. *Statistical Yearbook of Kosovo 2020* and *2021*

Table 7 KOSOVO AND METOHIA: NUMBER OF PENSION BENEFICIARIES, 2014–2020

OLD-AGE PENSIONS FUNDED BY WORK-LIFE (LABOR) CONTRIBUTIONS	pensioners
Old-age pensions funded by work-life contributions, in 2014	38.651
Old-age pensions funded by work-life contributions, in 2015	40.365
Old-age pensions funded by work-life contributions, in 2016	41.315
Old-age pensions funded by work-life contributions, in 2017	43.300
Old-age pensions funded by work-life contributions, in 2018	45.391
Old-age pensions funded by work-life contributions, in 2019	47.486
Old-age pensions funded by work-life contributions, in 2020	49.451
BASIC OLD-AGE PENSIONS*	
Basic old-age pensions in 2014	128.883
Basic old-age pensions in 2015	132.000
Basic old-age pensions in 2016	120.017
Basic old-age pensions in 2017	122.716
Basic old-age pensions in 2018	126.888
Basic old-age pensions in 2019	133,917
Basic old-age pensions in 2020	142.280
FAMILIES OF LIQUIDATED KLA MEMBERS AND DISABLED KLA MEMBERS	
Families of liquidated KLA members and disabled KLA members in 2014	13.097
Families of liquidated KLA members and disabled KLA members in 2015	12.652
Families of liquidated KLA members and disabled KLA members in 2016	12.680
Families of liquidated KLA members and disabled KLA members in 2017	12.472
Families of liquidated KLA members and disabled KLA members in 2018	13.138
Families of liquidated KLA members and disabled KLA members in 2019	10,493
Total number (all three schemes)	cca 200.000

*Received by all people older than 65

Source: KAS. *Statistical Yearbook of Kosovo 2020* and *2021*

Table 8 KOSOVO AND METOHIA: NUMBER OF EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED, 2014–2020

EMPLOYED	
Number of employed persons in 2014	323,508
Number of employed persons in 2015	296,940
Number of employed persons in 2016	331,761
Number of employed persons in 2017	357,095

EMPLOYED	
Number of employed persons in 2018	345,131
Number of employed persons in 2019	363,180
Number of employed persons in 2020	347,071
UNEMPLOYED	
Number of unemployed persons in 2014	176,743
Number of unemployed persons in 2015	145,776
Number of unemployed persons in 2016	126,070
Number of unemployed persons in 2017	156,583
Number of unemployed persons in 2018	144,972
Number of unemployed persons in 2019	125,305
Number of unemployed persons in 2020	121,379

Source: KAS. *Statistical Yearbook of Kosovo 2020 and 2021*

Table 9. KOSOVO AND METOHIA: NUMBER OF BIRTHS FROM JANUARY TO NOVEMBER 2021

January 2021	2.229	July 2021	2.609
February 2021	2.103	August 2021	2.406
March 2021	2.510	September 2021	2.496
April 2021	2.434	October 2021	2.325
May 2021	2.524	November 2021	2.091
June 2021	2.622		

Source: November 2021 Birth, Death, Marriage and Divorce Statistics. KAS, Priština 15.12.2021.

Table 10. KOSOVO AND METOHIA: NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM JANUARY TO NOVEMBER 2021

January 2021	1.432	May 2021	1.078	September 2021	1.598
February 2021	1.127	June 2021	890	October 2021	993
March 2021	1.535	July 2021	862	November 2021	871
April 2021	1.505	August 2021	1.363		

Source: November 2021 Birth, Death, Marriage and Divorce Statistics. KAS, Priština 15.12.2021.

ЕТНИЧКИ АЛБАНАЦИ НА КОСОВУ И У МЕТОХИЈИ:
ДЕМОГРАФСКЕ ПРОМЕНЕ, 1948–2021.

ЈОВАН КРШИЋ
jovankrsic@yahoo.com

Сажетак

Број етничких Албанаца (албанске националне мањине или како их неки аутори називају Арбанаси, а сами се називају Шћипетари или Шиптари) на Косову и Метохији предмет је манипулација дуже времена. Настоји се приказати да на КиМ живи знатно већи број Арбанаса од стварног, да се то становништво увећава великом брзином, да је удео српског становништва већ сад занемарив и да ће убудуће, како се прориче, стање бити још и горе.

Ово треба да послужи као кључни аргумент да је Косово „изгубљено“, да је „мит“ и да је „терет“ те да актуелна власт треба да нас „спасе“ и откине део Србије (чији територијални интегритет гарантује Резолуција СБ 1244 и обновљено чланство у УН у границама Србије дефинисаним у СФРЈ) и поклони је Великој Албанији која је *in statu nascendi*.

LITERATURE

- Вилотић 2009 → Миладин Вилотић, *Ко је и зашто скривао истину о Косову и Метохији*, (Miladin Vilotić. *Who Hid the Truth About Kosovo and Metohia and Why*) Belgrade 2009.
- Шаровић 2018 → Лука Шаровић. У последњих 30 година Албанци имају далеко већи пад natalитета од Срба – власт и медији намерно плаше грађане причама о „албанској демографској бомби“, (Over the last 30 years the Albanians have had a much bigger decrease in the birth rate than the Serbs – the authorities and the media deliberately frighten citizens with stories of the “Albanian demographic bomb”) *НСИМ*, August 26, 2018 / <http://www.nspm.rs/komentar-dana/u-poslednjih-30-godina-albanci-imaju-daleko-veci-pad-nataliteta-od-srba-%E2%80%93-vlast-i-mediji-namerno-plase-gradjane-pricama-o-albanskoj-demografskoj-bombi.html>
- The Vreme Dossier: Kosovo 2000 → Dosije Vremena: Kosovo /Bernar Kušner/ (The Vreme Dossier: Kosovo /Bernard Kouchner/). *Vreme*, edition 497, July 15, 2000.
- Kosovo and Metohia 2006 → Kosovo and Metohia : Past, Present, Future. Papers presented at the International Scholarly Conference held at the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, March 16–18, 2006. Editor Academician Kosta Mihailović. Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2006.
- IOM 2007 → IOM, International Organisation for Migration. The Republic of Albania. Migration Profile, Publisher: Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia, 2007. On line available: http://www.iom.hu/PDF/migration_profiles2007/Albania_2007.Pdf.
- IOM 2008 → IOM, International Organisation for Migration. *Identifikimi I zonave më të*

- prekura nga emigracioni dhe migracioni I kthimit në Shqipëri: Profili I migrantëve të kthyer* (Identification of the most affected areas from emigration and return migration in Albania: The profile of returned migrants), 2008.
- INSTAT 2004 → INSTAT, Albanian Institute of Statistics. *Migration in Albania in 2001*, REPOBA, Tirana 2004.
- INSTAT 2014 → INSTAT, Albanian Institute of Statistics. *Migracioni në Shqipëri • Migration in Albania*, Tirana 2014.
- INSTAT May 2014 → INSTAT: *Population and Population Dynamics in Albania: New Demographic Horizons?* May, 2014, Instituti i statistikave, Tirana 2014.
- 2011 Census thematic publications 2014 → Lista e publikimeve tematike të Censurit 2011, Maj 2014 / List of 2011 Census thematic publications, May 2014 • Censuri i Popullsisë dhe Banesave 2011: karakteristikat ekonomike • 2011 Population and Housing Census: Economic Characteristics • Dimensionet e cilësisë së Censurit 2011 • Quality Dimensions of the 2011 Population and Housing Census of Albania • Kushtet e banimit dhe të jetesës • Dwelling and living conditions • Migracioni në Shqipëri • Migration in Albania • Një klasifikim i ri urban – rural i popullsisë shqiptare • A new urban – rural classification of Albanian population • Popullsia dhe dinamikat e saj – horizonte të reja demografike? • Population and population dynamics in Albania – New demographic horizons? • Projektionet e popullsisë, 2011–2031 • Population Projections, 2011–2031 • Shqipëria 2011 Censuri në harta • Albania 2011 Census Atlas • Tipologjia e komunave dhe bashkive • Communes and Municipalities Typology • Lëvizjet vajtje-ardhje për qëllime punësimi • Commuting from home to work • Dinamikat e tregut të punës, 2001–2011 • Labour market dynamics, 2001–2011 • Aplikimi INSTATGIS – hartat në web (www.instatgis.gov.al) • INSTATGIS – Atlas web application (www.instatgis.gov.al)
- Ocić 2006 → Časlav Ocić. Kosovo and Metohia : Ethnodemographic Changes from the End of World War II to 1991 – Резиме: Косово и Метохија: етнодемографске промене од краја Другог светског. *Срди на Косову и у Метохију / Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia* . A collection of papers from a scientific conference held in Kosovska Mitrovica on May 27–29, 2005. Ed. Academician Stevan Karamata and corresponding member Časlav Ocić. Scientific conferences / SASA; book CXII. Department of Social Sciences; book 26, Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2006, pp. 441–460
- Živančević 1989 → Predrag Živančević. *Emigranti: Naseljavanje Kosova i Metohije iz Albanije* (*Emigrants: Populating Kosovo and Metohia from Albania*), Eksportpres, Belgrade 1989.

SOURCES

CAK / KAS / ASK – Kosovo Agency of Statistics, *The Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2017*, *Kosovan Migration 2014*, *Agriculture Census in Kosovo and Metohia 2014*, *Kosovo in Figures 2016*, *Marriage Statistics in Kosovo 2016* and other relevant publications; World Bank, *Population Projection 2011–2061*; IMF; UN – Department of Economic and Social Affairs; CIA World Factbook; the EU's *Indicative Strategy Paper for Kosovo 2014–2020*, 2014; Population Reference Bureau (USA); Eurostat.

SOURCES FROM THE WEB

- countrymeters.info
<https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/wphc/Albania/04-analysis.pdf>
<https://www.albania.iom.int/en/albania>
<https://www.reuters.com/...albania-migration.../albania-migration-trends-change-52-pe...>

KOSOVO AND METOHIA: AMBIENCE OF THE CRISIS

SINIŠA LJEPOJEVIĆ

London, UK

ljepojevicstinisa@gmail.com ♦ sinisa.london@gmail.com

SUMMARY: Kosovo and Metohia is now the longest crisis in Europe in modern times. But, still no end is visible. Although its creators are claiming that it is already finished and done it is not, the crisis is still there. Actually there is still no real vision for Kosovo and Metohia. Kosovo did unilaterally declare independence from Serbia and has support from major western countries but no sustainable solution yet.

The only idea on the table is that Serbia should recognize Kosovo as an independent state and all will be fine. But, even those who advocate that idea don't want it. Because, the crisis in Kosovo and Metohia is a part of a much larger geopolitical game that is still in progress. Not the end yet. Usually they say it is a frozen conflict that nobody wants but no it is not a frozen conflict it is one still in place and in progress.

Well, what is Kosovo and Metohia's future? It is really difficult to say. All will depend on geopolitical games in the Balkans and the strength of Serbia. Because it is the same game. But, it will take time.

KEY WORDS: Kosovo and Metohia, Serbia, Albania, USA, EU, geopolitics, crisis

The latest phase of the crisis with Kosovo and Metohia has been going on for several decades, during which time much has been written, discovered and almost all said and known. Both in domestic and international public communication. The crisis, however, is still ongoing, and despite some important fractures that have since broken down, it is still a long way from emerging from that vicious circle. There are many reasons, of course, for this crisis longevity, but the whole situation and the fate of Kosovo and Metohia could still be reduced to that people's saying "evil born ends on a trial".

In human's life someone can have plans, desires and ambitions, a willingness to try to achieve them but, as a rule, in human societies and nature itself it all depends on the environment, the circumstances in which it happens because no one is alone, separated from others. Thus, the end outcome of the event depends on the circumstances by which the event in the final is defined. Legendary British Prime

Minister Harold Macmillan¹ suggested to young politicians after years of political experience that “they can have many plans but ultimately politics is dictated by events.” In history, sociology and politics, it’s usually called “context.”

In that light, it would be useful, and of course important, to remind of the environment in which the Kosovo latest crisis is happening². In what circumstances was it generated and to what purpose.

HOW DID THE CRISIS COME ABOUT

The dominant view is that hostilities between Serbs and Albanians last for centuries, since they share relatively common space. It’s the most easy thing to say but it is not quite so. If it were so ones or the others wouldn’t be there any more. Hostilities are generally related to the interference of a third, foreign party. They started with the arrival of the Ottoman Empire, when a large part of the area’s population embraces Islam. Orthodox Serbs were victims of violence by both Islamicized Albanians and Islamicized Serbs³. But real hostility begins in the 19th century. In the 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire was in ruins, and the Serbian state simultaneously getting stronger, the frightened Islamist Albanians appeared as the “last defenders” of the Empire. Hostility was particularly fed by the settlement of Islamicized Albanians from today’s northern Albania into the Kosovo area (in Metohia to a lesser extent because in this area that Albanians call Dukadjin Albanian population has always been) where the Albanian population has never been before⁴. Those Albanians also had settlements in parts of Toplica and Jablanica region in Central Serbia⁵.

Of the many “inspirations of violence”⁶ two important historical events should be singled out: the Serbian-Turkish wars of 1876 and the Berlin Congress

1 Harold Macmillan was British Prime Minister from 1957 to 1963. He was born in 1894. and died in 1986. By circumstances, one history episode was related him to events in the former Yugoslavia. As commander of the British occupation zone in Austria in 1945 he ordered allies to return fugitive soldiers of the Ustashe Independent State of Croatia and the Yugoslav Royal Army in their country, returning to Yugoslavia, where most of them were killed.

2 Although the official name is Kosovo and Metohia in this text, we will only use the name Kosovo which is the international standard. Albanians after 1999 call it Kosova which is the name of the province in Turkish language.

3 Most of these Islamicized Serbs eventually became Albanians and part of them have settled in today’s Raška area.

4 There is still serious doubt within Albania whether Albanians from Kosovo are indeed ethnic Albanians. On one occasion, the author of this article in Tirana was asked if he thought that Kosovo (not Metohian) Albanians were indeed Albanians. Those who asked didn’t think they were.

5 There are, of course, many other details, among which historically the two great migrations of Serbs and Christian Albanians are the most important. Turkish authorities have supported violence against Serbs over their entry into the Austrian-Turkish wars on the Austrian side.

6 Much of the violence is caused by deep mentality differences.

in 1878 when Serbia formally became independent and expanded at the southern borders where is today’s administrative line with Kosovo. Only Preševo, Bujanovac and Trgovište, at the deep south, remained under Ottoman rule. Back then, almost all Albanians from Jablanica and Toplica were expelled or moved away, some estates were state-bought and sold to other people, and in retaliation many Serbs from Kosovo, mostly from Drenica, were expelled.

Later, it is also worth remembering, the Balkan wars that finally crushed the Ottomans and the Old Serbia returned to Serbian rule. Among the Serb soldiers there were many who had their families expelled from Kosovo before, so there was a lot of revenge and violence. Then, in 1913 the Austro-Hungary organised the Albanian uprising, the so-called Arnaut insurgency, in which violence was claimed and there were many casualties. The Serbian army, however, remained in Kosovo and Metohia but had to withdraw from the part that is Albania today.

A long series of violence and animosity. Over time, conditions of anger, resistance and manipulation of the Albanian population have been rooted.

It should be said, however, that it is primarily about the Albanian elite and not the ordinary man.

For a nowadays phase of the Kosovo crisis, the most important is how it came to be. It is clear that the conditions of nationalism have long since been established and that nationalism has been fed by separatism. But what was the basic idea?

The whole project is American and the West only got involved later.

The problem for America was Albania, how to establish control over this strategic important country.

After the collapse of communism and the establishment of a democratic authority, whatever it might be in that country, Albania did not immediately opt except for the general declaration that she is for the West and “democracy” whatever it meant in its terms.

America in Albania had no strong network, almost none. Diplomatic relations were severed back in 1939 when Italy occupied the country and were re-established in the full sense of the word 1993. Albania’s new authorities, however, were much closer to Germany and France at the time than to America. But America wanted to have a full control over Albania.

Without their own strong network on the ground, American special services turned to Albanians from Macedonia, the only ones with whom they had close ties for a long time because many of them have been emigrees in the USA. Through these connections, first Macedonian and then Kosovo Albanians are also involved in the network of transmission and drug trafficking. Albanians from Macedonia

were the first among Albanians to go to the world, mainly to the West, so they are the oldest contacts of Western special services⁷.

This created the initial base of US influence in Albania. But still insufficient to take full control.

In Washington, it was then estimated that the most effective way of acing Albania and establishing full control would be the principle of Italian leader Benito Mussolini, what Mussolini did should be done – to Albania should be promised Kosovo. This was acknowledged and thus began contemporary drama of both, Kosovo and Metohia and Serbia.

It's, as it is today, an American project⁸. The essence is in the US control of Albania through Kosovo.

The realization of this American project has begun.

At the time, during 1997 and 1998, the Americans also did not have a strong network in Kosovo itself. In the creation of American networking, the old links between Albania's security and intelligence structures, created in the time of Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha, were primarily used. Then other European countries, that already, mainly through the diaspora, had good contacts, followed. It's Germany and Switzerland first and foremost. For years, there was a Kosovo Albanian insurgent government in Germany, with Bujar Bukoshi in the house.

And then in Macedonia, in the Albanian village of Zajas, near Kičevo, an armed formation was formed known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). It was formed in the house of Ali Ahmeti, later and the current leader of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia.

But basically there was no clear vision for Kosovo, there was no clear goal or strategy. Even the independence wasn't an option.

As time went on, new goals were set that then dragged the entire West and NATO into the Kosovo American project. The project also fit tediously into punishing Serbia for "past sins" in the breakup of Yugoslavia, the old ambition of regime change in Serbia, and the Western war against then-leader Slobodan Milošević. And in the end, it was designed to become a model of so-called humanitarian intervention, without the consent of the United Nations, a crusade against international law. And, on top of that, it fits into the ambition of further purpose of the NATO alliance.

Basically it was a dark-seated and ad hoc decision-making to buy time and

⁷ For example, in the UK in the decades after World War II, was the only one Albanian who later brought his sister. He was from the Priština's family of Fona. Before the war he was a Yugoslav royal officer and during the war he served in the Royal Army. With the remnants of the Royal Army after the war, he arrived in London, where he ran a small restaurant.

⁸ Many Macedonian Albanians from America came to Albania and took over many jobs, including various exchange offices and banks. From those circles, the unrest began, because those pyramid schemes failed. There's been chaos all over the country and military weapons warehouses have been robbed. Much of that weapons were then transferred to Kosovo and Macedonia.

take the opportunity for other, broader interests. That's the reality even though most people tend to believe it's a well-thought-out project. From the perspective of the average informed man, it can all be made clear and that everything is known but it wasn't like that at all, much more of the situation dictated the moves on its own than the deliberate action.

Interestingly, America did not want to use the already existing Albanian political opposition in Kosovo. The Americans wanted war, armed rebellion and a model of war intervention outside international law but the then political opposition in Kosovo led by Ibrahim Rugova did not want that kind of violence. Earlier, the Americans, should to remain recorded, through Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, asking Rugova to raise Albanians to arms and war, too, but he refused.

Although social energy came from the desire for an united state for all Albanians the then political opposition had no close ties to Albania. Ibrahim Rugova had no ties to the political elite in Albania.

America chose the KLA and the armed rebellion, not the political opposition. Many Albanians who belonged to the political opposition were also KLA victims, they were killed.

And with the support of Albania's security structures and Western money, KLA training and arming began in Albania.

But the KLA and the Americans did not have enough support among the majority of Albanians in Kosovo. Although the general situation in Kosovo has already been largely tense due to intense propaganda and a series of stupidity by Local Authorities, which were dominated by Serbs after the reduction of province autonomy in 1989. Yet most people did not want war and did not support the KLA. It was an insignificant movement. But then the two events changed the mood. The first was an attack by special police forces and part of the Yugoslav Army on 5 March 1998 at Ademi Jashari's house in the village of Donje Prekaze in Drenica, where, Albanians claimed, 52 people were killed, including children. This elevated tensions to the maximum, but there still was no KLA support to a large extent. Adem Jashari was a local *kabadahi* who later has been identified all these years as the "founder of the KLA", which is not true, and an Albanian hero. What was suspicious to many Albanians was why such a mass armed attack was carried out and so many people killed. Because just a day earlier, Jashari was at the market in Vučitrn and then he wasn't arrested.

The second event was in July of 1998 when US Special Representative Richard Holbrooke came to Kosovo, and with the help of Serbian security forces, he met with one of the KLA leaders in the village of Junik, near Djakovica. And that was public. Also later, on the same day, Holbrooke met with President Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade. This was all suspicious to most Albanians and

they began to believe that there was some “secret plan” and therefore better to join the KLA.

That’s how it started and what happened later and it’s still happening is less than familiar.

SERBIA

In such a Kosovo environment, in the circumstances of the most serious state crisis since World War I, Serbia is, in the most severe condition, in a very disadvantaged position. And she’s showing off his naïveté. Objectively, it should not be so unfavourable, but above all Serbia’s political elite has put the state in such a position. The official unquestionable determination, or even blackmail, of Serbian authorities for so-called European integration, which means complete commitment to the West, has officially tied its hands in Belgrade.

For years, the West hasn’t changed its position, so it’s not clear about what or why it’s even negotiating. During the so called negotiations Serbia kept offering many proposals but all of them were rejected by the West. The West’s position is almost daily repeated from the top of Western countries to the “porters” of their embassies, who, interestingly, receive much more publicity than critics of the policy, that supposedly without a “legally binding agreement” as it is euphemistically called recognition of Kosovo, there is no membership in the European bloc. In what then capacity are European officials saying this primarily when the five EU members have not recognised Kosovo? And still official Belgrade claims that “European integration has no alternative”. And there is also a doubt, however, whether that’s enough or if it’s just another deception. It is, the promise of membership of the European Union, more likely to be a hoax.

In that light, the bigger problem is the belief in Western political and diplomatic circles that the current Serbia does not actually want Kosovo. Or at least she doesn’t want Albanians. Serbia wants the EU⁹. In this belief, in the West it is estimated that everything, in the meantime, is just buying a time because the end result is, it is claimed, known. Whether that’s the way it’s going to be the time will say, but the West is confident of such an outcome. These beliefs are extremely important because the West has long embraced the Anglo-Saxon formula that the perception is more important than reality (perception is a power).

On this basis, it has long been insisted on, for Serbia a fatal replacement thesis, that Serbia negotiates only on the protection of the “Serb minority” and cultural and historical heritage, and only one that belongs to the Serbian Orthodox

⁹ This is the testimony of the author based on many private conversations with diplomats and politicians of several Western countries.

Church. Such an approach implies that it is a “purposeful thing” and that Kosovo is already a different state. It’s really a disastrous substitution of the thesis on which the so-called negotiations are being led.

Unfortunately, the official Serbia follows that replacement thesis.

But, Kosovo “problem”, however, is exclusively about the state territory that the West has forcibly occupied and which it wants to permanently separate from Serbia. Serbia therefore has an obligation to preserve that part of the state territory one way or another.

The usual explanation, or excuse, for this fatal replacement thesis is that in Kosovo ethnic Albanians are supposedly “not wanting to live in Serbia.” Maybe some don’t want to, but what does that have to do with state territory? The state has its own territory, created through history and on its victims, and who is living there has nothing to do with the state as such. State sovereignty has emerged throughout history and history cannot go backwards, nor can time, whatever force it may be. That’s the essence.

When it comes to a thorough and fatal replacement thesis, it would be interesting to point to one example from Northern Ireland. The holy site of British Protestants is in the Northern Irish city of Londonderry, or just Derry as the Irish call it, where William Orange defeated Catholics. It was a crucial defeat for British Catholics. Today in that city, however, there is no a single Protestant, all Irish are Catholic, but it is still part of the UK.

Of course, minority people in every state have their rights that the state must protect, not because of international conventions but because they are its citizens.

Serbia’s reputation regarding Kosovo is no less down to the fact that the current Serbia, with the exemption of Russia and China, maintains its closest relations with the countries that have recognised Kosovo. It’s perceived in the world as very unusual. Of course, co-operation between countries must exist but to call friends those who bombed you and admitted to abducting Kosovo is a bad message. The impression, too, is that Serbia is largely even follows the advice of these “friends”. Serbia should remember past experiences and, for example, ask who encouraged Slobodan Milošević and the then government to take violence against Adem Jashari’s family. Someone encouraged Serbia to do so.

Back then, the US special representative was Robert Gelbard, who declared that the KLA was a terrorist organisation and thus gained the affection of Serbia¹⁰. But the key question is to what extent he encouraged the use of force. Because that’s what happened in his days¹¹.

¹⁰ He then, as the press largely conveyed, regularly washed his hands immediately after meetings with Albanian leaders.

¹¹ Gelbard later advocated the bombing of Serbia and now he is chairman of the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, a NATO NGO.

In other words, not everything what was said by these “friends” and proven enemies should not be taken for granted.

There are, unfortunately, many other examples. At the time when Victor Ponta was Romanian Prime Minister (a friend of Tony Blair’s) he advocated that Romania should recognise Kosovo after all and “go with the European family”¹². When Ponta later in 2013 had to resign and was charged with 10 years in prison for the murder of a state prosecutor and embezzlement¹³ he had to escape from the country and came to Serbia and got a Serbian citizenship and passport. He even was a guest at the session of the Serbian Parliament as a “friend”. And it also took away the credibility of official Belgrade.

Of course, the most bizarre case is former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. He led the bombing of Serbia in 1999. Later, a champion of Kosovo’s independence, he also has a street in Pristina, and now he is an adviser to the authorities in Belgrade.

To a large extent, the downsizing of Serbia’s reputation as a result of the so-called 2013 Brussels Agreement. In 2013, Serbia practically recognised Kosovo and treats it as another state. It’s a perception of the West. Everything else presented to the Serbian public is a hoax.

It would be worth remembering that no one in the West, at least in Europe, believed that such an agreement would be accepted by Serbia and was not expected to sign it. In fact, this agreement was designed to be rejected by Serbia in order to keep the problem, not to create the solution¹⁴. But it happened. The key was America’s role. As negotiations under the auspices of the EU were under way, US diplomat Philip Reeker sat in the next room, who was briefed during the breaks¹⁵. American Reeker is still in the next room during negotiations in Brussels. Back then, in 2013, Kosovo’s policy of Serbia in fact was crashed.

In general, it is extremely unclear why the official Serbia accepts the deceptions of the West, and above all the non-objective interpretation of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The International court did not deem the secession of Kosovo and Metohia from Serbia legally valid. The declaration of independence, according the Court opinion, was in the form of a “group of citizens” not institutions and therefore does not have a legal basis. But to Serbia was imposed a false interpretation that Serbia persistently follows. Serbia in some way becomes an accomplice in the hijacking of Kosovo.

Serbia’s position is also threatened by the absence of the Serbian public in politics towards Kosovo. Media caption of Kosovo has been heavily recessed for

12 *Kosovo: Sui Generis or Precedent in International Relations*, Editor Dušan Proroković, Institute for International Politics and Economy, Belgrade, 2018, pp. 224–225.

13 www.blic.rs, 11, January 2018. Later, Ponta returned to Romania.

14 Author’s talks with Western diplomats at the time.

15 *Ibid.*

years but it is still in people, as rare opinion polls show. Why Serbia allows that its citizens be informed about Kosovo process exclusively through Albanian leaders and their press. And it is interesting that only to them they trust.

Serbia lacks an overall, larger picture of the situation in Kosovo. No one in the elite seems to be dealing with it, no one’s interested. But it is, as it is known, extremely important for political decisions and above all political vision. Sometimes you get the impression that, however, basically Serbian authorities don’t care. Kosovo has become just an excuse to cover up Serbia’s overall political void.

And there’s another serious problem in that area. Kosovo’s fate in this time and according to the style of state negotiations has become a private business. The public still doesn’t really know what’s being negotiated, it’s been misled by false statement, and what’s going on. Let alone know anything about goals and vision. It is unbelievable that only Kosovo is invoked by its Constitution and not Serbia.

And no state can effectively solve such major state problems as Kosovo if it does not activate all or to the greatest extent potential in society as well as institutions. Only then can the public, as the greatest power of any society, be able to participate in such important businesses. And it’s the only way to create legitimacy and history that lasts.

When you look at the various, however empty, announcements they generally point to violations of rights and international legal norms around Kosovo. All this is true, and, of course, clear to all but Kosovo is primarily a political problem, a political issue. To that end, Serbia should harmonise its position with changes that already happened in the world. The world is already in major fractures and of those fractures will depend not only the fate of Kosovo but also of Serbia. These fractures will also bring new divisions in the world, and as at the time of writing this text, Serbia, with present attitude, could eventually be left alone. Serbia has painted itself in the corner.

Serbia simply mustn’t waste time. It needs to turn to its own development and solve systemic problems, from the economy to education and health care¹⁶. In that way to get her strength and change her position.

In addition, Serbia should know that the West sees every concession, every goodwill, not as benevolent understanding but exclusively as a weakness and then there is no end of humiliation..

16 This was also suggested in a private letter to then Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić by US Ambassador Michael Kirby in December 2015 shortly before his departure from Belgrade in February 2016. Parts of that private letter were misused and manipulated and published in the newspaper *Politika* but in a very negative light.

KOSOVO

Despite the support of its creators from the West “independent” Kosovo, however, is in a very delicate, very difficult position. Not in heaven or on earth. In the end, it all could be the adventure with a tragic ending.

The great Serbian writer from Kosovo, Grigorije Božović wrote “Kosovo is cursed”.

Although declared independence and recognition of major Western governments Kosovo is not an independent state after all. Kosovo, along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, is a colony. Just like before World War I. They are still the only two colonies on European soil, with Kosovo directly an American and Bosnia an European colony too. Kosovo, it should be reminded, is not formally legally independent, formally it is still part of the Republic of Serbia under temporary international governance even though it has its own state bodies. In fact, it is only independent to Serbia, whose is still a formal part, and the other independence does not exist. It also has an international phone number, but it is not a state. It’s all one big hoax.

Since it is basically a colony, Kosovo is not really that important for all the political processes and negotiations that are being negotiated about its fate. Kosovo, except for violence against its citizens, primarily Serbs, has no influence. That’s reality. Former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj himself acknowledged that Priština does not have its own policy, Kosovo is, as he put it, “part of the American bloc”.

After the declaration of independence, the US-led West embarked on strong lobbying for other countries to recognise Kosovo. There is still no reliable data on how many countries have actually recognised Kosovo except for EU and American vassals. According to unofficial data obtained by the author, the number of countries that have formally recognised Kosovo is below 90. This is almost certainly even though Pristina and its allies at one point said that 115 and even more world states recognised Kosovo’s independence. In translation to a plain language, the American project of independence recognition has failed sufficiently. This was demonstrated, among other things, by Serbia’s now suspended campaign to withdraw recognition. The fact is that there is no wider support for Kosovo in the world.

Kosovo’s leaders and their advocates are constantly pushing for membership of the United Nations (UN) which would then confirm Kosovo’s independence. This is also imposed as a key topic in all negotiations with Belgrade. But that’s a big question, too. The decision to join the UN is made by the Security Council and there the idea is not supported even if Serbia formally recognises Kosovo. For example, China told to Belgrade officials that she is not going to recognise Kosovo and will not support it in the Security Council even if Serbia does.

The only valid, legally binding document on Kosovo is Security Council Resolution 1244. That resolution, unlike most other resolutions, is permanent and Kosovo’s status can only be changed if the resolution is abolished by a Security Council decision and a new resolution on Kosovo’s fate made. That, however, won’t go as easily as Western negotiators believe.

Kosovo lost its only internal strength during “independence”, lost its population. Hundreds of thousands of people have left Kosovo. First, many took advantage of the war and reached Western countries as victims and refugees, and then the second, others went primarily with a “belly for bread.” Kosovo is emptying intensely.

The number of people, more accurately Albanians in Kosovo, is a constant instrument in their political and separatist manipulations. No one ever knew exactly how many there were and even today the exact number is not known. Basically all the data is false, both once and now¹⁷.

After the NATO bombing and western occupation, UNMIK, United Nations transitional administration established in 2000, has published pro-business census upon arrival to Kosovo and found that there were about 800,000 people. And then, in 2011 there was an so called official census, done by local Albanian authorities, saying there were 1,61 million Albanians. The estimate of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is that there are now 1,889,000 people in Kosovo, 1,800,000 of whom are ethnic Albanians. That CIA data is officially used by the UN.

And that’s not true. There are now no more than 900,000 people in Kosovo, about 100,000 of whom are Serbs and other nationalities¹⁸.

Serbs in Kosovo, according to private estimates, are around 90,000 and are most concentrated in central Kosovo, Pomoravlje (eastern part) and in the North. Despite their coercion to be citizens of Kosovo, which unfortunately happens with Belgrade’s support, they are not more importantly incorporated in Kosovo society. They live in basically closed communities and that’s how they organized themselves. Only some Serbs have infiltrated Kosovo society through the crime.

In addition to the population, one of the myths is Kosovo’s mining wealth. For a long time, many centuries, lasted the exploitation of what Kosovo’s land hides inside and, realistically speaking, it is now mostly at the level of the sample gallery. Official information from the former Yugoslavia as well as those from today is not a true picture of the state. The only real wealth is coal for thermal power plants. It’s in the true sense of the word wealth.

In fact, there is still no realistic picture of the situation in Kosovo, no field research. What is being published is unreliable and researches are largely funded

¹⁷ After World War I, when the creation of Albania revived the ambition for the so-called Greater Albania, one of the Albanian leaders, Hasan Prishtina, spoke to European powers about having 8 million Albanians.

¹⁸ Have a look at the work of Jovan Kršić in this book.

and commissioned by the West to conceal reality and justify its mistakes. There are two realities in Kosovo, one constructed by the West, followed by the official Serbia and the other one that is not talked about but it is only real. For example, there is virtually no education system or normal health care. Kosovo is inundated with private hospitals where citizens are being treated for big money by doctors from Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Many also come to Serbia for treatment.

If there were any long-term strategy, Serbia should offer education to young Albanians at its universities in addition to health treatment.

The economic picture is similar. In 2016, trade deficit reached 2,5 billion Euros. Also, the unemployment rate in 2017 was 30 percent but among those between the ages of 15 to 24 51 percent. A third of the youth do not attend school or are trained for anything. Only 29% of people has a full-time job and everyone else is employed from day to day¹⁹.

The only real economic activity, with trade to which the government's friends have a monopoly, was the construction of a NATO travel network. It is primarily the Durres-Prizren-Priština-Podujevo motorway, which needs to continue all the way to Nis in order to connect NATO road from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. But that's pretty well over.

As it stands, there is little chance that Kosovo's internal situation will change.

International circumstances and the development of relations in the world also do not work for Kosovo Albanians or the West.

Kosovo, like Serbia, is a victim of the West and its unrealistic assessments of the geopolitical game.

WEST AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The West and America have not changed their Kosovo policies as well as towards Serbia, despite the passage of time and events and changes of the overall international environment.

If you could even call it politics. When it comes to the West, everything is still largely at the level of special operations and intelligence services. This level feeds the bureaucrats dealing with the Balkans. And not on reality assessments and what is possible, but these special services primarily deal with the authorities, the people in power, and the psychological profiles of the leaders, and then on that basis, it is about blackmail, they are trying to achieve political goals. It's less about some clear vision, it's all kind of an experiment. And it's an experiment no matter what the consequences.

¹⁹ Have a look at the work of Milenko Dželetović and Bojan Dimitrijević in this book.

The best illustration is who the mediators in the negotiations are and the "special representatives" for the "Kosovo negotiations". It's mostly about people whose resume is full of servants and doing dirty work and the degree of their arrogance and ignorance depends on the instructions of "people without faces". Sometimes they exaggerate uncontrollably, although sometimes they are honest. As recently as negotiating mediator Miroslav Lajčak denied that if Kosovo and Serbia cannot agree then let them change the constitutions, because, he said, "the constitution is not the Bible". It really was a moment of sincerity because it is the position of the EU and the West.

That Lajčak is not alone in that kind of honesty was also reminded by Germany's Ambassador to the UN, Christoph Heusgen, who argued that "our Serbian friends shoot themselves in the foot if they want to join the EU because they should work for recognising Kosovo and recognising Kosovo themselves"²⁰. This is of course, the position of the "friends", of the Germans, which even without the Security Council session are constantly spoken about by the German ambassadors in Belgrade. But their obvious impression is that it's always forgotten and they need to repeat it constantly.

Although Western policy towards Kosovo and Serbia remains the same as it was 20 years ago, it is increasingly noticeable that Kosovo is increasingly becoming an instrument of geopolitical reckoning among Western countries themselves. The most common example is the so-called Washington Agreement on "economic normalisation" signed (only) by the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo at the White House. It is more than clear that the wording of "economic normalisation" is just a front for trying to geopolitical domination of America, not the EU, in Serbia and Kosovo. Being excluded, spokesperson of the European Commission angrily asked "do they know what they have signed?". That ceremony in Washington is also part of Washington's aggressive policy towards Russia and China. The latest Washington's official mantra is that the Kosovo problem can be solved quickly through economic co-operation. It's like it never existed before. The main goals are the financial installation of US private investment funds that should buy the remaining state giants in Serbia and finance the construction of new thermal power plants in Kosovo. These thermal power plants are the only thing worth the investment in Kosovo. And that's why the Americans insist on Lake Gazivoda too, which is partly on the territory of the Central Serbia. Without Gazivoda, there are no thermal power plants, they can't work without water. And in this way, it is estimated in Washington, that Serbia will primarily break away from co-operation with Russia and China but also from the European Union.

²⁰ German Ambassador to the Video Session of the Security Council on October 21, 2020.

It is unclear what is the fate of this Agreement, it lacks any institutional infrastructure. But it is obvious that America is in hurry now even though it has been quite inactive in recent years. It's worth remembering that America was in a hurry in 2008 when pushed Kosovo to declaration of independence. It was just several months before a big financial crash that changed relations in the world. Now Washington is re-entering a new economic collapse that will be a prelude to tectonic changes.

The Agreement, however, has no clear legal validity or authority under which it was made but at the same time, considering Belgrade and Priština's servitude to Washington bureaucracy, should have no doubt that it will be implemented. It should be noted that even after 78 days of bombing, the NATO coalition did not defeat Serbia, Serbia was not defeated, but all its leaders since 2000 accepted West's mantra that she was. Serbia did not lose the war, but her leaders did later politically capitulate.

At the same time, the Washington papers reveal broader goals, leaving them with a place that had nothing to do with "economic normalization". For example, the proclamation of Lebanese Hizbollah as a terrorist organisation or the relocation of the Serbian Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Israel's recognition of Kosovo and becoming member of a pro-homosexual global coalition.

There is also talk of the US military base Bondsteel, near Uroševac, Kosovo. That, however, is no longer a base in the meaning of that word, it is actually a secret American prison for some time. And probably the only remaining secret prison in the world where Americans house those kidnapped around the world. Who knows what's going on there. There are parts of Bondsteel where the local workforce is denied access but also by representatives of NATO countries. Interestingly, the Americans use Skopje, Macedonia, airport for that base, not Priština.

Although there are profound differences and conflicts within the West over Kosovo, Western politics generally is still the same. The main goal is to break Serbia, more accurately to crush Serbia's leaders so that they meet all the demands for Kosovo's independence because the West itself is simply unable to realise the political ambitions of creating an independent Kosovo. The latest experiences, such as the Washington Agreement, make the West believe it is possible.

It is a futile and pointless hope of Serbia to persuade the West to accept and understand reality and inspire them to appreciate their mistakes. It's in vain. There are no talks, and Serbia has to understand that. It should also be known that there is no demand, a condition that Serbia would meet and for the West to change its policy.

But the West is no longer the only "international community" and is no longer the only one in the Balkans. The world has changed, which has opened up space for others, notably Russia and China. Their increasingly notable presence for America and the West is becoming a serious problem as the Western bloc moves

increasingly intensely into open and aggressive economic and political conflicts with Moscow and Beijing.

In this new reality, Serbia and Kosovo become instruments of this Western aggression, which above all for Serbia sets new challenges that, in order to be a state, it must find answers.

HOW TO GO ON?

What is going on in and around Kosovo is clear to everyone but the key question is – what to do, how to go on and what will happen.

Of course, it's always hard to predict but, still, in politics, there are some constant realities that might help in reckoning if not in prediction. The decision on a possible solution to the Kosovo crisis will be made primarily by America, whose Kosovo is a project, with the chorus of support of America's allies in Europe, and Serbia, which is basically the key of any solution. Kosovo Albanians, it should be acknowledged, will not have a decisive influence because they are only the sub-contractors and executors of their protectors, the Americans.

The positions seem clear. The West is not giving up on Kosovo's independence and from Serbia does not want to accept anything less than recognition of an independent Kosovo. In return, it promises only that such a Kosovo will recognise Serbia as a neighbouring state. In addition, a condition has been imposed that without it, Serbia will not be able to become a member of the EU, which is supposedly its strategic goal. But there's no guarantee that she's going to become a member. The only thing that seems to be guaranteed is that an independent Kosovo will recognise an independent Serbia.

That's the position of the West. In other words, Serbia by renouncing part of its state territory practically legalises bullying, bombing in 1999, and all that evil that followed. And that is what the West calls a "final solution" for Kosovo and Serbia and would be called a "legally binding agreement".

And what is Serbia's position? During years of negotiations, Serbia has held the position that Kosovo is still a province in Serbia, as guarantees by Resolution 1244, which is legally mandatory for all countries, and is ready for an extremely high degree of autonomy. Meanwhile, that stance has gradually given up, and in 2013 Serbia signed the Brussels Agreement, which opened the door to an independent Kosovo. Step by step, Serbia has made major concessions, from giving an international telephone number to transferring energy network to Albania's energy system. And a lot more, all under the formula of seeking "compromise." Every day, the current political Serbia publicly demonstrates that it treats Kosovo as another, independent state.

At the same time, political propaganda is being offered to the public of Serbia, and if it wasn't for the statements of Kosovo Albanian leaders, people almost wouldn't even know what was really going on. Everything about Kosovo has become a private business. For the domestic public, it's one story and with foreigners behind closed doors it's the other.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić says he is "afraid that there is no solution for Kosovo"²¹ and then signs everything that is asked of him. This controversy he justifies because "we are too small to say everything we think and know"²². He also says that "a frozen conflict is not a resolution".

But the President of Serbia is increasingly saying that Serbia cannot recognise Kosovo without getting anything for it. Although he admits it would be "an insult to history and to all those who died defending Kosovo and Serbia"²³. Vučić also says that the EU offers Serbia the membership in the European bloc if accepts the recognition of Kosovo, but he believes that is not enough. It takes a lot more.²⁴

In other words, current Serbia is ready to recognise Kosovo it is only a matter of price. But who's the one who's going to set the price and with what authority?

That's where another fact is suppressed. It is true that Serbia is small, though still the largest country in its region. The little ones don't have the strength, but they have dignity. The only thing left for small and poor countries is a dignity.

What is real position of Serbia? The biggest problem in current Serbia is debts. Serbia is a country that withdraws new loans unfreely and is in additional debt through the sale of government bonds in order to pay liabilities on earlier loans and to keep up state spending. It's called "debt slavery" and it's a key problem for Serbia including her position towards Kosovo. Indirectly, the Serbian president acknowledged that in suggesting that Serbia is ready for anything it is just a matter of price. This is the reality not the public deceptions about the Kosovo negotiations and state of economy.

The most direct symbol of Serbia's position is the 4th September 2020 Washington Agreement. Serbia signed the Agreement in the same rank as Kosovo. In other words, Serbia treats Kosovo as another state. But the Agreement also states that the American International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which operates under the authority of the US government and is in reality a private investment fund company, is opening a permanent representative office in Belgrade. The official version is that economic co-operation is the most efficient way to Kosovo's solution. It's like the whole treaty a great deception. What's the goal? Serbia intends to sell the most valuable, strategic assets left, Telekom, MTS

21 www.b92.net, June 13, 2020.

22 *Ibid.*

23 *Ibid.*

24 Vučić's interview with *Večernje Novosti* newspaper, June 18, 2020.

mobile telephony and most of electricity production and distribution, Elektroprivreda. Serbia needs money and the sale of strategic capacities will be presented as investments. And buyers are already well-known, American private investment funds and they will then sell it to someone else and Serbia will not have an impact or control. For Serbia to sell its assets, however, it must also even pay. Absurd. For Lake Gazivoda, that is under Serbia's control, has been left to the Americans because their private funds won't invest in thermal power plants in Kosovo unless they control the water, they can't work without. In addition, Lake Gazivoda supplies the accumulation of Badovac, from which almost all of Kosovo is supplied with drinking water. In the Washington Agreement, Kosovo is just an excuse for Serbia in seeking money. The current Serbia is being blackmailed with debts and desperate to find the money.

And then, is there a solution for Kosovo?

Most non-government chroniclers suggest two scenarios are possible. One is for Kosovo to truly become independent and the other to remain part of Serbia in some form.

In light of the wider reality, however, there are indeed two realities for Kosovo, but these are not the ones the chroniclers are talking about. Kosovo can be either part of Serbia or part of Albania. Kosovo does not have the elemental capacity to be a state and can only function if it is part of a larger organization. It's just a fact. There's no such thing as a third solution. Everything else is deception and waste of time.

Are those realistic? In this time, they are not, although staying in Serbia in any form is more realistic in the long term.

In fact, it is generally not yet realistic to expect any solution to the Kosovo crisis. Perhaps some deal, based on the demands of America and the West, will soon be sold to the public as a "final solution" but it won't be that. In the West, there is a belief that the current authorities in Serbia can accept everything that is being asked of them, but none of that is a solution. Only the source of a new and further crisis.

As one Kosovo Albanian put it in a conversation with this author: he says no deal can be reached. Why? For Belgrade and Priština have the same boss. And that landlord doesn't want a solution that's realistic and sustainable.

The exit from the Kosovo crisis is making it more hard, however, by above all the basic fact – Kosovo is part of a great geopolitical game that is still going on, it is not finished. And that's why there can be no solution for Kosovo. At this stage, it is a part of America's hybrid war against Russia and China. And that, U.S. President Donald Trump's envoy, Riccardo Grenell, doesn't hide. He publicly says that Washington Agreement will move Serbia away from Russia and China and tie it to America.

In the Washington Agreement, as part of this geopolitical game, there is also a hidden change in the American attitude towards the nature of Kosovo. America treats Kosovo as a Muslim country belonging to the Muslim world, which could change Kosovo's status in Europe and the Balkans. Later, President Trump said publicly that Kosovo should team up with Muslim countries in the Middle East. The goal, however, is to create a broader, even with Kosovo, an anti-Iranian Muslim coalition. At the same time, it also testifies to elemental ignorance – the Islamic Conference, which brings together all Islamic countries in the world, has persistently been refusing to recognise Kosovo's independence, even though Turkey insists on it every year.

The outcome of that geopolitical game is still uncertain. The international environment is changing now rapidly. It seems that Western hope is the current Serbia, believed to be committed to the West. That assessment may be accurate for now, but Serbia's relations with, say, China and Russia are not that simple. Serbia is strategically tied to Russia and depends on it to block various anti-Serbian initiatives in international organisations and China is the largest single investor in Serbia. So it's all uncertain.

But the West won't give up on its familiar views. In this reality, what should Serbia do?

The most important for Serbia is that it does not sign anything. Nothing more to sign. And she should not heed the messages of American and European propagandists that Kosovo is a "done deal" and that Serbia must accept this reality. No, Kosovo is not a done deal and therefore Serbia must not sign anything. Despite the fact that it's been a long time, there's no need to rush. But at the same time, Serbia must have clear views which should have support of the Serbian people. And to perform with the power of the people behind. And to keep in mind the experiences of other countries. For example, France waited 50 years to recover Alsace-Laurent.

In considering all of these circumstances it is highly likely that Kosovo will be a protectorate for a long time to come used for geopolitical games and destabilisation of Serbia and the region. That seems like the only certainty.

КОСОВО И МЕТОХИЈА: АМБИЈЕНТ КРИЗЕ

СЕНИША ЉЕПОЈЕВИЋ

Сажетак

Најновија фаза кризе с Косовом и Метохијом траје већ неколико деценија и за то време много је тога написано, откривено и готово да је све речено и познато. И у домаћој и у међународној јавној комуникацији. Криза, међутим, и даље траје и упркос неким важним ломовима који су се у међувремену збили још се далеко од изласка из тог зачараног круга. Много је наравно разлога за ту кризну дуговечност али би се цела ситуација и судбина Косова и Метохије могли ипак свести на ону народну „зло рађање готово суђење“.

У животу неко може да има планове, жеље и амбиције, спремност да покуша да их оствари али, по правилу, у људским друштвима и самој природи све зависи од амбијента, околности у којима се нешто догађа јер нико није сам, одвојен од других. Тако и крајњи исход догађаја зависи од околности којима је сам догађај у коначници дефинисан. Легендарни британски премијер Харолд Макмилан²⁵ је после дугогодишњег политичког искуства поручио младим политичарима да „могу да имају разне планове али на крају политику диктирају догађаји“. У историји, социологији и политици то се обично зове „контекст“.

У том светлу било би корисно, и наравно важно, подсетити у каквом се то амбијенту дешава косовска криза²⁶. У којим околностима је генерисана и с којим циљем.

Како је дошло до кризе. Одомаћено уверење је да непријатељства између Срба и Албанаца трају вековима, откад деле релативно заједнички простор. То је најблаже речено претеривање, јер да је тако једних или других више не би ни било. Непријатељства су по правилу везана за уплитање неког трећег, странаца. Почињу доласком Отоманске империје када велики део становништва тог подручја прихвата ислам. Православни Срби су били жртве насиља и исламизираних Албанаца и исламизираних Срба²⁷. Али, право непријатељство почиње у 19. веку када је Отоманска империја у распаду, а српска држава истовремено јача па се уплашени исламизирани Албанци појављују као „последњи браниоци“ Империје. Непријатељство је посебно храњено насељавањем исламизираних Албанаца из данашње северне Албаније на подручје Косова (у Метохији у мањој мери јер је у том подручју које Албанци зову Дукађин албанско становништво одувек било) где албанског становништва пре тога практично није ни било²⁸. Насељавани су и делови Топлице и Јабланичког краја²⁹.

25 Харолд Макмилан (Macmillan) је био британски премијер од 1957. до 1963. Рођен је 1894. а умро 1986. Стицајем околности једном историјском епизодом је био везан и за збивања у бившој Југославији. Као командант британске окупационе зоне у Аустрији 1945. године извршио је наређење савезника да се избегли војници усташке Независне Државе Хрватске и Југословенске краљевске војске у отаџбини врате у Југославију где је већина њих побијена.

26 Иако је званично име Косово и Метохија у овом тексту ћемо користити само име Косово. Албанци после 1999. године користе име Косова што је назив на турском језику.

27 Већина тих исламизираних Срба је временом постала Албанци а један део се населио у данашњу Рашку област.

28 У самој Албанији још увек постоји озбиљна сумња да ли су Албанци са Косова заиста етнички Албанци. Једном приликом су аутора овог текста у Тирани питали да ли ја мислим да су косовски (не метохијски) Албанци заиста Албанци. Они који су питали мисле да нису. Велики део насиља је узрокован и дубоким разликама у менталитету.

29 Има наравно много других детаља међу којима су историјски најважнији две велике сеобе Срба и

Од многих „инспирација“ насиља³⁰ требало би издвојити и два важна историјска догађаја. После српско-турских ратова 1876. и 1878. и Берлинског конгреса 1878. када је Србија и формално постала независна и проширила се на јужним границама све до данашње административне линије с Косметом. Под отоманском влашћу су тада остали само Прешево, Бујановац и Трговиште. Тада су готово сви Албанци из Јабланичког краја и Топлице протерани или се одселили, нека имања је држава и откупљивала, а као одмазду протерано је много Срба с Косова, највише из Дренице.

Касније треба такође подсетити и на Балканске ратове који су коначно сломили Отоманску власт и Стара Србија враћена под српску власт. Међу српским војницима је била много и оних чије су породице раније протеране с Косова па је било доста освета и насиља. Па потом, 1913. године Аустроугарска је организовала албански устанак, такозвана Арнаутска побуна, у којој је насиље узвраћено и било је много жртава. Српска војска је, међутим, остала на Косову и Метохији али се морала повући из оног дела који је данашња Албанија.

Дуга је серија насиља и анимозитета. Временом су се устоличили услови беса, отпора и манипулација албанског становништва.

Треба, међутим, рећи да је пре свега реч о албанској елити а не обичном човеку.

За ововремену фазу косовске кризе најважније је како је до ње дошло. Јасно је да су услови национализма већ одавно успостављени и да је тај национализам храњен и сепаратизмом. Али, шта је била основна идеја.

Цели пројект је амерички а Запад се тек касније укључио.

Проблем за Америку је била Албанија, како успоставити контролу над том стратешки важном земљом.

После пропасти комунизма и успостављања какве такве демократске власти Албанија се није одмах опредељивала изузев општег декларисања да је за Запад и „демократију“ шта год то у њеним условима значило.

Америка у Албанији није имала јаку мрежу, готово никакву. Дипломатски односи су прекинути још 1939. године када је Италија окупирала ту земљу а успостављени су тек 1992, а у пуном смислу речи 1993. године. Нове власти Албаније су, међутим, у то време биле много ближе Немачкој и Француској него Америци. А Америка је хтела да она има контролу над Албанијом.

Без сопствене јаке мреже на терену америчке специјалне службе су се обратиле Албанцима из Македоније, једини с којима су одавно имали блиске везе. Преко тих веза су прво македонски па онда косовски Албанци увучени и у мрежу преноса и трговине дрогом. Албанци из Македоније су први међу Албанцима отишли у свет, махом на Запад, па су они тако и најстарији контакти западних специјалних служби³¹.

Тако је створена иницијална америчка база утицаја у Албанији. Али, још недовољна за преузимање пуне контроле.

У Вашингтону је онда процењено да би најефикаснији начин придобијања Албаније и успостављања пуне контроле био принцип италијанског лидера Бенита Мусолинија, треба

Албанаца хришћана. Турске власти су подржавале насиље према Србима због њиховог учешћа у аустријско-турским ратовима.

30 Велики део насиља је узрокован и дубоким разликама у менталитету.

31 На пример, У Великој Британији деценијама после Другог светског рата био је само један Албанац који је довео и своју сестру. Био је из приштинске породице Фона, пре рата је био краљевски официр и током рата је био у Краљевској војсци, четницима. С остацима Краљевске војске је после рата стигао у Лондон, где је држао један мали ресторан.

урадити оно што је Мусолини урадио – треба Албанији обећати Косово. То је прихваћено и тако је почела савремена драма и Косова и Метохије али и Србије.

То је, као и данас, амерички пројект³². Суштина је у америчкој контроли Албаније а преко Косова.

Почела је реализација тог америчког пројекта.

У то време, током 1997. и 1998. Американци такође нису имали јаку мрежу на самом Косову. У стварању америчке мреже пре свега су коришћене старе везе безбедносних и обавештајних структура Албаније, настале још у време Енвера Хоџе, а потом и европских земаља које су већ, углавном преко дијаспоре, имале добре контакте. То су, пре свега, Немачка и Швајцарска. У Немачкој је годинама била побуњеничка влада косовских Албанаца на чијем челу је био Бујар Букоши.

И онда је у Македонији, у албанском селу Зајас, код Кичева, формирана оружана формација позната као Ослободилачка војска Косова (ОВК). Формирана је у кући Аљија Ахметија, каснијег, и садашњег, лидера македонских Албанаца.

Али, у основи није било јасне визије за Косово, није било никаквог јасног циља нити стратегије.

Како је време пролазило постављани су нови циљеви који су онда увукли цели Запад и НАТО у косовски амерички пројект. Тај пројект се уклопио и у кажњавање Србије за „ранији грехове“ у распаду Југославије, стару амбицију смене режима у Србији и западни рат против тадашњег лидера Слободана Милошевића. И на крају је смишљено да то постане модел такозваних хуманитарних интервенција и то без сагласности Уједињених нација, ратних похода кршења међународног права. И, поврх свега, уклопило се у амбицију очувања НАТО савеза.

У основи било је то тумарање по мраку и ad hoc доношење одлука како би се купило време и коришћена прилика за неке друге, шире интересе. То је било тако иако је већина људи склона да верује да је реч о неком добро смишљеном пројекту. Из угла просечно обавештеног човека све то може да личи да је све јасно и да се све зна али то уопште није било тако, много је више ситуација сама од себе диктирала потезе него смишљена акција.

Занимљиво је да Америка није хтела да користи већ постојећу албанску политичку опозицију на Косову. Американци су хтели рат, оружану побуну и модел ратних интервенција изван међународног права, а тадашња опозиција предвођена Ибрахимом Руговом није желела ту врсту насиља. Американци су раније, треба да остане забележено, преко хрватског председника Фрање Туђмана, током ратних сукоба у Хрватској и Босни и Херцеговини, од Ругове тражили да и он дигне Албанце на оружје и рат али је он то одбио.

Иако је социјална снага потицала од жеље за једном албанском државом тадашња политичка опозиција није имала блиске везе с Албанијом. Ибрахим Ругова није био у везама с политичком елитом у Албанији.

Америка је изабрала ОВК и оружану побуну а не политичку опозицију. Многи Албанци који су припадали тој политичкој опозицији су били и жртве ОВК, убијени су.

И уз подршку безбедносних структура Албаније кренули су обука и наоружавање припадника ОВК у Албанији.

32 У Албанију су дошли многи македонски Албанци из Америке и преузели многе послове укључујући разне мењачнице и банке. Из тих кругова су и кренули немири, јер су те пирамидалне шеме, пропаде. Дошло је до хаоса у целој земљи а војни магацини оружја су опљачкани. Велики део тог оружја је потом пребаčen на Косово и у Македонију.

Али, ОВК и Американци ипак нису имали довољну подршку међу већином Албанаца на Косову. Иако је општа ситуација на Косову већ увелико била веома напета због интензивне пропаганде и серије глупости локалних власти којима су доминирали Срби после редуцирања косметске аутономије 1989. године. Ипак већина људи није желела рат и није подржавала ОВК. То је била безначајна снага. Али, онда су два догађаја променила расположење. Први је напад специјалних полицијских снага и делом Војске СР Југославије 5. марта 1998. на кућу Адемија Јашарија у селу Доње Преказе у Дреници у којем је, тврдили су Албанци, убијено 52 људи међу којима је било и деце. То је подигло напетости до максимума али и даље није било подршке ОВК у великој мери. Адем Јашари је био локални кабахаџија кога све ове године представљају као „оснивача ОВК“, што није тачно, и албанског хероја. Оно што је многим Албанцима било сумњиво је зашто је тако масован оружани напад изведен и поубијани толико људи. Јер, само дан раније Јашари је био на пијаци у Вучитрну и зашто онда није ухапшен.

Други догађај је био јула лета 1998. године када је специјални представник Америке Ричард Холбрук дошао на Косово, и уз помоћ снага безбедности Србије, састао се са једним од лидера ОВК у селу Јуник, код Ђаковице. И то је било јавно. Исто вече, Холбрук се у Београду састао са Слободаном Милошевићем. То је све било сумњиво за већину Албанаца и почели су да верују да има неки „тајни план“ и зато се боље приклонити ОВК-у.

Тако је то почело а оно што се касније догађало и још се догађа мање више је познато.

Србија. У таквом „косовском“ амбијенту, у околностима најозбиљније државне кризе од Првог светског рата, Србија је, најблаже речено, у веома неповољном положају. И показује се наивном. Објективно, то не би требало да буде толико неповољно али пре свега политичка елита Србије је довела државу у такав положај. Званично неупитна опредељеност, или чак и уцењеност, власти Србије за такозване европске интеграције, што значи комплетно везивање за Запад, званичном Београду је везала руке.

Већ годинама Запад не мења своју позицију па није јасно о чему се и зашто уопште преговара. Став Запада је, што скоро свакодневно сви понављају, од врха западних земаља до порттира њихових амбасада, који, занимљиво је, добијају много већи публицитет од критичара те политике, да наводно без „правно обавезујућег споразума“ како се еуфемистички зове признање Косова нема чланства у (западно)европском блоку. А званични Београд тврди да „европска интеграција нема алтернативу“. И ту међутим, постоји сумња да ли је и то довољно или је то само још једна обмана. Вероватније је да је обмана. У којем то капацитету пре свега говоре европски званичници када пет чланица ЕУ није признало Косово?

У том светлу још је већи проблем уверење у западним политичким и дипломатским круговима да садашња Србија у ствари, не жели Косово. Или бар не жели Албанце. Србија жели ЕУ³³. У том уверењу, на Западу се процењује да је све, у међувремену, куповина времена јер крајњи резултат је, тврди се, познат. Да ли ће то баш тако и бити показат ће време. Али Запад је уверен у такав исход. Та уверења су изузетно важна јер је Запад одавно прихватио англо-саксонску формулу да је најважнија перцепција а не стварност (перцептион ис а повер).

На тој основи се већ дуго инсистира на, за Србију, фаталној замени теза да Србија преговара само о заштити „српске мањине“ и културно-историјског наслеђа и то искључиво онога које припада Српској православној цркви. Такав приступ имплицира да је „свршена

33 Ово је сведочење аутора на основу многих приватних разговора с дипломатама и политичарима неколицине западних земаља.

ствар“ и да је Косово већ друга држава. То је заиста погубна замена теза на којој се махом и воде такозвани преговори.

На жалост, и званична Србија следи ту замену теза.

На Косову је, међутим, искључиво реч о државној територији коју је Запад силом окупирао и коју жели да трајно одвоји од Србије. Србија зато има обавезу да тај део државне територије сачува на овај или онај начин.

Најчешће објашњење те фаталне замене теза је да су на Косову у великој већини етнички Албанци који наводно „не желе да живе у Србији“. Можда неки и не желе али какве то везе има са државном територијом. Држава има своју територију, насталу кроз историју и на жртвама, а ко ће на којем њеном делу да живи то нема никакве везе с државом као таквом. Државни суверенитет је настао кроз историју а историја не може да се врати уназад, као ни време, ма каква сила била. То је суштина.

Када је реч о темељној и кобној замени теза било би занимљиво указати на један пример из Северне Ирске. Свето место британских протестаната је у северноирском граду Лондонерију или само Дери како га Ирци зову где је Вилијем Оранц победио католике. То је био кључни пораз британских католика. Данас у том граду, међутим, не живи ни један протестант, сви су Ирци католици, али и даље је део Велике Британије.

Наравно, мањински народи у свакој држави имају своја права које држава мора да штити, не због међународних конвенција него зато што су они њени грађани.

Углед косовске Србије ништа мање не срозава и чињеница да актуелна Србија, ако изузмемо Русију и Кину, најближе односе одржава управо са земаљама које су признале Косово. То се у свету доживљава као веома необично. Наравно, сарадња међу државама мора да постоји али називати пријатељима оне који су те бомбардовали и признали отимање Косова је лоша порука. Утисак је, такође, да Србија у великој мери чак и следи што јој саветују ти „пријатељи“. Србија би требало да се сети ранијих искустава и, на пример, запита ко је Слободана Милошевића и тадашњу власт охрабривао да предузме насиље према породици Адеми Јашарија. Неко је Србију за то охрабрио.

Тада је амерички специјални представник био Роберт Гелбард који је чак изјављивао како је ОВК терористичка организација и тако стекао наклоност Србије³⁴ али и питање је у којој мери је охрабривао и на примену силе. Јер, то се догодило у његово време³⁵.

Другим речима, не би требало све што кажу ти „пријатељи“ а доказани непријатељи узимати „здро за готово“.

Има, на жалост, много примера. У време док је био румунски премијер Виктор Понта (пријатељ Тонија Блера) је заговарао да Румунија ипак призна Косово и да „иде заједно са европском фамилијом“³⁶. Када је Понта касније, 2015. године, морао да поднесе оставку и био оптужен чак и за саучесништво у убиству једног тужиоца и проневере побегло је из земље и на брзину добио држављанство Србије³⁷. Чак је био и гост на седници Скупштине Србије као „пријатељ“. И то је такође одузело кредибилитет званичног Београда.

34 Он је тада, што је штампа увелико преносила, редовно прао руке одмах после састанака с лидерима Албанаца.

35 Гелбард се касније залагао за бомбардовање Србије а сада је већ неколико година члан одбора директора Атлантског савеза, НАТО невладине организације.

36 Зборник радова *Kosovo: Sui Generis or Precedent in International Relations*, Belgrade, 2018, стр. 224–225.

37 www.blic.rs, 11. јануара 2018. Касније се Понта ипак вратио у Румунију.

Наравно, најбизарнији је случај бившег британског премијера Тонија Блера. Он је био предводник бомбардовања Србије 1999. године, касније шампион косовске независности, има и улицу у Приштини, а сада је саветник власти у Београду.

У великој мери је претходно речено, срозаване угледа Србије, последица такозваног Бриселског споразума из 2013. године којим је Србија практично признала Косово и према њему се односи као према другој држави. То је перцепција Запада. Све друго су обмане.

Вредило би подсетити да нико на Западу, бар у Европи, није веровао да ће такав споразум Србија прихватити и није се ни очекивало да га потпише. У ствари, тај споразум је тако и прављен да би га Србија одбила како би проблем остао а не да изгледа да се решава³⁸. Али се ипак то десило. Кључна је била улога Америке. Док су трајали преговори под окриљем ЕУ у суседној соби је седео амерички дипломата Филип Рикер којем су у паузама подношени извештаји³⁹. Американац Рикер је и сада током преговора у Бриселу у тој суседној соби. Тада, те 2013. године, је сломљена косовска Србија.

Генерално, крајње је нејасно зашто званична Србија прихвата обмане Запада, а пре свега нетачно тумачење саветодавног мишљења Међународног суда правде. Међународни суд није оценио да је отцепљење Косова и Метохије од Србије правно важеће али је Србији наметнуто лажно тумачење које власти у Србији упорно следе. Тиме оне на неки начин постају саучесник у отимању Косова.

Позицију Србије угрожава и одсуство јавности у политици према Косову. Медијски је Косово у великој мери потиснуто већ годинама али оно ипак живи у људима, није нестало што показују и ретка истраживања јавног мњења. Зашто Србија дозвољава да се њени грађани о свим збивањима око Косова информирају искључиво преко албанских лидера и штампе и што је занимљиво једино њима и верују.

Србији недостаје укупна, шира слика стања на Косову. Тиме се изгледа нико не бави, нико није заинтересован. Али, то је, као што је познато, изузетно важно за доношење политичких одлука и пре свега политичке визије. Понекад се стиче утисак да, ипак, у основи власти Србије Косово и не занима. Косово је постало само изговор за прикривање укупне политичке празнине Србије.

И у том делу се долази и до још једног озбиљног проблема. Судбина Косова је у овом времену а према начину вођења државних преговора постала приватни посао. Јавност и даље уопште не зна о чему се стварно преговара, обмањивана је лажним саопштењима, и шта се дешава. А камоли да нешто зна о циљевима и визији. Невероватно је да се само Косово позива на Устав а не и Србија.

А ни једна држава не може да ефикасно решава тако велике државне проблеме као што је Косово ако не активира све или у највећој мери потенцијале у друштву као и институције. Само тако јавност, као највећа снага сваког друштва, може да учествује у тако важним пословима. И само тако се могу створити легитимитет и историја која ће да траје.

Када се погледају разна, ма колико испразна, саопштења углавном се указује на кршење права и међународне правне норме око Косова. Све је то тачно, и, наравно, свима јасно али Косово је пре свега политички проблем, политичко питање. У том смислу Србија би своју позицију требало да усклади и с променама у свету. Свет је већ у великим ломовима а од тих

38 Ауторови разговори са западним дипломатама у то време.

39 *Исто*.

ломова зависиће не само судбина Косова него и Србије. Ти ломови ће донети и нове поделе у свету и како у време писања овог текста ствари стоје Србија би на крају могла да остане сама. Србија је у много чему себе зафарбала у хошак.

Србија једноставно не сме да губи време. Треба да се окрене сопственом развоју и решава системске проблеме, од економије до образовања и здравствене заштите⁴⁰.

Уз то, Србија би требало да зна да Запад сваки уступак, сваку добру вољу не види као добронамерност него искључио као слабост и онда нема краја.

Косово. Упркос подршци својих креатора са Запада „независно“ Косово је, ипак, у веома деликатном, тачније веома тешком, положају. Ни на небу ни на земљи. Све би на крају могло да буде авантура Албанаца с трагичним крајем.

Велики српски писац с Косова Григорије Божовић је писао „Косово је проклето“.

Иако је једнострано, у форми „групе грађана“, прогласило независност Косово ипак није независна држава. Косово је, уз Босну и Херцеговину, колонија. Као и пре Првог светског рата. То су још једине две колоније на тлу Европе с тим што је Косово директно америчка европска колонија. Косово, треба подсетити, није ни формално правно независно, формално је још увек део Републике Србије под привременом међународном управом иако има своје државне органе. Оно је у ствари једино независно од Србије, чији је још увек формално део, а друга независност не постоји. Оно, сагласношћу Србије, има и међународни телефонски број али ипак није држава. Све је то једна велика обмана.

Будући да је у основи колонија Косово у ствари и није толико важно за све политичке процесе и преговоре који се воде о његовој судбини. Косово, изузев насиља над својим грађанима, пре свега Србима, нема никакав утицај. То је његова реалност. И сам бивши премијер Рамуш Хардинај је признао да Приштина нема своју политику, Косово је, како је рекао, „део америчког блока“.

После проглашења независности Запад предвођен Америком је кренуо у снажно лобирање да друге земље признају Косово. Још увек нема поузданих података колико је стварно земаља признало Косово изузев чланица ЕУ и Америке. Према незваничним подацима до којих је дошао овај аутор број земаља које су формално признале Косово је испод 90. То је готово сигурно иако су Приштина и њени савезници у једном периоду говорили да је чак 115 па и више светских држава признало косовску независност. У преводу, амерички пројект признавања независности у довољној мери није успео. То је, поред осталог, показала и сада суспендована кампања Србије за повлачење признања. Чињеница је да шире подршке Косову у свету нема.

Косовски лидери и њихови заштитници непрестано инсистирају на чланству у Уједињеним нацијама (УН) што би онда потврдило косовску независност. То се намеће и као кључна тема у свим преговорима с Београдом. Али и то је вештачко питање. Одлуку о чланству у УН доноси Савет безбедности а тамо та идеја нема подршку чак и ако Србија формално призна Косово. То су званичном Београду још од 2010. године неколико пута пренели званичници Кине (а и Руске Федерације).

Једини важећи, правно обавезујући документ о Косову је Резолуција 1244 Савета безбедности. Та резолуција, за разлику од већине других резолуција, је трајна и косовски

40 То је у приватном писму тада премијеру Александру Вучићу сугерисао амерички амбасадор Мајкл Кирби у децембру 2015. недуго пре његовог одласка из Београда фебруара 2016. Делови тог приватног писма су злоупотребљени и изманипулисани и такви објављени у листу *Политика* али у сасвим негативном светлу.

статус се може променити само ако се та резолуција укине одлуком Савета безбедности и донесе ново решење о косовској судбини. То, међутим, неће ићи тако лако како западни преговарачи верују.

Косово је за време „независности“ остало без своје једине унутрашње снаге, остало је без становништва. Стотине хиљада житеља је напустило Косово. Прво су многи искористили рат и догодили се западних земаља као жртве и избеглице, а потом други отишли пре свега „трбухом за крухом“. Косово се интензивно празни.

Број становника, тачније Албанаца на Косову је константа у њиховим политичким и сепаратистичким манипулацијама. Нико никада није тачно знао колико их има а и данас се не зна тачан број. У основи сви су подаци непоуздани како некада тако и сада⁴¹.

После бомбардовања и западне окупације међународна управа, УНМИК, је 2000. године направила провизорни попис и установила да има око 800.000 људи. А онда, 2011. године је обављен званичан попис становништва који су радиле албанске власти и саопшtile да само Албанаца има 1,61 милион. Америчка Централна обавештајна агенција (ЦИА) тврди да сада на Косову живи 1,889.000 људи од којих су 1,800.000 етнички Албанци. Те ЦИА податке званично користе и УН.

И то није тачно. На Косову сада не живи више од 900.000 људи од којих је око 100.000 Срба и других националности⁴².

Срба на Косову, према приватним проценама, има око 90.000 и у већини су концентрисани у централном Косову и Поморављу. Упркос њиховом присиљавању да буду држављани Косова, што се, на жалост, дешава и уз подршку Београда, нису битније инкорпорирани у косовско друштво. Живе у, у основи, затвореним заједницама и тако су се организовали. Једино су се неки Срби инкорпорирали у косовско друштво и то у криминалу.

Поред броја становника један од митова је и рудно богатство Косова. Једино право богатство је угаљ и то за термоелектране. То је у правом смислу речи богатство.

У ствари, и даље не постоји реална слика о стању на Косову, нема истраживања с терена. Оно што се објављује је непоуздано и та истраживања махом финансира и наручује Запад како би прикрио стварност и оправдао учињене грешке. Постоје две реалности на Косову, ону коју конструише Запад, и коју следи и званична Србија и она друга о којој се не прича али она је једино стварна. На пример, практично не постоји образовни систем нити нормална здравствена заштита. Косово је преплављено приватним болницама у којима грађане за велике паре лече лекари из Србије, Хрватске и Словеније. Многи долазе и у Србију на лечење.

Да постоји било каква дугорочнија стратегија Србија би, поред лечења, требало да понуди и школовање младим Албанцима на својим универзитетима.

Привредна слика је слична. Само 2016. године дефицит спољнотрговински је износио 2,5 милијарде евра. Такође, стопа незапослености 2017. године је око 30 одсто а чак 51 одсто међу онима између 15 и 24 године. Трећина младих не похађа школу нити је обучена за било шта. Стално је запослено само 29 одсто људи а сви остали су од дана до дана⁴³.

Једина стварна привредна активност, уз трговину на коју монопол имају пријатељи

41 После Првог светског рата када је стварањем Албаније оживела амбиција за такозваном Великом Албанијом један од албанских лидера Хасан Приштина је говорио европским силама како има 8 милиона Албанаца.

42 Погледати рад Јована Кршића у овој књизи, стр.

43 Погледати рад Миленка Џелетовића и Бојана Димитријевића у овом Зборнику, стр. XX до УУ.

власти, је била изградња НАТО путне мреже. То је пре свега ауто-пут Драч-Призрен-Приштина-Подоујево који треба да буде настављен све до Ниша како би се НАТО друмска мрежа повезала од Јадрана до Црног мора. Али, и то је махом завршено.

Како сада ствари стоје мали су изгледи да ће се у унутрашњој ситуацији Косова нешто променити.

Међународне околности и развој односа у свету такође не иду на руку косовским Албанцима а ни Западу.

И Косово је као и Србија жртва Запада и његових нереалних процена геополитичке игре.

Запад и међународна заједница. Запад и Америка своју политику према Косову као и према Србији, упркос протоку времена и догађајима, нису променили али се променио укупан међународни амбијент.

Ако би се то уопште могло и назвати политиком. Када је реч о Западу све је још увек махом на нивоу специјалних операција и обавештајних служби. Тај ниво храни бриократе који се баве Балканом. И то не на проценама реалности и ономе што је могуће него се те специјалне службе пре свега баве властима, људима из власти, и психилошким профилима лидера па се онда на основу тога, реч је о уценама, постижу политички циљеви. Мање је ту реч о некој јасној визији, све је некако експеримент. И то експеримент без обзира на последице.

Најбоља илустрација је ко су све посредници у преговорима и „специјални представници“ за „преговоре о Косову“. Махом је реч о људима чија је биографија препуна слуганства и обављања прљавих послова а степен њихове ароганције и незнања зависи од инструкција „људи без лица“. У чему они понекад и неконтролисано претерују мада им у томе понекад промакне и искреност. Као што је недавно преговарачки посредник Мирослав Лајчак поручио да ако се не могу Косово и Србија договорити онда нека мењају уставе, јер „устав, каже, није Библија“. То је заиста био тренутак искрености, јер је то позиција ЕУ и Запада.

Да Лајчак није усамљен у искренности подсетио је и амбасадор Немачке у УН Хриштоф Хојзген који је устврдио да „наши српски пријатељи пуцају сами себи у ногу ако желе да се придруже ЕУ и треба да раде на признању Косова а и да сами признају Косово“⁴⁴. То је наравно став „пријатеља“ Немаца о коме и без седнице Савета безбедности стално говоре немачки амбасадори у Београду. Али, утисак је да се то стално заборавља.

Иако је западна политика према Косову и Србији и даље иста као и пре 20 година све је приметније да Косово све више постаје инструмент и геополитичког обрачуна међу самим западним земљама. Најсвежији пример је такозвани Вашингтонски споразум о „економској нормализацији“ који су (само) лидери Србије и Косова потписали у Белој кући. Више је него јасно да је формулација „економска нормализација“ само параван за покушај геополитичког продора Америка, а не ЕУ, у Србији и на Косову а који је део агресивне политике Вашингтона према Русији и Кини. Званична мантра Вашингтона је да се косовски проблем може брже решити кроз економску сарадњу. Као да она и до сада није постојала. Главни циљеви су финансијска инсталација америчких инвестиционих фондова који би требало да купе преостале државне гиганте у Србији и да финансирају изградњу нових термоелектрана на Косову. Те термоелектране су и једино што вреди инвестиција. И зато Американци инсистирају на језеру Газиводе, које је делом и на територији уже Србије. Без Газиводе нема ни термоелек-

44 Немачки амбасадор на видео седници Савета безбедности 21. октобра 2020.

трана које не могу без воде. И на тај начин, процењује се у Вашингтону, да се пре свега Србија отргне од сарадње с Русијом и Кином али и од Европске уније.

Нејасна је судбина тог Споразума, утолико пре што му недостаје било каква институционална инфраструктура, али очигледно Америци се жури иако је последњих година била доста неактивна. Вредило би подсетити да се Америци журило и 2008. године да се прогласи независност Косова и то баш уочи великог финансијског слома који је битно променио односе у свету. Сада се Вашингтону поново жури и то уочи новог економског колапса који ће бити увод у тектонске промене.

Тај споразум, међутим, нема јасно правно важење нити ауторитет под којим је направљен али не би требало сумњати да ће бити спроведен. Треба подсетити да НАТО коалиција ни после 78 дана бомбардовања није победила Србију, Србија није била поражена али су њени лидери после 2000. године прихватили америчку тврдњу да је Србија изгубила рат. Србија није изгубила рат али јесте касније политички капитулирала.

Папири из Вашингтона истовремено откривају шире циљеве па су тако у њему нашле место ставке које немају никакве везе с „економском нормализацијом“. Рецимо, проглашење Хицболоха као терористичке организације или пресељење амбасаде Србије из Тел Авива у Јерусалим, признање Косова од стране Израела и пркључење про-хомосексуалној глобалној коалицији.

Често се говори и о америчкој војној бази Бондстил, код Урошевца, на Косову. То, међутим, није више никаква база у значењу те речи, то је већ извесно време тајни амерички затвор. И вероватно једини преостали тајни затвор на свету у коме Американци смештају оне које широм света киднапују. Ко зна шта се ту ради. Има делова Бондстила где је локалној радној снази забрањен приступ али и представницима НАТО земаља. Занимљиво је да Американци за ту базу користе аеродром у Скопљу а не у Приштини.

Иако постоје дубоке разлике па чак и сукоби унутар Запада поводом Косова западна политика је ипак иста. Главни циљ је сломити Србију, тачније сломити лидере Србије да они испуне све захтеве о независности Косова, јер сам Запад једноставно није у стању да реализује политичке амбиције стварања независног Косова. Најновија искуства, као што је Споразум из Вашингтона, учвршћују Запад у уверењу да је тако нешто могуће.

Узалудна је и бесмислена нада Србије да ће уразумити Запад и да ће они да схвате своју грешку. Узалуд. Ту нема разговора и то Србија мора да схвати. Треба такође знати да не постоји захтев, услов који би Србија испунила а да би Запад променио политику.

Али, Запад није више једина „међународна заједница“ и није више једини на Балкану. Свет се променио што је отворило простор и за друге, пре свега Русију и Кину. Њихово све приметније присуство за Америку и Запад постаје озбиљан проблем утолико пре што западни блок све интензивније креће у отворене и агресивне економске и политичке сукобе с Москвом и Пекингом.

Србија и Косово у тој новој реалности постају инструменти те западне агресије што изнад свега за Србију поставља нове изазове на које, да би се сачувала као држава, мора да пронађе одговоре.

Како даље? Свима је у ствари на Косову и око Косова све јасно, изузев можда јавности, оних којих се то највише и тиче, али је кључно питање – шта даље, шта ће да буде.

Наравно, увек је тешко предвиђати али, ипак, у политици постоје неке константе реалности које би могле помоћи ако не у предвиђању а оно у проценама. Одлуку о евентуалном решењу косовске кризе ће пре свега доносити Америка, чији је Косово пројект, уз хорску

подршку америчких савезника у Европи, и Србија око које се, у основи, цели проблем и врти. Косовски Албанци, треба признати, неће имати одлучујућу реч, јер су они само извршиоци својих заштитника, Американаца.

Позиције су, изгледа, јасне. Запад не одустаје од косовске независности и од Србије не жели да прихвати ништа мање од признања независног Косова. За узврат, обећава да ће и такво Косово признати Србију као суседну државу. Уз то, наметнут је услов да без тога Србија неће моћи да постане чланица ЕУ што је, наводно, њен стратешки циљ. Али, само да неће моћи а нема гаранција да ће и да постане чланица. Једино што изгледа може да се гарантује је да ће независно Косово признати независну Србију.

То је позиција Запада. Другим речима, да Србија одрицањем дела своје државне територије практично легализује силеџијство, бомбардовање 1999, и све оно зло које је после тога уследило. И то Запад зове „konačним решењем“ за Косово и Србију а звало би се „правно обавезујући споразум“.

А шта је позиција Србије? Током вишегодишњих преговора Србија се држала става да је Косово и даље покрајина у Србији, што гарантује и Резолуција 1244 која је правно обавезна за све земље, и да је спремна на изузетно висок степен аутономије. У међувремену се од тог става постепено одустајало па је 2013. потписан Бриселски споразум који је отворио врата независном Косову. Корак по корак Србија је пристајала на велике уступке, од давања међународног телефонског броја до пребацивања преносне енергетске мреже у енергетски систем Албаније. И још много тога а све под формулом тражења „компромиса“. Сваким даном актуелна политичка Србија јавно показује да Косово већ третира као другу, независну државу.

Јавности се истовремено нуди махом политичка пропаганда и да нема изјава лидера косовских Албанаца готово да не би ни знала шта се стварно догађа. Све је око Косова постало приватни посао. За домаћу јавност је једна прича а са странцима иза затворених врата се говори нешто друго.

Председник Србије Александар Вучић каже да се „плаши да нема решења за Косово“⁴⁵ а онда потписује све што се од њега тражи. Ту контраверзу у исто време оправдава, јер смо „сувише мали да би могли увек да говоримо све што мислимо и знамо“⁴⁶. Он такође каже да „замрзнути конфликт није решење“.

Али, председник Србије у новије време све чешће говори како Србија не може да призна Косово а да не добије ништа за то. Мада признаје да би то била „увреда за историју и све наше погинуле који су бранили Косово и Србију“⁴⁷. Вучић такође каже да нам ЕУ за признање Косова нуди чланство у ЕУ али он сматра да то није довољно. Потребно је много више.⁴⁸

Другим речима, Србија је спремна да призна Косово само је питање цене. Али, ко је тај који ће одредити цену и с којим овлашћењем.

Ту се потискује једна друга чињеница. Тачно је да је Србија мала, мада ипак највећа земља у њеном региону. Мали немају снагу али имају достојанство. Једино што је малим и сиромашним земљама преостало, једино што имају је достојанство.

У каквој је стварној позицији актуелна Србија? Највећи проблем актуелне Србије су дугови. Србија је земља која бесомучно подиже нове кредите и задужује се путем продаје др-

45 Изјава телевизији Б92, 13. јуна 2020.

46 *Истио*.

47 *Истио*.

48 Интервју листу *Вечерње новости*, 18. јуна 2020.

жавних обавеза како би платила обавезе према ранијим кредитима и одржавала државне трошкове. То се зове „дужничко ропство“ и то је кључни проблем који се прелама на њену позицију према Косову. Индиректно је то и признао председник Србије сугеришући да је Србија спремна на све само је питање цене. То је реалност која се прикрива не само обманама о преговорима о Косову него и свакодневним изјавама о економским успесима.

Најдиректнији симбол тог положаја Србије је Вашингтонски споразум од 4. септембра 2020. године. Србија је тај споразум потписала у истом рангу као и Косово. У преводу, Србија третира Косово као другу државу. Али, у том споразуму има и ставка да америчка Корпорација за финансирање међународног развоја (DFC), која делује под ауторитетом америчке владе, а у стварности је приватна компанија приватних инвестиционих фондова, отвара стално представништво у Београду. Званична верзија је да је економска сарадња најефикаснији пут до косовског решења. То је као и цели споразум велика обмана. Шта је циљ? Србија намерава да прода највредније што јој је преостало, Телеком, мобилну телефонију МТС и највећи део Електропривреде. Србији су потребне паре а продаја стратешких капацитета ће бити представљена као инвестиције. И купци су већ познати, амерички инвестициони фондови који ће те стратешке компаније после продати неком другом а Србија неће имати на то утицаја. Да би, међутим, Србија продала своју имовину мора и да плати. Апсурд. Препуштено је језеро Газиводе на управу Американцима, јер њихови приватни фондови неће да инвестирају у термоелектране на Косову ако не контролишу и воду без које не могу да раде. Уз то, језеро Газиводе снабдева и акумулацију Бадовац из које се готово цело Косово снабдева пијаћом водом. Косово је у Вашингтонском споразуму само изговор за тумарање Србије у тражењу новца. Актуелна Србија је уцењена дуговима и очајем да пронађе новац.

И онда, да ли има решења за Косово?

Већина хроничара који не припадају властима указују да су могућа два сценарија. Један је да Косово заиста постане независно, а други да у некој форми остане део Србије.

У светлу шире реалности, међутим, за Косово постоје заиста два решења али то нису та о којима говоре хроничари. Суштински, Косово може да буде или део Србије или део Албаније. Косово нема елементарних капацитета да буде држава и може да функционише само ако је део неке веће целине. То је једноставно чињеница. Не постоји треће решење. Све друго су обмане и губљење времена.

Да ли су таква решења реална? У овом времену нису мада је на дужи рок остатак у Србији у било којој форми реалније.

У ствари, генерално још увек није реално очекивати решење косовске кризе. Можда ће се неки договор, на основу захтева Америке и Запада, ускоро и постићи и јавности продати као „коначно решење“ али то неће бити решење. На Западу влада уверење да актуелне власти у Србији могу да прихвате све што се од њих тражи али ништа од тога није решење. Само извориште нове и даље кризе.

Како је рекао један косовски Албанац у разговору с овим аутором: он каже да се не може постићи никакав договор. Зашто? Зато што и Београд и Приштина имају истог газду. А тај газда не жели решење које је реално и одрживо.

Изаз из косовске кризе отежава, међутим, изнад свега основна чињеница – Косово је део велике геополитичке игре која још траје, није завршена. И зато не може ни да буде решења за Косово. У овој фази она се базира на хибридном рату Америке и Запада против Русије и Кине. И то, изасланик америчког председника Доналда Трампа Ричард Гренел и не крије. Он

јавно поручује да ће Вашингтонски споразум удаљити Србију од Русије и Кине и везати за Америку.

У Вашингтонском споразуму, као део те геополитичке игре, има и скривена промена америчког става према природи Косова. Косово Америка третира као муслиманску земљу која припада муслиманском свету што би могло да промени косовски статус у Европи и на Балкану. Касније је председник Трамп и јавно рекао да Косово треба да се удружи с муслиманским земљама Блиског истока. Циљ је, међутим, стварање што шире, макар и с Косовом, анти-иранске муслиманске коалиције. То истовремено сведочи и о елементарном незнању – Исламска конференција која окупља све муслиманске земље света упорно већ годинама одбија да призна независност Косова иако на томе сваке године инсистира Турска.

Исход те укупне геополитичке игре је ипак неизвестан. Међународни амбијент се мења и то сада убрзано и западна нада је актуелна Србија за коју се процењује да је опредељена за Запад. Та процена је можда и тачна али односи Србије са, рецимо, Кином и Русијом нису баш тако једноставни. Србија је стратешки везана за Русију и од ње зависи у блокирању разних антисрпских иницијатива у међународним организацијама, а Кина је највећи појединачни инвеститор у Србији. Тако да је ипак све неизвесно.

Али, Запад од својих познатих ставова неће да одустане. У тој реалности шта би онда Србија требало да учини?

За Србију је најважније да ништа не потписује. Али, ништа. И не треба да се обазире на поруке америчких и европских пропагандиста да је Косово „завршена ствар“ и да Србија мора да прихвати ту реалност. Не, Косово није завршена ствар и зато Србија не сме ништа да потписује. Упркос томе што је већ прошло много времена не треба журити. Али истовремено мора Србија да има јасне ставове о којима ће бити упозната јавност и са снагом јавности да наступа. И да има на уму и искуства других земаља. На пример, Француска је чекала 50 година да би повратила Алзас-Лорен.

А Косово ће још дуго бити протекторат коришћен за геополитичке игре, за дестабилизацију Србије и региона. То изгледа као једина извесност.

KOSOVO AND METOHIA ISSUE

Draft Proposal for the Multidisciplinary Research Project

ČASLAV OČIĆ

WORDS, WORDS, WORDS

Kosmet or Kosova? Kos and Kosovo, metoh and Metohia. Other toponyms. Anthroponyms. Names and (territorial) claims.

THE LAND

Location: border region. Area: comparatively small, but „dense”. Natural Resources. Geoeconomics. Geopolitical importance. Perception of the space: geopiety. (Sub)regional boundaries: spatial organization.

THE PEOPLE

Number. Dynamics: demographic explosion and its consequences. Density. Age. Sex. Other structures: occupational, ethnic, linguistic, confessional, educational, urban, rural, health, literacy... Migrations. Comparative view. Population policies: problems of demographic transition. Census boycott: politicization of statistics.

THE PAST

The Age of Ascent. The Age of Tribulation. The Age of Migrations. The Age of Oppression. The Age of Restoration. The Age of Communism. Archaism: Past in the Present and Future. Legacies of the Past: Negative and Positive. Pre-modernity, Modernity and Post-modernity: cummulation of the problems. Undigested History.

THE PRESENT TIME CONTEXT

World: globalization. Western Europe: integration. Central and Eastern Europe: (post-communist) transition. Yugoslavia: breakup/disintegration of the state and country, war ... Serbia: sealed from the outside (UN and US economic sanctions) and from the inside (avoidance of reform).

SOCIAL SPACE AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

Ethnicization of social relationships. Social space: sociofugal and sociopetal. Dualism and social density. Social stratification. Social mobility. Polarization. Dominance pattern. In-group exclusivity. In-group non-transparency: walls – real and symbolic. Command system and group cohesiveness. Compliance. Discipline: subsocial control. Ostracism. Shame. Hypocrisy. Mimicry. Detribalization process. Sociopathy: criminalization (ethnic Mafia). Social inhibition. Tensions. Neighbour images: stereotypes and (reflected) self-stereotypes.

ECONOMIC (UNDER)DEVELOPMENT

Level and structure of Region's development. Regional disparities. Interregional economic flows. Regional policy: goals and methods, costs and results, goals and achievement. Efficiency problem. Failure of the Positive Discrimination („Affirmative Action") Model. Autarky and autarchy. Privileges of the nomenklatura. Redistribution and parasitism. Psychic income: investing in ethnicity. Separatism: economic and political. Unemployment. Poverty. Conspicuous consumption. Black market. „Black" (parallel) state: double taxation. Carrying capacity: economic emigration.

CULTURAL LANDSCAPE

Multiculturalism. Cultural boundaries and cultural ambivalence. Elements of contradiction: cross-cultural influences. Territorial subculture. Tradition and modernity. Universalism–particularism. Work culture. Symbols. Taboos.

RELIGION

Religiosity. Clericalism. Christianity and Islam – interconfessional relations. Religion and politics LANGUAGE Languages characteristics. Mutual linguistic influences. Dositej Obradovic' s attempt to reform the Albanian alphabet. Toponymastics. Diglossia. Polyglotism. Ethnic slurs: ethnophaulism. Language and politics: glottopolitics.

EDUCATION

Age structure of the population and education. Elementary schools. Secondary schools. University. Departments and faculty staff. The number and structure of students. Politicization of the University. Diploma Disease.

IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS

Politicization. Polarization: ethnic political parties and organizations. Political power structure. Nepotism, clientism, bribery, corruption, parasitism of the pseudoelite. Public opinion. Legacy of communism. (High) level of ethnic political aspiration. Euphoria and hostility. Disappointment and frustrations. Political emigre activity. Organized crime and politics. Autonomy. Secessionism.

GEOPOLITICS

Ethno-contact zone. The Balkans geopolitical knot. Multiethnic equilibrium in Kosovo and Metohia and the stability of the Region.

LAW

Un/written Law: decisions of zoti te shtepise (pater familias), kuvendas, kanuns (The Canon of Leke Dukagjini), pleqnias. Besa: the pledged word. Dorzonias. Adjudication. Retaliation: vendetta. Dushan's Code. Immigrants from Albania: citizenship problem. Ownership: problems of privatization. Law and politics: minority rights, human rights or the right to secession.

FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD

Group absolutism, group identification and group solidarity (viscosity). Extended family, clan, phratry and tribe. Sororate. Levirate. Pro-natalist behaviour. Familialism. Androcracy. Patriarchy.

MULTIETHNICITY

Source of conflicts and the element of disintegration of the state and society. Factor of cooperation. Precondition for creative cross-cultural enrichment process. Ethnocentrism and social integration, Interethnic communication.

IDENTITY

Individual and collective identity. Strong, almost exclusively, ethnic identification. The Kosovo pledge – The cornerstone of Serb identity. Inventing tradition. Illyrianism: the problems of interpretation. Limes. Identification with the agresor: The Jannisaries phenomenon. Overall crisis and the identity problem. Identity crisis in post-Titoist Yugoslavia.

PARALLELISM

(Self)isolation. Inward projection: endo-conviviality. Avoidance of contacts. Copresence. Silent trade. Working together in silence. Co-action tendencies – convergence or divergence? Who is right in the case of the Kosovo parallels – Euclid or Lobachevski?

CONFLICT

Conflict of interests. Conflict of values. Conflict of identities. Credibility crisis. Ethnic aversion: biases and prejudices. Antagonisms. Ethnoexpansionism. Forced Albanization and Islamization. Ethnic cleansing. Assimilation. Ostracism (blacklists of the „collaborateurs”). Terrorism. Repression. Mass manipulation. Role of the media. Propaganda and lobbying. A/polemity: from armistice to war?

COOPERATION

General politicization of ethnicity as a hindrance to communication. Cooperation at work. Trade. Business (particularly underground economy). Cooperation in criminal activity.

VOJVODINA AND KOSOVO-METOHIA: A COMPARISON INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF KOSOVO AND METOHIA

In the ex-Yugoslavia. By the Great Power(s) (International Community) and by neighbours.

„FUTURE STATUS”

Substantial autonomy. Global interdependence and provincial independence. (Un)conditional independence – Domino effect: Western Macedonia, Eastern Montenegro, Republika Srpska, Republic of Serbian Krayina, Istria, Transylvania,

Catalonia, Bask Countries, Corsica, South Tyrol, Ireland, Transdnyestria, Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhasia, Chechnya, Northern Cyprus, Kurdistan, Tibet, Taiwan, Xingkyang, Tamil Elam (Sri Lanka), Kashmir, Southern Thailand...

PROSPECTS

The Balance of fear and/or dialogue. From struggle to co-existence. Divided responsibility.

KOSOVO – BETWEEN LEGEND AND REALPOLITIK

ПРИЛОЗИ / ANNEXES

† Миодраг Скулић
ДРУШТВЕНА ПРЕДУЗЕЋА НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ 1990. ГОДИНЕ
◆
SOCIALLY OWNED ENTERPRISES IN KOSOVO AND METONIA, 1990
† Miodrag Skulić

Сандра Давидовић
КАКО ЈЕ НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ
УЗУРПИРАНА СРПСКА ИМОВИНА
◆
HOW SERBIAN PROPERTY IN KOSOVO AND METONIA WAS USURPED
Sandra Davidović

Душан Челић
РЕТРОСПЕКТИВА НАСИЉА НАД СРПСКОМ СВОЈИНОМ НА КОСОВУ
И МЕТОХИЈИ НАКОН 10. ЈУНА 1999. ГОДИНЕ
◆
VIOLATING SERBIAN PRIVATE AND STATE PROPERTY IN KOSOVO AND
METONIJA AFTER 10 JUNE 1999
Dušan Čelić

Велибор Џомић
МОДЕЛИ ПРАВНЕ ЗАШТИТЕ ЕПАРХИЈЕ РАШКО-ПРИЗРЕНСКЕ
СПЦ НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ
◆
MODELS FOR THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE DIOCESE OF RAŠKA-
PRIZREN OF THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN KOSOVO AND
METONIA
Velibor Džomić

ДРУШТВЕНА ПРЕДУЗЕЋА НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ
1990. ГОДИНЕ

† МИОДРАГ СКУЛИЋ

**

SOCIALLY OWNED ENTERPRISES IN
KOSOVO AND METOHIA, 1990

† MIODRAG SKULIĆ

У друштвеном сектору привреде Аутономне Покрајине Косова и Метохије (АП КиМ) 1990. године било је укупно 406 привредних субјеката.

Међу њима осам сложених организација удруженог рада (СОУР):

1. СОУР Агрокосово, Косово Поље – у пољопривреди;
2. СОУР Електропривреда Косова, Приштина – у електропривреди;
3. СОУР РМКХ Трепча, Кос. Митровица – у рударству, металургији и хемији;
4. СОУР Инвестметали, Приштина – у металопрерађивачој индустрији;
5. СОУР Косоводрво, Приштина – у дрвној индустрији и шумарству;
6. СОУР Рамиз Садику, Приштина – у грађевинарству;
7. СОУР Трговина Косова, Приштина – у трговини, и
8. СОУР Водопривреда Косова, Приштина – у водопривреди.

• У тих осам СОУР-а био је 171 привредни субјект, 70 РО без ООУР-а, 19 РО са 74 ООУР-а.

- Привредних субјеката ван СОУР-а било је, 186, од чега 102 РО без ООУР-а, 21 РО са 62 ООУР-а и једном пољопривредном станицом.

• Било је 27 привредних субјеката чији су оснивачи из централне Србије и АП Војводине, од чега шест РО, три РО са 14 ООУР-а и 4 погона.

• Било је 7 привредних субјеката чији су оснивачи из других република (Хрватске, Словеније и БиХ), од чега једна РО, једна РО и пет ООУР-а.

• Било је 15 привредних субјеката у задругарству, од чега 4 задруге, 2 задруге с ООУР-а и ООК-а, које имају четири ООУР-а и 5 ООКОС.

Да рекапитулирамо: организациона структура 406 привредних субјеката друштвеног сектора у КиМ 1990. изгледала је овако:

- 8 СОУР-а,
- 172 РО без ООУР-а,
- 40 РО са ООУР-има,
- 136 ООУР-а,
- 1 пољопривредном станицом,
- 27 привредних субјеката чији су оснивачи из Србије и Војводине,
- 7 привредних субјеката чији су оснивачи из Хрватске, Словеније и БИХ,
- 4 задруге без ООУР/ООК,
- 2 задруге с ООУР/ООК,\
- 4 ООУР-а у оквиру задруга,
- 5 ООК-а у оквиру задруга.

*

ПО СЕКТОРИМА

ПОЉОПРИВРЕДА И ПРЕХРАМБЕНА ИНДУСТРИЈА

СОУР Агроекосово је имао 48 правних субјеката, од чега: 16 РО, 5 РО са 17 ООУР-а и 2 ООК, две З.З. и једну З.З. са два ООУР-а и три ООК.

- РО ПИК Косово-Експорт, Косово Поље, са седам ООУР-а:
Пољопривреда, Ратарство, Сточарство, Свињогојска фарма,
Фабрика сточне хране, Индустрија меса са Хладњачом и ООУР Коопераната
- РО ПИК Душан Мугоша – Дућ, Пећ
- РО ПИК Прогрес-Експорт, Призрен, с три ООУР-а:
Индустрија конзервираног воћа, поврћа, меса и сухомеснатих производа,
Кооперација и
Ремонтни сервис
- РО Ервенику, Ђаковица
- РО ПИК Милан Зечар, Урошевац
- РО ПК Младост, Ђилане
- РО Житопромет, Ђилане, с ООУР Индустрија брашна и хлеба, Ђилане
- РО Дубрава, Исток, с три ООУР-а:
Пољопривреда, Сточарство и ООУР Кооперација „Будућност”, сви из
Истока и два ООК: Врело и Ракош
- РО Дреница, Глоговац
- ПИРО Ораховац, Ораховац, с три ООУР-а:
Винарство,
Виноградарство и
Кооперација
- РО Продукт, Србица

- РО ПИО Сува Река, Сува Река
- РО Шарпроизвод, Драгаш
- РО Агроморава, Витина
- ПИРО Врело, Врело, Исток
- ЗЗ Вучитрн, Вучитрн
- ЗЗ Слога, Подујево
- ЗЗ Косово, Липљан, с два ООУР-а:
Ратарство и
Живинарство и три ООК:
Липљан,
Доња Гуштерица и
Бујку-Магура
- РО Житопромет, Приштина, с ООУР-ом:
Индустрија брашна и хлеба, Кос. Митровица
- РО Агроекосова-commerce, Приштина
- РО Институт за економију и развој, Косово Поље
- РО Уникоспројект, Приштина
- РО Кијево, Кијево
- ПРО Мируша, Малишево
- РОК Коперими, Сува Река

ЕЛЕКТРОПРИВРЕДА

СОУР Електропривреда Косова, Приштина с 5 РО без ООУР-а и 3 РО с 13 ООУР-а:

- РО Термоелектрана Косово Обилић А и Б
- РО Електро Косово, са девет ООУР-а:
ООУР Електропренос Приштина
ООУР Дистрибуција Приштина
ООУР Дистрибуција Призрен
ООУР Дистрибуција Пећ
ООУР Дистрибуција Кос. Митровица
ООУР Дистрибуција Урошевац
ООУР Дистрибуција Ђаковица
ООУР Дистрибуција Ђилане
ООУР Изградња и ремонт Приштина
- Радна заједница (РЗ) Приштина
- РО за производњу и транспорт Косово, Обилић
ООУР Сепарација с депонијом Обилић

- ООУР Сушара Обилић
- ООУР Гасификација (производња карбогаса)
- ООУР Топлана Обилић
- ООУР Азотара Обилић
- с ООУР-ом Површински откуп Косово, Добро Село
- РО Косовомонт, Приштина-Добро Село, с три ООУР-а:
 - ООУР Монтажа Косово Приштина
 - ООУР Електроремонт Косово, Приштина
 - ООУР Централни ремонт Косово Приштине
- РО Рудник боксита Косово, Волујак - Клина
- РО Електрокосово, Приштина – ООУР за дистрибуцију и производњу,

Пећ

РУДАРСТВО, МЕТАЛУРГИЈА И ХЕМИЈА

СОУР РМХК Трепча, Кос. Митровица с 23 РО и једна РО са шест ООУР-а:

- РО Рудник и флотација Стари Трг
 - ООУР Флотација Звечан
- РО Рудници и флотација Кишница
 - ООУР Флотација Кишница
- РО Рудници и флотација Ајвалија
- РО Рудници и флотација Копаоник, Лепосавић
 - ООУР Флотација, Лепосавић
 - ООУР Рудник олова и цинка Бело Брдо
- РО Рудници и флотација Ново Брдо
- РО у области металургије и хемије, Кос. Митровица
- РО Металургија олова, Кос. Митровица
- РО Металургија цинка, Кос. Митровица
 - ООУР Топионица олова, Звечан
 - ООУР Рафинерија олова, Звечан
- РО Хемијска индустрија, Кос. Митровица (производња вештачког

ђубрива)

РО у области прераде:

- РО Индустрија акумулатора, Кос. Митровица
- ООУР Фабрика гуме, пластике и сепаратора, Кос. Митровица
- РО РО Фабрика индустријских батерија, Пећ
- РО Фабрика никл-кадмијум батерија, Њилане
- РО за производњу поцинкованих трака и лимова, Вучитрн
- РО за производњу ловачке муниције и прераду пластике, Србица

- РО Металику, метална индустрија, Призрен, са шест ООУР-а:
 - Фабрика жице и корда,
 - Фабрика челичних цеви,
 - Фабрика поцинкованог и емајлираног посуђа,
 - Фондерија и
 - Енергетика, сви из Ђаковице и
 - Фабрика арматурне мреже, Дечани
- РО Фабрика процесне опреме, Кос. Митровица
 - ООУР Израда опреме, Кос. Митровица
 - ООУР Електромашинска монтажа, Кос. Митровица
- РО Фамипа, производња накита од сребра и злата, Призрен
- РО Услугне делатности, Кос. Митровица
- РО Транспорттранс, Кос. Митровица
- РО Енергетика, Кос. Митровица
- РО Лабораторија, Кос. Митровица
- РО Друштвени стандард, Кос. Митровица
- РО Трепча-комерц, Кос. Митровица
- РО Електрораџунски центар, Кос. Митровица
- РО Обезбеђење имовине, Кос. Митровица
- ЕО Фабрика боја и лакова Вучитрн

МЕТАЛОПРЕРАЂИВАЧКА ИНДУСТРИЈА

СОУР Инвестметали, Приштина (с 8 РО без ООУР-а)

- РО Фабрика амортизера, Приштина
 - ООУР Алатница и одржавање, Приштина
- РО Металац, индустрија металних окова, Јањево
- РО Фабрика процесне опреме и машиноградње Металац, Призрен
- РО Југотерм, фабрика радијатора и клима уређаја Њилане
- РО Винекс, фабрика за производњу вијчане робе Витина
- РО Пластика, Приштина
- РО Косовосировина, Кос. Митровица
- РО Имкос, Кос. Каменица

ДРВНОПРЕРАЂИВАЧКА ИНДУСТРИЈА

СОУР Косоводрво, шумарство, индустрија, промет, Приштина са 7 РО и 3 РО са 8 ООУР-а:

- РО Дрвни комбинат Тефик Чанга, Урошевац
ООУР Примарна прерада, Урошевац
ООУР Фабрика намештаја Урошевац
ООУР Фабрика столица Урошевац
ООУР Фабрика столица Урошевац
- РО Дрвни комбинат, Пећ с два ООУР-а
ООУР Фабрика намештаја Пећ
ООУР Пилана Пећ
- РО Напредак, индустрија намештаја, Приштина,
ООУР Фабрика намештаја, Приштина
ООУР Фабрика намештаја Напредак, Подујево
ООУР Тапетарија, Приштина
ООУР Продими, Ђаковица
- РО Храст, индустрија и трговина, Лепосавић
- РО Мокра Гора, Кос. Митровица
- РО Радуша, Исток
ООУР Дрвна индустрија Исток
- РО Ђеравица, Дечани
- РО Дубравица, шумарство, инд. трговина, Дечани
с пет ООУР-а: Шумарство, Пилана и паркетара,
Фабрика масивног намештаја, Фабрика таролита и Ђеравица-комерц.
- РО Косоводрво комерц, Приштина
- РО Шар, Приштина, ООУР Шумско газдинство, Вучитрн

ГРАЂЕВИНАРСТВО

- СОУР Рамиз Садику, Приштина:
ООУР Производња металних конструкција Кос. Митровица
РО Косово, индустрија грађевинског материјала Приштина
РО Грађевинска оператива
РО Транспорт и механизација

ТРГОВИНА

- Трговинске организације удружене у СОУР Трговина Косова, Приштина с
10 РО и 4 РО с 10 ООУР-а:
• РО Грмија, Приштина
с ООУР-ом Лаб, Подујево

- РО Лирија, Призрен
са четири ООУР-а:
Малопродаја-Призрен,
Малопродаја-Драгаш,
Малопродаја-Средска и
Великопрода-Призрен
- РО ЛУКС, Кос. Митровица
с ООУР-ом Универзал, Лепосавић
- РО Агрометохија, Пећ
- РО Агими, Ђаковица,
са четири ООУР-а:
Месо
Робна кућа
Трговина на мало и
Трговина на велико, сви из Ђаковице
- РО 16. новембар, Ђилане
- РО Поморавље, Ђилане
- РО 17. новембар, Урошевац
- РО Ситница, Липљан
- РО 25 мај, Сува Река
- РО Шар, Качаник
- РО Механизација, Приштина
- РО Воћар, Кос. Митровица
- РО Дуван, Приштина

ВОДОПРИВРЕДА

- СОУР Вопривредна организација Косова с једном РО и две РО са 4 ООУР-а:
• РО Хидросистем Ибар-Лепенац, водопривредна РО, Приштина
• РО Метохија, Призрен
с ООУР Дукађини, Призрен
• РО Ндертими, Призрен
с три ООУР-а:
Исток, водопривреда, Ђураковац,
Косово-хидротехника, Приштина и
Бистрица, Дечани

*

РО И ООУР ИЗ ЦЕНТРАЛНЕ СРБИЈЕ, ВОЈВОДИНЕ
И БИВШИХ РЕПУБЛИКА СФРЈ

Из централне Србије и Војводине

27 привредних субјеката од чега: 9 РО имају 14 ООУР-а и 4 погона, док из Хрватске, Словеније и БИХ 7 субјеката и то: 1 РО, 1 РО с једним ООУР- и 4 ООУР-а:

- СОУР ЕИ Ниш
РО ЕИ-Фабрика елетромотора, Ђаковица
РО Фабрика полиестера Фапол, Подујево и
РО ЕИ-Електрометална индустрија, Урошевац
ООУР Фабрика пегли, Урошевац
ООУР Фабрика алата Урошевац
- СОУР Југодуван, Ниш – РО Борис Кидрич, дувански комбинат Ђилане с три ООУР-а:
Баир – Кос. Митровица,
Призрен и
Ђилане
- СОУР Гоша Смедеревска Паланка
РО Металац, рударска опрема и грађевинске. конструкције, Ђилан
- СОУР Магнохром, Краљево –
РО Дева, рудник хрома, Ђаковица и
РО Стрезовица, индустрија и рудници магнезита с два ООУР-а
Рудник магнезита Стрезовица и
ООУР Фабрика синтермагнезита Бориво
- СОУР Минел, Београд – РО Минел-Ливница, Ђаковица
- СОУР Утва, Панчево
РО Конструкције, Панчево,
ООУР Борис Кидрич, фабрика металних конструкција, Пећ
- СОУР Црвена застава, Крагујевац
РО Рамиз Садик, израда ауто делова, Пећ
- СОУР Југословенска индустрија равног стакла, Панчево
РО Стаклопан, Београд
ООУР Стакло, Приштина
- РО Иво Лола Рибар, Железник – Погон Фабрика алата и делова, Зубин Поток
РО Јавор, Ивањица – Погон за производњу спортске одеће, Борјак – Зубин Поток

- РО Компресор, Београд – ООУР Компресор, ауто-кућа, Ђаковица
 - РО Рекорд, Београд
РО Рекорд, производња гумено-техничке робе, Ђаковица
ООУР Трговина аутоделовима на велико и мало, Ђаковица
 - РО Јастребац Ниш, ООУР Фабрика клипних пумпи Дечане
 - РО Изолација, Београд – ООУР Приштина
 - РО Југоинспект, Београд – ООУР Југоинспект, Приштина
 - РО Комунист, Београд – ООУР Комунист, Приштина
 - РО Нискоградња, Врање – ООУР Градња, Приштина
 - Путник, Београд – ООУР Путник Косово, Приштина
- Погони:
Погон за производњу столица у Угљарима, Зубин Поток
Погон Наде Томић, за прераду длаке и производњу четака, Зубин Поток

Привредни субјекти из других република

- СОУР ИНА, Загреб
РО ИНА-Трговина Загреб
ООУР Нафтни деривати, Приштина и
ООУР Косовопласт, Ђенерал Јанковић
- СОУР Енергоинвест, Сарајево –
РО Електромонтажа Блажуј
ООУР Енергомонтими, Приштина
РО Фабрика електроприбора и постројења, Приштина
- СОУР Словин, Љубљана – РО ИБИ, Љубљана,
ООУР Липљан-пунионица кока коле
- СОУР РМК Зеница – РО Метално Зеница,
ООУР Творница грађевинске арматуре, Подујево
- СОУР Ђуро Ђаковић, Славонски Брод – РО Фабрика измењивача топлоте,
Урошевац
ПЈ производња хемијских производа, Липљан
- 19 новембар
ООУР Фабрика металне столарије Сува Река

ОСТАЛЕ РАДНЕ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЈЕ НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ

Рудници (једна РО):

- РО Мухарем Бабуш, рудник лигнита, Липљан
- РО Косово, ООУР Рудник боксита Волујак, Клина

- РО Рудник хрома Дева, Ђаковица
- РО Рудник и индустрија магnezита ООУР Инкос, Кос. Каменица
- РО Рудник магnezита Голеш
ООУР Јама са сепарацијом Голеш
ООУР Прерада Магура
- РО Качарево, рудник каолина
ООУР Индустрија керамике
- Фабрика за прераду минералне воде Клокот

Пољопривреде, водопривреда и прехранбене индустрија (4 РО и једна РО с два ООУР-а):

- РО ПИК Карачево, ООУР Угоститељство Минерали, Кос. Каменица
- РО Рибарско газдинство Приштина,
- РО Рибарско газдинство Приштина, РЈ Мотел Рибњак, Исток
- РО Ерозија, заштита земљишта од ерозије и уређење бујица, Пећ
- РО Бели Дрим, водопривредна организација, Пећ, с два ООУР-а:
Нискоградња и
Наводњавање
- Дуванска индустрија:
ООУР Вирџинија, Ђаковица
ООУР за откуп и обраду дувана, Призрен

РАЗНЕ ИНДУСТРИЈЕ

(са 14 РО и 6 РО с 21 ООУР-ом):

- РО Дувански комбинат Борис Кидрич, Ђилане
Откуп и обрада дувана, Ђилане
- РО Косовка, текстилна индустрија, Приштина
с ООУР-ом Производња памучног предива, Приштина
- РО Дрита, за израду декоративног и конфекцијског материјала, Приштина
- РО Металунис, радионица за израду свих врста бургија и алата, Пећ
- РО Комбинат Пећ, кожа, обућа, крзно и конфекција, Пећ

ООУР Фабрика крупне и ситне коже, Пећ
ООУР Фабрика крзна, Пећ
- РО Принтекс, призренска текстилна индустрија, Призрен
ООУР Предионица, Призрен
ООУР Метража, Призрен

- ООУР Конфекција, Призрен
- РО Комуна, индустрија обуће, Призрен
ООУР Фабрика обуће, Призрен
ООУР Кожна конфекција
- РО Слога, конфекција и ХТЗ опрема, Кос. Митровица
- РО Прогрес, индустрија филамената, Призрен
ООУР Производња синтетичког предива, Призрен
ООУР Производња предива, Призрен
ООУР Дорада филамената, Исток
- РО Фармакос, фабрика фармацеутских и хемијских производа, Призрен
- РО Филигран, израда накита од сребра и злата, Призрен
- РО Југотерм, фабрика радијатора и клима уређаја, Ђилане
- РО Емин Дураку, Ђаковица, са шест ООУР-а:
ООУР Предионица, Ђаковица
ООУР Ткачница, Ђаковица
ООУР Дорада, Драгаш
ООУР Конфекција, Ђаковица
ООУР Трикотажа, Ђаковица
ООУР Трговина-Напредак, Ђаковице
- РО Текстилни комбинат ИНТЕГЈ, Ђилане, са четири ООУР-а:
ООУР Гивал, Ђилане
ООУР Тафтисан, Ђилане
ООУР Трикотекс, Ђилане
ООУР Хегејкомерц, сви из Ђилана
- РО Косовска метална индустрија за производњу шавних цеви, Урошевац
- РО Балкан, гумарско-хемијска индустрија, Сува Река, с пет ООУР-а:
ООУР Припремање материјала, Сува Река
ООУР Балбо, Сува Река
Фабрика тканина, Сува Река
ООУР Клинасто ремење, Сува Река
ООУР Транспортне траке, Сува Река
ООУР Балкан-комерц, Сува Река
ООУР Енергетика и радионица, Сува Река
ООУР у изградњи, Сува Река
- РО Карачево, рудници и индустрија керамике, Кос. Каменица, с два ООУР-а:
ООУР Пољопривредна производња и
ООУР Трговина на мало и три ООК:
Бујку Рогачица,
Каменица-Кос. Каменица и
Живка Васић – Ранилуг

- РО Станоје Аксић, фабрика папира, картона и амбалаже, Липљан
ООУР Папир и лепенка, Липљан
ООУР Валовита лепенка, Липљан
- РО 18. новембар, индустрија за прераду пластике, Ораховац с три ООУР-а:
ООУР Шприцање, Ораховац
ООУР Екструзија, Ораховац
ООУР Вакуумпласт, Зрзе
- РО Полет, фабрика савремене конфекције, Вучитрн

ГРАЂЕВИНАРСТВО И ГРАЂЕВИНСКИ МАТЕРИЈАЛИ

(са 20 РО и пет РО са 17 ООУР-а)

- РО Инвестиџењеринг, Приштина
- РО Уникоспројект за студије, пројектовање, и консалтинг, Приштина
- РО Приштина за завршне радове у грађевинарству, Приштина
- РО Пут за путеве, Приштина
- РО Монтажа Косова, Приштина с три ООУР-а:
Електромонтажа
Хидромонтажа и
Термомонтажа
- РО Фазита, фабрика зидних тапета, Приштина
- РО Бистрица, грађевинско занатска РО, Пећ с три ООУР-а:
Електроинсталатерски и монтажни радови,
Мофаст, молерско-фарбарски радови и
Водовод
- РО Метохијапројект, пројектовање, урбанизам, инжењеринг, Пећ
- РО Ругово, промет грађевинског материјала на велико и мало, Пећ
- РО Изградња, високо и нискоградња, грађевинско занатство и пројектовање, Пећ
ООУР Циглана, Пећ
- РО Елан, Призрен
- РО Победа, монтажна индустрија, Кос. Митровица
- РО Биначка Морава, хидро-грађевинска РО, Ђилане
ООУР Косово, Ђилане, производња камена
ООУР Морава, Крушчице
- РО Дукађини, грађ. инд. комбинат, Ђаковица, с три ООУР-а:
ООУР Грађевинска оператива, Ђаковица
ООУР Индустрија грађевинског материјала, Ђаковица

- ООУР Транспорт, Ђаковица
- РО Ђеравица
ООУР Пилана, Дечани
ООУР Фабрика теролита, Дечани
- РО Трајко Ђрковић, грађевинско-индустријска РО, Урошевац
ООУР Циглана Љуботен, Урошевац
- РО ШАР, производња грађ. материјала, Качаник, са четири ООУР-а:
ООУР Цементара, Генерал Јанковић
ООУР за промет Хани, Генерал Јанковић,
ООУР Лепенац, Качаник, производња хидратисаног и комадног креча, камена, туцаника и кречњака
ООУР Салонит, Генерал Јанковић, производња азбест-цементних производа свих врста и профила
- РО Мируша, грађевинска индустрија, Клина
- РО Трајко Перић, грађевинско-производна РО, Кос. Каменица, са четири ООУР-а:
ООУР Грађевина, Кос. Каменица
ООУР Циглана, Кос. Каменица
ООУР Блокетара, Кос. Каменица
ООУР Возни парк, Кос. Каменица
- РО Улпијана, грађевинарство, Липљан
- РО Ждрело, грађевинска индустрија Ораховац са два ООУР-а:
Грађевинарство и
Мермерикос, Зрзе
- РО Бетонтокос, за израду и техничку прераду бетонита, Витина
- РО Косово, грађевинска организација, Вучитрн
- РО Будућност, високоградња и производња цигле и другог грађ. материјала, Србица
19. новембар ООУР Производња елемента од бетона и Транспорт, Сува Река
• РО 1. мај, грађевинска индустрија, Ораховац
• РО Секо, фабрика металне столарије, Сува Река
• РО Косово, индустрија грађевинског материјала Приштина – ООУР 8 новембар, индустрија цигле, Подујево
• Металику РО за производњу поцинкованог и емајлираног посуђа, Ђаковица

САОБРАЋАЈ И АУТО СЕРВИСИ

(са 4 РО и једном РО са 14 ООУР-а):

- РО Косовотранс, Приштина
са 14 ООУР-а од чега 12 ООУР-а за путнички саобраћај и то у Приштини, Кос. Митровици, Пећи, Призрену, Ђаковици, Ђилану, Урошевцу, Подујеву, Вучитрну, Липљану, Кос. Каменици и Глоговцу, ООУР за градски саобраћај Приштина и ООУР Ремонт, Приштина
- РО Бошко Чакић, ауто-кућа, Урошевац
- РО Петранс, транспорт терета у друмском саобраћају, Пећ
- РО Метохијаремонт, ремонт, сервис и промет моторних возила, Пећ
- РО Транскосова, превоз терета у друмском саобраћају, Кос. Митровица

УГОСТИТЕЉСТВО И ТУРИЗАМ

(9 РО и 3 РО с 5 ООУР-а):

- РО Слога, Приштина
с ООУР-ом: Гранд Хотел, Приштина
- РО Турист-Косова, за туризам, саобраћај и угоститељство, Приштина
- РО Метохија, Пећ
- РО Бања Илида, центар за рехабилитацију, угоститељство и туризам, Пећ
с два ООУР-а: Угоститељство и туризам и ООУР за физикалну медицину
- РО Душанов град, Призрен
с три ООУР-а: Теранда-Призрен, Дукађини-Ораховац, Паштрик-Ђаковица,
- РО Косово, угоститељска организација, Ђилане
- РО Илирија-турист, туристичка организација, Ђаковица
- РО Високи Дечани, угоститељско-туристичка РО, Дечани
- РО Паштрику, угоститељска РО, Ђаковица
- РО Сутјеска, угоститељска организација, Урошевац
- РО Ситница, угоститељство, Липљан
- РО Кристал, угоститељска РО, Сува Река

ТРГОВИНА

(с 12 РО):

- РО Ексимкос, спољнотрговинска РО, Приштина
- РО Воћар, Приштина
- РО Фармег, медицинско снабдевање, Приштина
- РО Дарданија, за промет грађевинског материјала, Приштина
- РО 17. ментори, промет робе на велико и мало, Пећ
- РО Косовосировина, Кос. Митровица
- РО Модел, индустрија и трговина, Ђаковица
- РО Просвета, књижевна трговина, Ђилане
- РО Коперник, Исток
- РО Подрима, Ораховац
- РО Горња Морава, Витина
- РО Чичавица, Вучитрн

МЕДИЈИ И ШТАМПА

(7 РО и три РО са 10 ООУР-а):

- РО Радиотелевизија Приштина
с три ООУР-а: Радио, Телевизија и Музичка продукција
- РО Јединство, новинско-издавачка РО, Приштина
с два ООУР-а: Редакција листа Јединство и Издавачка делатност
- РО Рилиндја, новинско издавачка РО, Приштина с пет ООУР-а:
ООУР Рилиндја, Приштина
ООУР Часописи, Приштина
ООУР Едиција издања, Приштина
ООУР Зери и Ринисе, Приштина
ООУР Штампарија, Приштина
- РО Службени лист – САПК, новинско издавачка РО, Приштина
- РО Тан, новинско-издавачка РО, Приштина
- РО Никола Тесла, организација за приказивање филмова, Приштина
- РО Прогрес, графичке услуге, Кос. Митровица
- РО Планика, штампарија РО, Пећ
- РО Рад, за приказивање филмова, Пећ
- РО Рамиз Садик, графичко-књижевна РО, Призрен

КОМУНАЛНЕ ДЕЛАТНОСТИ

(23 РО и две РО са 7 ООУР-а)

- РО Батлава, регионални водовод, Приштина
 - РО Грачанка, водовод и канализација, Приштина
 - РО Хигијено-Техника, комунална РО, Приштина
 - РО Хотикалтура, пројектовање, одржавање и подизање зеленила, Приштина
 - РО Термокос, за топлофикацију, Приштина
 - РО Ургенс, одржавање зграда, станова и пословног простора, Приштина
 - РО Трегу, за снабдевање робом на пијаци, Приштина
 - РО Завод за урбанизам и пројектовање, Приштина
 - РО Завод за геодетске и фотограметријске послове, Приштина
 - РО Водовод, Кос. Митровица
 - РО Стандард, комунална РО, Кос. Митровица
 - РО Водовод, водовод, канализација и чистоћа, Пећ
 - РО Комуна, изградња и одржавање комуналних објеката, Пећ
- с два ООУР за изградњу и одржавање пијаца и ООУР за изградњу и одржавање комуналних објеката, Пећ
- РО Завод за урбанизам и пројектовање, Пећ
 - РО Универзал, стамбено-комунална изградња и услуге, Призрен с пет ООУР-а: Нискоградња и услуге, Високоградња и услуге, Водовод и канализација, Пијаце и пијачне услуге и Јавна хигијена – Зеленило и вршење услуга
 - РО 5 октобар, комунална организација, Драгаш
 - РО Чабрати, комунална РО, Ђаковица
 - РО Звезда, комунална РО, Урошевац
 - РО Љуботен, комунално-услугне делатности, Качаник
 - РО 29. новембар, комунално-услугна организација Лепосавић
 - РО Напредак, комунална организација, Кос. Каменица
 - РО за одржавање стамбених зграда и комуналних објеката
 - РО Перпарими, комунална организација, Вучитрн
 - РО 18. новембар, комунална организација, Србица
 - РО Занатско-комунални и услужни сервис, Подујево

ЗАДРУГЕ (ЗАНАТСКЕ, ЗЕМЉОРАДНИЧКЕ И ПЧЕЛАРСКЕ)

(осам 33 и једна задруга са четири ООУР-а и четири ООК)

- 33 Девет Југовића, Девет Југовића-Приштина
- 33 22. новембар, Кос. Митровица

- 33 Морава, Партеш-Ѓиљане
 - Пчеларска задруга Љуботен, Урошевац
 - 33 Дечани
 - 33 Бец
- са четири ООУР-а: Кланица живине, Биљна производња, Промет на мало и Промет на велико, сви из Беца и четири ООК Бец, Скивјан, Пуношевац и Бистражин
- Пољопривредна задруга Рамадан Агуши, Качаник
 - 33 Krushe e Madhe (Велика Круша), Ораховац
 - 33 Зубин Поток

ОСТАЛЕ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЈЕ

(8 РО и једна пољопривредна станица)

- РО Покрајинско ловно газдинство, Приштина
- РО Косоварја, производња и промет производа домаће радиности и сувенира, Приштина
- РО Лутрија Косова, Приштина
- РО Домаћа радиноста, производња, трговина, откуп и услуге, Призрен
- РО ДЕС, Кос. Митровица
- РО Хусни Зајмо, приказивање филмова, Ђаковица
- РО Јединство, кројачко трговинска организација, Ѓиљане
- РО Металографика, Урошевац
- РО Косово, за прераду пластичних маса и израду играчака, Србица
- РО Косовка, кројачко трговинска организација, Кос. Каменица
- Станица за унапређење пољопривреде, Ѓиљане.

Напомена: У горњем списку није Фероникл, Глоговац, јер је тада био „у изградњи”. После термоелектрана Обилић, то је била једна од највећих инвестиција у КиМ пре 1990. У њу је само 1979. године уложено око 300 милиона долара. Резерве се цене на више од две милијарде долара. Годишњи обим производње је око 9.000 тона у вредности од око 140 милиона долара, а циљ је 11.000 тона годишње. Фероникл се састоји од три отворена рудника никла и фабрике за производњу нерђајућег челика. Године 1998. производња је обустављена, јер је НАТО оштетио рудник. Фероникл је продат компанији Sinico.

Власничка структура косметске привреде данас? То је истраживачки пројект на коме ће у наредном периоду бити ангажовани чланови и сарадници Одбора за економске науке САНУ.

СКРАЋЕНИЦЕ

АП = Аутономна Покрајина
 БИХ = Босна и Херцеговина
 З.З. = ЗЗ = земљорадничка задруга
 КиМ = Косово и Метохија
 ООК = основна организација кооперације
 ООУР = основна организација удруженог рада
 ОУР = организација удруженог рада
 ПИК = Пољопривредно-индустријски комбинат
 РЗ = радна заједница
 РЈ = радна јединица
 РО = радна организација

СОУР = сложена организација удруженог рада

КАКО ЈЕ НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ
УЗУРПИРАНА СРПСКА ИМОВИНА

САНДРА ДАВИДОВИЋ

Институт за међународну политику и привреду, Београд
 Универзитет Колумбија, Њујорк, САД
 sandradavidovic@yahoo.co.uk

HOW SERBIAN PROPERTY IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA
WAS USURPED

SANDRA DAVIDOVIĆ

Institute for International Politics and Economy, Belgrade, Serbia
 Columbia University, New York, USA

Књига Сандре Давидовић, коју је потписала заједно с Данилом Бабићем и Јеленом Пејић под називом *Приватизација друштвених предузећа на Косову и Метохији под окриљем УНМИК администрације*, изазвала је огромно интересовање јавности, о чему сведочи и за кратко време распродато прво издање¹. Реч је о студији која разматра више него актуелну проблематику приватизације на Косову и Метохији; од тренутка самопрокламовања тзв. државе Косово* па до данас нисмо имали примерен одговор на правно неутемељене поступке приватизације српских предузећа и остале имовине. Књига је објављена крајем 2017. као део пројекта Београдског форума за свет равноправних. Вишемесечно истраживање, укључујући и серију истраживачких посета Приштини и Косовској Митровици с циљем прикупљања података и правних аката, резултирао је радом који обухвата политиколошке, економске и међународноправне аспекте истраживаног проблема који нужно захтева мултидисциплинаран приступ.

Како сте одабрали ову тему као предмет истраживања?

Пошто се већ неколико година бавим темама Балкана, поготово Косова, ... заинтересовало ме је шта се тамо дешава с имовином. Кренула сам

¹ Ово је прерађена верзија разговора о приватизација друштвених предузећа на Косову и Метохији под окриљем УНМИК администрације који је са Сандром Давидовић водила Мила Милосављевић и који је интегрално објављен у *Печату* од 4. маја 2018.

најпре с истраживањем по библиотекама, међутим, убрзо сам схватила да на ову тему ништа није написано, или је то врло кратко и штуро. С обзиром на то да је реч о веома важној теми коју домаћа научна заједница до сада није довољно разматрала, одлучила сам да се озбиљно посветим овим истраживања. У овој области сам најпре одбранила мастер тезу, да бих за докторат с том темом конкурисала за пројект владе Републике Србије, тачније Канцеларије за Косово и Метохију, која је ту идеју препознала и подржала је као свој званични пројект а мене подржала као истраживача. ... То је била прилика да у знатној мери унапредим своје мастер истраживање и да надасве истражујем на терену, што ми ја као истраживачу било веома драгоцено. Пред крај пројекта сам ангажовала још двоје својих колега доктораната, јер је било веома важно да обухватим економску страну питања. Колега Данило Бабић по основном образовању је економиста, а колегиница Јелена Пејић бави се међународноправним механизмима.

Низ чињеница у Вашој књизи сведочи на жалост о већ завршеном процеси приватизације. Да ли је ипак се овом сејменіа іииче реч о свршеном чину, іо којем је имовина срјских іредузећа оіишла нейоврајно или іак іосііје индикације које би означиле могућности ревизије процеса?

На жалост, најопипљивији део је пропуштен, што видим и као пропуст научне заједнице и државних органа који су били задужени за ово питање и за процес разговора, управо на тему имовине; у овом случају одабрала сам друштвена предузећа као сегмент имовине на Косову и Метохији где можете много конкретније да идентификујете ваша права и ваше интересе и да их заступате, јер право својине нема никаквих ограничења у погледу тога да ли је на КИМ данас тренутно мисија изградње мира или је привремено суспендован суверенитет, односно власт Републике Србије. Право својине постоји и оно је неповредиво. Заправо, представља једно од најзаштићенијих начела у међународном праву и то је простор у којем је Србија могла да игра као на нешто сигурније, опипљивије и што није у директној вези с процесом преговарања о статусу. Значи, „виша“, статусна, питања била су на столу, док су ова „нижа“, питања била занемарена, а управо је то могао бити терен за дугорочнију и озбиљнију стратегију заштите права. Мишљења сам да су представници Србије оставили ово питање по страни да не би „реметили“ преговоре о статусу, док се фактички, паралелно с преговорима одвијао процес једностраних мера с друге, албанске стране, која је своју стратегију и дефинисала као стратегију једностраних мера. Док је Србија била уздржана, вероватно с циљем неког компромиса или „неотварања“ тема, *іривремена администірација* донела је низ једностраних мера које су доживеле врхунац усвајањем закона о Трепчи 2016, а онда и одлуком косовске владе о преузимању свеукупне имовине која је била уписана на СРЈ и правна лица Републике

Србије – на „Републику Косово“. Тада је већ било јасно да је тај терен био потпуно препуштен иницијативи других, да се њиме у Србији није довољно бавило. Е сад, шта су наши адути, то је врло сложено питање. Наиме, до 2008. године, правни оквир приватизације Косова био је међународни, заснован на правном систему и организацији УНМИК-ове администрације која је тамо представљала државу. Све уредбе, на челу са, пре свега, резолуцијом 1244, која је највиши правни акт су стварале тај правни систем Косова. Након 2008. долази до једностраног проглашења независности и тада на снагу ступа Ахтисаријев план, као правни акт који Савет безбедности *није* прихватио. Није имао ту снагу коју има Резолуција 1244 и није могао да је замени. Он је пак постао основ за даљи развој правног система Косова, тако да ту имамо *два паралелна система*, један који је заснован на Резолуцији 1244 и други, по свим тачкама у супротности с Резолуцијом. С обзиром на то да Косово није члан многих међународних организација, то је добро. Србија не може рецимо да се обраћа међународним правним инстанцама, јер би се у том случају односила као држава према држави, и надам се да до тога неће доћи, јер би то тада била једина могућност за одбрану тих права. С друге стране, правни систем послова и цео процес приватизације предвидео је неке правне механизме заштите: у књизи је истакнуто да је зарад приватизације основана пословно-повереничка агенција и посебна привредна комора Косова, а поред тога, основан је и омбудсман који није био директно повезан с приватизацијом, али, свакако представља орган заштите права. То су били неки правни механизми којима би се евентуални потражиоци права у процесу приватизације могли обратити. Међутим, постоји серија проблема која је била везана за те правне механизме заштите. Први и основни проблем је што Србија није била довољно укључена у заступање својих грађана, својих предузећа, па и поверилаца којима је дуго низ година плаћала дугове. Познато је да је Србија плаћала суверени део дуга Косова, тако да су грађани превасходно били неинформисани о својим правима и нису могли да их остваре, друго, било их је немогуће остварити, јер нису постојали елементарни безбедносни услови. Пролазили су рокови а није постојао никакав пуномоћни правни механизам УНМИК-а, који би рецимо информисао грађане и трудио се да се та права и искористе. Тај процес је пролазио а ти механизми су имали и много процедуралних мана. Када имате такву територију на којој сте физички измештени, рецимо у централну Србију, морате да имате извршан период да поднесете жалбу. На страну што је жалба само једно од основних права у судском поступку. ... Тек после 2008. она је уведена као правни инструмент, али, за то време прошли су многи спорови и многе могућности које су могле да се искористе, пропуштене су. Друго, процес у доношењу административне процене од

стране косовске повереничке агенције која је била задужена за цео процес приватизације такође је вишеструко споран. Прво, косовска повереничка агенција је устројена као независно правно тело унутар правног система Косова. Јасно се види да је устројена као независна. Е, сад, поставља се питање од кога је то она независна: од УНМИК-а или од УН? То значи да Србија не може да тужи УНМИК, уколико се докаже неко кршење права поверилаца којег би она могла да заступа. Пошто повереничка агенција постоји као независно правно тело које нема привилегије имунитета, које су иначе гарантоване особљу УН, и то је био проблем у приватизацији. Јер, људи који су радили тамо нису хтели да буду одговорни за све оне пропусте и кршења права власника а, с друге стране, доношење административне оцене шта је то друштвено предузеће и да ли спада у надлежност косовске повереничке агенције имало је велику ману а то је да у том процесу доношења административне оцене није било прилике за власнике да доказују своја права. Значи, то је био *инијерни* поступак који није био јаван и након њега је косовска поверилачка агенција објављивала да ли је неко предузеће друштвено или није и самим тим да ли спада у њихову надлежност. Има још много спорних ствари, али серија административних тешкоћа, нејасноћа, преклапања правних прописа, правних режима отежавала је деловање органа Србије, али, то дефинитивно не оправдава оне који су морали да се много боље организују, да се информишу и да знатно боље заступају своје грађане и своја предузећа, јер велики број тих предузећа има своја представништва у централној Србији и Војводини, тако да су дефинитивно многе ствари пропуштене нашом кривицом.

Ујркос чињеници да су многе шансе на овом плану иројушћене, може ли ио Вама иу иишћа да се иоирави и на који начин?

Овом приликом цитирала бих директора Канцеларије за Косово и Метохију: на скупу с темом „Унутрашњи дијалог о Косову и Метохији“, где сам била позвана управо због ове књиге, он је рекао да ће *ишражити ревизију ириваиизације*. То значи преиспитивање свих процеса приватизације који су завршени до данас. Да је УНМИК основао Косовску поверилачку агенцију, место где бисмо могли да потражимо правду био би Међународни суд правде. Србија би могла да тужи УНМИК пред Међународним судом правде. Међутим, УНМИК није могуће гонити правно, јер нема међународно правни субјективитет. ... Али, постоји много међународних форума, постоји УН, где се треба обраћати и информисати те међународне форуме о начинима који је спроведена приватизација, о томе да постоје власници и повериоци чија су права нарушена и просто да покуша да се нађе *ад хок* механизам заштите тих права пошто је цела приватизација изведена на *ад хок* начин и цела администрација је била *ад хок*, тако да је тешко идентификовати инстанце

које би биле надлежне за то питање, поготово што је остало нерешено питање статуса, због *сукоба иравних режима*, али, свакако да је добра адреса за то Скупштина УН. ... Не можемо да се обраћамо Међународном суду за људска права, али, постоје разне арбитраже и предузећа би могла директно да се обрате на њихову адресу, али, процес у Бриселу компликује сад додатно овај оквир потраге за правима.

Ваша књија иредсћавља јединсћвен збир докуменатиа и чињеница везаних за ириваиизацију друишћвених иредузећа на Косову и Меиохији сабраних на једном месту. То је, рекло би се, врх легендарне дреиа. Будући да сћие до ишанчина уиознаићи с овим иишћањем како видишће будућу борбу за иовраћај иракшично нам оиешће имовине?

Морамо да имамо све документовано, да сву документацију имамо на једном месту. Ово је једина књига у којој су први пут сакупљене све уредбе које су се тичале имовинско-правних овлашћења УМНИК-а и приватизације. Одатле се у ствари почело. Не постоји неки регистар у том смислу. Неопходно је направити можда тим у оквиру Канцеларије за КИМ, пошто су они за то надлежни, да се позабаве тим питањем. То значи да се идентификују власници, број предузећа који је приватизован, начин на који су предузећа приватизована, обичан *сиин оф*, посебан *сиин оф*, који су губици произашли из те приватизације, затим повериоци у односу на свако конкретно предузеће, да се направи регистар купаца који су купили та предузећа, и да се сва та документација сакупи на једном месту. Та врста тапије има вредност за себе. Не можемо да кажемо да је данас време права. Међутим, морамо да будемо спремни и да не делујемо као пре петнаест година када се пред нашим очима приватизација одвијала тако како се одвијала а ми нисмо на тај бесправни чин одговорили како треба. Било је неких иницијатива државе, улагане су протестне ноте Уједињеним нацијама. Имала сам прилике да разговарам с професором Самарцићем, координатором преговора у Бечу. Они су улагали амандмане на Ахтисаријев план који се тичао имовине, јавног дуга а самим тим и приватизације. Али, наравно свих петсто амандана на целокупан Ахтисаријев план су одбијени. Није било никаквог ефекта. Суштина јесте да је решење у томе да се на неки начин уобличи стратегија да се сакупља документација, јер постоји интересантна тенденција. Наиме, сајт УНМИК-а је све сиромашнији, све мање уредби је на њиховом сајту и ако их нико није правовремено „скинуо” и сачувао, а они их склоне са сајта, питање је како ће се доћи до тих уредби. ... Они не праве никакве архиве. И то је наш задатак. Оно што је било доступно 2016. када сам почела овим да се бавим, сада већ није, јер, посао је мање-више завршен. На нама је да овакве ствари документујемо. И чувамо. Фактичко стање нам тренутно не иде у корист, међутим, врло је важно инсистирати на правном сегменту, не само

када је у питању статус Косова, него када су у питању и појединачне ствари а имовина јесте простор на коме се проблем Косова може сагледавати на реалан начин који у будућности може да доведе до за нас повољнијих исхода. То су врло реалне ствари, опипљиве, материјалне које имају практичну употребну вредност. Оне немају неки симболички или етно-психолошки значај, већ употребну вредност на самој територији која има своју вредност у међународним односима: то је простор који има своју изузетно објективну употребну вредност у смислу природних ресурса: ви имате земљу као својинско добро и то је простор на који се питање Косова сагледава на објективан начин. Овде говоримо о правном аспекту, јер не можете да дођете на нечију територију и да имовину која је јасно регистрована, која има своје власнике, *узурпирате* и пребаците на неког другог. То је био начин на који је приватизација обављена.

У којој мери сће се у својим истраживањима бавили ишћањем црквених ишћаија, имовине СПЦ на ишћерији Косова и Мешохије?

Нисам се бавила питањем црквене имовине, али, волела бих да истакнем успех манастира Дечани да врати своју земљу. Било је то одлуком Уставног суда Косова из маја 2016. када је манастиру враћен део њиховог земљишта после дуге и тешке борбе унутар правног система Косова, јер је манастиру то био једини начин да се избори за своја права. Манастир се обратио Уставном суду и изборио се за своје. Србија мора да се обраћа међународним форумима, радници који имају права на исплате приватизационог прихода такође морају да иду на КИМ како би остварили своја права. То је сложен, конфузни правни систем за који постоји јасан узрок, а то је насилно наметање Ахтисаријевог плана као основа за правно и политичко уређење Косова и на тај начин је створен *хибридни иравни систем* и паралелно постојање два система: један који је заснован на резолуцији 1244 Савета безбедности, а други на неформалном акту који никад није прихваћен од Савета безбедности. Тај хибридни правни систем произвео је такво стање да ми не знамо да постоји та разноликост правних режима и самим тим не знамо место за обраћање и потраживање права. То и није питање само за економисте и правнике, већ захтева мултидисциплинарни приступ, јер није реч о приватизацији, већ о процесу који је само део мисије *изградње мира* која се касније трансформисала у мисију *изградње државе* која је покушала да економски аспект реши на начин на који је решила, а то је овакав вид приватизације. Иначе, суштина мог рада није истраживање о приватизацији, немам капацитет да се бавим истраживањем економских учинака појединачне приватизације. Питањем приватизације бавила сам се са ширег аспекта међународних европских студија. Контекст је специфичан и као што је у књизи јасно наведено, приватизација има нека општа

обележја која дели с приватизацијама и уопште процесима транзиције источноевропских „постсоцијалистичких“ земаља, али, с друге стране, она из више разлога представља *јединствен*, специфични случај приватизације. Прво, због територије на којој се одвијала, због тога што је та територија била под међународном управом, зато што њом није руководила класично схваћена држава, већ је била покушај „државотворне“ операције праћен мноштвом проблема, од проблематичног циља до недостатка капацитета за његову реализацију. Било је веома интересантно пратити начин на који су се УНМИК администратори сусрели с друштвеном својином. То су људи који долазе из западних капиталистичких држава који треба да приватизују друштвену својину, а не знају шта је то друштвена својина, не знају ко је њен титулар. Нема дефиниције титулара. То је процес који зависи од контекста, а тај контекст је био на много начина сложен, конфузан, и правно и политички, ...

РЕТРОСПЕКТИВА НАСИЉА НАД СРПСКОМ СВОЈИНОМ НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ НАКОН 10. ЈУНА 1999. ГОДИНЕ

ДУШАН ЧЕЛИЋ

Универзитет у Приштини,
Правни факултет – Косовска Митровица
dusko.celic@pr.ac.rs



VIOLATING SERBIAN PRIVATE AND STATE PROPERTY IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA AFTER JUNE 10, 1999

DUŠAN ČELIĆ

С а ж е т а к

Започет у XVII веку, процес интензивног насељавања и демографске експанзије Албанаца на Косову и Метохији, три столећа касније, резултираће њиховом демографском доминацијом и насилним променама у својинскоправним односима на непокретностима које су и данас и те како актуелне.

Основно обележје друштвене стварности која се одвијала у сагледаваном времену на Косову и Метохији је притисак албанског етничког фактора, који у континуитету траје више векова а који је уобличен у албански национални програм поткрај XIX века. Тај притисак и експанзионизам, на уштрб српског народа и историјског етничког простора, није заустављен ни стављањем покрајине под цивилну управу Уједињених народа уз снажно присуство међународних оружаних снага под водством НАТО. Начин на који су деловали и делују међународни чиниоци на Косову и Метохији, као да указују да им није ни био циљ да на овим просторима стану на пут етнички мотивисаном систематском насиљу Албанаца над Србима и припадницима неалбанских мањина. Од успостављања до данашњих дана, политика УНМИК-а заснивала се на партнерству са формално и неформално владајућим албанским структурама на Косову и Метохији, изниклим на сукобу са државом Србијом и њеним правним поретком и коначно, са српским народом на Косову и Метохији. Прва и последња жртва таквог партнерства била је владавина права, са њом и неалбанско становништво и њихова људска права.

Насиље над својином, као “краљицом свих (стварних) права”, комплементарно је остваривању националних и великодржавних аспирација Албанаца на овим просторима. Запоседање територије Косова и Метохије од стране Албанаца, у условима “постконфликтног мира”, остварује се “новом земљишном политиком” и праксу са-

from 1853, confirmed the provisions of the 1757 firman. A British official, Lionel Cust [Cust 1980] in 1929 compiled a summary of this important document.

In the case of Kosovo and Metohia, the Jerusalem model is not acceptable as it is a legal act regulating the property-legal relations and the manner of use of such places, primarily for liturgy and other services, by different churches and religious communities exclusively in Jerusalem and Bethlehem and not in the whole of Israel and Palestine. The ownership of the holy buildings of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church or the Islamic Community in Kosovo and Metohia, however, is not disputed. It is obvious that the Islamic Community in Kosovo and Metohia does not claim or seek ownership over the Patriarchate of Peć or Gračanica, nor does, for instance, the Diocese of Raška and Prizren have any legal claims to the Community's mosques.

Furthermore, this model, initially an 18th century Ottoman feudal formula, is not applicable in the 21st century in which the international law is increasingly gaining primacy over national legislation. Thirdly, Turkey was and still is a state, as is Israel. In our case, the Jerusalem model is unacceptable also because the compiling of a document based on it would require the participation of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, an entity not recognized by the Republic of Serbia or the Serbs, both refusing to acknowledge the existence of a state on an occupied part of their territory.

THE CONSTANTINOPLE MODEL

This model was formulated in 1923, based on the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations with a Protocol of January 30, 1923 [Стојковић 1998: 155–161]; the Peace Treaty with Turkey of July 24, 1923 [Стојковић 1998: 162–181]; the Convention on the borders of Thrace [Стојковић 1998: 181–184]; the Protocol relating to certain concessions granted in the Ottoman Empire and the Declaration of July 24, 1923 [Стојковић 1998: 185–189]; the Protocol on the evacuation of the Turkish territory occupied by the British, French and Italian forces of July 24, 1923 [Стојковић 1998: 189–191]; the Protocol relative to the Karagatch territory and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos of July 24, 1923 [Стојковић 1998: 191–192]; the Protocols from the Sèvres Treaty between the Great Allied Powers and Greece of August 10, 1920 in connection with the protection of minorities in Greece and the Treaty of August 10, 1923 in connection with Thrace of July 24, 1923 [Стојковић 1998: 193]; the Convention on the Turkish Straits of July 24, 1923 [Стојковић 1998: 194], and the Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction of July 24, 1923 [Стојковић 1998: 195–202].

The above-mentioned agreements and declarations from Lausanne, with the participants in their preparation being Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Bulgaria and Turkey, were made after the Greco-Turkish War, also known as the War in Asia Minor, waged between May 1919 and October 1922. It ended unfavorably for the Greeks, who had to withdraw to the pre-war borders and then accept the exchange of population. As a result, the Greeks from Asia Minor were forced to leave their ancestral homes.

After the Lausanne agreements were signed and implemented, the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople (today's Istanbul) was left without the faithful and most of its priests and monks. The population exchange plan pertained to the Greeks from all parts of Turkey except Constantinople. The rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, especially property and religious rights, were not protected by said agreements, which is to say that this institution was left to the mercy of the Turkish authorities in Ankara. Today, close to a century later, the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the territory of Turkey has some two thousand faithful, and only in Constantinople. Although formally they were exempt from deportation, the Orthodox Greeks from Constantinople were also forced to leave in the decades following the war. Many shrines were nationalized by the Turkish state and for almost one hundred years there have been no priests, monks, believers or liturgies in them. A number of the shrines were abandoned, many were declared immovable cultural heritage of Turkey, and some were completely destroyed.

The Constantinople model is also not applicable in the case of Kosovo and Metohia. The 1999 armed clashes there did not occur between two states as was the case with Greece and Turkey. In our case the regular military and police units were conducting campaigns to neutralize or destroy the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army's paramilitary units that were terrorizing civilians and security forces. In the period between March 24 and June 10, 1999, NATO intervened, siding with the terrorist KLA. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 pertaining to Kosovo and Metohia.

The Republic of Serbia has no right to conclude agreements with the so-called Republic of Kosovo on the moving of the remaining Serb population (around 120,000 to 130,000) from the territory of Kosovo and Metohia to central Serbia, but instead must assist and encourage their survival after the difficult, 20-year long occupation, and also persistently demand the return to Kosovo and Metohia of over 200,000 Serbs exiled from there in 1999 and later. In addition, the Republic of Serbia has no right to relinquish the state, private and church property in Kosovo and Metohia, but must persistently demand the return of all usurped property to their rightful owners. And, of course, the Republic of Serbia should also demand that all human rights and freedoms be respected and protected. It is thus obvi-

ous that this model cannot be acceptable to the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church's Diocese of Raška and Prizren either.

THE MOUNT ATHOS MODEL

An organized monastic life in the Mount Athos peninsula began in 963 when St. Athanasius the Athonite founded the Great Lavra monastery. The first general ecclesiastic-legal act of Mount Athos was issued in 972 under the name of Tragos (meaning "male goat," as it was written on kidskin). From its inception, Mount Athos has been subject to various legal regimes, initially of Byzantium, then of the Tzar Dušan Empire, followed by Turkey, and, eventually, the Republic of Greece.

The issue of Mount Athos was also discussed at the Berlin Congress in 1878. Article 62 of the Berlin Agreement guarantees the freedom of religion and expressly prohibits discrimination based on religious grounds regarding the exercising of civil or political rights, admission to public employment, offices and honors and exercising of all professions and industries, whatever the locality may be. It guaranteed the absence of any impediment either to the hierarchical organization of the various religious bodies or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs. The monks from Mount Athos, whatever their nationality were to be maintained in possession of their possessions and previous advantages, and were to enjoy without exception full equality of rights and prerogatives [Mowat 1915: 79–83]. As of 1912 *de facto*, and as of 1913 and the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, *de jure* as well, Mount Athos has been an integral part of the Republic of Greece's territory.

The Mount Athos model became part of the contemporary ecclesiastic-legal vocabulary on May 10, 1924⁶ when the Extra-ordinary Double Synaxis of the Twenty Monasteries adopted the Charter of the Holy Mount⁷ (Καταστατικός Χάρτις Του Αγίου Ορους – The Holy Mount Constitutional Charter). In the contemporary state-legal sense, the model, as an authentic ecclesiastic formula, is tied to the Legislative Decree confirming the Holy Mount's Charter, signed by the president of the Republic of Greece, Pavlos Kountouriotis, on September 10, 1926. Before that, "the beginning of the contemporary legal status of the Holy Mount was *de facto* tied to the establishing of Greece's sovereignty over the Athos peninsula in November 1812, while that sovereignty was *de jure* regulated by a provision of Article 5 of the Treaty of Bucharest (1913), whereby the new borders of the Ottoman territories in the Balkans were defined." [Παπαστατίς 2004: 525].

6 Καταστατικός Χάρτις Του Αγίου Ορους, Αγίου Ορους, 1931. In Serbian: [Устави Свеће Горе од 10. маја 1924. године 1959] and in: [Αγγελόπουλος 1997].

7 The highest legal act of the Holy Mount is also called The Statute.

8 The Law-Decree on the confirmation of the Charter of the Holy Mount on September 10, 1926, in [Устави Свеће Горе од 10. маја 1924. године 1959: 69–84].

The Constitution of the Republic of Greece of June 11, 1975, amended in 2005, in its normative part contains a provision regulating the position of the Holy Mount as a self-governed monastic republic in the territory of the Republic of Greece. Article 105 of the Constitution stipulates that "[T]he Athos Peninsula extending beyond Megali Vigla and constituting the district of Mount Athos shall, in accordance with its ancient privileged status, be a self-governing part of the Greek State whose sovereignty thereon shall remain unaffected. Spiritually, Mount Athos shall come under the direct jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. All persons residing therein shall acquire Greek nationality upon admission as novices or monks without any further formality." In other words, it is a self-governing monastic community on the *sui generis* Greek territory that is undoubtedly under the full sovereignty of the Greek state. Paragraph 2 of the same article stipulates that "Mount Athos shall, in accordance with its regime, be governed by its twenty Holy Monasteries, among which the entire peninsula is divided and its territory shall be exempt from expropriation." Paragraph 3 of the same article further stipulates that "[its] administration shall be exercised by representatives of the Holy Monasteries who constitute the Holy Community. No change whatsoever shall be permitted in the administrative system or the number of monasteries of Mount Athos, nor in their hierarchy and their position in regard to their dependencies. The dwelling therein of heterodox or schismatic persons shall be prohibited." It is further prescribed that "[T]he determination in detail of the Mount Athos regimes and the manner of operation thereof is effected by the Constitutional Charter of Mount Athos, which, with the co-operation of the State representative, is drawn up and voted by the twenty Holy Monasteries and ratified by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Parliament of the Hellenes." [The 2001 Constitution of Greece, Article 5] The document adds that "[T]he correct observance of the Mount Athos regimes shall, in the spiritual sphere, be under the supreme supervision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and, in the administrative field, under the supervision of the State which shall be exclusively responsible for safeguarding public order and security" [The 2001 Constitution of Greece]. And finally, Paragraph 5 of Article 105 stipulates that "[T]he afore-mentioned powers of the State shall be exercised through a governor whose rights and duties shall be determined by law" [The 2001 Constitution of Greece], as well as that "[T]he law shall likewise determine the judicial power exercised by the monastic authorities and the Holy Community, as well as the customs and taxation privileges of Mount Athos."

From the above citations it is obvious that the Mount Athos model, mentioned for the first time in 1998,⁹ and later promoted on a few occasions by senior

9 The implementation of the Mount Athos model in Kosovo and Metohia was first promoted by former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia president and author Dobrica Ćosić (*Kosovo*, Večernje Novosti, Belgrade 2004) within the idea of the division of the Kosovo and Metohia territory and so-called delineation with Albanians.

government officials¹⁰ and by certain influential media outlets¹¹, is inapplicable and unacceptable for the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and Metohia for several reasons.

First and foremost, the Republic of Greece is a state and, at that, an ancient and serious one, whereas the so-called Republic of Kosovo is not a state but an occupied portion of the Republic of Serbia's territory. We could stop here, because the ecclesiastic-legal and state-legal position of the Holy Mount with its 20 monasteries, numerous hermitages and cells is regulated by the Church's Canon Law and legal acts of the Holy Mount and the Republic of Greece. Sovereignty of the Republic of Greece over the Holy Mount as part of the integrated and indivisible territory of the Greek state which is under a special legal regime is undisputed and obvious to every jurist. The provisions cited above clearly show that the monasteries in question are not extraterritorial, but are self-governed, and that all of them, without exception, are located in the territory of the Republic of Greece.

There are other facts clearly showing that the Republic of Greece and the so-called Republic of Kosovo can in no way be considered comparable. It should be kept in mind that the Republic of Greece, according to its Constitution of June 11, 1975, is a parliamentary republic. The so-called Republic of Kosovo is the result of occupation and is not recognized as a state by two-thirds of humanity. As far as the population structure is concerned, there are also major differences – 98 percent of the Greek population is Orthodox Christian, whereas the Jews, Muslims, Protestants and Armenians account for the remaining two percent. In Kosovo and Metohia, on the other hand, owing to a decades-long ethnic cleansing, persecution and expulsion of Serbs and other non-Albanians, the adherents of Islam are in absolute majority.

In Greece, a system of state church is in effect. Article 3 of the Greek Constitution stipulates that “[T]he prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Or-

ans. It is obvious that as a person not versed in legal matters Ćosić did not tell the difference between extraterritoriality as a legal principle and the position of Hilandar and other monasteries in the Holy Mount; for him, these were one and the same thing (p. 98). In his “Proposal for the co-existence of the Albanian and Serbian peoples” in September 2004 he suggested that “the medieval Serb monasteries – the Patriarchate of Peć, Dečani, Gračanica and Devič, after the restitution of their land and forests confiscated in 1945, be granted self-government and the rights in accordance with the Mount Athos model in Greece” (p. 254). He sought a special legal position for only four Serb monasteries. The proposal has never been discussed by the Serbian Orthodox Church.

- 10 In his capacity of the Serbian foreign minister, Ivica Dačić has advocated the implementation of Ćosić's ideas about the Mount Athos model. In an article titled “Delineation with Albanians is a lasting solution,” published in *Večernje Novosti's* online edition on August 13, 2017, Dačić tied the idea of the alleged Serbian-Albanian agreement to “a compromise between the historical and ethnic rights,” as well as to “securing the Serbian Orthodox heritage by creating independent monastery communities after the Mount Athos model in Greece.”
- 11 The so-called Mount Athos model was later additionally elaborated on in an article titled “What does the ‘Mount Athos model’ implies for temples – self-government for monasteries,” published in *Večernje Novosti's* online edition on August 15, 2018. Bishop of Bačka Irinej (Bulović) strongly reacted to this idea, rejecting the application of this model in Kosovo and Metohia.

thodox Church of Christ.” The so-called Constitution of Kosovo¹² is predicated on the principle of separation of the religious communities from that so-called state, whereas the Law on religious freedoms from 2007,¹³ promulgated by a special representative of the United Nations Secretary General, regulates relations with religious communities on the postulates entirely opposed to those from the Greek Constitution. In addition, the territory of the Holy Mount is unified, whereas our Serbian Holy Mount encompasses the entire territory of Kosovo and Metohia. In the Holy Mount there can be no other residents except monks, whereas our Church in Kosovo and Metohia includes priests and the faithful. Physical entities in the Holy Mount do not possess any property while in Kosovo and Metohia they do. In addition, all monks in the Holy Mount are, regardless of nationality, the citizens of Greece. The entry to and exit from the Holy Mount is under the exclusive control of the Greek police. Also, the Greek police are in charge of maintaining security in the Holy Mount.

All the above clearly shows that the Mount Athos model is not acceptable in regulating the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church's Diocese of Raška and Prizren in Kosovo and Metohia.

THE VATICAN MODEL

The Vatican model¹⁴ is regulated by the legal system of the Republic of Italy, where the Roman Catholics account for 82 percent of the population. Religious minorities – the Protestants, Muslims, Eastern Orthodox, Jews and others – account for the rest. Article 7 of the Italian Constitution from 1948 stipulates that “the State and the Catholic Church are, each within its own order, independent and sovereign. Their relations are regulated by the Lateran Pacts. Changes to the Pacts accepted by both parties do not require the procedure for constitutional amendment.”

The Lateran Treaty between the Kingdom of Italy and the Holy See, of February 11, 1929 [Trattato 1929], regulates the position of the City of Vatican and the Holy See within the state of Italy and, in particular, their mutual relations, meaning that this model, too, is impossible to apply in regulating the position of the Diocese of Raška and Prizren in Kosovo and Metohia.

12 The so-called Constitution of Kosovo, the so-called Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, № 25/12, 6/13 and 20/15.

13 The Law on religious freedoms, from 2007, the Official Gazette of the Temporary Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo – Priština, year II, № 11/2007.

14 I have partly dealt with the unacceptability of this model in a paper titled “A review of the proposals for regulating the status of the Serbian Church in Kosovo and Metohia within a political platform and a resolution of the National Assembly of Serbia” that was posted on January 13, 2013 at the Serbian Patriarchate's official website.

The Lateran treaty was concluded in the name of the Most Holy Trinity by representatives of the Roman Catholic ecclesiastic and Italian state authorities, both belonging to the Roman Catholic faith. The situation in Kosovo and Metohia is far from similar. The treaty's preamble states that it is concluded to "assure the Holy See the absolute and visible independence" and "guarantee its indisputable sovereignty" [Trattato 1929]. The document confirms the constitutional status of the "Catholic Apostolic Roman religion" as "the only State religion" since 1848 [Trattato 1929: Article 1], while also recognizing the Holy See's sovereignty and absolute dominion over the Vatican City [Trattato 1929: Article 2]. With this constitutional act not only the Holy See's religious, but its legal and political subjectivity has been recognized, which is to say that on that date it became a state-legal institution, with the clearly separated religious and state jurisdictions.

The provisions on the creation of the unified territory of the Vatican state in the territory of the Kingdom of Italy are actually the most important part of the agreement, which is clearly prescribed by the stipulation that "Italy recognizes the full ownership, exclusive dominion, and sovereign authority and jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican" [Trattato 1929: Article 3]. Another provision regulates this with greater precision and more clearly, by stating that "[T]he sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over the Vatican City, which Italy recognizes as appertaining to the Holy See, forbid any intervention therein on the part of the Italian Government, or that any authority other than that of the Holy See shall be there acknowledged" [Trattato 1929: Article 4]. An exemption was made regarding St. Peter's Square that was to remain open to the public while being under supervision by the Italian police authorities [Trattato 1929: Article 3, Paragraph 2]. The Holy See is named as the owner of all immovable property in the territory of the Vatican City [Trattato 1929: Article 5, Paragraph 1]. The person of the "Supreme Pontiff" was declared "sacred and inviolable" [Trattato 1929: Article 8], and in regard to his legal protection, he was equalized with the King [Trattato 1929: Article 8]. Since then, the pope has not only been the religious head but the head of the state of the Vatican City as well, much like any absolute elective monarch.

In addition, the treaty established the Vatican citizenship [Trattato 1929: articles 9 and 10], while the Holy See was granted the right to found its diplomatic missions (nunciatures) [Trattato 1929: articles 11 and 12], with its property rights fully guaranteed [Trattato 1929: articles 13 and 14]. Also guaranteed is exemption from various contributions and taxes [Trattato 1929" articles 15 and 16], while all cardinals are envisaged to "enjoy the honors due to the Princes of Blood" [Trattato 1929: articles 20 and 21]. It is unnecessary to continue citing further provisions of this treaty as it is already clear that they cannot be applied to Kosovo and Metohia.

The 1929 Lateran Treaty was jointly amended by the Holy See and Italy on February 18, 1984 in the form of a new agreement between the Holy See and the

Italian Republic [Accordo 1984]. The two states – the state of the City of Vatican and the Italian Republic – agreed as equals on regulating all status issues and the framework of mutual cooperation. In Italian conditions this was normal and natural, but in view of the circumstances the Diocese of Raška and Prizren faces and its position, it is difficult to see the Vatican model as an appropriate example to follow.

For, if the Serbian side agreed to the implementation of the Vatican model in Kosovo and Metohia, it would mean, firstly, that the state of Kosovo is the other contractual party, which is unacceptable for the Serbian Orthodox Church. Other conditions for the implementation of this model are also fully at odds with the reality in Kosovo and Metohia. For example, the Vatican City is a unified whole, while the situation with the Diocese of Raška and Prizren is quite different. Furthermore, in Italy, in whose center the Vatican City is located, also exists, like in all other countries in which the Roman Catholic Church is active, the Episcopal Conference of Italy. This fact, too, speaks against the acceptability of the so-called Vatican model in Kosovo and Metohia.

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL MODEL

As of recently, the so-called extraterritorial model – either independently or, erroneously identified with the Mount Athos model – is increasingly being mentioned as a solution to the position of our churches and monasteries in Kosovo and Metohia. But although it is described as being "optimal for our monasteries in Kosovo and Metohia," no example of a country where it was applied has ever been presented.

To understand the principle of extraterritoriality, it is necessary to first define the principle of territoriality. Territory, along with population and sovereignty (government), is one of the three elements essential to a state. State territory is inseparable from the principle of territoriality, meaning that the legitimate power of government is exercised over all subjects in a state territory. It should also be taken in account that "with the emergence of modern state, the territorial principle became the basic principle for the implementation of legal norms" [Лукић, Кошутић и Митровић 2002: 61].

Otherwise, in the theory of state and law the principle of extraterritoriality, also known as "a legal fiction," does not exist without the principle of territoriality. The former exclusively pertains to diplomatic and consular missions and other international organizations enjoying diplomatic immunity, as well as to foreign ships.

According to international law, extraterritoriality means that the authority or sovereignty of a state is not practiced in a certain area which is geographically located within it. In accordance with the extraterritoriality principle, "otherwise

accepted by international law, the laws of a certain country do not apply to that part of its territory on which the facilities of foreign missions are located; there, the laws of such missions' respective countries are in effect" [Благојевић 2003: 49].

This model, thus, is in opposition to the very being not only of our Church but of our state in Kosovo and Metohia. Firstly, to debate the issue of extraterritoriality for a certain number of Orthodox churches and monasteries in Kosovo and Metohia means that Serbia is renouncing that part of its territory and is stating not only that it has no sovereignty over that part of its occupied region, but also that it does not want to govern it.

The principle of extraterritoriality is established by "special agreements" [Луквић 1995: 253] between two states which have recognized each other both *de facto* and *de jure*. Therefore, mutual recognition of two states is a *sine qua non* for the principle of extraterritoriality to be considered at all. Furthermore, state authority, in accordance with the principle of territoriality, is always exercised over all citizens in the territory of a certain state.

No one has the right to demand a special, extraterritorial status for only several important temples and monasteries, as that would actually imply that the implementation of the other state's principles of territoriality and sovereignty are simultaneously demanded for the bishop, the monks and nuns, and the faithful of the Diocese of Raška and Prizren, as well as for all other Orthodox Christian churches and monasteries which are all excluded from such status. Furthermore, such a model is not applied to churches and monasteries, and especially not if they are Orthodox Christian.

The person who would demand the application of this principle to several of our churches and monasteries in Kosovo and Metohia would actually ask for the principle of territoriality of the so-called Albanian authorities to apply to all other Serbs and everything that is Serbian and Orthodox Christian in Kosovo and Metohia.

Searching for an example of extraterritoriality (not related to diplomatic and consular missions and similar) we have come upon an instance in which the so-called extraterritorial model was applied in one-time Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Namely, an extraterritorial Greek municipality existed from 1945 until 1949 in the territory of the village of Maglić (formerly Buljkes), near Bački Petrovac in northern Serbia. It is a village in which up to World War II ethnic Germans accounted for majority population. At the end of the war, the Germans left the village, and already in May 1945 it was populated by some 4,500 Greek refugees, communist members of the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), and their families. The FPRY isolated the village in which Greek laws were in effect, the drachma was the legal tender, and where a special currency – the Buljkes dinar – was also issued. The village was governed by members of the Greek Communist

Party. The extraterritoriality of the village was cancelled when its inhabitants supported the Cominform Resolution of 1948 (the split between the Yugoslav and Soviet communists), and its inhabitants were sent by train to Czechoslovakia, Poland and other socialist countries. Science calls this example "an experiment" and "a Greek Utopia in Yugoslavia" [Ристовић 2007]. This example, too, very directly speaks against the implementation of this model in Kosovo and Metohia.

THE ENCLAVE/EXCLAVE MODEL

From the above it is clear that none of the five aforementioned models of legal protection for the Church in Kosovo and Metohia (the Jerusalem, Constantinople, Mount Athos, the Vatican and extraterritorial models) are possible without Serbia's recognition of the so-called Republic of Kosovo and its so-called legal order. Accepting any of these models in Kosovo and Metohia would necessarily mean, on the one hand, the recognition of the so-called Republic of Kosovo as an independent state, and on the other, placing everything that belongs to the Serbian Orthodox Church's Diocese of Raška-Prizren, including the Peć Patriarchate, under the legal and political regime of the so-called Republic of Kosovo or, possibly, a so-called Greater Albania. Or, to speak as precisely as possible, under the regime of the Greater Albanian project with all of its negative manifestations. This would undoubtedly mean the abandonment of Kosovo and Metohia by the Republic of Serbia. It is noticeable that the advocates and proposers of some of the previously mentioned models have not responded with arguments of their own to the criticism of their proposals. Instead, under the auspices of the Open Society Fund, an analysis called *Serbian Cultural and Religious Heritage in Kosovo from Ahtisaari's Special Zones to Its Final Status* [Surlić and Novaković 2020] was published by the recently founded Institute for Territorial Economic Development which, from the clear standpoint of Serbia fully recognizing the so-called Republic of Kosovo, offers two previously unmentioned models – the model of enclaves/exclaves and the condominium model.

The model of enclaves/exclaves prompts us to recall the definition and legal meaning of an enclave and exclave. The *Legal Lexicon* defines an enclave as "a part of another state completely surrounded by the state within which it is located. The same area from the standpoint of the state within which the enclave is located is called an exclave." [Pravni leksikon 2007: 298]. An exclave is defined as "a part of a state's territory which, being owned by another state, is excluded from its domicile state" [Novi Vujaklija 2011: 330].

The condition for applying the enclave/exclave model is tied to the recognition of the so-called Republic of Kosovo's independence by the Republic of Serbia, which is impossible from the position of the legal order of the Republic of Serbia

and unacceptable in terms of the Serb people's national interests. The advocates of this solution say that it is "interesting for the most important churches and monasteries," which is unacceptable to the Serbian Orthodox Church precisely because it would mean entirely sacrificing the remaining Serbian Orthodox spiritual and cultural heritage in Kosovo and Metohia.

THE CONDOMINIUM MODEL

The institution of a condominium dates back to Roman law and originally implied the co-ownership of several legal subjects of an undivided object. Co-ownership could be acquired in several ways, including through a legal undertaking, but each of the co-owners could independently use their share.

In the 20th century condominiums found a new expression in public law and took on the meaning of dual sovereignty over a territory. The mostly frequently cited examples are Pheasant Island in the Bidasoa River – a condominium of France and Spain, and parts of the Parana River as a condominium of Brazil and Paraguay. It also should be noted that the so-called Independent State of Croatia is seen between 1941 and 1943 as a condominium of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

The advocates of this model stress that dual sovereignty "would not be capable of encompassing the entirety of Serbian religious and cultural heritage but the most important cultural and religious monuments that would be defined by a special annex to an agreement, while the status of the remaining religious and cultural monuments would be legally regulated via a contract between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Priština authorities and confirmed through a possible comprehensive Agreement on Normalizing Relations" [Surlić and Novaković 2020: 26].

A potential condominium in Kosovo and Metohia is only being suggested for several historically important Orthodox Christian churches and monasteries, and would not pertain to the entire territory of Kosovo and Metohia. The model of a condominium over several churches and monasteries on the land that they were built on simply means that the Republic of Serbia permanently forfeits its sovereignty over more than 99 percent of Kosovo and Metohia's remaining territory. This model cannot be accepted by the Serbian Orthodox Church.

CONCLUSION

Acceptance of any of the afore-mentioned models for the protection of certain monasteries and churches in Kosovo and Metohia would unavoidably signify the recognition of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, on one hand, while, on the oth-

er, it would mean leaving everything else that belongs to the Serbian Orthodox Church's Diocese of Raška and Prizren, including the Patriarchate of Peć – a stau-ropepic monastery, i.e. the one subordinated directly to the Serbian Patriarch – to be subject to the legal and political regime of the so-called Republic of Kosovo or the so-called Greater Albania. Or, more precisely, it would mean allowing for its inclusion in the Greater Albania project, with all its negative consequences. This would simply equal to the Republic of Serbia's renouncing of Kosovo and Metohia.

In addition to a lack of an efficient and acceptable model for the legal protection of our sacred places which are part of the Serbian Orthodox Church's Diocese of Raška and Prizren, what is also of great importance is how the legal norms from the possible protection models would be applied by Albanians and their political representatives in Kosovo and Metohia. In other words, even if one of the said models were accepted, in what manner, if at all, would Kosovo Albanians implement its provisions to our monasteries, churches, clergy, monks, nuns and the faithful of the Diocese of Raška and Prizren.

The several protected medieval monasteries and churches would very soon be left without the believers, who in the course of 20 years have endured the most difficult and life-threatening conditions. The arrival of new monks and nuns would also be quite uncertain and would fully depend on Albanian authorities.

Furthermore, no international legal protection of our holy places would in itself be of great help. For, since 1999, the basic international legal provisions guaranteeing the life, safety and dignity to every person, even the Serbs, have been impossible to carry out. It is, therefore, illusory to expect any efficient protection of cultural property of our Church in Kosovo and Metohia. It suffices to mention the example of the Dečani monastery, listed as the World Heritage site by UNESCO, which was shelled on several occasions, or the destruction of internationally protected cultural heritage in Syria by Islamists.

Furthermore, all the afore-mentioned models are in contravention of the 2006 Constitution of Serbia. The Constitution's Preamble clearly declares that "the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia is an integral part of Serbia's territory" [Устав Републике Србије од 2006] and that "from such position of the province of Kosovo and Metohia stem the constitutional obligations of all state bodies to represent and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohia in all internal and foreign political relations" [Устав Републике Србије од 2006]. True, there are some who – guided by the wish to minimize and downgrade the said part of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia – say that "the Constitutional Preamble does not have a normative character." These, however, forget the norm from Article 8 of the Constitution stipulating that, "[T]he territory of the Republic of Serbia is inseparable and indivisible" and that "The border of the Republic of Serbia is inviolable and may be altered in a procedure applied to amend the Constitution."

The inapplicability of the said models in Kosovo and Metohia and in the case of the Diocese of Raška and Prizren should be recognized by the authorities of the Republic of Serbia as the most relevant reason for not taking the resolution of the Gordian knot in Kosovo and Metohia lightly. Under no circumstances should they accept to settle the issue of the status and protection of the Diocese of Raška and Prizren in Kosovo and Metohia or cultural heritage through an agreement, such as in the case of the Gazivode Lake dam or the Trepča mine.

The very idea of searching for some new model to legally protect the Diocese of Raška and Prizren in Kosovo and Metohia indicates a negation of the legal protection provided by the Republic of Serbia in this territory. In such case, one part of the Diocese would remain under the regime of the Republic of Serbia (the Novi Pazar Deanery and the monasteries, church institutions, clergy, monks, nuns and the faithful in that part of the Diocese), while the other would be subject to different legal norms.

The Republic of Serbia, the Serbian people, and the Serbian Orthodox Church's clergy have an obligation to not only do their best to preserve Serbian cultural and sacral heritage, but also the rights of the Serbs, the Diocese of Raška and Prizren and all citizens of the Republic of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohia in accordance with only one model – the legal system of the Republic of Serbia.

СЕДАМ МОДЕЛА ПРАВНЕ ЗАШТИТЕ ЕПАРХИЈЕ РАШКО-ПРИЗРЕНСКЕ
СРПСКЕ ПРАВОСЛАВНЕ ЦРКВЕ НА КОСОВУ И МЕТОХИЈИ

ВЕЛИБОР ДЖОМИЋ
otacvelibor@gmail.com

Сажетак

Епархија рашко-призренска Српске Православне Цркве има своју хиљадугодишњу канонску јурисдикцију на читавој територији Косова и Метохије. Она се од 1999. године нашла у положају какав није забележен у њеној хиљадугодишњој историји. Током претходних година у преговорима између представника Републике Србије и Привремених институција самоуправе из Приштине уз посредовање Европске уније постављало се питање правне заштите културног наслеђа или „манастира и цркава” Епархије рашко-призренске Српске Православне Цркве. У раду се анализирају до сада познати и примењивани модели правне заштите који су познати као јерусалимски, цариградски, светогорски, ватикански, тзв. Екстериторијални, енклава/ексклава модел, као и кондоминијум модел.

LITERATURE

- Ангелопулос 1997 → А. Ангелопулос. *Монашка заједница Свете Горе*, Манастир Хиландар 1997. [A. Angelopoulos. *Monastic community of Mount Athos*, Hilandar Monastery 1997].
- Благојевић 2003 → С. Благојевић. *Увод у право*, НИУ Службени лист Републике Црне Горе, Подгорица 2003 [S. Blagojević. *Introduction to Law*, NIU Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro Podgorica 2003]
- Лукић, Кошутих и Митровић 2002 → Р. Лукић, Б. Кошутих и Д. Митровић. *Увод у право*, ЈП Службени лист СР Југославије, Београд 2002 [R. Lukić, B. Košutić and D. Mitrović *Introduction to Law*, Belgrade: ЈР Official Gazette of FR Yugoslavia 2002]
- Лукић 1995 → Р. Лукић. *Теорија државе и права – 1. Теорија државе*, Завод за уџбенике и наставна средства, Београд 1995 [R. Lukić. *Theory of State and Law – 1. Theory of State*, Institute for Textbooks and Teaching Aids Belgrade 1995]
- Нови Вујаклија 2011 → *Нови Вујаклија*, Штампар Макарије and Октоих, Београд–Подгорица 2011.
- Ристовић 2007 → М. Ристовић. *Експеримент Буљкес – грчка утопија у Југославији 1945–1949*, Платонеум, Нови Сад 2007 [M. Ristović. *Buljkes Experiment – Greek Utopia in Yugoslavia 1945–1949*, Platoneum, Novi Sad 2007]
- Папастатис, 2004 → Х. К. Папастатис (2004), *Савремени правни статус Свете Горе, Зборник радова Византолошког института САНУ*, XLI [H. K. Papastatis (2004). *Contemporary legal status of Mount Athos, Proceedings of the Byzantine Institute of SANU*, XLI]
- Стојковић 1998 → М. Стојковић. *Балкански уговорни односи 1876–1996*, књ. II, ЈП Службени лист СРЈ Београд 1998 [M. Stojković. *Balkan Contractual Relations 1876–1996*, vol. II, Official Gazette of the FRY, Belgrade: 1998]
- Ћосић 2004 → Д. Ћосић. *Косово*, Вечерње новости Београд 2004 [D. Ćosić. *Kosovo*, Večernje novosti, Belgrade 2004]
- Cust 1980 → L. G. A. Cust, *The Status Quo in the Holy Places*, Ariel Publishing House, Jerusalem 1980.
- Mowat 1915 → Mowat, R. B. *Select Treaties and Documents to Illustrate the Development of the Modern European States-System*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1915.
- Pravni leksikon 2007* → *Pravni leksikon*, Leksikografski zavod “Miroslav Krleža”, Zagreb 2007.
- Surlić and Novaković 2020 → S. Surlić and I. Novaković, *Srpska kulturna i verska baština na Kosovu od Ahtisarijevih specijalnih zona do finalnog statusa*, Institut za teritorijalni ekonomski razvoj, Beograd 2020.

ONLINE SOURCES

- The Constitution of the Italian Republic from 1948, <http://www.constitution.org>, 10. maj 2019.
- The Constitution of the Greece from 2001, <http://confinder.richmond.edu>, 10. maj 2019.
- <http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/408759/Vucic-Nema-lakog-ni-bezbolnog-resenja-za-Kosovo-i-Metohiju>, 10. maj 2019.
- http://www.rtv.rs/sr_ci/politika/vucic-pozvao-verske-lidere-na-zastitu-manastira-i-crkava-spc-na-kosovu-i-metohiji_956906.html, 10. maj 2019.
- <http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ci/story/1/politika/3295300/palmer-za-rt-s-to-pre-dogovora-beograda-i-pristine-nema-crvenih-linija.html>, 10. maj 2019.
- <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:742893-Trazimo-neograni-cenu-zastitu-za-manastire>, 10. maj 2019.
- <https://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/2995225-beograd-pokrenuo-pitanje-zastite-srpskih-manastira-na-kosovu-briselu-predstavljen-konkretan-plan-foto>, 10. maj 2019.
- <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/politika/aktuelno.289.html:754038-NOVOSTI>, 10. maj 2019.
- <https://www.espreso.rs/vesti/politika/345195/srbija-daje-presevo-i-medvedju-ali-dobija-sever-procureo-dokument-u-kome-je-detaljno-podeljeno-kosovo>, 4. maj 2019. <http://www.nspm.rs/kosovo-i-Metohia/sta-je-spc-na-kosovu-i-metohiji-%E2%80%93-i-zasto-je-od-2008.-crkva-iskljucena-iz-pregovora-o-kim.html?alphabet=l>, 4. maj 2019.
- Џомић, В. Осврт на предлоге о регулисању статуса Српске Цркве на Косову и Метохији у Политичкој платформи и Резолуцији Народне скупштине Србије; 13. јануара 2013. године објављено на званичној интернет страници Српске Патријаршије [http://www.spc.rs/sr/osvrt_na_predloge_o_regulisanju_statusa_srpske_crkve_na_kosovu_metohiji_u_politichkoj_platformi, 10. maj 2019].

EUROPEAN MAPS OF KOSOVO AND METOHIIJA AS THE PRIMARY CORE OF OLD SERBIA FROM THE 16TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY

MIRČETA VEMIĆ AND SUZANA LOVIĆ

The Geographical Institute “Jovan Cvijić” of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Đure Jakšića 9, Belgrade, Serbia

SUMMARY: The aim of this paper is delimitation and territorial origin of Old Serbia with its primary core Kosovo and Metohija in the historical, ethnic, cultural, geopolitical and national respect from the time of the Turks’ invasion of the Balkans, as well as their withdrawal. This was accomplished by analysis and comparison of geographic, ethnographic, historiographic, memorial, political, military and other maps of the leading European cartographers from the 16th to the 20th century, who had high government titles, such as “the Cosmographer of the Republic”, “The Royal Geographer”, “the Imperial Geographer”, or were military architects, high-ranking General Staff officers, princes, consuls, professors, scientists, etc., which implies the high level of their knowledge and great seriousness in the authorization of their map. Forty historical and historiographical maps of the Dutch, Venetian, French, Austrian, German and Serbian cartographers were analyzed, which were collected, systematized and published in the form of an atlas in 2007, *An Atlas of Old Serbia – European Maps of Kosovo and Metohija* by M. Vemić and M. Strugar.

It is clearly and indisputably shown on all analyzed maps that Kosovo and Metohija have always been Serbian territory, and never Albanian. These two geographic areas are represented on the maps only in the natural historical and ethnical boundaries of state creations of the Serbian people, even over a long period of decline of the medieval Serbian state under Turkish rule, in 1459. Until the middle of the 19th century, the main separate boundary, that is, ethnographic border between fixed Serbian and Albanian settlements was on the rivers of Valbona (Crnica) and Crni Drim (northern Albania) that were considered both geographical borders of Albania and (Old) Serbia, but also a language-speech line that divided the Albanians of northern Albania from the Metohija Serbs.

KEY WORDS: Old Serbia, Kosovo and Metohija, Serbs, Albanians, atlas

Old Serbia, with its primary core Kosovo and Metohija¹, is the historical, geographical, cultural and political term describing the territory of Serbia

¹ Kosovo and Metohija (10 887 km²) are the two neighboring regional entities that are very different in structural, anthropo-geographical and functional regards, but have been politically and

before the Turkish invasion of the Balkans and its fall under Turkish rule (1459). It is linked to the reign of Serbian Emperor Stefan Dušan (1331–1355), when Serbia was at its peak and represented the strongest regional Balkan state, and for the period immediately before Emperor Dušan, for the Kingdom of Serbia under King Milutin (1282–1321) and Stefan Dečanski (1321–1331). After the partial liberation of Serbia from the Turks and the autonomy, in the 1830s, the term Old Serbia (Old Servia, Vieille Serbie, Altserbien) was increasingly used, and signified those areas of Serbia which remained under direct Ottoman rule, outside the borders of the new Serbian state. According to Vladimir Stojančević, the unliberated areas in the 19th century, or “Old Serbia was taken as a country of the ethnic core and centre of the medieval Serbian state of the Nemanjić period,” and consisted of “the regions: Stara Raška, Kosovo², Metohija³, the confluence of the Binička Morava and the northern Vardar valley with Skoplje” [Stojančević 1997]. The term Old Serbia, which had already become common in the local geographic, historiographic, travel, military, political and other literature, in the first half and middle of the 19th century, was also introduced by foreign authors into their works⁴, especially travel writers, reporters, missionaries, diplomats and scientists, who very objectively presented and vividly captured the ethnic, religious, social and political conditions in these areas, still under Turkish rule.

Kosovo and Metohija have immense significance in Serbian history and tradition. The Battle of Kosovo against the Turks in 1389 crucially influenced the formation of national ethics and thus stamped its mark on the spiritual and ethical being and the historical memory of the Serbian people. After the Battle of Kosovo, another way of counting time was adopted in the folk tradition of the Serbs – “before Kosovo” and “after Kosovo” and a great cycle of epic national songs was written, called “the Kosovo cycle.” Kosovo and Metohija are the most valuable part of Serbia, not only because of the Battle of Kosovo, but as the cradle of Serbian statehood and a center of religious and cultural life.

administratively united since 1945 as an autonomous region of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, and under the 1963 Constitution as the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. In 1968, the name Metohija was formally expelled from the name of the Province, and was again returned by the Serbian Constitution of 1990.

² The name Kosovo is etymologically linked to the blackbird (*Turdus merula*). According to Atanasije Urošević, the name “appeared after the battle between the Serbian and Turkish armies in 1389. For medieval Serbia, until the said battle, this area with a suspicious exception, not even once mentioned under the name Kosovo” [Urošević 1965]. Foreign writers and cartographers translated the word as *Campus merulae*, *Champ de merles* or *Amselfeld*, while older titles that preceded the name Kosovo, were in fact the names of certain parts of Kosovo, such as Lipljan, Sitnica, Lab, Obica, Nerodimlje and others.

³ The name Metohija derives from the Greek word “metoh” – monastic property or at first monastic agricultural cooperatives, and “given the extraordinary density and concentration of the monastery and church appendages (Metohija) referred to in the royal charters (official documents with gold seals) from Stefan Nemanja to the last Nemanjić, as well as the charters of princes, despots and great noblemen Hrebeljanović, Lazarević, Branković and others, the whole area of the Metohija-Prizren valley got the name Metohija” [Radovanović 2004].

⁴ Among the major ones are Ami Boué (France), Joseph Müller, Johann Georg von Hahn, Petar Kukulj (Austria), Alexander Hilferding, Ivan Yastrebov (Russia), A. P. Irby and Miss Muir Mackenzie, and writer William Forsythe (England) and others.²

Priština, Prizren and Vučitrn were the capitals of King Milutin, Emperors Dušan and Uroš, as well as great nobleman Vuk Branković, while Bodin, the King of Zeta, was crowned Emperor in Prizren.

Close to 1,500 Christian, Orthodox churches were built in this province around the Peć Patriarchate as the seat of the Serbian Patriarch, among which the monasteries widely known for their spiritual significance, antiquity and architecture were the monasteries of Gračanica, Visoki Dečani, Our Lady of Ljeviš, Banjska, St. Archangels and others. Many churches and monasteries were destroyed during Turkish rule, but to this day they are still being systematically, en masse, destroyed by Albanian separatists, despite the presence of the United Nations peacekeeping forces. Albanians, however, not at all spontaneous in their impetuosity, but on the contrary, quite systematic, are doing this in an effort to completely erase the marks of existence of the Serbian people on its holy land.

The old Serbian kingdom, with Kosovo and Metohija at its center, was shown throughout history on all major European maps, even at the time of the Turkish presence in the Balkans. Western and Central European geographers and cartographers (Dutch, Venetian, French, Austrian, German, British) and local authors wrote on their maps the name Serbia (*Servia*, *Zevia*, *Servien*, *Serbie*, *Serbien*), by which along with other cartographic content: rivers, mountains, settlements, borders, coats of arms, etc. they marked the existence of the medieval Serbian state, and in this way continuously, to the present day, preserved the memory of the territories that had belonged to it, making these maps Serbian deeds of sorts of Kosovo and Metohija.

MATERIALS

The paper analyzes 40 old (historical) and historiographical maps, which M. Vemić and M. Strugar found, thematically processed, systematized, unified and published in 2007 in the form of the atlas entitled *An Atlas of Old Serbia – European Maps of Kosovo and Metohija*. These maps were made by leading European cartographers with high state titles, such as “the Cosmographer of the Republic,” “the Royal Geographer,” “the Imperial Geographer,” as well as military architects, General Staff officers, princes, consuls, professors, scientists, etc., which assumes a high degree of their knowledge and seriousness in the authorization of the maps. The same line includes a number of maps that were done by the local geographers and cartographers in the country or in European workshops, for example, Jovan Cvijić, Spiridon Gopčević et al. The mentioned premises confirm a very high scientific, historical and social value of the selected maps. They provide a very clear view of mutual territorial, ethnic, demographic, religious and cultural relations between the Serbs and the Albanians and determine their mutual border in historical, ethnic, cultural, geopolitical and state terms during the Turks’ invasion of the Balkans, and their withdrawal.

Maps in the atlas are placed in chronological order. They are mostly small scale, meaning that they show space beyond the territory of Serbia, with Serbian,

Slavic and other neighboring lands in the Balkans and the Pannonian Basin. In addition to their general purpose of detecting and displaying the different geographical content of the framed area, older time layers were presented on many maps, which generally increases the content and highlights their historical layer of meaning, and which generally reveals the real intentions, interests, aspirations and objectives for which they were made. The purpose and method of their preparation is often mentioned in the title of the maps or in specially decorated cartouches, in various titles, emblems and inscriptions, or in information about the publisher, printer and the time of publishing of the map. Certain maps were dedicated to individuals, for example “to true aristocrat by birth, education and clarity of mind,” while most were made for general purposes, for example (intended to) “soldier, mathematician and friend of cosmographic association,” for a detailed military geographical description or quite specifically “for the purposes of the present war”.

The atlas consists of maps from seven European countries: the Netherlands (3), Venice (2), France (2), Austria (8), Germany (9), Great Britain (3) and Serbia (13), their main cartographic, state and publishing centers. All maps, although published in different places, are very similar and consistent in content, because they relied on each other as cartographic sources, as evidenced by the similarity seen in the data recorded on most of them. This generally harmonized cartographic spatial continuity evolved relatively uniformly over the time period from the 16th to the 20th century. By collecting and adding new data and geographic knowledge of the Balkan countries and their addition to the maps, with the correction of old errors, there has been significant progress in raising their geographical authenticity. Also, their geometric accuracy increased by introducing mathematical map projections, which greatly improved the general quality of maps. These maps, systematized by source of origin, stating the chronological ordinal number in the atlas are:

Dutch maps

Abraham Ortelij: *Map of Pannonia and old Illyricum* [1:2,000,000]. Atverpen 1590. – *Pannoniae, et Illyrici veteris Tabvla / Ex conatibus geographicis Abrahami Ortelij Antverpiani* [1:2.000.000]. Antverpiani 1590. (1).

Gerard Mercator – William Blau: *Wallachia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Byzantium*, [1:2,150,000]. Amsterdam [1648]. – *Walachia, Servia, Bvlgaria, Romania / Per Gerardum Mercatorem. Guljelmus Blaeu excudebat* [1:2.150.000]. [Amstelaedami], [1648]. (3).

Johan Blaeu: *Today's Illyricum ...* [1:915.000]. Amsterdam, [1662–1665]. – *Illyricvm Hodiernvm, Quod Scriptores communiter Sclavoniam, Itali Schiavoniam nuncupare solent, in Dalmatiam, Croatiam, Bosniam, et Slavoniam distinguitur. Sed cum ejus majorem partem Turcæ optineant in Praefecturas eorum more Sanzacatus dictas divisum est, reliquum autem Veneti, Vngari, et Ragusini tenent. Sanzacatus sunt Bosna, Residentia Baßæ; Poxega; Cernik; Bihak; Lika et Carbava; Clissa; Herzegowina.* / Ioannes Blaeu [1:915.000]. [Amstelaedami], [1662–1665]. (4).

Venetian maps

Maria Vincenzo Coronelli: *The course of the rivers Drim and Bojana in Dalmatia*, [1:315,000]. Venice 1688. – *Corso delli fiumi Drino, e Boiana nella Dalmatia / descritto Dal Padre M[a]r[ia] Coronelli Cosmografo della Seren[issima] Republica di Venetia*, [1:315.000]. 1688. (5).

Giacomo Cantelli from Vignola: *The Kingdom of Serbia, otherwise known as Rascia* [1:470,000]. Rome 1689. – *Il Regno della Servia detta altrimenti Rascia* [1:470.000], descritto Su l'Esemplare delle Carte piu esatte e, con la direzione delle piu recenti notizie da Giacomo Cantelli da Vignola. Suddito; e Geografo del Sereniss: Sig: Duca di Modena e dato in Luce da Gio; Giacomo de Rossi dale. Sue Stampe in Roma alla Pace con priu. Del. Som. Pont, 1689. (6).

French maps

Nicholas Sanson: *The course of the Danube from its source to its mouth* [1:1.950.000]. Paris, 1693. – *Le cours du Danube Depuis sa Source jusq'à ses Embouchures*. Dreseeé sur les Memoires les plus Nouveaux du P. Coroneli et autres, Par le Sr. Sanson Geographe du Roy, [1:1.950.000]. Paris: chez H. Iaillot, 1693. (7).

[*Serbia*] [1:2.250.000]. Paris [the end of the XIX century]. – [*Serbie*], [1:2.250.000]. Imprimerie générale de C. Lahure Paris. (28).

Austrian maps

Carl Schütz: *New map of the Kingdom of Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia and Slavonia together with the border provinces...* [1:1,1000,000].Vienna 1788. – *Neueste Karte der Koenigreiche Bosnien, Servien, Croatien und Slavonien samt den angrænzenden Provinzen Temeswar, Dalmatien, Herzegowina, Ragusa, Steyermark, Kærnthen, Krain, Friaul, Gradiska, und Istrien, einem grossen Theil von Ungarn, Siebenbürgen, Walachei, Bulgarien, Albanien, Macedonien, und einem Stück des Kirchenstaats und Kreichs Neapel / Nach den besten Originalzeichnungen Charten, und Beschreibungen entworfen von Herrn Carl von Schütz*, [1:1.1000.000]. Vienna: Artaria, 1788. (15).

Franz Johann Joseph von Reilly: *The Kingdom of Serbia*, [1:1,440,000]. [Vienna] [1791]. – *Das Koenigreich Serwien*, Nro. 5. / Franz Johann Joseph von Reilly. In: *Schauplatz der fünf Theile der Welt*, [1:1.440.000]. [Wien], [I. Albrecht sculpsit], [1791]. (16).

Franz Johann Joseph von Reilly: *The northern part of the Kingdom of Albania with the District of Montenegro* [1:400,000]. [Vienna] [1791]. – *Der Noerdliche Theil des Koenigreichs Albanien mit dem Distrikte Montenegro*, Nro. 21./ Franz Johann Joseph von Reilly [1:400.000]. [Wien] 1791. (17).

Meyer Herman Julius: *The European Turkey*, 1:3,000,000. Leipzig–Vienna, 1864. – *Die Europaeische Turkey / Meyer Herman Julius Meyer*, 1:3.000.000. In: Meyer's Hand Atlas, Leipzig–Wien 1864. (21).

Carl Sax: *Ethnographic map of European Turkey and its provinces, at the beginning of 1877*. Vienna, 1878. – *Ethnographische karte der Europäischen*

Türkei und ihrer Dependenz zu Anfang des Jahres 1877. von Carl Sax k.u.k. österreichisch-ungarischer Consul in Adrianopel. Wien, 1878. (23).

Political division, nationalities and religions. Appendix № 3 for a detailed description of Sandžak, Pljevlje and Kosovo vilayet. 1:750,000. Vienna 1899. – *Polit. Eintheilung, Nationalitäten und Religionen 1:750,000. Beilage № 3. zur Detailbeschreibung des Sandžaks Plevlje und des Vilajets Kosovo* (Mit 8 Beilagen und 10 Tafeln). Als Manuscript gedruckt. Wien. 1899. (27).

Karl Peucker: *Macedonia, Old Serbia and Albania*, 1:864,000. Vienna 1912. – *Makedonien, Altserbien und Albanien* / Bearbeitet von Dr. Karl Peucker, 1:864.000. Wien 1912. (33).

Ethnic and linguistic map of Central Europe, with Italy and the Balkan Peninsula, 1:3,000,000. Vienna, [1917]. – *Völker – und Sprachenkarte von Mittel-Europa nebst Italien und der Balkanhalbinsel*. Nach den neuesten statistischen Veröffentlichungen bearbeitet. / G. Freytags. 1:3.000.000. Wien: Druck und Verlag der Kartogr. Anstalt G. Freytag Berndt, Ges. m. b. H. [1917]. (38).

German maps

Martin Waldeseemüller: *Modern map of Bosnia, Serbia, Greece and Slavonia*. Strasbourg 1513. – *Tabula moderna Bossinae, Serviae, Graeciae et Sclavoniae* / Martin Waldeseemüller, 1513. (2).

Johann Baptist Homann: *The Danube Rivers (shown here as it flows from the city of Belgrade, through the Black Sea to Constantinople) the lower course, where Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania and Bessarabia are shown with neighboring areas* [1:2,000,000]. Nuremberg [1710]. – *Danubii Fluminis (hic ab urbe Belgrado per Mare Nigrum usque Constantinopolim defluentis exhibiti) pars infima in qua Transylvania, Walachia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, Servia, Romania et Bessarabia cum vicinis Regionibus ostenduntur* / à Ioh. Bapt. Homanno [1:2.000.000]. Norimbergæ [1710]. (8).

Johann Matthias Hase: *Map of Hungary in the broad sense and the old or methodical complex of kingdoms: Hungary in a narrower sense, Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Cumania; principality: Transylvania; despotisms: Wallachia, Moldavia...*, [1:2,500,000]. [Nuremberg] 1744. – *Hvngarie ampliori significatu et veteris vel Methodicae complexae Regna: Hungariae propriae, Croatiae Dalmatiae, Bosniae, Serviae, Bulgariae, Cvmaniae, Principatum: Transsylvaniae, Despotatus: Walachiae, Moldaviae [exclusis ab eadem alienatis Galitia et Lvdomiriria] in suas Provincias ac partes divisae et quoad Imperantes ex Avstriacis, Tyrcis et Venetis distinctae ...* Tabvla exrecentissimis pariter et antiquissimis relationibus et monumentis concinnata ac secundum leges Projectionis Stereographicae legitima descripta a I. M. Hasio M. PP. Curantibus Homannianis, 1:2.500.000, [Norimbergæ] 1744. (9).

Peter Conrad Monath: *Dalmatia and the surrounding regions, Croatia, Bosnia, Slavonia, Serbia, Albania accurately described*, [1:1,200,000]. Nuremberg [1750]. – *Dalmatia et regiones adjacentes, Croatia, Bosnia, Slavonia, Servia, Albania accurate descriptae* [1:1.200.000]. Normembergæ Petr Conr[ad] Monath excudit [1750]. (10).

Johann Baptist Homann: *Turkish Empire in Europe, Asia and Africa* [1:12,000,000]. Nuremberg [1750]. – *Imperium Turcicum in Europa, Asia et Africa, Regiones Proprias, Tributaries, Clientelares sicut et omnes ejusdem Beglirbegatus seu Praefecturas Generales exhibens.* / Sumtibus Io. Baptista Homanni, [1:12.000.000]. [Norimbergæ] [1750]. (11).

August Gottlieb Boehm – Homann's heirs: *The latest map of the Danube with the surrounding kingdoms, as well as whole Greece and the archipelago* [1:44,000,000]. Nuremberg 1766. – *Totius Danubii cum Adjacentibus Regnis nec non Totius Graeciae et Archipelagi*. Novissima Tabula ex recentissimis supsidüs concinnata et ad Leges Projectionis Stereographicae legitime / reducta ab Augusto Gottlob Boehmio electoris Saxoniae Cohortis Architecton ... , [1:44.000.000]. Norimbergæ ..., 1766. (12).

Tobiae Conrad Lotter: *New Greece and the Aegean Sea with Archipelago ...* [1:1,650,000]. [Augsburg], [1770]. – *Graecia Nova et Mare Aegeum s. Archipelagus in qua Mappa Macedonia, Albania, Epirus, Thessalia et Morea cum circumjacentibus Insulis Corcyra, Cephalonia, Zacynthnos, Stalimene, Metelino, Chios* / distinctae exhibentur, opera et sumtibus Tobiae Conradi Lotteri, Geographi Augustae Vindel. [Augsburg] [1770]. (13).

Homann's heirs: *Map of current Northern Greece* [1:1,300,000]. Nuremberg 1770. – *Mappa Geographica Graeciae Septentrionalis hodiernae sive Provinciarum Macedoniae Thessaliae et Albaniae, in qua ultima Provincia Habitationes sitae Gentis Montenegrinae in Comitatu Zentanensi expressae sunt, unacum finitimis Regionibus atque Insulis, ex recentissimis novissimisque Subsidiis secundum normam legitimae Projectionis in usum belli praesentis delineata*, [1: 1.300.000]. Norimbergæ Cura Homannianorum Heredum, C.P.S.C.M. 1770. D.A. Hauer sc. Norimb. (14).

Heinrich Kiepert: *General map of European Turkey* [1:1,000,000]. Berlin, 1853. – *General-karte von der europäischen Türkei* / Nach allen vorhandenen Originalkarten und itinerarischen Hilfsmitteln bearbeitet und gezeichnet von Heinrich Kiepert, [1:1.000.000]. Berlin 1853. (20).

British maps

Alfred Stead: *Etnographical Map of Servia* / Alfred Stead. 1:2,750,000. In: *Servia by the Servians*. London; William Heinemann, 1909. (32).

Arthur Evans: *Diagrammatic Map of Slav territories east of the Adriatic* / by Sir Arthur Evans. 1:2,000,000. London: Published by permission of the Royal Geographical Society. From the *Geographical Journal*, April 1916. (36).

Robert Williams Seton-Watson: *The Race of the Balkan Peninsula*. London 1917. – *The Race of the Balkan Peninsula* / by R. W. Seton-Watson D. Litt. London: Constable and Company limited 1917. (37).

Serbian maps

Dimitrije Davidović: *Countries in which Serbs reside*. Vienna: Novine Srpske, 1821. – *Земље у којима пребивају Срби*. Беч: Новине Српске, 1821. (18).

Nikola Vasojević: *Map of Kosovo Polje*, 1:200,000. [Novi Sad], [1847]. – *Земљовид Косова поља*, 1:200.000. [Нови Сад], [1847]. *Земљовидъ Косовы Поля (Situations-Plan von Kosowo-Polje, Amselfeld)* / Састављен од Кнеза Николе Васојевића (*Aufgenommen von Fürst Nicol Wasojevits*), 1:200.000. [Novi Sad]: Печат Јолер (Loler Print) [1847]. (19).

Miloš St. Milojević: *Historical-ethnographic geographical map of the Serbs and the Serbian (Yugoslav) countries in Turkey and Austria*, 1:2,000,000. Belgrade: Issued by Kosta Atanaskov-Šumenković, 1873. – *Историјско-еџнографско географска мапа Срба и српских (југословенских) земаља у Турској и Аустрији*, 1:2.000.000. Београд: Издао Коста Атанасков-Шуменковић, 1873. (22).

Dragaš Žegligović: *Ethnographical Map of the Balkan Peninsula*, [1:3.000.000]. Belgrade 1885. – *Еџнографска карта Балканског полуострва, Carte ethnographique de la presqu'île des Balcans* / Dressée d'après les documents historiques philologiques par Dragasch Gégligovatz professeur de Géographie et d'Ethnographie, P. Tchourtchitch libraire-éditeur, [1: 3,000,000]. Belgrade, 1885. (24).

Vladimir Karić: *Map of Distribution of the Serbs*. In: Serbia. Belgrade: Serbian-Royal state printing, 1887. – *Карта распрострања Срба*. У: Србија. Београд: Краљевско-српска државна штампарија, 1887. (25).

Spiro Gorčević: *Ethnographical Map of Macedonia and Old Serbia*, 1:750,000. [Belgrade] 1889. *Ethnographische Karte Alt-Serbien und Makedonien / von Spiridon Gorčević*, 1:300.000. In: *Makedonien und Alt-Serbien*. Wien: Verlag von L. W. Seidel and Sohn, 1889. – Spiridon Gorčević: *Еџнографска карта Сџаре Србије и Македоније*, 1:300.000. Београд: Књижевни фонд Илије М. Коларца, 1890. (26, а, б).

Jovan Mišković: *Map of Kosovo Polje*, 1:150,000. Belgrade: The General Staff Photo-Lithography Workshop [1900]. – *Карта Косова поља*, 1:150.000. Београд: Фото-литографска радионица Главног Генералштаба [1900]. (29).

The Serbian Velika Shkola (University) Youth: *Ethnographical Map of the Serbian countries with the south border of Old Serbia and the Serbian border of Tsar Dušan*, 1:2,000,000. Belgrade, 1905. – Српска високошколска омладина: *Еџнографска карта српских земаља са јужном границом Сџаре Србије и границом Србије цара Душана*, – *Carte ethnographique Serbe, avec les limites méridionales de la Vieille Serbe et celles de la Serbie du Tsar Doushan*, 1:2.000.000. Београд, 1905. (30).

Jovan Cvijić: *Political-ethnographical Sketch of Macedonia and Old Serbia*, 1:4,000,000. In: *Fundamentals of Geography and Geology of Macedonia and Old Serbia with observations in southern Bulgaria, Thrace, the neighbouring parts of Asia Minor, Thessaly, Epirus and northern Albania*. Belgrade: Serbian Royal Academy, 1906. – *Политичко-еџнографска скица Македоније и Саре Србије*, 1:4.000.000. У: Основе за географију и геологију Македоније и старе Србије с проматрањима у јужној Бугарској, Тракији, суседним деловима Мале Азије, Тесалији, Епиру и северној Албанији. Београд: Српска Краљевска Академија, 1906. (31).

Jovan Cvijić: *Ethnographical Map of the Balkan Peninsula*, 1:1,000,000. Gotha, 1913. – *Ethnographische Karte der Balkanhalbinsel / nach allen*

vorhandenen Quellen und eigenen Beobachtungen von Prof. Dr. J. Cvijić. Leitung: Prof. Paul Langhans ... 1:1.000.000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1913. (34).

Stevan P. Bošković: *New Map of the Serbian Kingdoms and neighbouring areas*, 1:1.000.000. Belgrade: Cartographic Workshop of the Geography Department of the The General Staff, 1914. – *Нова карта српских краљевина и суседних обласци*, 1:1.000.000. Београд: Картографска радионица Географског Одељења Гл. Ћ-штаба, 1914. (35).

Jovan Cvijić: *Ethnographical Map of the Balkan Peninsula*, 1:3,000,000. Paris, 1918. – *Carte ethnographique de la Péninsule des Balkans* / Jovan Cvijić, 1:3.000.000. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1918.(39).

Ljubiša Gvoić: *Serbian spiritual heritage in Kosovo and Metohija*, 1:300,000. Belgrade: Information Service of the Serbian Orthodox Church, 2003. – Љубиша Гвоић: *Српска духовна баштина на Косову и Меџохији*, 1:300.000. Београд: Информативна служба Српске Православне цркве, 2003. (40).

METHODS

The maps in the atlas were analyzed from several aspects in order to determine the boundaries and territorial affiliation of Old Serbia with its primary core of Kosovo and Metohija in the historical, ethnic, cultural, geopolitical and national respect from the time of the Turkish invasion of the Balkans, as well as the Turks' withdrawal. In this sense, the analysis carried out includes:

- Competences of authors and publishers (cartographic centers, institutions);
- Motives of making and purpose of the maps, as well as the time and place of their publication;
- Territories covered by the maps, with the geographical position of Kosovo and Metohija on them;
- The theme of mapping, regardless of whether the maps are general geographic or various thematic maps: ethnic, linguistic, religious, confessional, political, military, etc.;
- Classification of content by elements, thematic layers and internal hierarchy;
- Dimension of maps with inset maps, sketches, etc.;
- Composition of maps with more layers: natural presentation (hydrography and relief), settlements, ethnic, linguistic, religious, confessional, state and administrative boundaries, toponyms, additional content (panoramic drawings, emblems, flags, cartouches) and the like.

In addition to a multilateral analysis of the maps, they were also compared in spatial and temporal terms, whereby the following can be determined:

- Similarities and differences in approach, motives and goals of mapping,
- Perspectives on territorial units shown on the maps from different angles: the continental (Central European and Southern European), coastal (Mediterranean, Adriatic, Aegean, Black Sea), from the flow of major rivers (the Danube, the Sava, the Vardar, the Drim, the Bojana), the regional linking of countries, state status, provincial or local position, etc.
- Repetition of the contents of maps for the same territories over time with successive addition of new ones, retaining the previous cartographic layers,

- Correspondence of statistical numerical data with sign, graphic, cartographic presentation,
- Stability of natural, ethnic, linguistic, religious, confessional, state and administrative borders,
- Preservation of macro-, meso- and micro-toponyms in the territorial range of maps for the studied time period, etc.
- Constancy (or slow variability) of ethnic, linguistic, religious, confessional, cultural, political, military and other relations between peoples and countries for the observed period.

All maps in the atlas are analyzed in detail, which is in the form of short text put with every single map on a separate atlas page, together with the original and translated title. Comparison of maps and the final synthesis of the established historical and geographical data, facts and conclusions are presented in the wider text found at the beginning of the atlas.

RESULTS

The analysis and comparison of 40 atlas maps of the territory of Serbia and its Balkan and Pannonian surroundings, from the period 1513–1918, have shown that most of them have several historical layers: ancient, medieval and a layer from the time of publication of the map. The ancient layer shows the ancient Greek or provinces of the Roman Empire, the medieval all old kingdoms, principalities, despotisms, duchies as well as their immediate areas that existed at that time in the Balkans, while the modern layer mainly shows the current state of the presence of the Ottoman Empire through a division of the territories into dependent states, which paid tribute to the Empire, as well as their prefectures. On almost all maps, the most instructive is the middle – medieval layer.

All the maps show the territory, with the name of the old kingdom of Serbia inscribed (Zevia, Servia, Servia Regn., Servien, Das Königreich Serwien, Serbie, Serbien) and Raška (Rascia, Rassa, Rasia, Rassa, Raxia, Rascien) and the Serbian Empire, either in the wider or narrower territorial range. In the same line with the presentation of Serbia, other Serbian, Slavic and other neighboring countries are shown such as Bosnia (Bossina, Bosnia, Bosnien, Bosnie, Bosna) with Herzegovina of St. Sava (Herzegovina S. Saba, Herzegowina) or Duchy (Dukat) of St. Sava (Dvc. S. Saba), Zeta (Zenta), Montenegro (Montenegro, Zrna Gora), S(k)lavonia (Sclavonia, Schiavonia, Slavonien), Bulgaria (Bulgaria), Wallachia (Walachia, Walachei), Hungary (Hvngaria, Hungaria), Byzantium (Romania), Greece (Graecia) and the like. In addition to these countries on these maps, the territories of certain countries which retained their ancient names are presented with equal significance, for example, Macedonia (Macedonia, Macedonien) or Dalmatia (Dalmatia, Dalmatien). On the maps, which cover a narrower territory, besides the name of Serbia, its particular areas are also inscribed, such as: Kosovo Polje (Campus merulae, Merlinius Campus et Cassovius, Champ Merlin, Champ de merles, Amselfeld) or Kosovo (Cassova provincia), Metohija (Metoja, la Métochie, Metochia) or Podrima (Podrima, Podrima Provincia), as well as Toplica (Topliza), Sitnica (Sitimza), etc. The name

Albania does not appear on all maps in the atlas, and if it does it is not in the same rank as other countries, but more as an area within the existing countries, notably Greece and Macedonia.

Geographic position and natural boundaries. The geographical location of the old kingdom (empire) of Serbia, on older maps of either wider or narrower geographic range, is bounded by natural geographic boundaries, primarily relief and hydrography, although there are detailed maps with borders drawn on them. This is particularly expressively shown in respect to the position of Serbia and Albania. Thus on the Waldeseemüller map from 1513, which is part of the revived and modernized Ptolemy's map, the Balkan Peninsula is shown with natural and geographic territorial division between countries (Figure 1).



Figure 1. *Modern map of Bosnia, Serbia, Greece and Slavonia*

(*Tabula moderna Bossinae, Serviae, Graeciae et Sclavoniae*) [Waldeseemüller 1513]

“The mountain ranges of the central ridge, known as *Catena mundi* (Latin for ‘the chains of the world’; Serbian ‘verige sveta’), separate Serbia (Zevia) and Bosnia (Bossina) from Slavonia (Sclavonia), Dalmatia (Dalmatia) and Greece (Graecia) on the map. The territory of Greece is divided into several areas: Thessaly (abbreviated Thessalo.), Achaia (Achaia), Athens (Ducat Athenie) and

Morea (Morea). Among the Greek regions, the toponym Albania is placed in the area of northern Epirus, south of the Crni Drim River with the source from Lake Ohrid" [Vemić and Strugar 2007].

Strabon (62 BC – 23 AD), a long time ago, on the threshold between the old and the new era, found that the natural division or natural boundary between countries and peoples was the best. In this sense, it logically follows that the earliest maps show the orographic separation of Serbia and Albania, as it has long been known that two major mountain ranges stretch and face one another in that area: Prokletije (2694m) and Šar Mountain (2748m) which are mutually connected by a series of small mountains: Bogičevica (2366m), Đeravica (2656m), Junička Mountain (2305m), Paštrik (1986m) and Koritnik (2393m). The orographic boundary is continuously shown on the maps as follows: 1) in the ancient layer, between the Roman provinces of Upper Moesia (with Dardania) and Macedonia, north and south in relation to the aforementioned mountain range, 2) in the medieval layer, between Serbia (Raška) and Zeta or Greece and 3) in the present, between Serbia and Albania.



Figure 2. Part of the map *The Course of the Rivers Drim and Bojana in Dalmatia* (*Corso delli fiumi Drino, e Boiana nella Dalmatia*) [1:315.000]. [Coronelli 1688]

The cartographers who tied their presentations to the river basins, for example, M. V. Coronelli, “the cosmographer of the republic” of Venice, or N. Sanson, a French “royal geographer”, in addition to orographic also drew borders on rivers, confirming completely the aforementioned truth by Strabon. Thus on Coronelli’s map, *The Course of the Rivers Drim and Bojana in Dalmatia* (*Corso delli fiumi Drino, e Boiana nella Dalmatia*) [1:315.000] (1688) boundaries are drawn in dashed lines between all the territories that had some kind of self-government in pre-Ottoman time (kingdoms, duchies, parishes, cities, republics), with noble coats of arms depicted on them. On this “map Albania is not mentioned anywhere, although the names of some Albanian tribes are mentioned” [Vemić and Strugar 2007], which are located on the left bank of the Drim River. In this part of the territory, the boundary is drawn between the parts of the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia and Zeta and it is on the rivers Valbona (Crnica), the Drim and the Crni Drim (Figure 2).

The boundary on three rivers is also repeated later on maps by G. Cantelli, N. Sanson, P. C. Monath, J. B. Homann, T. C. Lotter, etc., and appears as an ethnographic boundary between Serbian and Albanian settlements, as well as the language line, on thematic, ethnic and linguistic maps from the end of the 19th and early 20th century.

Toponyms. In addition to natural, orographic structure and hydrographical lines that define the affiliation of territories at a macro level, a large number of settlements with the toponyms is presented on the analyzed maps, which confirm and complete the affiliation of a territory, at a meso level. On the Waldeseemüller map from 1513, on the territory of Serbia, a small but significant number of toponyms is written, of which three in Kosovo and Metohija: the medieval mining town of Novo Brdo (Nouomont), then Lake Svrčinsko, that is, Sazlijsko and Robovačko mud, where Svrčin was (Suercegin), the castle of the Serbian Nemanjić dynasty and the third, the area of Sitnica (Sitimza), shown as a settlement. These Serbian toponyms are usually repeated on maps from the early period, and are becoming more numerous, especially on larger scale maps. Thus Coronelli’s map (1688), in addition to Novo Brdo (Novo Monte), shows all of today’s larger cities in Kosovo and Metohija: Mitrovica (Mitrouiza), Vučitrn (Wciterna), Priština (Pristina), Suva Reka (Suha Riesca), Peć (Pechia), Dečani (Deciani), Đakovica (Iacoua, Iacouizza) and Prizren (Prisrendi, Prisren), as well as other settlements: Gušterica (Gusteriza), Janjevo (Iagneuo), Vragolija (Vragolia), Ribare (Ribare), Krajmirovce (Kraimirouc), Graždanik (Grasdanico), etc. On Cantelli’s map (1689) Trepča (Treppcia) appears with Mitrovica, Hoča (Hocia) with Suva Reka, and Ljubižda (Iubossida) with Prizren, Graždanik (Grasdanico), Gorožup (Gorosupi) etc. It should be noted that all the maps place all the major peripheral Metohija cities, Peć, Dečani, Đakovica and Prizren in Serbia, and never in Albania, which indicates that the European cartographers have known that fact for the last five centuries.

Ethnic, linguistic and other maps. A more detailed analysis of the position of territory and borders of Old Serbia, near Kosovo and Metohija in the studied period, can be conducted on the basis of thematic maps in the atlas with ethnic,

religious and confessional and linguistic contents, such as maps by the following cartographers: C. Sax (1878), D. Žegligović (1885), V. Karić (1887), S. Gopčević (1889), J. Cvijić (1906, 1913, 1918), A. Stead (1909), A. Evans (1916), R. W. Seton-Watson (1917), followed by *The Ethnic and Linguistic Map of Central Europe with Italy and the Balkan Peninsula* (1917) published by the Vienna-based cartographic house Freytag and the like (Figure 3). These maps were created as a result of detailed research and collection of data (knowledge) of European travelers and explorers in the territory of the Balkan countries (H. Pouquille., A. Boué, J. Müller, J. G. von Hahn, A. Grisebach, H. Kiepert et al.), and had a great impact on European scientific and political opinion in the 19th century. Special attention was paid to the presentation of ethnic relations. One of the indicators is usually represented on them, but there are maps with more complex representations. Thus, for example, C. Sax, the Austrian consul in Constantinople, identified and presented the ethnic groups using a “combination of features:” language, confession and national consciousness. The map legend shows that he presented 8 major ethnic groups, 11 subgroups and three mixed categories, which are classified into three existing confessions—Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Mohammedan—so that the map has a total of 21 thematic units. Similarly, S. Gopčević (1889) distinguished 13 ethnic groups, Cvijić (1913) 12 of them with 23 entities, of which 7 multi-confessional.




Figure 3. Part of the map *The Race of the Balkan Peninsula* [R.W. Seton-Watson 1917], left; part of the map *Ethnic and Linguistic Map of Central Europe with Italy and the Balkan Peninsula (Völker – und Sprachenkarte von Mittel-Europa nebst Italien und der Balkanhalbinsel)*, [Freytags 1917] to the right.

Since this is about thematic maps, which by their origin represent an achievement of modern cartography from the end of the 19th and early 20th century, and cannot be found for the preceding centuries, for a more detailed and thorough analysis, the historical maps of M. Pešikan, M. Macura and A. Urošević are also placed in the atlas, which are based on the Turkish censuses from the early 16th century. The territory of Kosovo and Metohija with its surroundings is covered by several such censuses (*defterleri*), from 1452, 1455, 1485, 1489, 1571, 1566–74. The settlements are classified in them according to *nahias*, but the basic data relate to individual men, women, widows (as the heads of the families), as well as monks and unmarried adult males, i.e. to all taxpayers. Defterleri are transcribed from the old Turkish to the Serbian language and are a very accurate and reliable historical source for the reconstruction of the ethno-demographic circumstances at the beginning of Turkish rule in Serbia.

Analyzing a unique record of personal names by settlements, according to linguistic affiliation, Pešikan compiled a variety of maps showing the territorial distribution of population of old Serbian and old Albanian type who lived in a broader regional framework of today's southwestern Serbia, southeastern Montenegro and northern Albania, where the general ambivalence of these two people can be seen, with very few mixed areas. Although the map was drawn in a simplified way, with hatches, it clearly shows the full extent of the old Serbian type of names in Old Serbia, that is, in Kosovo and Metohija, except for slight




Figure 4. *Map of personal names in the 15th and early 16th century* [Pešikan 1982]

mixing near Đakovica in the territory of present-day Serbia, but also across the border in old Altina in the territory of Albania. A similar situation existed in the territory of today's Montenegro, except for a small mixing of names around Lake Skadar.

Synthesizing the data for seven consecutive Turkish defterleri covering a hundred and twenty years, from 1452 to 1574, Pešikan gave a very comprehensive and complex map titled *The Kosovo Personal Names of the XV–XVI Century*, which presents all the settlements of that time in Kosovo and Metohija. The settlements are divided into two categories: settlements with the Serbian type of names and the Albanian type of names (Figure 5). On this much more concrete map by Pešikan, in terms of ethnic affiliation of settlements, the absolute presence of the Serbian settlements is visible, with a partial mix with the Albanian ones only near Đakovica, in a slightly higher percentage than on the previous map, which shows some settling of Albanians from Albania and their gradual infiltration in Metohija, which would gradually increase in the following cen-




Figure 5. *The Kosovo Personal Names of the XV–XVI Century* [Pešikan 1986]

turies. The Turkish conquest of Kosovo and Metohija damaged permanent settlements the most, as established by the 1455 census analysis by M. Macura, who found that there were 32 destroyed villages probably during the Battle of Kosovo, 42 deserted villages, from which the people were exterminated or fled. In other words, out of a total of 599 villages recorded, 74 or 12% were unfit for human habitation. In addition to the above noted, as many as 142 tiny (up to 5 houses) and small villages (6–10 houses) were recorded, indicating that the whole structure of the villages was damaged by the Turkish occupation [Macura 2001].

In this ethno-demographic situation, where they lived mixed – majority Serbian Christian population to minority Albanian – of Islamic and, to a much lesser extent, Catholic confession, there is a frequent descent of the Albanian cattle-farming *fis* population (Malisors, Mirdita, Feni) from the mountainous areas of northern and central Albania, who individually or collectively began to occupy the gentle plains of Metohija, continuing to exert tremendous pressure on the native, mostly Serbian farming population. Thus the Albanians seized Serbian estates, continuing to violently push out and persecute the remaining Serbs from Old Serbia, throughout the period of Ottoman rule in the region, and due to religious reasons, i.e. their majority confession being Islam, the Albanians were privileged in the Turkish Empire. “The Turkish authorities tolerated many cases of violation of public order, in some of them they were participants or accomplices in the extortions and executions particularly of Serbian leaders in the villages. Ransom called ‘tally’ and abductions of women were a special kind of persecution of non-Muslim subjects ...” [Stojančević 1994].

The ethno-demographic situation during early Ottoman rule in Kosovo and Metohija, which was successfully reconstructed by Pešikan, Macura and others, continuously changed with the permanent colonization of Albanians, for a long time, but was never reversed in favor of the Albanians until the 20th century. This is confirmed by a travelogue by Miloš S. Milojević entitled *Travels through a Part of Real (Old) Serbia*, which was published in three volumes in 1871, 1872 and 1877. Milojević was the first Serbian travel writer who traveled around Old Serbia and directly in the field collected and published data on population and settlements in these areas. Based on original data from Milojević's travels, M. Vemić produced a map entitled *Ethnic Map of a Part of Old Serbia 1:300,000*, which is in the atlas with other historiographical maps. It shows that the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, with visible marks of Albanian colonization, were still the majority at that time, and the Albanians the minority.

The ethnic picture of mutual relations between the Serbs and Albanians shortly before the Serbian–Turkish wars of 1876, 1877/78 is shown on this map using the diagrammatic map method by settlements, by national and religious and confessional criteria. There are 895 settlements represented out of a total of 1,140 recorded in the travelogue by Milojević, with 123 unreconnoitred and 122 repeated settlements, which are classified in seven categories according to

the number of houses. Of the total number of represented settlements, 483 were Serbian, 92 Albanian and 230 mixed. All big cities, Prizren, Priština, Peć, Đakovica and Kuršumlija, were over 90% ethnically Serbian. Of the smaller ethnic groups, five Circassian villages are mapped, Ottomans in a mixed village (Mamuša, 80 houses) and Prizren (120 houses), and Gypsies in 7 mixed settlements. More precise indications are given in the table below:




Figure 6. *Ethnic Map of a Part of Old Serbia* [Vemić 2005]

Table 1. Distribution of ethnic groups by settlements [Vemić 2011]

Ethnic groups	Settlements
Serbs (Orthodox Christians)	244
Islamicized Serbs (converts)	130
Serbs – Islamicized Serbs	109
Total:	483
Major urban settlements – Serbs being the majority	5 settlements in all
Arnauts (Islamicised Albanians)	69
Latins (Roman Catholic Albanians)	21
Arnauts – Latins	2
Total:	92
Serbs – Arnauts	18
Serbs – Latins	15
Islamicized Serbs – Arnauts	152
Islamicized Serbs – Latins	4
Total:	189
Serbs – Islamicized Serbs – Arnauts	22
Serbs – Arnauts – Latins	1
Islamicized Serbs – Arnauts – Latins	2
Serbs – Islamicized Serbs – Arnauts – Latins	5
Total:	30
Serbs – Gypsies	1
Islamicized Serbs – Gypsies	2
Serbs – Islamicized Serbs – Gypsies	1
Serbs – Arnauts – Gypsies	1
Islamicized Serbs – Osmanlis – Gypsies	1
Total:	6
Islamicized Serbs or Arnauts	77 “either-or” settlements in all
Circassians	5
Settlements without data on the ethnic situation	8
Total of	895 settlements

It can be concluded from these figures that at that time there were three times more settlements populated by the Orthodox Serbs than Islamicized Albanians (244:69), and nearly twofold more settlements with Islamicized Serbs than with the Islamicized Albanians (130:69), and compared with only 21 settlements of Roman Catholic Albanians (Catholics) there are then 11, i.e. 6 times more Serbs. However, the Albanians were mixed more with the Islamicized Serbs due to confessional similarity (in 152 settlements) than with the Orthodox Serbs (in 18 settlements), while the Roman Catholics were mixed more with the Orthodox Serbs (in 15 settlements) than with the Islamicized Serbs (in 4 settlements). The Serbs of both confessions were mixed in 109 settlements.

The Albanian state was created in 1912, when its borders were temporarily defined. Demarcation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was made only after the First World War (1920). The negotiations in Paris were led precisely

on the subject of the natural, historical, ethnic and linguistic boundaries in the river valleys of the Drim and Crni Drim, in the north of present-day Albania. There were two proposals: by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George (from 14/1/1920) and the delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (from 20/1/1920), which were slightly different. However, instead of one of the presented suggestions being accepted or an intermediate solution being established, the boundary was shifted in favor of the Albanians far in the north, i.e. from the valleys of these rivers on the orographic borders of mountain ranges of the Prokletije and Šar Mountain (Figure 7).




Figure 7. Two proposals for demarcation between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Albania at the Paris Conference in 1920 [Slukan-Altić 2006]

THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS

The analyzed maps in the atlas were made by the best European cartographers who in addition to the indisputable cartographic competence had high government and scientific titles and occupied high positions in their respective societies. The maps were made over a long time period from 1513 to 1918. They were made for the general, educational, scientific, cultural, political, military (war) and other purposes. In their time they had a great impact on scientific and political opinion, but also permanently, not only in their own countries but in Europe, too.

All analyzed maps have shown that the area of Old Serbia, which included Kosovo and Metohija, has always been considered an integral part of Serbia.

The maps directly show that the selected European and national authors, geographers, cosmographers and cartographers did not recognize the Turkish conquest of the Balkans and by their representations on the maps preserved awareness of the fact that these territories belonged to Old Serbia. The maps show that these two geographic areas existed only within the natural historical and ethnic boundaries of the state creations of the Serbian people, despite traces of gradual Albanian settlement over a long time period from the Turkish invasion of the Balkans, the Turks' withdrawal, to the present day. Kosovo and Metohija were never particularly singled out from the wider context and environment of Old Serbia, so neither territorially nor thematically did their separate cartographic representations ever exist. This has clearly and indisputably shown that Kosovo and Metohija have always been Serbian territory, and never Albanian.

Most of the maps confirm that the main division border, i.e. ethnographic boundary between Serbian and Albanian settlements, until the mid-19th century, was on the rivers Valbona (Crnica), Drim and Crni Drim, which were regarded as both the geographical border between Albania and (Old) Serbia, as well as a speech and language line dividing the Albanians of northern Albania from the Metohija Serbs. In this sense, with the creation of Albania in the 20th century, the Serbs and Albanians have already once made a historic compromise regarding demarcation when they raised the new age historical, ethnic, linguistic and natural boundary from the aforementioned rivers onto the highest peaks of the mountain range.

The selected maps compiled in the *Atlas of Old Serbia – European Maps of Kosovo and Metohija* undoubtedly have great scientific, historical and social value. Because of their documentary, they now represent special Serbian deeds (document on the right of governing, certificate of ownership) of Kosovo and Metohija.

LITERATURE

- Macura 2001 → Милош Мацура (Ур.) *Насеља и становништво Области Бранковића 1455. године*. Београд: Српска академија наука и уметности, 2001. [Miloš Macura (Ur.) *Naselja i stanovništvo Oblasti Brankovića 1455. godine*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 2001 / Miloš Macura (Ed.) *The Settlements and the Population of the Branković 1455*. Belgrade 2001]
- Pešikan 1982 → Митар Пешикан (1982). *Зетско-хумско-рашка имена на почетку турског доба – I. Уводна разматрања*. У: Ивић, П. (Ур.) *Ономајолошки прилози, књ. III*. Београд: Српска Академија наука и уметности, Одељење језика и књижевности, Одбор за ономастику, 1982. [Mitar Pešikan, *Zetsko-humsko-raška imena na početku turskog doba – I. Uvodna razmatranja*. U: Ivić, P. (Ur.) *Onomatološki prilozi, knj. III*. Beograd: Srpska Akademija nauka i umetnosti, Odeljenje jezika i književnosti, Odbor za onomastiku, 1982 / Mitar Pešikan, *Names of Zeta-Hum-Raška Region at the Beginning of the Turkish Era – I. Introductory considerations*. In: Ivić, P. (Ed.) *Onomatološki prilozi, knj. III*. Belgrade 1982]
- Pešikan 1986 → Митар Пешикан, *Стара имена из Доњег Подримља*, У: Ивић, П. (Ур.) *Ономајолошки прилози, књ. VII*. Београд: Српска Академија наука и уметности,

- Одељење језика и књижевности, Одбор за ономастику, 1986. [Mitar Pešikan, Stara imena iz Donjeg Podrimlja. U: Ivić, P. (Ur.) *Onomatološki prilozi, knj. VII*. Beograd: Srpska Akademija nauka i umetnosti, Odeljenje jezika i književnosti, Odbor za onomastiku. 1986 / Mitar Pešikan, *Old names from the Lower Drim Basin*. Belgrade 1986]
- Radovanović 2004 → Милован Радовановић, *Етнички и демографски процеси на Косову и Меџохији*. Београд: Liber λ press, 2004. [Milovan Radovanović, Etnički i demografski procesi na Kosovu i Metohiji, Beograd: Liber λ press, 2004 / Milovan Radovanović, *Ethnic and Demographic processes in Kosovo and Metohija*, Belgrade 2004]
- Stojančević 1994 → Владимир Стојанчевић, *Косово и Меџохија у српско–арбанашким односима у XIX веку (1804–1878)*. Београд: Српска академија наука и уметности, Одељење историјских наука, Међуодељенски одбор за проучавање Косова и Метохије, 1994. [Vladimir Stojančević, *Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko-arbanaškim odnosima u XIX veku (1804–1878)*. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, Odeljenje istorijskih nauka, Međuodjeljski odbor za proučavanje Kosova i Metohije, 1994 / Vladimir Stojančević, *Kosovo and Metohija from the Perspective of Serbian–Albanian Relations in the 19th century (1804–1878)*. Belgrade 1994]
- Slukan- Altić 2006 → Mirela Slukan-Altić, *Povijesna geografija Kosova*, Zagreb: Golden marketing – Tehnička knjiga, 2006. [Mirela Slukan-Altić, *Historical Geography of Kosovo*, Zagreb 2006]
- Stojančević 1997 → Владимир Стојанчевић, Стара Србија, Даница, српски народни илустрирани календар за годину, Београд: „Осветљења“, Вукова Задужбина, 1997. [Vladimir Stojančević, Stara Srbija, Danica, srpski narodni ilustrovani kalendar za godinu, Beograd: „Osvetljenja“, Vukova Zadužbina, 1997 / Vladimir Stojančević, *Old Serbia*, Belgrade 1997]
- Urošević 1965 → Атанасије Урошевић, *Косово*. Београд: СЕЗб, књ. LXXVIII, Насеља и порекло становништва, 39, 1965. [Atanasije Urošević, *Kosovo*, Beograd: SEZb, knj. LXXVIII, Naselja i poreklo stanovništva, 39, 1965 / Atanasije Urošević, *Kosovo*, Belgrade 1965]
- Vemić 2005 → Мирчета Вемич, *Етничка карта дела старе Србије према путопису Милоша С. Милојевића (1871–1877)*. Београд: Географски институт „Јован Цвијић“ САНУ, Посебна издања, књ.61. 2005. [Mirčeta Vemić, *Etnička karta dela stare Srbije prema putopisu Miloša S. Milojevića (1871–1877)*. Beograd: Geografski institut „Jovan Cvijić“ SANU, Posebna izdanja, knj.61. 2005 / Mirčeta Vemić, *An ethnic map of a part of Old Serbia. Based on the travelogue of Miloš S. Milojević 1871–1877*. Belgrade 2005]
- Vemić 2011 → Mirčeta Vemić. Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija in the Second Half of the 19th Century According to an Ethnic Map of a Part of Old Serbia. *Forum geografic. Studii și cercetări de geografie și protecția mediului* 10 (2), 255–263, 2011

THE LAST TESTAMENTS

(Митра Рељић, *Српска гробља на Косову и Меџохији: унишћена сџоменичка и језичка дашћина*, Матица српска, Нови Сад 2020, 343 стр.

Mitra Reljić, *Serbian Cemeteries in Kosovo and Metohia: Destroyed Monumental and Linguistic Heritage*, Matica Srpska, Novi Sad 2019, 343 pages)

It is often the case – by far more so than not – that a project warranting the efforts of entire teams of experts along with full institutional support is undertaken by a single individual, one fueled solely by their own enthusiasm and awareness that should he or she shy away from this endeavor things are only bound worsen. This book and its author are prime examples of the above. *Serbian Cemeteries in Kosovo and Metohia: Destroyed Monumental and Linguistic Heritage* was preceded by *The Serbian Language in Today's Kosovo and Metohia: A Sociolinguistic and Linguocultural Perspective*. The latter was Professor Reljić's scientific overview of the current, endangered status of both the Serbian language and its speakers in Kosovo and Metohia, which was issued by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, without any further support from this institution, a few years after its official 2013 publication date. The product of nearly two decades of research, *Serbian Cemeteries* is another scientific overview, this time of the razed Serbian graveyards in Kosovo and Metohia, which were the region's last testaments to the cultural and linguistic heritage of local Serbs. Following the war and NATO bombing of 1999, and the establishment of the international KFOR and UNMIK administration in Kosovo and Metohia, Albanian extremists began targeting not only living Serbs but Serbian cultural and religious heritage as well – the goal being to permanently erase every trace of Serbian life in the region. Lives were lost, as were monasteries and churches, cemeteries, and even orchards, wells, and livestock – anything that could evidence the centuries of Serbian presence and culture in Kosovo and Metohia. As the final testaments and memorials to past Serbs, graveyards were destroyed systematically: headstones were defaced and broken, the graves themselves plowed over, blown asunder and filled, and even the remains of the dead were scattered. As Reljić testifies on page 23:

The plowed-over cemetery in Rečani, the once-cemeteries now – sanitary landfills in Kojlovica and Matičane near Priština, along with cemetery in Đakovica that was the paved-over and flattened by tractors and other machinery, the razed cemetery in the village of Zlatare near Priština, the cemetery in Vučitrn's Velika Reka which was covered with sand – are but a few of the numerous Serbian graveyards that can no longer be found where only yesterday they stood.

The most common approaches to destroying these cemeteries were toppling and breaking the headstones, using explosives, and burning entire graveyard sites. In some places (such as the Metohia villages of Žakovo, Siga, Brestovik, Belo Polje, as well as in Vučitrn and the nearby village of Vrnica, among others) the remains of the deceased were dug up and strewn about.

The desolation wrought upon the “final resting places” of Kosovo and Metohia Serbs was a harrowing constant in Professor Reljić's research and field work. Given that all the mentioned locations, along with many others that the Reljić visited, lie inside an overtly hostile environment, she also rarely passed unseen or undisturbed. Footnotes 144 and 145 in *Serbian Cemeteries* expound on the dangers she faced, providing, of course, merely examples of the scare tactics, searches, verbal abuse as well as the physical assaults by Albanian children which Reljić routinely endured while in the field:

During this work, the author [Mitra Reljić] was subject to ID checks, the confiscation and inspections of her camera and an array of other high-tension situations created by KFOR patrols (such as panic radio calls to the command center requesting instructions on how to deal with the “suspicious” person found at the cemetery). In addition to the fear of being taken who knows where, there was the even greater apprehension that the author's large notebook filled with painstakingly gathered data would be seized. Hence, following one such “scene”, I began going into the field each time with a new notebook.

For example, while logging the destroyed tombstones at the old cemetery in downtown Istok (the list of which was published on November 6, 2006), my helpers – the now late poet Darinka Jevrić and Petar [Ulemek], the then hegumen of the monasteries Saint Cosmas and Damian and Tracts of St. George, who provided me with physical and moral support – and I were subject to physical attacks by Albanian children, so it is quite possible that, despite our best efforts, some of the toppled headstones (not counting those long buried deep in the earth) remained undetected in the tall, flattened grass and under bush. (68–69)

The author's methodology in both gathering and classifying data clearly indicate a highly responsible and dedicated scientist. Despite the hardships she faced during data collection, as well as the psychological stress of dealing with dug-up graves, destroyed headstones and desecrated human remains – many of them belonging to children – that were often not only disinterred but also subsequently

crushed, shot and stabbed in the eyes, Reljić provides an objective and scientifically-based account of her findings and how this data was processed:

To interpret the inscriptions, it was often necessary to gather and piece together bits of crushed marble. In the transcriptions, any chipped or missing letters were replaced with a question mark or the assumed original placed in brackets. Inscriptions were recorded in the exact format found on the stones, i.e. with all orthographic and other errors, while the headstones themselves were also most often sketched or photographed. Surnames written vertically, either in the middle or on the side of family tombstones, were necessarily transcribed horizontally, before first names. (69) If the headstone contained an inscribed cross or five-point star, the author noted this as well and included this information in her book.

Serbian Cemeteries in Kosovo and Metohia: Destroyed Monumental and Linguistic Heritage comprises two parts. The first of these provides the author's introductory notes regarding the book's goals and methodology, and is composed of the following chapters: “The sacral, national and cultural significance of cemeteries, headstones and monumental inscriptions”, “Cemeteries, headstones and monumental inscriptions”, “Serbian cemeteries in an Albanian environment: an undesirable testimony to the area's identity”, “The age and symbolism of the destroyed monumental inscriptions”, “The content and form of monumental inscriptions”, “The anthroponomy of the broken and partial headstones: surnames, first names, hypocorisms and nicknames”, “The names of professions, titles and status symbols on the destroyed headstones”, “How the monumental inscriptions were collected, identified and recorded”. The second, larger portion of the book provides the data gathered from the destroyed Serbian graveyards in Kosovo and Metohia, along with short introductions on local history and destruction as well as the current situation on the ground. Part two comprises the following chapters: “Northern Kosovo: Kosovska Mitrovica, the Catholic segment of the Kosovska Mitrovica city cemetery, the old cemetery in the church yard of the St. Sava Church”, “Vučitrn and the surrounding area: Viljanice (Vilance), Vrnica, Vučitrn”, “Central Kosovo: Priština, the Priština city Orthodox Cemetery, the segment of the Priština city Orthodox Cemetery containing posthumously desecrated victims, the old cemetery by the Church of St. Nicholas”, “Kosovo-Pomoravlje: Gnjilane, Gornji Livoč, Žegra”, “South Metohia: Đakovica, Orahovica”, “Northern Metohia (the municipality of Istok): the old and new Istok cemetery, Ljubožda, Srbobran, Suvi Lukavac”, “Northern Metohia (the municipality of Peć): Belo Polje, Brestovik, Vragovac, Ljevoša, Siga”, “The monastic cemeteries in Zočište and Devič”. Completing the book are a Foreword, Conclusion, summaries in English, Russian and German, as well as an Index of Names and Index of Locations. The author emphasizes that the subject matter may be discussed in a variety of ways, yet that “the book's primary goals is to draw attention to the disappearance of monumental inscriptions

– particular and precious linguistic data which testifies not only to religion and customs, value judgments and moral principles, but also to social status and cultural habits, in short, to the mentality and identity of a people” (23). Of course, and regrettably so, not all of the destroyed graveyards in Kosovo and Metohia could be included in *Serbian Cemeteries*, yet those that were lend insight into what valuable linguistic, onomastic and other data one could expect to find on, for instance, headstones in Prizren.

Just as Gilgamesh of the ancient epic “carved on a stone all of his toils”¹⁵, so do headstones speak of the lives, deeds and suffering of the deceased; yet instead of ensuring these people’s lasting memory, the stones have become testaments to new anguish and new plights. To take away someone’s name, Reljić says, is to take away their biography, to erase any awareness of that person ever having lived. Hence, cemeteries provide an endless multitude of data crucial to onomastic – and specifically anthroponymic – research. Having analyzed her data and consulted *The Dictionary of Serbian Given Names* by Milica Grković (*Речник личних имена ког Срба*), Reljić concludes that there exist 45 Serbian first names (namely 24 male and 21 female) which have not been included in the *Dictionary*.

The inscriptions found in *Serbian Cemeteries* convey attitudes toward life, family, work. Below are some of the most poignant, printed to replicate their original (and transcribed) formats:

Dašić
Radovan Milena
1922 – 1977 1930 – 1970
shall remain with us forever
regardless of where we may be This stone was raised
may you rest in peace by [your] sons and daughters along with
dear parents our stepmother Ljubica
Your children

††
Slavomir – Slavko Cerović Miomir
Cerović 1961 – 1995
Aug. 11, 1966 – May 1, 1983 o my dear youth
this stone was raised you broke my wings so soon
by [your] father Golub mother Milena in my brother Slavko’s arms
and [paternal] uncle Tomo and I left [my] father mother
[their] families my brother and little sisters
to wash their faces in tears

This stone was raised by [your] father Golub mother
Milena brother Branko sisters
and [paternal] uncle Tomo and his family

[Here] Rests
Vučica of the Ćerkovići
This stone was raised by her brother-in-law’s wife Stanica
[in the] y[ear] 1930

Here lies
Dragomir
the only
son
of Ljubisav and
Vasilija
a 1st grade student
of elem[entary] school
born Feb. 30
1925 and
returned [to our Lord] 23
1931 leaving his father
and mother
to mourn

here li[es]
Lazar K. Stošić
killed in the mountain
herding sheep murdered by Mila(n)
P(a)vlović
on J. 7–11, 1923
i. oprostimu
urazvoj
duše
his] mother’s
onl
y son
[he] liv[ed] on[ly] 14 y[ears]

¹⁵ As translated to English by Maureen Gallery Kovacs (translator’s note).

Catholic cemeteries housing Roman Catholic Albanians have also frequently been destroyed alongside Serbian Orthodox graveyards. Hence, it is not uncommon for Albanians to leave messages in hope of deterring vandals. Reljić cites an example from Priština's Orthodox cemetery, where Catholic Albanians began burying their dead following the exile of Serbs from the city. On a headstone with the inscribed names of Ollga and Dhimitri Gjolek, both passed in 2005, the deceased's family left the following note: "Respected passers-by, these are Albanians from the south. Please do not deface!" The completely destroyed Catholic section of the Kosovska Mitrovica cemetery indicates the Islamist tendencies of the Kosovo Albanian separatists, who are clearly bothered not only by Serbs but also by their own Christian compatriots.

To read the inscriptions from the ruined headstones is a somewhat cathartic experience: it brings back to life all these people whose existence the headstones were supposed to "lastingly" commemorate. Instead, the lasting testament to their lives is *Serbian Cemeteries*. The Serbian verb 'to bury' – *sahraniti* – originally denoted 'to keep, to preserve'; and so does this book preserve the memory of all these misfortunate souls, gifting them and their descendants, and the Serbian people as a whole, lasting peace. *Serbian Cemeteries* represents an indelible memorial to all these individuals, historical fate, life marked by violence and suffering, and the humble, forgiving nature of the people of Kosovo and Metohia.



Žarko N. Milenković
 University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Philosophy,
 Department of Serbian Literature
 zarkomilenkovic@hotmail.rs

KOSOVO AND METOHIA : A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY КОСОВО И МЕТОХИЈА : КРАТКА БИБЛИОГРАФИЈА

- Albanian Genocide of the Serbs in the Twentieth Century: Documents of the Archives of the Diocese of Ras-Prizren and Kosovo-Metohija, Belgrade 2011.
- American Serbian Heritage Foundation. *Šta je ko rekao na Kosovu Polju. Stenografske beleške razgovora u noći između 24. i 25. IV 1987*, Los Angeles 1987.
- Andrejević Keleri, Nađa. *Otimanje Kosova*, Beograd 2012.
- Antonijević, Nenad. *Albanski zločini nad Srbima na Kosovu i Metohiji u Drugom svetskom ratu: Dokumenta*, Beograd 2009. (2. izm. izd.)
- Apel za zaštitu srpskog življa i njegovih svetinja na Kosovu, 1982.
- Apostolska nuncijatura u Beogradu. *Sveta stolica i kriza na Kosovu*, Beograd 2003 (original Vatican edition 2002)
- Arhiv Srbije. *Srpski manastiri i crkve na Kosovu i Metohiji: Umetnička fotografija*, Beograd 2013. (Katalog izložbe povodom Sretenja, fotograf Aleksandar Radoš)
- Babić, Goran M. *Zapisi sa Kosova i Metohije*, Priština–Leposavić, 2006.
- Bataković, Dušan. *Dečansko pitanje*, Beograd 1982. (2. izd. 2007)
- Bataković, Dušan. *Kosovo Chronicles*, Belgrade 1992.
- Bataković, Dušan. *Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko–arbanaškim odnosima*, Priština – Gornji Milanovac 1991. (2. dop. izd. 2006).
- Bataković, Dušan. *Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji*, Beograd 1989.
- Bataković, Dušan. *Kosovo i Metohija. Istorija i ideologija*, Beograd–Valjevo 1998. (2. dop. izd. 2007)
- Bataković, Dušan. *Kosovo: La spirale de la haine*, Lausanne 1993.
- Bataković, Dušan. *Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1850–1912*, Beograd 1989.
- Bataković, Dušan. *Serbia's Kosovo Drama. A Historical Perspective*, Belgrade 2012.
- Bjelić, Novak. *Kazivanja o Trepči 1303–2018*. Beograd 2019.
- Bogavac, Milovan J. i Dragoslav S. Četković. *Srbi na Kosovu i Metohiji u 19. i 20. veku*, Beograd 2018. [Biografski leksikon]
- Bojović, Boško. *Kosovo et les Balkans Occidentaux: questions de stabilité régionale et de sécurité européenne*, Beograd 2013.
- Bojović, Boško. *Kosovo i Zapadni Balkan: Pitanje regionalne stabilnosti i bezbednosti*, Beograd 2014.
- Bokan, Dragoslav. *Kosovo je srce Srbije: Mit, hronika, album*, Beograd 2008.
- Božović, Branislav i Milorad Vavić. *Surova vremena na Kosovu i Metohiji*, Beograd 1991.
- Božović, Grigorije. *Slike Kosova i Metohije*, Priština 1998.
- Božović, Ivan. *Specifičnosti procesa tranzicije u AP Kosovo i Metohija*, Beograd 2010.
- Bradić, Kosta; Slobodan Filimonović i Miodrag K. Skulić. *Loza Nemanjića: jubilarno izdanje povodom proslave 600 godina Kosovske bitke*, Beograd 1989.

- Brajić, Rade. *Kosovo i Metohija: Navikavanje na nezavisnost: Bombardovanje obmanama*, Beograd 2014.
- Bruđar, Mario. *Nada, obmana, slom: politički život Srba na Kosovu i Metohiji (1987–1999)*, Beograd 2003.
- Cani, Bahri i Cvijetin Milivojević. *Kosmet ili Kosova*, Beograd 1996.
- Cerović, Vuksan. *Kosovo: kontrarevolucija koja teče*, Beograd 1989.
- Crucifed Kosovo and Metohija: The Holy Serbian Land*, Belgrade 2007.
- Cultural Heritage of Kosovo and Metohija*, Belgrade 2002.
- Cvetanović, Vladimir. *Iz prošlosti Gnjilana: Prolegomena za kulturni istoriju Kosovskog Pomoravlja*, Gnjilane 1994.
- Cvetanović, Vladimir. *Zarija R. Popović*, Priština 2000.
- Čerškov, Emil. *Rimljani na Kosovu i Metohiji*, Beograd 1969.
- Čupić, Mirko. *Oteta zemlja: Kosovo i Metohija (zločini, progoni, otpori, ...)*, Beograd 2006.
- Četković, Dragoslav S. i Branko V. Inić. *Vek postojanja i razvoja Kombinata „Kosovo” u Obiliću*, Beograd 2015.
- Čosić, Dobrica. *Kosovo*, Beograd 2004.
- Dacić, Rade. *Pogled s Kosova (Vidovdan 1389)*, Beograd 1997.
- Darmanović, Mina i Sazan Kulaši. *Nakit i zlatovez Kosova i Metohije*, Priština 1998.
- Davidović, Sandra; Danilo Babić i Jelena Pejić. *Privatizacija društvenih preduzeća na Kosovu i Metohiji pod okriljem UNMIK administracije. Pregled. Ocene. Zaključci*, Beograd 2018. (2. izd.)
- Dejzing, Ger. *Religija i identitet na Kosovu*, Beograd 2005.
- Derens, Žan-Arno. *Kosovska zamka: Kosovo, godina nulta*, Beograd 2009.
- Drašković, Vuk. *Kosovo (Govori i intervjui)*, Beograd 2006.
- Duijzings, Ger. *Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo*, London 2000.
- Dvadesetdruga /22/ sednica CKSKJ. *Politička platforma za akciju Saveza Komunističke Jugoslavije u razvoju socijalističkog samoupravljanja, bratstva jedinstva i zajedništva na Kosovu*, Beograd 1981.
- Dželetović Ivanov, Pavle. *Balistički pokret 1939–1952: Masovnost, saradnja sa italijanskim i nemačkim okupatorima i zločini nad Srbima*, Beograd 2000.
- Dželetović Ivanov, Pavle. *Jevreji Kosova i Metohije*, 1998.
- Dželetović Ivanov, Pavle. *Kačaci Kosova i Metohije*, 1990.
- Dželetović Ivanov, Pavle. *Kosovski boj u slici i reči*, Požarevac 1989.
- Đaković, Spasoje. *Sukobi na Kosovu*, Beograd 1984 (2. izd. 1986)
- Đapović, Lasta. *Zakletva na tlu Jugoslavije*, Beograd 1977.
- Đoković, Milorad. *Kosmetički dosije (ispovesti i sudbine prognanih Kosovaca)*, Beograd 1990.
- Đorđević, Zoran. *Političko-prosvetna delatnost Srbije na Kosovu i Metohiji u XIX i početkom XX veka*, Prizren 1993.
- Đuričić, Milutin. *Običaji i verovanja Albanaca*, Beograd 1994.
- Đurić, S. Slađana. *Osveta i kazna: sociološko istraživanje krvne osvete na Kosovu i Metohiji*, Priština 1998.
- Ekonomija e Kosoves = Privreda Kosova*, Priština s. a.
- Ekonomska reforma i njen uticaj na privredu Kosova*, Brezovica 1990.
- Ekonomski institut Sarajevo. *Kompleksna analiza rezultata dosadašnjeg razvoja privredno nedovoljno razvijenih republika i SAP Kosova sa ocjenom mogućnosti njihovog daljeg razvoja*, Sarajevo 1995.

- Elzser, Jirgen. *Ratne laži od kosovskog sukoba do procesa Miloševiću*, Beograd 2004.
- Evangelista, Antonio. *Čele Kula: Kosovo 2000–2004*, Beograd 2011.
- Filić, Milorad Minja. *Izdavačka delatnost Srba na Kosovu i Metohiji 1539–1941 (Građa za bibliografiju i istoriju knjige)*, Priština 1996.
- Filić, Milorad Minja. *Srpska štampa na Kosovu i Metohiji 1871–1941*, Priština–Gnjilane 1995.
- Fond Slobodan Jovanović. *Nečasni muk Ustavnog suda povodom Kosova i Metohije*, Beograd 2013.
- Fond za humanitarno pravo. *Otmice i nestanci ne-Albanaca na Kosovu*, Beograd 2001.
- Gaćinović, Radoslav. *Otimanje Kosova i Metohije*, Beograd 2004. (2. izd. 2012)
- Galerija Vid – Beograd i Narodni muzej Kruševac. *Boj na Kosovu, šest vekova...*, Kruševac 1989. (slike inspirisane Kosovskim bojem).
- Gavrilović, Žarko. *Kosovski zavet srpskog naroda*, Beograd 1989.
- Glasnik Kosova i Metohije*, Manastir Gračanica 200, broj 18.
- Guskova, Jelena. *Kosovo i Metohija: Rat i uslovi mira*, Kosovska Mitrovica 2014.
- Hadri, Ali. *Narodnooslobodilački pokret na Kosovu 1941–1945*, Beograd 1973.
- Hadžibulić, Muris. *Ekonomski razvoj SAP Kosova (faktori, efekti i regionalna struktura)*, Priština 1983.
- Handke, Peter. *Kukavice od Velike Hoče / Die Kuckucke von Velika Hoča*, Kosovska Mitrovica 2011.
- Hasani, Sinan. *Kosovo: istine i zablude*, Zagreb 1986.
- Henri, Izolda. *Prikrivanje genocida na Kosovu: Zločin protiv Boga i čovečnosti*, Gračanica, Beograd 2007.
- Henry, Iseult. *Hiding Genocide in Kosovo: A Crime against God and Humanity*, Washington, D.C. 2007.
- Hofbauer, Hannes. *Eksperiment Kosovo: Povratak kolonijalizma*, Beograd 2009.
- Horvat, Branko. *Kosovsko pitanje*, Zagreb 1988.
- Hudelist, Darko. *Kosovo – bitka bez iluzija*, Zagreb 1988.
- Igić, Živorad. *Kosovo i Metohija (1981–1991)*, Priština 1992.
- Imami, Petrit. *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove I*, Beograd 2000.
- Imami, Petrit. *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove II*, Beograd 2016.
- Imami, Petrit. *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove III*, Beograd 2017.
- Janjić, Dušan. *Ogledi o Kosovu*, Beograd 2007.
- Jevrić, Milorad. *Srpsko Kosovo*, Priština 1993.
- Jevtić, Atanasije. *Od Kosova do Jadovna: Putni zapisi jeromonaha Atanasija Jevtića*, Beograd 1984.
- Jevtić, Đorđe. *Bitka za Kosovo šest vekova posle I*, Priština 1995.
- Joksimović, Vojin. *Kosovo Crisis: A study of Foreign Policy Mismanagement*, Los Angeles 1999.
- Josimović, Ivan. *Samo ime je ostalo (Apokrifni zapisi o kosovskom mitu)*, Beograd 2000.
- Jovanović, Gordana. *Kosovo i Metohija u svetlu etnologije: Prilog bibliografiji*, Beograd 2004.
- Jovanović, Petko i Golub Bojičić. *Kosovski ugljeni baseni*, Beograd 1968.
- Jovanović, Živadin. *1244: ključ mira u Evropi. Prilog pravu Srbije na Kosovu i Metohiju*, Beograd 2018.
- Kanon Leke Dukadžinija, Zagreb 1986.
- Kapusela, Andrea Lorenzo. *Izgradnja države na Kosovu: demokratija, korupcija i EU na Balkanu*, Beograd 2016.
- Karan, Milenko. *Isključivo lično: Kosovo posle svega*, Beograd 2001.
- Kešetović, Muhamed. *Nacija u socijalizmu*, Beograd 1978.
- Kešetović, Muhamed. *Kontrarevolucija na Kosovu*, Beograd 1984.

- Kešetović, Muhamed. *Drama na Kosovu*, Beograd 1988.
- Klub generala i admiralata Vojske Srbije. *Agresija NATO: Uzroci, karakter i posledice krize na Kosovu i Metohiji*, Beograd 2008.
- Knežević, Miloš. *Otmica Kosova*, Beograd 2006.
- Koljević, Bogdana. *Kosovo, Evropa, demokratija*, Beograd 2011.
- Kosovo, Priština 1986.
- Kosovo: turistički vodič*, Priština 1978.
- Kosovo: u usmenoj i srednjovekovnoj književnosti*, Kruševac 1989.
- Kosovo – Kosova: Confrontation or Coexistence*. Edited by Ger Duijzings (main editor), Dušan Janjić and Shkëlzen Maliqi. Nijmegen: Peace Research Center, University of Nijmegen, 1997.
- Kosovo danas*, Beograd 1984.
- Kosovo danas i sutra*, Split 1988.
- Kosovo Dossier*, Beograd 1996.
- Kosovo i Metohija: izazovi i odgovori*, Beograd 1997.
- Kosovo i Metohija*, Beograd 2003. sv. 3
- Kosovska bitka i posledice*, Beograd 1991.
- Kosovska bitka: mit, legenda i stvarnost*, Beograd 1988.
- Kosovska kriza: uzroci i putevi izlaska*, Priština 1989.
- Kosovska narodna čitanka 1989*, Dalmatinsko Kosovo 1989.
- Kosovski čvor: drešiti ili seći*, Beograd 1990.
- Kosovsko-metohijska obeležja: uspešni i poznati ijudi*, Beograd 2007. (3. izd.)
- Kosovsko-metohijska obeležja: uspešni i poznati ijudi*, Beograd–Priština 1997. (1. izd.)
- Kossmat, Franz. *Geologie der zentralen Balkanhalbinsel*, Berlin 1924.
- Kostić, Dragomir i Srđan Jablanović. *Savremeni pisci Kosova i Metohije*, Priština 1998.
- Kostić, Irena i Slobodan Vuksanović. *Pesma o Kosovu / The poem of Kosovo*, Beograd 1981. (antologija, savremena srpska poezija o Kosovu, dvojezično srpsko–engleski)
- Koštunica, Vojislav. *Odbrana Kosova*, Beograd 2009. (2. dop. izd.)
- Krestić, Vasilije i Đorđe Lekić (prir.). *Kosovo i Metohija: Tokom vekova zublja*, Priština 1995.
- Kriteriji i metode za utvrđivanje stupnja razvijenosti republika i autonomnih pokrajina i sistema podsticajnih mjera za ostvarivanje bržeg razvitka nedovoljno razvijenih republika i SAP Kosova u 1976–1980*, Zagreb 1975.
- Krstić, Branislav. *Amputirano Kosovo – Odbrana Miloševića koja traje*, Beograd 2007.
- Krstić, Branislav. *Kosovo između istorijskog i etničkog prava*, Beograd 1994.
- Krstić, Branislav. *Spomenička baština: Svjedočanstvo i budućnost prošlosti: Tematska enciklopedija*, Sarajevo, Zagreb, Beograd 1990 / 2010.
- Le projet regional de Kosovo-Metohija*, Paris 1968.
- Lestve: časopis za nacionalna, duhovna i kulturna pitanja*, Kosovska Mitrovica 2012, God I, br. 1.
- Ljepojević, Siniša. *Kosovo i Metohija: Realnost, ekonomija i zablude*, Beograd 2006.
- Malcolm, Noel. *Kosovo – A Short History*, London 2002.
- Malići, Škelzen. *Kosovo i raspad Jugoslavije*, Beograd 2014.
- Marendić, Božo i Zvonimir Baletić. *Razvojne mogućnosti SAP Kosova u razdoblju od 1976. do 1980: pogled po privrednim delatnostima*, Zagreb 1975.
- Margetić, Domagoj. 'Operacija Durrës': *Kosovo i novi balkanski poredak*, Beograd 2012.

- Marković, Marko S. *Na razvalinama Jutopije: Srbi od stvaranja Jugoslavije do Srebrenice i Kosova*, Čačak 2007.
- Matica srpska. *Kosovo i Metohija: Juče, danas, sutra*, Novi Sad 2018.
- Petrović, Aleksandar i Danko Kamčevski. *Kosovo na kraju istorije*, Novi Sad 2021.
- Memorandum o Kosovu i Metohiji* (Svetog arhijerijskog sabora Srpske pravoslavne Crkve), Beograd 2003.
- Memorandum on Kosovo and Metohija* (By the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church), Belgrade 2003.
- Mihajlović, Živorad Šilja. *Podzemni rat na Kosovu i Metohiji 1389–1989*, Beograd 1989.
- Mihajlović, Živorad Šilja. *Pokošene kosovske istine*, Beograd 1986.
- Mihaljčić, Rade. *Junaci kosovske legende*, Paraćin 1993.
- Mihaljčić, Rade. *The Battle of Kosovo*, Belgrade, 1989.
- Mijač, Božidar. *Kosovo kao crkveno-teološki problem*, s.l., s.a. (c.1990)
- Mikić, Đorđe. *Društvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba u XIX i početkom XX veka*, Beograd 1988.
- Ministarstvo kulture Republike Srbije, Muzej u Prištini. *Kosovo and Metohija: The March Pogrom: Martovski pogrom*, Belgrade/Beograd 2004.
- Mišović, Miloš. *Ko je tražio republiku: Kosovo 1945–1985*, Beograd 1987.
- Mitropolija crnogorsko-primorska. *Memorandum o Kosovu i Metohiji Svetog arhijerejskog sabora Srpske pravoslavne crkve*, Podgorica 2018.
- Narodna književnost Srba na Kosovu: Govorne narodne tvorevine*, Priština 1980.
- Narodna književnost Srba na Kosovu: Junačke pesme*, Priština 1980.
- Narodna književnost Srba na Kosovu: Lirske pesme 1*, Priština 1980.
- Narodna književnost Srba na Kosovu: Lirske pesme 2*, Priština 1980.
- Narodna književnost Srba na Kosovu: Narodne poslovice*, Priština 1980.
- Narodna književnost Srba na Kosovu: Narodne pripovetke 1*, Priština 1980.
- Narodna književnost Srba na Kosovu: Narodne pripovetke 2*, Priština 1980.
- Narodna književnost Srba na Kosovu: Narodne zagonetke*, Priština 1980.
- Narodna književnost Srba na Kosovu: O narodnoj književnosti Srba na Kosovu*, Priština 1980.
- Narodna književnost Srba na Kosovu: Pripovedna epika*, Priština 1980.
- NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia: Documentary Evidence 25. April – 10 June 1999 I*, Belgrade 1999.
- NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia: Documentary Evidence 25. April – 10 June 1999 II*, Belgrade 1999.
- NATO rat i sukob na Kosovu*, Beograd 1999.
- NATO zločini u Jugoslaviji: dokumenta i dokazi 25. april – 10. jun 1999. I*, Beograd 1999.
- NATO zločini u Jugoslaviji: dokumenta i dokazi 25. april – 10. jun 1999. II*, Beograd 1999.
- Novaković, Stojan. *Priča o boju kosovskom*, Beograd 1989.
- Nušić, Branislav Đ. *Kosovo: opis zemlje i naroda*, Beograd 1986 (1903).
- Obradović, Milovan. *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija na Kosovu (1918–1941)*, Priština 1981.
- Očić, Časlav. *Efektivi redistribucije saveznih budžetskih i vanbudžetskih predstava na privredu Kosova*, Beograd 1989.
- Očić, Časlav. *Ekonomika regionalnog razvoja Jugoslavije*, Beograd 1998.
- Očić, Časlav. *Integrisanost privrede Kosova u jugoslovensku privredu*, Beograd 1989.
- Očić, Časlav. *Kosovo i Metohija: etnodemografske promene od kraja Drugog svetskog rata do 1991. godine*, Beograd 2006. (separat)

- Očić, Časlav. *Nacionalna ravnopravnost i regionalni razvoj*, Beograd 1986.
- Očić, Časlav. *Organizaciona struktura kosovske privrede*, Beograd 1989.
- Očić, Časlav. *Ostvareni rezultati i mogućnosti privredne saradnje Beograda i Kosova*, Beograd 1986.
- Očić, Časlav. *Privredni razvoj Kosova – rezime i istraživanja*, Beograd 1990.
- Očić, Časlav. *Utvrđivanje strukturnih izmena privrede SAP Kosovo: Položaj privrede Kosova i stepen njene integrisanosti u jugoslovensku i svetsku privredu*, Beograd 1989.
- Očić, Časlav. *Propast modela „pozitivne diskriminacije“*. Privredni razvoj Kosova i Metohije posle 2 svetskog rata, Beograd 2007. (separat)
- Očić, Časlav. *Regionomska istraživanja*, Beograd 2004.
- Očić, Časlav. *Upporedna analiza strukturnih promena u privredi Kosova, Srbije i Jugoslavije: identifikovanje specifičnosti proizvodne i radne strukture Kosova*, Beograd 1989.
- Očić, Časlav. *Utvrđivanje sličnosti i razlika u razvijenosti jugoslovenskih republika i pokrajina pomoću klaster analize*, Skoplje 1980. (separat)
- Očić, Časlav. *Utvrđivanje strukturnih izmena prevrede SAP Kosovo: Upporedna analiza strukturnih promena u privredi Kosova, Srbije i Jugoslavije i identifikovanje specifičnosti proizvodne i radne strukture Kosova*, Beograd 1989.
- Očić, Časlav. *Uvod u regionomiku*, Beograd 2003.
- Očić, Časlav; Milica Bisić i Rajko Bukvić. *Utvrđivanje strukturnih izmena prevrede SAP Kosovo – svodna studija*, Beograd 1989.
- Očić, Časlav; Milica Bisić. *Kosovo u planovima društveno ekonomskog razvoja Jugoslavije*, Beograd 1989.
- Očić, Đorđe. *I Srbi su Crnogorci (Kosovo i srpsko pitanje)*, Beograd 1989.
- Orlović, Dragan. *Kosovski epitaf*, Beograd 1989.
- Orovac, Tomo P. *Arbanaško pitanje i srpsko pravo*, Beograd 1913.
- Ostvarivanje politike bržeg razvoja privredno nedovoljno razvijenih republika i SAP Kosovo u periodu od 1971. do 1975. godine s osvrtom na regionalni razvoj*, Beograd 1980.
- Ostvarivanje politike bržeg razvoja privredno nedovoljno razvijenih republika i SAP Kosovo u politike najbržeg razvoja pokrajine Kosovo u periodu od 1976. do 1979. godine, sa prikazom privrednih kretanja u 1980. godini*, Beograd 1980.
- Otač Tadej i dr. *Kosovo će opet biti srpsko: Duhovna i narodna proročanstva*, Beograd 2013.
- Pavlović, Blagoje. *Albanizacija Kosova i Metohije*, Beograd 1996.
- Pavlović, Trifun. *Kosovo u srpskim imenima*, Priština 2001.
- Pean, Pjer. *Kosovo: „Pravedni“ rat za stvaranje mafijaške države*, Beograd 2013.
- Pejčić, Jovan. *Milan Rakić na Kosovu: Zavet – pesma – čin*, Beograd. 2006.
- Pejčić, Jovan. *Zavet i čin: Milan Rakić na Kosovu 1905–1912*, Beograd 2013.
- Pejin, Jovan. *Obnavljanje ideje 'krvavog' sultana Abdula Hamida II I NATO–EU agresija na Srbiju / Restoration of the Idea of 'bloody' Sultan Abdul Hamid II and NATO–EU Aggression on Serbia*, Kosovska Mitrovica 2010.
- Pejin, Jovan. *The Extermination of the Serbs in Metohia, 1941–1944*, Beograd 2006. (separat)
- Pejin, Jovan. *Zatiranje Srba u Kosovu i Metohiji 1941–1944*, Istok 2004.
- Pelević, Borislav. *Kroz istoriju Kosova i Metohije od VI do XXI veka*, Beograd 2005.
- Perić, Raša. *Izgon Srbalja: Kosovo u pesništvu dvadesetog veka*, Novi Sad 1990.
- Pesmazoglu, Stefanos. *Kosovo: Dvostruka hibris: Nadzor i kazna*, Beograd 2006.

- Pešić, Jovica. *Kosovo, Srbi i novi svetski poredak: Odgovor Srbina, arhitekta, nastanjenog u Finskoj, srbofobskom javnom glasilu Helsingin Sanomat*, Beograd 1998.
- Podrimja, Fellanza. *Die Beziehungen zwischen Kosovo und Serbien: Eine Analyse am Beispiel des Normalisierungsabkommens*, Hamburg 2015.
- Pokrajinski zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture. *Starine Kosova, knjiga IV–V*, Priština 1964.
- Pokrajinski zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture. *Starine Kosova, knjiga VI–VII*, Priština 1973.
- Pokrajinski zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture. *Starine Kosova, knjiga IX*, Priština 1990.
- Pokret za Kosovo i Metohiju u Srbiji. *Sabor Kosmet u Srbiji*, Beograd 2013.
- Popović, Janićije. *Manastir Gračanica na Kosovu*, Gračanica 2011.
- Popović, Janićije. *Za čast Srbije: Plamen, Kumanovo, Kosovo u ropstvu pod Bugarima*, Gračanica 2009.
- Popović, Janićije. *Život Srba na Kosovu i Metohiji 1812–1912*, Gračanica 2007.
- Popović, Nenad. *Otvoreno o ekonomiji Kosova i Metohije*, Beograd 2008.
- Popović, R. Zarija. *Pred Kosovom: beleška iz doba 1874–1878. godine*, Gornji Milanovac 1991.
- Popović, Radmila; Zlatimir Marković, Verica Kitić i Pavle Dželetović Ivanov. *Stradanja Srba na Kosovu, Malom Kosovu i Siriničkoj župi 1941–1944. godine*, Beograd 1999.
- Pravni život, *Šest vekova Kosovske bitke*, Priština 1995.
- Privreda Kosova*, Priština s. a.
- Proroković, Dušan, ed., *Kosovo: Sui generis or Precedent in International Relations*, Belgrade 2018.
- Radovanović, Milovan. *Kosovo i Metohija u Republici Srbiji i Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji*, Valjevo 1993.
- Radovanović, Milovan. *Etnički i demografski procesi na Kosovu i Metohiji*, Beograd 2004.
- Radovanović, Milovan. *Kosovo i Metohija u Republici Srbiji i na Zapadnom Balkanu*, Beograd 2005.
- Radovanović, Milovan. *Kosovo i Metohija: Antropogeografske, istorijskogeografske, demografske i geopolitičke osnove*, Beograd 2006.
- Radovanović, Milovan, prir. *O Kosovu: Gradovi, naselja i drugi antropogeografski spisi*, Priština–Beograd 2009.
- Rajović, Radošin. *Autonomija Kosova: istorijsko pravna studija*, Beograd 1985.
- Ratković, Borislav. *Oslobođenje Kosova i Metohije 1912*, Beograd 1997.
- Regional Project of Kosovo–Metohija*, Paris 1968.
- Rezultati ankete o potrebama sela Srbije i kosovsko-metohijske oblasti u industrijskim proizvodima*, Beograd 1946.
- Ristić, Dušan. *Kosovo između dva kongresa*, Beograd 1978.
- Roth, Hugo. *Kosovski iskoni / Kosovo Origins*, Beograd 1996.
- SANU. Bogdanović, Dimitrije. *Knjiga o Kosovu*, Beograd 1986.
- SANU. *Zbornik okruglog stola o naučnom istraživanju Kosova*, Beograd 1988.
- SANU. Petrović, Ruža i Marina Blagojević. *Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca sa Kosova i Metohije (rezultati ankete sprovedene 1985–1996 god.)*, Beograd 1989.
- SANU. Nikić, Ljubomir. *Kosovo 1389–1989*. (izbor iz fondova Biblioteke Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti), Beograd 1990.
- SANU. Petrović, Ruža and Marina Blagojević. *The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo i Metohija : Results of the survey conducted in 1985–1986*, Belgrade 1992.
- SASA. Terzić, Slavenko, ed. *Response to Noel Malcolm's Book Kosovo: A Short History*, Belgrade 2000. (Milorad Ekmečić, Đorđe Janković, Mile Bjelajac, Ema Miljković-Bojanić, Đorđe Borozan, Ljubodrag Dimić).

- SANU. *Srbi na Kosovu i u Metohiji*, Beograd 2004. (ur. Stevan Karamata i Časlav Očić)
- SANU / SASA. *Kosovo and Metohija. Past – Present – Future*, Belgrade 2006. (Kosta Mihailović, ed.)
- SANU / SASA. Institute for Balkanology. *Kosovo and Metohija: Living in the Enclave*, Belgrade 2007. (Dušan Bataković, ed.)
- SANU. *Kosovo i Metohija*, Beograd 2007. (ur. Kosta Mihailović).
- SANU / SASA. *Serbian Artistic Heritage in Kosovo and Metohija: Identity, Significance, Vulnerability*, Belgrade 2017.
- SANU / SASA. *Umetničko nasleđe srpskog naroda na Kosovu i u Metohiji: istorija, identitet, ugroženost, zaštita*, Beograd 2017, (ur. Dragan Vojvodić i Miodrag Marković)
- SANU / SASA. Predsedništvo. *Učešće Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti u unutrašnjem dijalogu o Kosovu i Metohiji: Prilozi članova i odeljenja SANU*, Beograd 2018 (ur. Marko Anđelković)
- SANU. *Kosovsko metohijski zbornik 1*, Beograd 1990.
- SANU. *Kosovsko metohijski zbornik 2*, Beograd 1998.
- SANU. *Kosovsko metohijski zbornik 3*, Beograd 2005.
- SANU. *Kosovsko metohijski zbornik 4*, Beograd 2011.
- SANU. *Kosovsko metohijski zbornik 5*, Beograd 2013.
- SANU. *Kosovsko metohijski zbornik 6*, Beograd 2016.
- SANU. *Kosovsko metohijski zbornik 7*, Beograd 2017.
- SANU. *Kosovsko metohijski zbornik 8*, Beograd 2019.
- Savezni zavod za društveno planiranje. *Analiza funkcionisanja sistema podsticanje bržeg razvoja privredno nedovoljno razvijenih SR i SAP Kosovo i sva druga prelivanja koja se vrše putem instrumenata ekonomske politike*, Beograd 1987.
- Simić, Pero. *Raspeto Kosovo: Dokumenti o Kosovu i Metohiji*, Beograd 2006.
- Skupština AP Kosova i Metohije. *Kosovo i Metohija 1943–1963*, Priština 1963.
- Skupština Opštine Štrpce. *Prostorni plan opštine Štrpce: Analiza i ocena stanja*, Štrpce–Beograd 1991.
- Spisi o Kosovu XIII*, Beograd 1986.
- Spomenička baština Kosova i Metohije*, Beograd 1999.
- Srpsko Kosovo*: List za srpsku omladinu i narodno prosvetavanje, Kosovska Mitrovica, 1922, god I, br. 19 i 20.
- Srpsko Kosovo*: List za srpsku omladinu i narodno prosvetavanje, Kosovska Mitrovica, 1922, god. II, br. 23.
- Srpsko Kosovo*: List za srpsku omladinu i narodno prosvetavanje, Kosovska Mitrovica, 1922, god. III, br. 2 i 3.
- Srpsko Kosovo*: List za srpsku omladinu i narodno prosvetavanje, Skoplje, 1923, god. IV, br. 5.
- Srpsko Kosovo*: List za srpsku omladinu i narodno prosvetavanje, Skoplje, 1930, god. XI, br. 10–14.
- Stanojević, Saša. *Zbornik Radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Prištini: Bibliografija 1963–2013*, Kosovska Mitrovica 2014.
- Stanovništvo slovenskog porijekla u Albaniji*, Titograd 1991.
- Stanovništvo SR Jugoslavije na početku devedesetih sa posebnim osvrtom na Kosovo i Metohiju*
- Statistički godišnjak SAP Kosova 1977*, Priština 1977.
- Statistički godišnjak SAP Kosova 1988*, Priština 1988.

- Stepić, Milomir. *Kosovo i Metohija: političko-geografske i geopolitičke perspektive*, Beograd 1999.
- Stepić, Milomir. *Kosovo i Metohija: Postmoderni geopolitički eksperiment*, Beograd 2012.
- Stojanović, Radoslav. *Živeti s genocidom (hronika Kosovskog bečaća 1981–1989)*, Beograd 1990.
- Sveti knez Lazar i kosovski zavet*, Cetinje–Beograd 2007.
- Šebek, Lazar. *Srbija posle Kosova*, Srpske sveske, Beograd s.a.
- Šeststo (600) godina Kosovske bitke*, album 9 razglednica, s. l., s. a.
- Šiptarski genocid nad Srbima u 20. veku: Dokumenta Arhive Eparhije raško-prizrenske i kosovsko-metohijske*, Beograd 2011.
- Šta i kako dalje na Kosovu*, Beograd 1985.
- Šta se događalo na Kosovu*, Beograd 1981.
- Tautović, Radojica. *Tucović i Kosovo (Eseji i polemike)*, Beograd 1988.
- Teroristički akti albanskih terorističkih grupa na Kosovu i Metohiji: dokumenta i dokazi 1. januar 1998 – 10. jun 1999. III, prvi deo*, Beograd 2000.
- Teroristički akti albanskih terorističkih grupa na Kosovu i Metohiji: dokumenta i dokazi 1. januar 1998 – 10. jun 1999. III, drugi deo*, Beograd 2000.
- Terzić, Slavenko, ur. *Spomenica stogodišnjice oslobođenja Stare Srbije 1912–2012*, Beograd 2012.
- The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies. *The Kosovo Dossier*, London; Aiken, USA 1999, 2nd edition.
- Thörner, Klaus. *Der ganze Südosten ist unser Hinterland: Deutsche Südosteuropapläne von 1840 bis 1945*. Freiburg 2008.
- Tito na Kosovu*, Priština 1979.
- Tomac, Petar. *Kosovska bitka*, Beograd 1968.
- Tomić, Duško. *Kosovski Levijatan: NATO agresija i razaranje multietničkog društva*, Beograd 2000.
- Tomić, Jaša. *Rat na Kosovu i Staroj Srbiji 1912. godine*, Niš 1988 (Novi Sad 1913).
- Tomić, Jovan N. *O Arnautima u Staroj Srbiji i Sandžaku*, Beograd 1913 (2009).
- Trajković, Momčilo. *Kosovo: (Ne)moguća misija*, Beograd–Priština 2007.
- Trnavci, Halit. *Moja ispovest o Kosovu*, Beograd 1987.
- Urošević, Atanasije. *Kosovo*, Priština 1990.
- Urošević, Atanasije. *O Kosovu: Gradovi naselja i drugi antropogeografski spisi*, Priština 2009.
- US Department of Defense. *KFOR Handbook*, Washington 1999.
- Vasić, Nenad. *Geoekonomija Kosova: Quo vadis?*, Beograd 2001.
- Veka, Marija Lina. *Vučje srce / Maria Lina Veca. Cuore di lupo*, Beograd 2010.
- Vemić, Mirčeta and Mladen Strugar. *An Atlas of Old Serbia: European maps of Kosovo and Metohia*, Cetinje–Belgrade 2007.
- Vidović, Žarko. *Njogoš i kosovski zavjet u novom vijeku*, Beograd 1989.
- Vidović, Žarko. *Njogoš i kosovski zavjet*, Beograd 2013 (2. izd.)
- Vilotić, Miladin. *Ko je i zašto skrivao istinu o Kosovu i Metohiji*, Beograd 2009.
- Vilotić, Miladin. *Svedočanstvo o zbivanjima na Kosovu i Metohiji (razdoblje od 1959–1968. godine)*, Beograd 2003.
- Vlajki, Emil. *Kosovsko raspeće Srbije / Kosovo – Crucified Serbia*, Beograd / Belgrade 2007.
- Vujinović, Janko. *Kosovo je grdno sudilište*, Beograd 1989.
- Vukanović, Tatomir. *Srbi na Kosovu I*, Vranje 1986.
- Vukanović, Tatomir. *Srbi na Kosovu II*, Vranje 1986.
- Vukanović, Tatomir. *Srbi na Kosovu III*, Vranje 1986.

- Vuković, Ilija. *Autonomaštvo i separatizam na Kosovu*, Beograd 1985.
- Vuković, Ilija. *Stranputice Hajredina Hodže*, Beograd 1985.
- Vuletić, Vladimir; Jovan Ćirić i Uroš Šuvaković (prir.). *Globalizacija i desuverenizacija. Međunarodni tematski zbornik, Kosovska Mitrovica 2012.*
- Zadužbine Kosova*, Prizren–Beograd 1987.
- Zemon, Rubin. *Balkanski Egipćani: istina o Egipćanima sa Kosova i Metohije*, Beograd 2001.
- Zločini albanskih terorista na teritoriji AP Kosovo i Metohija od 10. juna 1999. godine: dokumenta i dokazi IV, prvi deo*, Beograd 2000.
- Zločini albanskih terorista na teritoriji AP Kosovo i Metohija od 10. juna 1999. godine: dokumenta i dokazi IV, drugi deo*, Beograd 2000.
- Živančević, Predrag. *Emigranti: naseljavanje Kosova i Metohije iz Albanije*, Beograd 1989.
- Živković, Nikola. *Kosovo: dnevnik 1999–2000*, Novi Sad 2000.
- Žižek, Slavoj and Agon Hamza. *From Myth to Symptom: the Case of Kosovo*, Prishtinë 2013.
- Žrtveno polje Kosovo (Poezija 1389–1989)*, Beograd 1989.